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‘These administrations face challenges and responsibilities that are unique among 
United Nations field operations. No other operations must set and enforce the law, 
establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal 
taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war 
damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run 
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these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human 
rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep.’  
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‘If the intervening international force is acting, even temporarily, as a government 
then it has to take on the full responsibilities of a government - from the rule of 
law, to the economy, to transport infrastructure, to the defence and intelligence 
services, to protecting human rights, to local government, to the customs and the 
police, to health and education, to the operation of the utilities and the setting up 
and managing of political and governmental institutions.’ 
Paddy Ashdown,  




‘The desire for European integration is one issue shared by all in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Europe must use this desire to shape a multi-ethnic, democratic 
country based on the rule of law’  
 Wolfgang Petritsch, 




‘Ultimately, Kosovo is, and will remain until resolved, a European problem’ 
International Crisis Group, 
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Note on the terminology 
 
In this study the term Bosnia refers to the country Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
three major peoples or ethnic communities living in Bosnia are referred to as 
Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks (in the literature also referred to as 
Bosnian Muslims, but ‘Bosniak’ is the self-chosen term used by this community). 
The adjectives Croat and Serb refer to the national or ethnic identity, while the 
terms Croatian and Serbian relate to Croatia and Serbia respectively. The term 
Bosnian is used when a reference is made to all inhabitants of Bosnia, including the 
smaller ethnic communities. The two political entities of Bosnia are referred to as 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (abbreviated as Federation) and the Serb 
Republic. Together these two entities form the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is referred to as the federal 
state, the central state or simply as the state. Its institutions are referred to as 
federal state institutions, central state institutions or state level institutions. The 
term Kosovo refers to the territory which used to be a province of Serbia, but 
whose official self-declared name since 17 February 2008 is Republic of Kosovo. 
The term Kosovo Albanian is used when referring to the Albanian community 
living in Kosovo. For the Serb community in Kosovo, the term Kosovo Serb is 
used. When referring to all communities living in Kosovo the term Kosovar is 
applied. Regarding the place-names in Kosovo both Albanian and Serbian forms 
are mentioned, unless both forms are similar (like in the case of Mitrovica). 
Because people outside Kosovo are still more familiar with the Serbian form, this 
one is mentioned first. An exception is made for Kosovo’s capital. I chose to use 
one term only, namely Pristina (instead of the Serbian Priština or Albanian 
Prishtina/Prishtinë), because this internationalized form is commonly used in 
English texts. The same goes for the term Kosovo. The Republic of Serbia is 
referred to as Serbia. Only in case of quotations a reference is made to the 
federation which Serbia formed with Montenegro, i.e. the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2003 and the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro from 
2003 to 2006. Finally, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is referred to as 













After the end of the Cold War the number of international interventions in 
countries that were torn apart by internal conflicts increased rapidly. This new 
interventionism, which was motivated by the United Nations’ (UN) desire to 
engage in so called ‘wider’ or ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping in the 1990’s, also 
gave impetus to the establishment of so called international administrations. During 
the 1990’s, several large and ambitious international administrations were 
established to administer territories that had been plagued by war and which were 
left without an effective government. This was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Bosnia), in Eastern Slavonia/Croatia, in East Timor and in Kosovo. Before the 
1990’s, even before the Second World War, international administrations have 
been established in places such as Danzig, Leticia, Libya, Congo and Cambodia.1 
In addition there are several cases in which international administrations failed to 
materialize, but were nonetheless considered (like in Liberia and the Middle East 
for example).2 
Despite its practical and empirical relevance, international administration 
has been until recently a neglected area of research and study.3 In the last few 
years, however, several studies have appeared which analyze international 
administrations from different perspectives.4 This study builds on that literature 
                                                 
1 See Chapter one for an historical overview of international administrations.  
2 When state collapse threatened Liberia in the summer of 2003, the option of an international 
administration was seriously considered by the UN: Tim Weiner, ‘An evolving idea for Liberia 
envisions U.N. Trusteeship’, The New York Times 17 August 2003. An international administration 
was also proposed to assist in finding a solution for the conflict in the Middle East: Martin Indyk, ‘A 
Trusteeship for Palestine?’ Foreign Affairs Mai/June: (2003) 51-66. 
3 Mats Berdal and Richard Caplan, ‘The Politics of International Administration’, Global 
Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations 10:1 (2004) 1-5, 2. Boyka 
Stefanova, ‘Regional Integration as a System of Conflict Resolution. The European Experience’, 
World Affairs 169:2 (2006) 81-93, 81. 
4 Examples of recent studies on international administration: Jarat Chopra, Peace-Maintenance: The 
evolution of international political authority (London/New York: Routledge, 1999). Richard Caplan, 
‘A New Trusteeship? The Administration of War-torn Territories’, International Institute of Strategic 
Studies Adelphi Paper 341 (2002); William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the 
Obligations of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Simon Chesterman, You, The People. 
The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories. Rule and 
Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Michaela Saluman, Democratic Governance 
in International Territorial Administration. Institutional Prerequisites for Democratic Governance in 
the Constitutional Documents of Territories Administered by International Organizations. (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2005). Daniel Sven Smyrek, Internationally Administered Territories - International 
Protectorates? An Analysis of Sovereignty over Internationally Administrated Territories with Special 
Reference to the Legal Status of Post-War Kosovo (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 2005). Dominik 
Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox. The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding (Oxford: 
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and offers a comparative analysis of the international administrations in Bosnia 
(1995 – 2008) and Kosovo (1999 – 2008). The primary objective is to understand 
how these international administrations have attempted to build sustainable 
political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although both international 
administrations can be considered successful in the sense that large scale violence 
has not re-occurred in Bosnia since 1995 and in Kosovo since 1999, the question 
remains whether they have achieved their objective of transforming the war-torn 
territories into two sustainable political entities.5 The main question guiding this 
research is whether the international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo have 
been successful in building political institutions. Institution-building is not only 
about establishing political institutions, but also about embedding the institutions in 
the domestic societies. In other words, have the political institutions matured from 
mere internationally created institutions to domestically embedded institutions? 
The international administration’s policy of creating and embedding institutions is 
referred to as ‘institution-building’, whereas the process of institutions being 
created and being embedded is referred to as ‘institutionalization’. Since the type 
of international administration in Bosnia differs from the one in Kosovo, the 
process of institutionalization might differ for both cases.  
The main difference between both international administrations was that 
the administration established in Bosnia was based on a peace agreement, whereas 
the one in Kosovo was merely based on a UN Security Council resolution. The 
international administration in Bosnia was founded after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (1995) had ended three years of civil war between the three major 
ethnic communities in Bosnia: the Bosniaks (often also referred to as Bosnian 
Muslims), the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.6 The Dayton Agreement 
established Bosnia as a federal state in which the three communities were 
organized in two autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Federation) and the Serb Republic. A group of about sixty states and international 
organizations formed the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in order to supervise 
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The international administration 
which actually carried out this task was the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR).  
In Kosovo, the international administration was led by the UN. The 
conflict in Kosovo was about the political status of the territory. As a province of 
                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press, 2007). Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration. How 
Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
5 The rather vague term ‘political entity’ is used instead of ‘state’, because in the case of Kosovo the 
status of the territory (an independent state, an autonomous region within Serbia, or another solution) 
had not been decided upon in 1999.  
6 The official name of the Dayton Peace Agreement is: ‘General Framework Agreement for Peace in 






the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Kosovo had enjoyed a large degree of autonomy 
within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) since 1974. In 
1989, amidst the rising ethnic nationalist tide in Yugoslavia, Serbia’s President 
Slobodan Miloševi moved to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy. Increasing tensions 
between the majority population of Kosovo Albanians and the government in 
Belgrade led to large scale violent conflict in 1998. After the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) intervened militarily (operation Allied Force) in the first half 
of 1999 forcing Miloševi to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, the UN established 
its United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In 
contrast with Bosnia, the presence of UNMIK was not based on a peace agreement 
which settled the political status of the territory. Instead, it was based on 
Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council which authorized an international 
administration to develop so called Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
and to support a process towards a political settlement. A decision on the final 
status of the territory was expected to be made by the UN Security Council. 
However, due to political differences between the permanent members of the 
Security Council, a decision could not ultimately be reached and eventually 
Kosovo declared independence unilaterally on 17 February 2008.  
 The presence of a peace agreement in Bosnia and the absence of one in 
Kosovo are characteristic of two different types of international administration. An 
international administration can be defined as a specific form of state-building in 
which an international authority temporarily assumes some or all powers of the 
state.7 First, as the definition indicates, international administrations are in most 
cases used for state-building purposes. Both the OHR and UNMIK were founded 
in order to establish a sustainable political entity. This is explicitly mentioned in 
documents that list the objectives of these international administrations. In the case 
of Bosnia, during the Peace Implementation Conference in London on 8 December 
1995 it was stressed that peace should result in ‘the creation of a climate of 
stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the achievement of a durable 
and lasting political settlement.’8 With the case of Kosovo, the international 
administration was requested to establish and oversee ‘the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.’9 This shows that in both 
cases the development of political institutions was regarded as essential for 
maintaining peace and security. It was generally accepted that the international 
administration over Bosnia and Kosovo would only be ended once - according to 
the judgment of the PIC or UN Security Council respectively - sustainable 
democratic political institutions would have been established. 
                                                 
7 Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 5.  
8 Peace Implementation Council, ‘Conclusions Of The Peace Implementation Conference Held At 
Lancaster House London’, (1995). 
9 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1244’, (New York: 1999). 
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Second, the definition also takes into account that the sovereign powers 
which are assumed by the international administration may differ from case to 
case. Although the OHR had legislative and executive powers, its mandate was 
formally limited due to the fact that the Dayton Agreement made Bosnia a state 
which enjoyed external sovereignty. Therefore the OHR is an international 
administration of the ‘control type’, in which an international administration acts 
throughout the domestic political structures and in which the country concerned 
does not enjoy full internal sovereignty. In contrast, the international administration 
in Kosovo took full control of the sovereign powers. Due to its lack of political 
status until 17 February 2008, Kosovo’s provisional political institutions were 
neither internally, nor externally sovereign. It was UNMIK which formed the 
legislative, executive and judicial authority. In this way, UNMIK represents with 
such powers an international administration of the ‘governorship type’ in which the 
international administration takes full responsibility for the functioning of the 
territory.10  
 The establishment of a PIC/OHR led international administration of the 
control type in Bosnia and a UN/UNMIK led governorship type of international 
administration in Kosovo was the result of international political negotiations. 
Starting with Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement was an internationally forced 
compromise, but ultimately the decision of conflicting parties’ to settle was a 
tactical decision.11 Tactical, because all three conflicting parties calculated that by 
the end of 1995 they would gain more by concluding a peace agreement (which 
they would not necessarily have to commit) than by continuing the war. Partly 
facilitated by NATO’s operation Deliberate Force (which consisted of air attacks 
against Bosnian Serb military targets), strategic developments on the ground made 
all parties ‘ripe’ for negotiations.12 Whereas thorny territorial issues had blocked 
peace negotiations for almost three years, these disputes were suddenly ‘settled’ by 
force. As a result, it became possible to establish a line of demarcation between a 
Bosnian Serb Republic and a Bosniak-Croat Federation.13 They could now also 
reach agreement on a (weak) federal government. The countries (France, Germany, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) which had established the 
Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia (Contact Group) and which had 
succeeded in launching peace negotiations, preferred the creation of a single 
                                                 
10 This classification is based on the work of Jarat Chopra and will be elaborated upon in Chapter two. 
See for Chopra’s classification: Chopra, Peace-Maintenance, 16. 
11 Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia. Implementing the Dayton 
Accords (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 26. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking 
Democracy after Dayton (London/Sterling: Pluto Press, 1999), 34. 
12 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention (Armonk/London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 311, 320 and 322. 





Bosnian state over the creation of separate ethnically defined states or the merger 
of parts of Bosnia with Serbia and Croatia.  
In the wake of the violent ethnic conflict, the Contact Group recognized 
that an international authority would be needed to ensure the implementation of the 
peace agreement. The implementation of the Dayton Agreement would be 
facilitated by establishing an international administration that would cooperate with 
Bosnia’s political institutions, but which would also have the final authority 
regarding the implementation of the peace agreement. Within the Contact Group 
there was little disagreement over the type of international administration proposed 
or with the political solution offered. All major powers supported the Dayton Peace 
Agreement with its provision that a control type of international administration 
would be established to supervise the implementation process.  
 In the case of Kosovo, international disagreement over the final status was 
widespread. NATO’s operation Allied Force in Kosovo had been conducted 
without explicit approval of the UN Security Council. In the Security Council, 
Russia tried to condemn NATO’s military operation by passing a Security Council 
resolution. Although Russia did not succeed (the resolution was only supported by 
two other (non-permanent) members of the Security Council), Moscow was not 
alone in its criticism. China was also strongly against this ‘humanitarian war over 
Kosovo.’14 Despite the lack of international consensus, several options were 
discussed concerning what would have to be done after Allied Force had ended. At 
first, an international administration was considered of the control type, the same 
model used in Bosnia. That model had actually already been adopted in the failed 
‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo’ (widely known as 
the Rambouillet Agreement after the French town where the peace negotiations had 
taken place). On 23 February 1999, the Rambouillet Agreement was accepted by 
the Kosovo Albanian delegation, but rejected by Miloševi. According to the 
agreement, Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia, but it would also be allowed to 
have a substantial amount of self-government. The text called for an assembly, a 
government and even a presidency for Kosovo. At the same time, the territorial 
integrity of Serbia would be respected. Given the presence of a sovereign 
government in Belgrade and self-governing institutions in Kosovo, the 
implementation of the peace agreement would be monitored by a joint 
implementation mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). The implementation mission would 
have tasks and authorities comparable to those of the OHR in Bosnia.15 Just like the 
OHR, it would be ‘the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the 
                                                 
14 Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo’, Survival 41:3 (1999) 102-123, 102. 
15 ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo’, (Rambouillet: 1999), Chapter 5, 
article II. 
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civilian aspects’ of the agreement and the parties would agree ‘to abide by his 
determinations as binding on all Parties and persons.’16  
An international administration of the control type as proposed by the 
Rambouillet Agreement was impossible to establish after Allied Force. NATO’s 
military intervention had come to an end with a peace plan that had been drafted by 
the group of eight leading industrial nations (G8) in May 1999 and accepted by 
Miloševi on 6 June. The plan called for an international administration of the 
governorship type. The international administration would have to ‘provide a 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.’17 It was unthinkable that 
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo could be restored as had been suggested in the 
Rambouillet Agreement given the atrocities that had been carried out during the 
war. Discussions within the UN Security Council showed an international 
consensus that in the case of Kosovo humanitarian norms should prevail over the 
norm of state sovereignty. Therefore, the UN Security Council decided to launch a 
UN mission that would (temporarily) act as the sovereign government in Kosovo. 
Belgrade protested, but within the Security Council Serbia was only supported by 
China. In spite of its objections, China did not make use of its veto power because 
of Serbia’s acceptance of the general principles of the peace plan and the 
acknowledgement that a joint adoption of a Security Council resolution would 
restore the body’s unity which had fallen apart during the NATO intervention. 
Moreover, China (and Russia for that matter) feared a NATO-led international 
administration in case Resolution 1244 would not be adopted. A UN-led 
international administration was considered to be the lesser evil. For these reasons, 
China abstained from voting so that Resolution 1244 could be adopted by 
consensus.18 Resolution 1244 established an international administration for 
Kosovo of the governorship type. UNMIK would prepare the territory for self-
government, without clarifying whether this would eventually be self-government 
as an independent state, or as an autonomous province within Serbia, or as any 
other self-governing political entity.  
As it is argued above, the absence of a peace agreement and the decision to 
establish international governorship makes the case of Kosovo different from 
Bosnia. Both cases are interesting to study by themselves, but the main reason 
Bosnia and Kosovo were selected for analysis were the differences in design of 
                                                 
16 Ibid., Chapter 5, article V. 
17 Philip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald, eds., The Kosovo Conflict. A Diplomatic History 
Through Documents, (Cambridge/Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 1079-1081. 
18 Lene Mosegaard, ‘The Kosovo Experiment: Peacebuilding through an international trusteeship’, 
Kosovo between War and Peace. Nationalism, peacebuilding and international trusteeship, Tonny 






their respective international administrations. Although the main objective of this 
study is to analyze whether the international administrations have succeeded in 
establishing sustainable political institutions in each particular territory, a 
comparative perspective might lead to some general insights about international 
administration and institutionalization. There have not been that many cases of 
international administration, so general insights extracted from the analysis of 
Bosnia and Kosovo are by definition a substantial contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge of this sort of political phenomenon.19 Another reason for choosing 
Bosnia and Kosovo was that, compared to other cases of international 
administration, Bosnia and Kosovo have become long-term projects. Both cases 
have been operational for years, which enables a historical analysis. The analysis 
begins in 1995 for Bosnia and in 1999 for Kosovo. It ends in autumn 2008 for both 
cases. By that time, the OHR had almost been phased out and the EU had become 
the principal conflict manager in Bosnia. In Kosovo, on 15 June 2008 the 
constitution of the self-declared state came into effect and replaced the 
Constitutional Framework which had been drafted by UNMIK in 2002. UNMIK 
had been scaled down significantly (but could not be closed down officially, 
because of the politically divided UN Security Council) and together with the 
newly created Office of the International Civilian Representative the EU had 
practically taken over the international administration from the UN.  
The question is whether international administrations were successful in 
creating sustainable political institutions by the time the EU took over. In this 
study, it is argued that a sustainable political institution is the outcome of a 
successful process of institutionalization during which an (internationally created) 
institution becomes embedded in domestic society. In the context of international 
administration one can speak of an embedded institution when it functions 
independently from the international administration (institutional autonomy), when 
it has congruent value systems (institutional congruency), and when it is supported 
by the domestic political elite and the population at large (institutional support).20 It 
will be argued that the processes of institutionalization in Bosnia and Kosovo were 
influenced by the way the conflicts in both territories were managed.  
The concepts of international administration, conflict management and 
institutionalization are explained in the second chapter of this study. It is shown 
that contemporary international administrations have had many predecessors, 
starting from 1920 onwards. Attention is also given to activities that are often 
associated with international administration, such as protectorates and military 
occupations. After presenting these two overviews, international administration is 
                                                 
19 See Chapter two for an overview of cases that could have been selected.  
20 These criteria of institutionalization are - with some modifications - based on the work of Richard 
Sisson. See Richard Sisson, ‘Comparative Legislative Institutionalization. A Theoretical Exploration.’ 
Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, Allan Kornberg, ed. (New York: David McKay, 1973) 17-
38. 
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conceptualized and defined. Next, the concept of conflict management is 
explained. Based on the work of Johan Galtung, it is argued that conflicts can be 
considered as resolved when the incompatibility of the conflict (that which the 
conflict is actually about; for example the political status of Kosovo) is solved and 
when the solution is supported by non-hostile attitudes and non-violent behavior of 
the conflicting parties. When that is not the case, the conflict is merely ‘managed.’ 
Finally, the concept of institutionalization is explained. The way the concept is 
used is based on the work of Richard Sisson, who studied the institutionalization of 
parliaments. It is argued that one can speak of sustainable political institutions 
when they are autonomous, have congruent value systems and are supported by the 
population. The chapter ends with an overview of the research design and 
methodology used in this study.  
Chapter three describes the background of the cases and presents a general 
overview of the international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Attention is 
given to the mandate and organization of the missions, the implementation 
strategies and the major international partners of the international administrations. 
Moreover, the basic political institutions of Bosnia and Kosovo are introduced. The 
analysis starts with the transitional executive institutions that were established in 
both cases right after the start of the international administration. Then the 
constitutional design of both territories and the political institutions are discussed. 
Special emphasis is given to the parliament, the government and the presidency, 
because these institutions were selected to help examine the process of 
institutionalization.  
 The following three chapters analyze the institutionalization process in 
detail. In Chapter four the question of whether the government, parliament and 
presidency in Bosnia and Kosovo have become autonomous is closely examined. 
The analysis starts with explaining the powers of the OHR and UNMIK. It shows 
that both international administrations are rather intrusive and that they exercise 
vast political power in Bosnia and Kosovo. The OHR’s and UNMIK’s decisions 
and regulations respectively show how deeply these international administrations 
are involved in daily politics. The chapter ends by evaluating the extent of the 
independence of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political institutions (from the 
international administration) and the capacity of their political institutions, since 
these two factors determine the degree of autonomy of the institutions. In Chapter 
five an assessment is made of the value systems of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political 
institutions and determines whether these are congruent or incongruent. It is 
explained that both international administrations have tried to establish a political 
culture which is based on citizenship rather than ethnicity. The extent in which the 
civic nationalist agenda of the international administration has replaced the ethnic 
nationalist agenda of Bosnian and Kosovar political actors, determines the degree 
of institutionalization in terms of institutional congruency. Chapter six addresses 





by the population. This is done by assessing the support for political institutions by 
the elites and among the majority of the population. The actual behavior of political 
elites and the satisfaction of the Bosnian and Kosovar population show to what 
extent the political institutions are supported.  
 Chapter seven elaborates on the attempts to close down both international 
administrations and on the increasing role of the EU. In Bosnia an attempt was 
made to end the international administration by facilitating the reform of the 
constitution which had been established in the Dayton Peace Agreement. After the 
Bosnians agreed on a new constitution, the OHR would then be closed down and 
the EU would guide Bosnia in the post-Dayton era towards EU-membership. In 
Kosovo, political negotiations on the final status took place in an attempt to end the 
international administration. After the final status would have been determined, 
UNMIK would leave and just like in Bosnia the EU would take over in order to 
guide Kosovo towards EU-membership (either as independent state or as part of 
Serbia). The process and outcome of the constitutional reform and the final status 
negotiations are indicative of the extent in which the international administrations 
have succeeded in establishing domestically embedded political institutions. If they 
were successful, the EU would be able to start an accession process similar to the 
processes which led to the EU-enlargements in 2004 and 2007. If not, then the EU 
would probably have to take over OHR’s and UNMIK’s international 
administration tasks. 
Finally, the last chapter contains a summary of the major findings of this 
study and provides a general answer to the question to what extent the international 
administrations have been successful in establishing sustainable (domestically 
embedded) political institutions. Some implications of these findings for 

















2 International Administration, Conflict Management and 
Institutionalization 
 
In this chapter, the three key concepts of this study, international administration, 
conflict management, and institutionalization are discussed and the research design 
is presented. In the first section of this chapter, the concept of international 
administration is introduced by presenting an overview of international 
administrations that have been established in the past. This overview is primarily, 
though not exclusively, based on the work of Ralph Wilde. Wilde argues that while 
international administration is not a permanent feature in international politics, it is 
an institution which has regularly been made use of since the end of World War I.1 
Since international administration is often associated with political concepts such 
as ‘protectorate’, ‘occupation’ and ‘trusteeship’, an overview of institutions which 
are analogous to and closely associated with international administration are 
discussed as well. After this overview is provided, the idea of international 
administration will be further conceptualized in the second section by looking into 
the purpose and authority of international administrations. Both elements are 
embedded in the definition used in this study and will be presented at the end of 
Section 2.2.  
The third section of this chapter elaborates on the notion of conflict 
management. Based on the work of Johan Galtung it is argued that conflict 
emerges from incompatibilities, hostile attitudes and violent behavior and that a 
conflict is resolved when all three ‘conflict atoms’ have been sufficiently 
addressed. Understanding when a conflict is resolved and when it is not is 
important for this study, since it will be argued that the establishment of 
international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo have led to the creation of 
weak political institutions and have failed to resolve the conflicts in both territories. 
While the international administrations have been successful in conflict 
management (in the sense that armed violence did not reoccur), they have not 
succeeded in resolving the conflict.  
The fourth section discusses the concept of institutionalization. 
Institutionalization is defined as the process through which an institution is created 
and becomes domestically embedded. This process of institutionalization can be 
studied by using Richard Sisson’s theory of institutionalization in a slightly 
adapted form.2 Following Sisson, the substance of a political institution is defined 
by its autonomy, culture and support. First, an institution is considered embedded 
                                                 
1 Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration. How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission 
Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 95. 
2 Richard Sisson, ‘Comparative Legislative Institutionalization. A Theoretical Exploration.’ 
Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, Allan Kornberg, ed. (New York: David McKay, 1973) 17-
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once it becomes autonomous; i.e. independent from the international administration 
and capable of carrying out its tasks. Second, institutionalization occurs when 
institutions become part of the prevailing political culture. Third, the extent to 
which the political institutions are supported by the population also determines 
whether they have become embedded or not.  
The chapter ends with a fifth section on the research design and 
methodology used in this study. It discusses two reasons why the comparative case 
study method is used for this research. First, since the primary objective of this 
research is to understand the process of institutionalization in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
case studies are a logical choice. Second, because the aim of this research is also to 
provide some general insights about international administration and 
institutionalization, a comparative perspective is necessary.  
 
2.1 Historical overview of international administrations  
 
2.1.1 A preliminary definition 
 
Before an overview of international administrations can be given, it is necessary to 
establish a preliminary definition of international administration. Since the 
overview is primarily based on the work of Wilde, his definition of international 
administration is used. The definition consists of the notions ‘administration’ and 
‘international.’ First, Wilde defines administration (he uses the term territorial 
administration) as: ‘a formally-constituted, locally-based management structure 
operating with respect to a particular territorial unit, whether a state, a sub-state 
unit or a non-state territorial entity.’3 Secondly, ‘international’ refers to actors (for 
example the UN or the League of Nations) whose spatial identity is international, 
and thus distinct from the local identity. This makes international administration a 
rather specific phenomenon, because normally (in a sovereign state) administration 
is conducted by actors who have the same spatial identity as those who they are 
administering, rather than by an international organization such as the UN.4 Using 
Wilde’s definition, several world wide cases of international administration can be 
identified since 1920.  
 
2.1.2 International administrations between 1920 and 1945 
 
After the end of the World War I, four international administrations were 
established. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the cities of Memel and 
Danzig were put under the authority of the Allied Powers, but without the task to 
organize a plebiscite and in that respect were different from the international 
                                                 
3 Wilde, International Territorial Administration, 21. 
4 Ibid., 37. 
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commissions which will be elaborated upon in Section 2.2. The status of Memel 
and Danzig was determined in a different way. Memel (currently 
Klaipeda/Lithuania) had been liberated from Germany by the Allied Powers in 
1919. Since Germany had renounced its sovereignty over the city in the Treaty of 
Versailles, it was held by a temporary condominium of Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Japan, with France delivering a High Commissioner and a military force of 200 
troops. Various proposals on the future status of Memel were made, but all were 
rejected by Lithuania because its port was their only entry to the Baltic Sea.5 In 
January 1923, Lithuania took the city by force, roused by the suspicion that France 
and Poland wanted Memel to become a ‘free city’ like Danzig (see below).6 In 
reaction to the events, the Conference of Ambassadors (the Paris based body 
consisting of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and representing the 
condominium) declared its willingness to transfer the sovereignty over Memel to 
Lithuania, ‘provided that the local German population was granted full cultural 
autonomy, that the Port of Memel was administered by an ‘International Harbor 
Board’, and that Poland was granted the right of free transit to and from the port.’7 
A commission of inquiry was appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, 
which studied draft proposals for solving the status issue from the Conference of 
Ambassadors and from Lithuania. On 8 May 1924, an agreement was reached 
which ensured Lithuanian sovereignty, but which also included provisions to 
protect the German community and to guarantee the access of Poland to the 
economically important harbor of the city. The Port of Memel was recognized as a 
harbor of international concern and its administration was entrusted to a Harbor 
Board.8 The League of Nations was entitled to appoint the chair of the Harbor 
Board and as such became involved in international administration.9  
The status of Danzig (currently Gdansk/Poland) was decided upon by the 
Allied Powers. Until the end of the World War I, Danzig had been a German city 
with a predominantly German population. After the war, Poland claimed the city, 
because Danzig was crucial to ensure its free and secure access to the sea. The 
Allied Powers decided that Polish access to the sea and the interests of the German 
community were ensured most effectively by declaring Danzig a Free City placed 
under the protection of the League of Nations. In the interim period between the 
German renunciation of sovereignty and the Free City’s creation in November 
                                                 
5 Simon Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-
Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23.  
6 David W. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation. A History and Forecast (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1966), 42. Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-
Building, 23. 
7 Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 23. 
8 Wainhouse, International Peace Observation, 40-42. 
9 Wilde, International Territorial Administration, 50. 
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1920, Danzig was put under the authority of the Allied Powers.10 They were 
represented by a British diplomat while British and French troops maintained law 
and order.11 This Allied administration ended in November 1920, after which the 
League of Nations became responsible for ensuring the city’s free status and 
settling possible disputes on the interpretation of their respective rights and duties 
between Danzig and Poland. The Free City lasted until September 1939 when it 
was occupied by Nazi Germany.12 
As mentioned above, the League of Nations exercised some administrative 
authority in the cities of Memel and Danzig. However, the first time that the 
League of Nations assumed complete and direct responsibility for the international 
administration of a territory was in the case of the Saar territory (situated between 
France and Germany).13 The Saar territory contained iron ore and coal. As part of 
the German reparation payments the Treaty of Versailles established that the 
coalmines would be transferred to French control. The inhabitants of the territory, 
however, were predominantly German and did not accept French administration. A 
solution was found in placing the territory temporarily under the responsibility of 
the League of Nations until a plebiscite would decide the fate of the territory.14 
Until the plebiscite was held in 1935, when the inhabitants decided in favor of 
Germany, the territory was administered by an international administrative 
commission which was obliged to report to the Council of the League of Nations 
four times a year. The tasks and the mandate of the commission were considerable. 
The commission had received the authority to appoint and dismiss domestic 
administrators, to provide certain public services, to establish administrative and 
representative organs, to maintain the rule of law and to levy taxes.15 The 
international administration was supported by a force of 3300 troops from Britain, 
Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands.16 
 The fourth and final case of international administration in the interbellum 
was Leticia; a disputed territory between Colombia and Peru. In September 1932 
Peru invaded Leticia; a territory that the country had ceded to Colombia in 1922 
(the treaty was ratified in 1928). After mediation by Brazil failed, the matter was 
referred to the Council of the League of Nations. According to international law, 
Peru was obliged to retreat and an agreement on the withdrawal of Peruvian forces 
was signed on 25 May 1933. A commission of the League of Nations was 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 115. 
11 Jarat Chopra, Peace-Maintenance: The evolution of international political authority (London/New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 40.  
12 Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 20 and 21. 
13 Chopra, Peace-Maintenance, 41. 
14 Wainhouse, International Peace Observation, 20. 
15 Ibid., 21. 
16 Chopra, Peace-Maintenance, 41. 
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established in order to administer Leticia on behalf of Colombia.17 The commission 
got a mandate for one year, and by the end of its term Peru and Colombia signed a 
border agreement (May 1934) and control over Leticia was transferred from the 
League of Nations to Colombia.18 
 
2.1.3 International administrations since 1945 
 
After World War II, most international administrations have been established by 
the UN. These administrations have been referred to as ‘trusteeship-type activities’, 
because they concern operations that were associated with the tasks of the UN 
Trusteeship Council (see Section 2.3), but were authorized by the UN General 
Assembly or the UN Security Council.19 The involvement of the UN Security 
Council particularly explains why these administrations are most often referred to 
as peacekeeping operations rather than international administrations.20 
Nevertheless, in all of the ten operations mentioned below (leaving out Kosovo) 
the UN has executed tasks that involved international administration.  
The first operation to be discussed is the case of Libya. Libya was under 
the international administration of the UN between 15 September 1948 and 24 
December 1951. Libya had been a colony of Italy since 1912. During World War 
II, French and British forces succeeded in taking control over the territory after 
which both countries established a military administration (occupation) in their 
respective spheres of influence.21 The 1947 Peace Treaty between Italy and the 
Allied Powers (the United States of America (USA), the Soviet Union (SU), the 
United Kingdom (UK) and France) included the provision that the ‘big four’ would 
decide on Libya’s future. However, with the unfolding Cold War, the allies were 
unable to reach agreement. As a result the case was passed to the UN General 
Assembly on 15 September 1948.22 Within the General Assembly several proposals 
for the future of the country were presented, ranging from making it a trusteeship 
to carving up the territory. In the end, UN General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV) 
decided that Libya: ‘(…) shall be constituted an independent and sovereign state.’23 
                                                 
17 Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 24 and 25.  
18 Wilde, International Territorial Administration, 129. 
19 A.J.R Groom, ‘The Trusteeship Council: a successful Demise’, The United Nations at the 
Millennium. The Principle Organs, A.J.R Groom and Paul Graham Taylor, eds. (London/New York: 
Continuum, 2001) 142-176, 164. 
20 See for example: United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of 
United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1996). 
21 The British took control over the regions Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and French forces occupied 
the Fezzan. Adrian Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations (New Haven/London: Yale 
University Press, 1970).  
22 Ibid., 34. 
23 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 289’, (New York: 1949). 
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In order to assist the Libyans in gaining their independence it was decided that the 
General Assembly would appoint a UN Commissioner. This post would be given 
to the Dutch diplomat Adrian Pelt, who was unanimously chosen on 8 November 
1949. Together with an International Council, consisting of several international 
and domestic representatives, Pelt assisted Libya in drafting a constitution and 
creating an independent government.24 In Resolution 289, the British and French 
administrations were summoned to take all necessary steps to prepare Libya for 
independence, which it gained on 24 December 1951.25  
 A second example of international administration is the Operation des 
Nations Unies en Congo (ONUC, 1960-1964). ONUC was the first peacekeeping 
operation which involved (de facto) some administrative responsibilities for the 
UN troops. The mission was aimed at saving a failing decolonization effort that 
had led to a separatist civil war.26 The original mandate consisted in the provision 
of military and technical support to the Congolese government, until it could 
maintain law and order by itself.27 The complicated situation led twice to a 
strengthening of the mandate, so that in the end ONUC had a peace enforcement 
mandate, rather than a peacekeeping mandate.28 That mandate did not include the 
explicit authority to execute administrative (executive) authority. However, since 
the Congolese government was not able to maintain law and order in its territory, 
in practice ONUC became the effective authority in many areas of the country. As 
a result, the troops protected lives and property, disarmed the combating factions, 
reorganized security forces and exercised extensive policing powers.29 Although 
the presence of ONUC had a stabilizing effect in the early weeks of the mission, it 
could not create the basis for a lasting peace.30 
The third example to be examined occurred at the same time as ONUC, 
when the UN established the United Nations Temporary Authority (UNTEA, 1962-
                                                 
24 The Council consisted of representatives from Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the UK and the USA 
as well as one representative from each of the three regions in Libya. Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 William J. Durch, ‘The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964’, The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping. Case studies and Comparative Analysis, William J. Durch, ed. (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993) 316-352, 316. 
27 Chesterman, The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 83. 
28 The initial mandate, established by UN Security Council Resolution 143 (14 July 1960) and 
confirmed in Resolutions 145 (22 July 1960) and 146 (9 August 1960), was expanded in Resolution 
161 (21 February 1961). Next to providing military and technical assistance to the Congolese 
government, ONUC was also allowed to take ‘all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of 
civil war.’ The use of violence was allowed if necessary. Resolution 169 (24 November 1961) 
strengthened the mandate for the third time by allowing ONUC to take ‘vigorous action, including the 
use of the requisite measure of force.’  
29 Chopra, Peace-Maintenance, 45. 
30 John Terrence O'Neill and Nicholas Rees, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2005), 71. 
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1963) in West New Guinea (currently the Indonesian province of Papua New 
Guinea or West Irian). Since 1848, New Guinea had been part of the Dutch 
colonial possessions in Indonesia. When Indonesia became formally independent in 
1949, the status of New Guinea was contested. Whereas Indonesia claimed New 
Guinea as an integral part of its territory, the Dutch argued that the Papuans formed 
a culturally and ethnically distinct people who had the right to self-determination.31 
This stand off between the Netherlands and its former colony resulted in a crisis in 
December of 1961 when Indonesian president Sukarno prepared for and threatened 
armed conflict.32 An agreement was negotiated under the supervision of the UN as 
the result of strong political pressure from the USA. The ‘Agreement between the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New 
Guinea (West Irian)’ was signed in New York on 15 August 1962 and provided for 
the transfer of the territory to Indonesia. A transitional regime of six months was 
accepted in the form of UNTEA. Under Article V of the Agreement, the Chief of 
Mission got: ‘full authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to 
administer the territory for the period of the UNTEA administration in accordance 
with the terms of the present Agreement.’33 These administrative powers were 
endorsed in UN General Assembly Resolution 1752, which authorized the 
Secretary General to ‘carry out the tasks entrusted to him in the Agreement.’34 The 
UNTEA mission lasted from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, when authority was 
transferred to Indonesia. The New York Agreement provided for a UN-supervised 
popular consultation in order to give the Papuans the freedom of choice in 
determining their future. The consultation in 1969 led to a vote in favor of 
remaining within Indonesia. According to most observers, this outcome was more 
the result of careful political orchestration by Indonesia rather than the genuine 
expression of the will of the people.35  
The fourth international administration after World War II was the United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG, 1989-1990). UNTAG was created 
in order to prepare West-South Africa (the current Namibia) for self-determination. 
South-West Africa had been a colony of Germany until 1915 when it was 
conquered by South Africa. After the end of World War I, the territory became a 
Class C Mandate under the supervision of the League of Nations (see Section 
2.1.4). The mandate was conferred on the UK on behalf of South Africa. After 
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World War II, South Africa refused to integrate the mandate of the territory into 
the UN Trusteeship System (see Section 2.1.4) and claimed South-West Africa as 
its own territory. The issue became important for the UN when large parts of 
Africa started to become independent. Another factor that contributed to its 
appearance on the international agenda was that South Africa extended its 
apartheid laws to the territory.36 Several actions were taken by the UN to end South 
Africa’s control; in 1966 the General Assembly revoked South Africa’s mandate to 
administer the territory and in 1971 the International Court of Justice ruled that the 
South African occupation was illegal.37 Preparations for an international operation 
which would prepare the territory for independence started in 1967 when the UN 
Council for Namibia was created. In January 1976, five Western nations (Canada, 
France, UK, USA and West-Germany) formed the a Contact Group. Half a year 
later it proposed a settlement which called for the creation of UNTAG.38 This was 
done by UN Security Council Resolution 435 which provided the mission with the 
mandate to prepare Namibia for independence by organizing free elections. South 
Africa’s refusal to accept UNTAG resulted in a delay of ten years, but a decade of 
negotiations finally resulted in the Namibia Accords on 22 December 1988.39 The 
Namibia Accords allowed for the implementation of Resolution 435 and the actual 
deployment of UNTAG. Based on Resolution 435 and some subsequent 
refinements in the shape of informal understandings and protocols, UNTAG was 
assigned three tasks: monitoring the elections, monitoring the police and 
supervising the cease-fire.40 Next to this explicit mandate, the added value of 
UNTAG consisted above all in forming a counterweight to South Africa’s presence 
and in ensuring a climate of security.41 Elections were actually organized in 
November 1989, after which the territory became independent. 
The mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO, since 1991) represents the fifth example of 
international administration even though it has never materialized. Western Sahara 
had been a colonial possession of Spain and after its withdrawal in 1975 both 
Morocco and Mauritania claimed the territory. The claim of both countries was 
opposed by the domestic population in general and in particular by the Frente 
Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) 
which started an insurgency. In 1979, Mauritania renounced its claim, but Morocco 
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consisted. In 1988, as a result of good offices provided by the UN and the 
Organization of African Unity, the Settlement Proposals were concluded. Based on 
these proposals a plan was created which consisted in holding a referendum in 
which the domestic population should decided whether to become independent or 
to integrate in Morocco. The UN would deploy a transitional authority in order to 
supervise the process.42 MINURSO was created by Security Council Resolution 
690 which made it solely and exclusively responsible for all matters relating to the 
referendum. MINURSO was allowed to promulgate and repeal laws, maintain law 
and order and assume the role of territorial authority.43 However, MINURSO never 
had the chance to implement its mandate, because of a genuine lack of will among 
the parties to support the agreement.44  
The sixth UN international administration was established with the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993). UNTAC 
was asked to create a neutral political environment and organize elections in a 
country that had been torn apart by war since 1975. The conflict in Cambodia was 
part of what has been called the ‘Third Indochina War’, involving the regimes of 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.45 Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge, 
after coming to power in Cambodia in 1975, terrorized the country until Vietnam 
intervened in 1978. The Vietnamese occupation force actively supported a 
Vietnam-friendly regime in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which 
changed its name to the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989. Yet Vietnamese 
intervention could not end the civil war. Regional powers condemned the 
intervention as a violation of international law and supported several resistance 
groups.46 Faced with a protracted military stalemate in Cambodia, a weakened 
political and diplomatic position and domestic economic problems, Vietnam 
withdrew its military forces in 1989.47 Attempts to start negotiations were made 
from 1987 onwards, but a breakthrough only occurred in September 1990, when 
the four major Cambodian parties to the conflict agreed to the establishment of a 
power sharing mechanism in the form of the Supreme National Council (SNC). 
The peace agreement was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991.48 An important part 
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of the agreement was the establishment of UNTAC. The mandate of the mission 
included a specific task of civil administration: ‘In accordance with Article 6 of the 
Agreement, all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of 
foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information will be 
placed under the direct control of UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to 
ensure strict neutrality.’49  
The seventh international administration to be mentioned is the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II, 1993-1995). UNOSOM II was 
established by the UN Security Council Resolution 814 and was authorized: ‘to 
assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a 
secure environment throughout Somalia.’50 UNOSOM’s mandate has been 
described as ‘a testing ground for new peacekeeping ideas.’51 Although the 
mandate did not include legislative authority, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General exercised de facto legislative authority by declaring that the 
former Somali Penal Code of 1962 would be the criminal law in force.52 Just like in 
the case of ONUC, the absence of an effective functioning domestic authority 
made UNOSOM the de facto authority of the territory. UNOSOM II was the first 
peacekeeping operation in which the use of force was not restricted to self-defense, 
but was expanded to include the use of force in pursuit of the mission objectives.53 
Part of the objective of maintaining a secure environment was the disarmament of 
Somali militias. Together with the institution building character of the mandate, the 
disarmament attempts led to violent confrontations with Somali factions which 
resulted in the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in March 1995.54 
The eighth international administration since World War II involved a city, 
like Memel and Danzig after World War I. Well before the OHR was established in 
Bosnia, Mostar had been put under international administration by the EU. Mostar 
had been the scene of fierce fighting between Bosniaks and (Bosnian) Croats after 
their alliance had broken down in 1993. As a result of the Washington Agreement, 
which renewed the alliance, the EU took over the administration of the city on 1 
August 1994. The German politician Hans Koschnik was appointed as the 
international administrator of the town. The administration was confronted with 
many difficulties; Koschnik survived several attacks on his life and he had to face 
intense opposition from hardline Bosnian Croat ethnic nationalists.55 The elections 
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for the city’s community council on 30 June 1996 led to the end of the EU 
administration, after which the OHR took over the responsibility of Mostar with a 
regional office. 
The ninth international administration, the United Nations Transitional 
Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES, 1996 – 1998), was created as a result of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. Eastern Slavonia is situated in the Danube region of 
Croatia. As a region with a Serb majority it seceded from Croatia when that 
country declared itself independent in 1991. Heavy fighting in the fall of 1991 
resulted in Serb control over the region which led to an exodus of Croatian 
inhabitants. In the summer of 1995, Croatian forces regained control over two other 
territories that had been occupied by the Serbs: the Krajina and Western Slavonia. 
Under pressure from the international community, the Croats renounced plans to 
proceed and re-conquer Eastern Slavonia. On 12 November 1995, Croatia and the 
Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (the Erdut Agreement). The 
Agreement contained a request for the Security Council to: ‘establish a transitional 
administration which shall govern the Region during the transitional period in the 
interest of all persons resident in or returning to the Region.’56 After the 
international administration ended in 1998, Eastern Slavonia was reintegrated into 
Croatia.  
Finally, the tenth international administration was the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999 – 2002). UNTAET was 
established on 22 October 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1272. It had 
been preceded by a multilateral intervention under the leadership of Australia and 
was endorsed by both the UN Security Council and the government of Indonesia. 
The intervention was the international response to the violence that emerged as a 
result of a referendum held on the question of whether East Timor should become 
independent or remain part of Indonesia. From 1515 to 1975, East Timor had been 
a Portuguese colony. Portuguese rule was only briefly interrupted by the Japanese 
occupation (1941 - 1945) during World War II. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East 
Timor after the sudden withdrawal of Portugal and the subsequent fighting among 
rival political factions. On 28 November 1975, one of the leading opposition 
parties to Portuguese rule, Freitilin assumed governance. On 30 August 1999 a 
referendum was organized in order to let the East Timorese choose between 
integrating into Indonesia as an autonomous region or becoming independent. The 
referendum was organized by the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET), which had started in June 1999. The participation rate was 98,6 
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percent of eligible voters and a majority 78,5 percent voted for independence.57 
After the international military intervention ended the violence, UNTAET was 
established. The mission ended on 20 May 2002 when sovereignty was returned to 
East Timor and when the country became independent.  
 In addition to these ten cases of international administration, several other 
more specific cases can be identified. First, the cases should be mentioned where 
an international administration is established through ‘international appointees.’ An 
international appointee is ‘an individual of foreign nationality who sits on a body 
concerned with some form of territorial administration and whose appointment in 
this regard involved an international actor such as an international organization or a 
member of an international court or tribunal.’58 International appointees were 
established in the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, 
Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. In Lebanon, for example, the tribunal concerning 
the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Harriri in 2004 consisted of 
Lebanese and foreign judges who were all appointed by the UN.59 Similarly, 
several foreign members were included in the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.60 Secondly, international administrations have been 
established in the form of internationally administrated refugee camps. A refugee 
camp can be considered an international administration when a state hands over the 
responsibility of running the camp to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
This has for example been the case with the Dadaab camps of Kenya.61 Also 
included in this category (although representing a less extensive form of 
international administration) is the UN Relief and Works Agency in Palestinian 
refugee camps.62 Finally, the distribution of humanitarian supplies sometimes 
involves international administration. This was for example the case with the UN 
Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program in Northern Iraq from 1996 to 2003.63 
  
2.1.4 Cases analogous to international administration 
 
There are different terms to describe territories which in some way or another are 
dependent on individual foreign states, groups of foreign states or on international 
organizations. The use of a particular term usually depends on the particular 
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constitutional relationship that exists between the territory and the foreign power.64 
In the section above international administration has been presented as one 
particular form of foreign dependence. This section contains an overview of 
operations which are analogous to international administration. Again, the 
overview of Wilde is used, who distinguishes five institutions analogous to 
international administration: protection, colonialism, representative bodies, the 
mandate system of the League of Nations and the trusteeship system of the UN, 
and occupation.65 In contrast to international administrations, the analogous 
institutions are constituted by ‘a state, a group of states, or a collectivity of state 
representatives’ rather than by an international organization.66  
Protection in the form of a protectorate is one of the oldest features of 
international relations.67 The idea of a protectorate can be summarized as: ‘The 
assumption by a comparatively powerful state of the duty of protecting a weaker 
state (...)’68 The notion has a long history and can even be traced back to antiquity 
in the form of the civitates foederatae: cities which did not belong to the Roman 
Empire, but were subordinate to Rome as far as their foreign relations were 
concerned. Also, in the Middle Ages several protectorate type of arrangements 
existed too; Andorra has been a protectorate of France and Spain since the 
thirteenth century.69 Finally, in the sixteenth century, protectorates were used by 
the French kings as an instrument of expansion. Cities like Cambrai, Verdun and 
Strassbourg first became protectorates before they were incorporated into the 
kingdom of France.70 The modern protectorate was born in the nineteenth century. 
These protectorates were established by a transaction (often a treaty) ‘between two 
or more subjects of international law, whereby the dependent entity surrendered to 
the protecting State or States at least the conduct of its foreign relations, and often 
responsibility for such relations together with various rights of internal 
intervention, without being annexed or formally incorporated into the territory of 
the latter.’71 In the nineteenth century protectorates were used by European states to 
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ensure access to foreign markets and to prevent territorial control by rival powers.72 
Protectorates provided control over territory with limited governance costs.  
James Crawford distinguishes three different types of protectorates: 
protected states, international protectorates and colonial protectorates. First, 
protected states are entities which still have substantial authority in their internal 
affairs, retain some control over foreign policy, and establish their relation to the 
protecting state on a treaty or another legal instrument. Protected states still have 
qualifications of statehood. Examples of protected states are Bhutan (with India as 
protector), San Marino (Italy) and Liechtenstein (Switzerland). Secondly, 
international protectorates are territories whose governments retain a separate 
international status, but lack some qualifications of statehood. Examples are 
Tunisia and Morocco (both under the protection of France). Some contemporary 
international administrations can also be understood as protectorates in the form of 
protected states. Wilde argues that international administration is an 
internationalized form of protection in the sense that ‘the actor in the ‘protector’ 
role is an international organization rather than a state.’ 73 As such, he contends 
than Kosovo could be described as a ‘protected state territory’ and Bosnia as a 
‘protected state.’ The term ‘protected state’ is more accurate than ‘international 
protectorate’ given the fact that both Bosnia and Kosovo had some qualifications of 
statehood (Kosovo as a territory being part of Serbia under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244).74 Finally, colonial protectorates are territories in which the 
protecting state exercises internal administration on the basis of the formal 
autonomy of the dependent entity. Many territories in Africa used to fall into this 
category, as well as Aden and the Solomon Islands (both protected by Britain).75 
This latter category, however, is challenged by several international lawyers on the 
grounds that the territories under protection often were considered to be part of the 
sovereign territory of the protecting states.76 The protecting states used the term 
‘protectorate’ merely to ‘avoid the responsibilities that would flow from the 
enjoyment of sovereignty.’ 77 As such, colonial protectorates would better qualify 
as colonies.  
Colonialism, the second institution analogous to international 
administration, refers to several different forms of foreign dominion, as it ranges 
from: ‘raising a claim over territory without introducing any substantive presence, 
to informal control exercised by corporate identities such as the East India 
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Companies, to direct administrative presence by European states exercised on top 
of local structures of governance, to more intrusive and extensive administrative 
conduct.’78 The most relevant form of colonialism in the context of historical 
predecessors of contemporary international administration is the form of 
colonialism that involves ‘some kind of direct administrative control exercised over 
the colonial territory by the imperial state.’79 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
this was especially the case in Africa.  
Next to protection and colonialism, so called ‘representative bodies’ can be 
regarded as conducting international administration-type activities. Representative 
bodies are ‘bodies made up of representatives of certain states, acting in a 
representative capacity (…).’80 According to Wilde, four categories of 
representative bodies can be identified. First, representative bodies have been 
established to exercise administrative tasks in disputed territories. Examples of 
representative bodies in this category are: Krakow which was administered by 
Austria, Russia and Prussia between 1815 and 1846; Shanghai that was 
administered by the international Shanghai Municipal Council under the control of 
the USA and Great Britain from 1854 to 1943; Tangier which was under the 
international administration of Great Britain, France, Spain between 1923 and 1957 
and from Italy since 1928; and Crete that was administered by a Commission of the 
Consuls existing of Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia from 1897 to 1909 
and Albania from 1913 to 1914.81 
For understanding this type of representative bodies, it is instructive to take 
a closer look at the case of Albania. Whereas Greece was the first European state to 
become independent from the Ottoman Empire, Albania was the last.82 Close to 
falling totally prey to Greece, Montenegro and Serbia during the First War of the 
Balkans (8 October 1912 – 18 May 1913) a special congress of Albanian leaders 
proclaimed independence on 28 November 1912. This proclamation was accepted 
by the Great Powers during the international peace conference which had been 
initiated in December 1912. Among the European powers, Austria and Italy had a 
strong interest in an independent Albania as a buffer zone between each other and 
between both countries and the new Slavic states.83 The Treaty of London in May 
1913 ended the First War of the Balkans and created an independent, but also a 
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chaotic Albania. Since there was no effective independent authority within the 
country, the major powers established an International Control Commission. The 
Commission (with one Albanian member) formed a constitution which established 
a neutral state with the German prince William of Wied as sovereign.84 Next to the 
Commission, an international police mission (carried out by the neutral Dutch) was 
established in order to maintain peace and security and help build an Albanian 
police force.85  
 The second category of representative bodies involves the various 
waterway commissions that were established in the 19th century. The commissions 
had been established in order to exercise joint administration over waterways that 
crossed the boundaries of different nations. Well known examples are the Central 
Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine (since 1815) and the International 
Danube Commission (since 1856).86  
The third category involved the international commissions that had been 
established by the Treaty of Versailles to organize plebiscites in certain 
territories.87 These commissions were organized in Upper Silesia, a contested 
territory between Germany and Poland, in Schleswig, a territory between Germany 
and Denmark, and in Allenstein and Marienweder, both situated between Germany 
and Poland. In Upper Silesia the plebiscite was organized on 20 March 1921. The 
plebiscite was decided in favor of Germany, but Poland refused to accept the 
outcome and created an irregular army that overran a large part of the territory. The 
international commission was paralyzed, because the British and Italians supported 
the Germans, whereas the French were on the side of Poland. The Allies handed the 
issue over to the Council of the League of Nations in order to settle the dispute. A 
plan for partition was worked out by the Japanese diplomat Kikijiro Ishii and was 
adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on 12 October 1921. Even though 
the Ishii plan was very unpopular in both Germany and Poland, it worked relatively 
well.88 Determining the new sovereign status of the other territories proved to be 
less difficult than it had been in the case of Upper Silesia. The territory of 
Schleswig was divided between Germany and Denmark after the plebiscite held in 
May 1920, and Allenstein and Marienweder went to Germany after the plebiscites 
held in July 1920.89  
Finally, representative bodies in the form of mixed commissions have been 
created. These commissions implemented particular policies in the territories under 
administration. An example is the Mixed Commission that was established in 
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Upper Silesia (1922 - 1937) after the Allied Commission in that territory had 
finished (see above).90 In 1922, the former conflicting parties Poland and Germany 
had signed a convention which was aimed at stimulating economic cooperation. In 
order to implement the convention, a Mixed Commission of two Polish members, 
two German members and a president from a neutral country (appointed by the 
Council of the League of Nations) was established. The League of Nations had the 
right to veto German or Polish laws if these concerned Upper Silesia. It also acted 
as a final arbiter in disputes concerning the convention.91 Another example of a 
mixed commission was the commission created in 1923 with the purpose ‘to 
‘supervise and facilitate’ the compulsory exchange of Turkish and Greek minority 
populations between Greece and Turkey.’92 
The fourth category of institutions analogous to international 
administration includes the mandate system of the League of Nations and the 
trusteeship system of the UN. After the end of World War I, the Allied Powers 
decided that the colonies of Germany and the territories belonging to the Ottoman 
Empire should be placed under the authority of the League of Nations. This 
authority was of an indirect nature, because the actual administration of the 
mandated territories became the responsibility of particular states. A direct 
consequence of this indirect rule of the League of Nations was that the mandatories 
could administer the territory as if it was a proper colony, because formal 
supervision by the League of Nations was limited to an annual report to the 
Permanent Mandates Commission.  
There were two important reasons for establishing the international 
mandate system. First, it was an instrument to prevent armed conflicts between the 
colonial powers. It was feared that if the German and Ottoman territories would be 
annexed by the victorious powers as the booty of war, the outbreak of violent 
conflict would only be a matter of time. Secondly, it was an attempt to protect the 
population of the mandated territories against colonial exploitation.93 Related to the 
second reason was the objective to develop the mandated territories and to prepare 
some of them for independence. Complete independence was only relevant for the 
Class A mandates. These were former Ottoman territories which according to the 
League of Nations had reached such a state of development that independence was 
a realistic option and could therefore provisionally be recognized. The 
administration was officially limited to administrative advice and assistance. 
Within this class, Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan became territories under British 
tutelage, and Syria and Lebanon got France as their mandatory. The prospect of 
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independence for territories belonging to the Class B mandates was much less 
likely. According to the League of Nations, the peoples inhabiting these territories 
were: ‘at such a state that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration 
of the territory.’94 Most German colonies in Africa, such as Togo and Ruanda-
Urundi were placed in this class. The last category, the Class C mandates, were 
regarded to be the least developed territories and were least likely to become 
independent. Therefore they had to be administered as an integral part of the 
mandatory’s territory. South-West Africa (administered by South Africa) and the 
South Pacific Islands (administered by Japan) are the two well known examples of 
Class C mandates. 
 The international mandate system was followed by the trusteeship system 
of the United Nations in 1945. Most mandated territories were turned into trust 
territories and the Mandate Commission was replaced by the Trusteeship Council.95 
An important difference with the international mandate system was that all trust 
territories were being prepared for self-government or independence.96 However, 
the effectiveness of the trusteeship system in promoting independence can be 
disputed, because trust territories did not receive their independence significantly 
earlier than other non-self-governing territories. Just as had been the case with the 
international mandates, individual states were responsible for the administration of 
the territory which meant that its administration was not very different from the 
administration of a proper colony.97 
 The administration and supervision of the trust territories was conducted 
on the basis of individual arrangements with the territories concerned. The 
categories which the UN used in order to define which territories could become 
trusts were: (1) those territories that had been mandates of the League of Nations; 
(2) those territories that had been detached from enemy states as a result of World 
War II; and (3) those territories that were voluntarily placed under the system by 
states responsible for their administration. The supervising UN-body was the 
Trusteeship Council, consisting of the member states administering the trust 
territories, the five permanent members of the Security Council and other members 
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of the UN elected by the General Assembly. The latter category was included in 
order to ensure that the total number of members was equally divided between 
those who administered the territories and those who did not.  
Compared to the international mandate system, the international 
supervision of the trusteeship system was much stronger and relatively more 
successful. However, it must be concluded that the trusteeship system ‘was also 
dominated by the imperial interests of the colonial power charged with 
governance.’98 The Trusteeship Council ceased operations as of 1 November 1994 
once the Pacific Island of Palau, the last remaining trust territory, had become 
independent on 1 October 1994. A month later the UN declared that: ‘The aims of 
the Trusteeship System have been fulfilled to such an extent that all Trust 
Territories have attained self-government or independence, either as separate States 
or by joining neighbouring independent countries.’99 
Finally, occupation can be considered as an activity closely associated with 
international administration. The end of World War II led to the creation of three 
Allied occupations in Germany (1945 – 1949), Austria (1945 – 1955) and Japan 
(1945 – 1952). The three territories were jointly administered by the military forces 
of the USA, the UK, France and the SU. More recently, the USA established the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after operation Iraqi Freedom had toppled 
the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Coalition Provisional Authority was a military 
occupation like those after World War II. The common objective of these 
occupations was to establish viable democratic regimes and many of the tasks were 
similar to the tasks carried out by contemporary international administrations. 
However, a crucial difference with international administration is that occupations 
are not authorized by and answerable to an international organization such as the 
League of Nations or the UN.100 Consequently, occupations are motivated by the 
particular national interests of the individual occupying states. National interest 
also plays a role in international administrations, but as Dominik Zaum argues, the 
dominance of these interests is mitigated because of the international character of 
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2.2 Conceptualizing international administration 
 
2.2.1 The purpose of international administrations 
 
The overview above has shown that international administrations and analogous 
institutions share a common characteristic in that they both involve territorial 
administration by a foreign actor. In this way, Wilde refers to both categories 
collectively as ‘foreign territorial administration.’ However, as pointed out above, 
the difference between international administration and the other foreign 
administrations is that the latter are state-conducted institutions rather than 
institutions conducted by international actors (international organizations and 
international appointees).102 For this reason, Wilde views international 
administration as a distinct activity from analogous institutions.  
Wilde also distinguishes international administration from state-building 
and peace operations (like peacekeeping or peacebuilding), because these labels 
risk ‘ignoring the complex nature of the projects under consideration and failing to 
appreciate the full potential of ITA [International Territorial Administration, NvW] 
based on recent and previous uses of the institution.’103 According to Wilde the 
range of tasks international administration can be used for is much broader than the 
terms state-building and peace operations suggest. Wilde categorizes the many 
tasks that international administration can carry out according to two broadly 
defined purposes.104 The first purpose of an international administration is to 
respond to a sovereignty problem. In that case the status of the territory in question 
is contested and an international administration is established in order to facilitate a 
solution to the problem. The case of Kosovo is mentioned as an example, because 
of its disputed political status. The second purpose for which international 
administration can be used is to respond to a governance problem. In that case the 
problem is not about who governs the territory, but about the quality of 
governance. The government is either incapable or unwilling to govern the territory 
well in the eyes of the international community. Bosnia with its legacy of ethnic 
nationalist politics (bad governance in the eyes of the international community) is 
mentioned as an example of international administration as a reaction to a 
governance problem; the international administration attempts to establish good 
governance by promoting ‘a multi-ethnic social and political culture.’105  
As a distinct activity, international administration is not synonymous with 
state-building, but even Wilde admits that – at least when addressing a governance 
problem – international administrations ‘perform what is usually called a “state-
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building” role.’106 State-building is an important purpose of international 
administration. That is not only illustrated by the actual cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, but also with the academic definitions and theoretical understandings of 
international administration. First, Richard Caplan regards international 
administration to be a peace-operation which is more comprehensive in scope and 
more political in character than other peace operations. Like Wilde he also 
distinguishes international administration from military occupation and state-
building.107 At the same time, Caplan acknowledges that international 
administration has much in common with complex peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and state-building and that ‘one must not be pedantic or dogmatic in drawing too 
sharp a distinction.’108 According to Caplan, the chief functions or purposes of an 
international administration can be divided in five categories: (1) establishment and 
maintenance of public order and internal security; (2) repatriation and reintegration 
of refugees and internally displaced persons; (3) performance of basic civil 
administrative functions; (4) development of local political institutions, including 
the holding of elections to these institutions, and the building of civil society; and 
(5) economic reconstruction and development.109 Especially the fourth category can 
be considered among state-building activities.  
Second, Simon Chesterman conceptualizes international administration 
(which he calls transitional administration) as a special form of state-building. He 
defines state-building as: ‘extended international involvement (primarily, though 
not exclusively, through the United Nations) that goes beyond traditional 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and is directed at constructing or 
reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with 
physical and economic security.’110 International administration, then, is a special 
type of state-building which is carried out by assuming ‘some or all of the powers 
of the state on a temporary basis.’111 Chesterman identifies five different types of 
international administration based on their purpose and trajectory.112 In some way 
or another, all five types are related to state-building, which makes Chesterman’s 
classification consistent with his definition of international administration as a 
special type of state-building. The first type of international administration is the 
one which is established in the context of a process of decolonization (UNTAG and 
UNTAET for example). The second type is international administration established 
with the purpose to facilitate the transfer of territory (UNTEA, MINURSO and 
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UNTAES). Thirdly, international administrations have been established in order to 
organize elections (UNTAC). Fourthly, international administrations can be 
established in order to implement a peace process (the OHR and UNMIK). The 
fifth and last type of international administration mentioned by Chesterman is the 
one established in the context of state failure (ONUC, UNOSOM II).  
Third and finally, Dominik Zaum defines international administration as: 
‘(…) international bodies exercising governmental functions over a territory, which 
are locally based, and most recent of which have been engaged in the establishment 
or reform of that territory’s political and social institutions.’113 Zaum considers 
international administration also to be a form of state-building. This is not only 
evidenced by his definition, but also by his description of the key objective of 
international administration as: ‘(…) the establishment of effective and legitimate 
control of the national political institutions, based on a specific model of 
organizing domestic society.’114  
Making a clear distinction between international administration on the one 
hand, and state-building or peace operations on the other hand, is necessary in 
order to avoid making the concept ‘empty.’115 In that respect, Wilde’s argument 
that international administration should be considered as a specific institution in 
international politics is compelling. For this study, international administration is 
considered a distinct activity in which an international authority (rather than a 
foreign authority) aims to solve sovereignty and/or governance problems through 
state-building. State-building is broadly defined as the construction or 
reconstruction of political, social and economic institutions.116  
 
2.2.2 The authority of international administrations 
 
Section 2.2.1 briefly mentions that international actors are responsible for 
conducting international administrations. These international actors have extensive 
powers at their disposal. Therefore, next to the purpose of international 
administration, the authority of these actors is also a defining characteristic of 
international administrations. Caplan points out that by administrating Eastern 
Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, the international authority in question 
has assumed ‘responsibility to a degree unprecedented in recent history.’117 Caplan 
has made a distinction between a rather limited scope of international authority and 
a more substantial scope of authority. He positions international administration on 
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a continuum with two extremes. One extreme is international administration with 
relatively little authority in the form of international supervision, while the other is 
a type of administration in which the international authority is extensive and 
engages in direct governance of the territory.118 A more detailed continuum has 
been presented by Jarat Chopra and Michael Doyle. Chopra distinguishes four 
types of international administration, ranging from little authority to more political 
authority. The first type is assistance, where the international authority acts as an 
independent advisor. The second type, partnership, refers to a situation in which 
the international authority serves as a partner of the domestic authority. The third 
type is control; a situation in which the international authority acts throughout the 
domestic authority structures. The last type is governorship, in which the 
international authority takes full responsibility for the functioning of the 
territory.119 Michael Doyle also distinguishes four types of international 
administration (which he calls ‘ad hoc semi sovereign mechanisms’). His scale of 
international transitional political authority ranges from monitoring, administrative 
authority and executive authority to full sovereign rule (or ‘supervisory authority’ 
as he calls it).120 Arguably, the three classifications are more or less overlapping as 
is shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: A classification of international administration based on the level of  
authority 
Richard Caplan Jarat Chopra Michael Doyle 
Supervision Assistance Monitoring 
- Partnership Administrative Authority  
- Control Executive Authority 
Direct Governance Governorship Sovereign Rule 
 
On one side of the spectrum, the supervision of Caplan could be regarded to be the 
same as the assistance of Chopra and the monitoring of Doyle. An example of an 
international administration of the supervision, assistance, or monitoring type is 
UNTAC. On the other side of the spectrum, Caplan’s direct governance is similar 
to Chopra’s governorship and Doyle’s sovereign rule. All three are based on the 
notion of total international political authority over the administered territory. 
Examples of the direct governance, governorship, or sovereign rule type of 
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international administrations are UNTAES, UNMIK and UNTAET. In all three 
cases the international administration functioned as the sovereign power. The 
international administration of Bosnia should be considered as a control (Chopra) 
or executive authority (Doyle) type of international administration. The difference 
between governorship and control is that in the former case the external state 
sovereignty is exercised by the international administration, while in the latter case 
the external state sovereignty lies with the domestic authorities.  
 The question is whether the categories of supervision, assistance, 
monitoring, partnership and administrative authority do enough justice to 
international administration as a specific institution. According to Zaum, 
international administrations have in comparison to other instances of institution- 
building ‘the most comprehensive mandates and the most comprehensive authority 
over local institutions at their disposal.’121 Zaum argues that ‘international 
administrations are involved in governance, rather than monitoring and assistance, 
distinguishing them from less intrusive incidents of international involvement such 
as election monitoring or development work.’122 Similarly, Wilde argues that ‘the 
difference between supervision/control/conduct, on the one hand, and mere 
assistance/advice, on the other, is (…) a key component in defining the nature of 
the involvement in territorial administration by international actors.’123 Given the 
specificity of international administration as an institution in international politics, 
the term international administration can better be reserved for those operations in 
which the level of authority is of the governorship type (Kosovo) or the control 
type (Bosnia). Thus, international administrations which involve ‘soft’ mandates 
with little authority (the first two types in Table 2.1) and no governance functions 
are not regarded as international administrations for this study.  
 
2.2.3 Defining international administration 
 
In the two sections above it was pointed out that international administrations are 
conducted by international actors that have extensive powers at their disposal. 
International administrations also develop in response to sovereignty or governance 
problems and most often involve state-building activities. Taking these elements 
into account, international administration is defined as: a political authority which 
is established by an international organization and which aims to develop political, 
social and economic institutions in a specific territory by assuming some or all 
sovereign powers of the state on a temporary basis. This definition includes an 
empirical as well as a normative aspect of international administration. First, the 
empirical aspect involves the extensive political power that is executed by an 
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international administration. The definition allows for a distinction in the level of 
authority. In the case of Bosnia, the OHR has assumed ‘some sovereign powers’ 
whereas in the case of Kosovo UNMIK has assumed ‘all sovereign powers’ of the 
state. This variation is important, because it is argued that the difference in 
authority might explain the different trajectories of both international 
administrations when it comes to institutionalization.  
The normative aspect of the definition is that international administrations 
aim to develop political, social and economic institutions; i.e. that they are 
involved in institution-building or state-building. Institution-building is an 
important task of international administrations as all authors mentioned above 
recognize.124 In this study it is regarded as the core activity of international 
administration. As has been explained in the introduction, this study attempts to 
assess the institution-building process in Bosnia and Kosovo. The focus is on 
political institutions without denying the importance of other institutions.  
 
 2.3 Conflict management 
 
A basic argument of this study is that the development of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s 
political institutions into domestically embedded institutions has been impeded by 
the absence of conflict resolution.125 The international administration in Bosnia was 
established after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed between the conflicting 
parties. As mentioned in the introduction, the Agreement was imposed by the 
Contact Group, which shows there was little commitment to conflict resolution. In 
the case of Kosovo the absence of conflict resolution was even more evident. 
UNMIK was established while the conflict, the political status of the territory, had 
not been addressed at all. Instead of being resolved, the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Kosovo were being managed. In order to understand the concepts of conflict 
management and conflict resolution, it is necessary to first take a closer look at the 
concept of conflict. 
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In everyday language, conflict has a negative connotation. However, many 
conflict researchers stress the positive sides of conflict. In his classic article 
Conflict as a Way of Life, Johan Galtung concluded that: ‘conflict can be basically 
seen as one of the major motivating forces in our existence, as both a cause, a 
concomitant and a consequence of change, as an element as necessary to social life 
as air to human life.’126 According to Luc Reychler, conflict has value, utility and 
even healing power.127 Finally, Lewis Coser states that conflict can contribute to 
society in a positive way.128 All three authors recognize the functional element of 
conflict, without denying its potential of destruction; next to a functional, 
constructive manifestation, conflict can, and often does, manifest itself in a 
dysfunctional or destructive form.  
 Most definitions of conflict include the notion of ‘incompatibility.’129 
Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall define conflict as: ‘the 
pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups.’130 Galtung defines conflict as an 
‘incompatibility between goal-states, or values held by actors in a social system.’131 
Adam Curle writes: ‘By conflict I mean, essentially, incompatibility.’132 Based on 
these definitions one can safely conclude that ‘incompatibility’ lies at the heart of a 
conflict. However, Galtung pointed to the equal importance of attitudes and 
behavior when analyzing conflict. He developed a model, the conflict triangle, in 
which he described the dynamics between the incompatibility of a conflict and the 
attitudes and behavior supporting it (see Figure 2.1). The conflict triangle shows 
three elements of conflict which continuously influence each other. The first 
element is the incompatibility (also called ‘contradiction’ by Galtung), the second 
element is the hostile attitudes and the third element is the hostile behavior of 
conflicting parties.133 One can speak of a fully articulated conflict when all 
elements exist.134 
Incompatibility should essentially be understood as the content of the 
conflict, i.e. what the conflict is actually about. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) defines incompatibility as ‘generally incompatible positions of the parties 
to the conflict.’ Although it is often not possible to identify one single cause of a 
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particular conflict, in most cases a primary reason for the incompatibility of the 
conflicting sides can be identified. The UCDP, for example, makes a distinction 
between two broadly defined incompatibilities: one concerning governmental 
power (a conflict about the political system or the composition of government) and 




As will be argued in Chapter three, in Kosovo the incompatibility of the 
conflict was the political status of the territory. The conflict in Kosovo has been 
described as: ‘an ethnic conflict with strong territorial and cross-
border/international dimensions.’136 In Bosnia, the incompatibility was also about 
the political status of the territory. The main issue was concerning the question 
whether the country should be one (federal) state or split into separate political 
entities, as will be elaborated upon in Chapter three. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup 
describe the content of the conflict in Bosnia as follows: ‘The war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina involved an internal struggle among ethnic nationalists over the 
definition and control, indeed the very existence of the state, as well as an 
international struggle between the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 
neighbours.’137  
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Conflict researchers, including Galtung, often regard incompatibility as the 
most important element of conflict.138 However, it is also recognized that conflicts 
may start from the other two corners of the conflict triangle. First, a conflict may 
be born out of the attitudes, or the actors’ perceptions and misperceptions of each 
other. Such a conflict starts with hostile attitudes, fostered and transmitted through 
ideology and tradition. To justify this attitude, an actor may search for an 
incompatibility and initiate violent behavior (or the other way around).139 Second, a 
conflict may start as a result of violent behavior. Behavior is the visible and 
manifest aspect of conflict, while attitude and incompatibility are the latent aspects 
of conflict. A conflict could start with violent behavior and subsequently be 
legitimized by hostile attitudes and an (invented) incompatibility.140  
 How can conflict be resolved? Based on the conflict triangle, Galtung 
identifies three types of what he calls ‘conflict interventions.’141 These 
interventions aim at resolving the three specific conflict elements and aim at ending 
the three types of violence that are associated with the three elements of the 
conflict triangle, namely: direct violence (associated with violent behavior), 
cultural violence (associated with hostile attitudes) and structural violence 
(associated with incompatibility).  
The first type of conflict intervention is focused on the behavioral element 
of the conflict triangle. Galtung defines behavioral violence as ‘direct violence’, or 
‘the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal 
or direct.’142 The intervention is aimed at controlling the actors to such an extent 
that direct violence stops. A concrete example of a conflict intervention which ends 
direct violence is a cease-fire. The second type of conflict intervention focuses on 
the attitudinal element of the conflict triangle. Violence emerging from people’s 
attitudes is defined as ‘cultural violence’, or ‘those aspects of culture (…) that can 
be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.’143 The intervention is 
aimed at diminishing the hostile attitudes of the conflicting actors to such an extent 
that it leads to mutual acceptance of each other. Reconciliation efforts, for 
example, could be regarded as belonging to this second type of conflict 
intervention. Finally, the third type of conflict intervention identified by Galtung is 
focused on resolving the incompatibility. Violence associated with incompatibility 
is called ‘structural violence’, or violence where there is no specific actor, but 
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which is ‘built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently 
as unequal life chances.’144 The intervention is aimed at ending the inequality in the 
system. A concrete example of this type of conflict intervention is a negotiated 
peace agreement.  
As has been argued above, a fully articulated conflict includes 
incompatibility among groups of people, violent behavior and hostile attitudes. 
Therefore, a resolved conflict includes a solution to incompatibility, which is 
supported by non-hostile attitudes and non-violent behavior. Only when this is the 
case, can one speak of conflict resolution. As such, conflict resolution ‘implies that 
the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed.’145 A resolved 
conflict means that a new status quo has been found which is accepted and 
sustained in word and deed by all parties to the conflict. In the case of Bosnia, the 
Dayton Agreement settled and contained the conflict but it did not resolve the 
underlining issues of incompatibility. The Agreement was imposed rather than 
freely accepted by the conflicting parties and resulted in the establishment of an 
international administration in order to ensure that the provisions of the Dayton 
Agreement would be carried out. In other words, the focus of the international 
involvement was on addressing violent behavior and hostile attitudes; the first and 
second types of intervention. The third type of intervention was absent in the sense 
that the international administration was based on the Dayton Peace Agreement, in 
which the incompatibility was incorporated.  
In the case of Kosovo the incompatibility was not resolved either, because 
the political status of the territory remained undecided. The hostile attitudes and 
violent behavior of the conflicting parties were contained by the international 
administration, yet their incompatibility persisted. In the case of Kosovo the 
international administration functioned as a buffer between on the one hand 
Kosovo Albanians who wanted independence and on the other hand Kosovo Serbs 
and the Serbian government who opposed Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. As in 
Bosnia, the international administration in Kosovo focused on the behavioral and 
the attitudinal aspects of conflict, rather than on the incompatibility. 
Focusing on the attitudes and behavior of conflicting parties without 
properly addressing the incompatibility in this study is defined as conflict 
management. This corresponds with the definition of conflict management as used 
by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall who define it as the ‘settlement and 
containment of violent conflict.’146 Settlement and containment is not the same as 
conflict resolution (which also addresses incompatibility) and results in different 
outcomes. Conflict management often leads to what is referred to in the academic 
literature either as frozen conflict or negative peace. Frozen conflict is a situation in 
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which (direct) violence is ended, but in which the incompatibility remains 
unresolved.147 Frozen conflicts have been associated with classic peacekeeping 
operations in which a buffer zone separates two warring parties.148 An example of a 
classic peacekeeping operation that has resulted in a frozen conflict is the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which was established in 1964 
and is still keeping the peace by separating the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish 
Cypriots.149 The peace in such a situation is a ‘negative’ one, meaning the absence 
of (direct) violence.150  
Negative peace is often contrasted with positive peace, which goes beyond 
the mere absence of violence. Unfortunately, Galtung is not very clear and 
consistent about the concept of positive peace and it can only be understood in 
relation to his conceptualization of negative peace. In 1969, Galtung defines 
negative peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the absence 
of direct violence and structural violence.151 In 1996, however, he defines negative 
peace more ambitiously as the absence of all kinds of violence (i.e. direct, cultural 
and structural) and positive peace as a ‘cooperative system beyond passive 
peaceful coexistence.’152 Galtung has never been very clear on what this 
cooperative system is about. That might explain why many academics working in 
the field of conflict resolution prefer to use Galtung’s earlier definition (although 
sometimes adding the absence of cultural violence as another element of positive 
peace as well).153 Following the literature on the topic, this study defines negative 
peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the absence of direct, 
structural and cultural violence.154 The ultimate challenge for international 
administrations like those in Bosnia and Kosovo is to avoid freezing the conflict 
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2.4  Institutionalization 
 
The establishment of (political) institutions (institution-building) by international 
administrations does not necessarily mean that they will continue to exist by 
default. A continuous process of institutionalization is necessary in order to prevent 
institutions from breaking down. According to Samuel Huntington, 
institutionalization gives institutions value and stability.155 More concretely, 
institutionalization is defined by Richard Sisson as: ‘the creation and persistence of 
valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior that enable the successful 
accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands 
within a given organization whether it be a party, a legislature, or a state.’156 Sisson 
developed a theory of institutionalization in which the internal and external 
structures of institutions are analyzed.157 The internal structure refers to the 
relationships among different actors within the institution; for example, within a 
parliament, the relationship between parliamentary party groups and parliamentary 
committees. The external structure refers to the relationships between the 
institution and its environment, which include other institutions or society as a 
whole.  
This study focuses on the external structure of political institutions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. The focus is on the one hand on the relationship between the 
political institutions and society, and on the other hand the relationship between the 
political institutions and the international administration. In this study, 
institutionalization is understood to be composed of two phases. Following the 
definition of Sisson, the first phase is about the creation of institutions (defined as 
valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior). This is done under the direction 
of the international administration and not by the domestic authorities and in this 
way the institutions cannot be regarded as embedded in domestic society (which I 
explain in Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3). Again following Sisson’s definition, the second 
phase is about the persistence of institutions. Within the context of international 
administration, this means that the institutions become embedded (or not) in the 
domestic societies. Although Chapter three is about the first phase of 
institutionalization, the second phase is the focus of this study.  
More needs to be said regarding the selection of the political institutions 
that are analyzed for this study. This study focuses on three institutions at the 
central state level: the presidency, the government and parliament. The choice for 
these institutions is motivated by the international administrations’ focus on the 
central level of governance in their institution-building programs. Although 
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projects for local government reforms have been initiated in both territories, the 
central level has been the principal target of institution-building. To adapt Sisson’s 
theory to suit the purpose of studying the second phase of institutionalization under 
international administration, three indicators are used: (1) institutional autonomy; 
(2) institutional congruency; and (3) institutional support.158 In the next three 
sections, I elaborate on these three criteria of institutionalization.  
 
2.4.1 Institutional autonomy 
 
The first criterion of institutionalization is institutional autonomy. Being 
autonomous is important for every institution since: ‘Autonomy affirms the 
separate identity of a social unit and suggests that its persistence is not primarily a 
function of directive action from other institutional spheres.’159 Some academics 
regard the existence of boundedness, or the ability of a particular institution to 
demarcate boundaries between itself and the environment, as the conceptual core of 
institutionalization.160 The autonomy of institutions in this study refers to the 
independence of domestic political institutions from the international 
administration and to the strength of domestic political institutions (institutional 
capacity).  
At the start of the mission the domestic institutions are not independent. It 
is the international administration rather than the domestic political institutions 
which has the authority of government. Ultimately, however, an international 
administration aims at creating independent domestic political institutions. During 
the process, it gradually transfers governance functions from the international level 
to the domestic level. In this way, the domestic institutions get the ability to 
demarcate their boundaries with respect to international involvement step by step. 
This can be done in two ways. First, institutional independence is increased by a 
transfer of authority from the international level to the domestic level. There not 
only needs to be a formal transfer of powers, but authority should also be 
transferred in practice. Full autonomy in the sense of ‘independence’ will be 
considered to exist when all fundamental decisions are being left to the domestic 
institutions. This holds mainly for the case of Kosovo, where the UN executed a 
governorship mandate. Second, independence increases when the number of 
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interventions carried out by the international administration decreases. This holds 
mainly for the case of Bosnia, where the international administration operated 
mainly through interventions in the domestic political process.  
Next to autonomy in the sense of independence, in this study autonomy is 
also understood as institutional capacity. Institutional capacity is about the strength 
of the institutions or the ability of institutions to: ‘plan and execute policies and to 
enforce laws cleanly and transparently.’161 The World Bank defines institutional 
capacity or ‘government effectiveness’ as ‘the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies.’162 Thus, institutional capacity 
says something about the quality of work of political institutions and is part of an 
institution-building policy.163 It can be expected especially after a war that 
institutional capacity will be weak. However, institutional capacity can be 
enhanced through capacity-building programs where the quality of for example 
parliamentary work or the civil service can be improved. When actual 
improvement can be identified, institutional autonomy in terms of institutional 
capacity has increased. A concrete example of capacity-building is the training of a 
professional civil service or parliamentarians.  
 
2.4.2 Institutional congruency 
 
The second criterion of institutionalization is institutional congruency, or the 
congruency of ‘value systems that associate the institution and its environment and 
that govern behavior within the institution.’164 Whereas the indicators of 
institutional autonomy and institutional support are analyzed at the level of the 
three particular institutions, for institutional congruency the level of analysis is 
within the political system. The value systems of a political system are defined as a 
political culture. Larry Diamond defines political culture as: ‘(…) a people’s 
predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the 
political system of their country and the role of the self in that system.’165 The 
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political culture of a political system can consist of different value systems that 
may be congruent or incongruent with each other. In the latter case, one cannot 
speak of institutionalization in terms of institutional congruency.  
When a territory is governed by an international administration, its 
domestic political system and its political culture are strongly influenced by that 
external body. International administration is not neutral in character, but is biased 
towards Western concepts and values.166 Although in the cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo it was the entire ‘international community’ that was referred to as being 
responsible for the international administrations, it were Western states and 
institutions that were the most deeply involved.167 The international administrations 
in Bosnia and Kosovo devised a political system which can be characterized as a 
market democracy; a liberal democratic political system combined with a market 
economy.168 This is clearly reflected in the preamble of Bosnia’s Constitution, in 
which it is stated that democratic institutions and procedures are needed to produce 
peaceful relations in a pluralistic society and that the promotion of a market 
economy is necessary for creating welfare and economic growth.169 The ambition 
to create a market democracy is also reflected in Kosovo’s Constitutional 
Framework (Kosovo’s provisional constitution). In the document it is stated that 
UNMIK aims at enhancing democratic governance and at developing a market 
economy.170 
The value system which the international administrations aim to promote is 
one based on civic nationalism. Civic nationalism is based on the idea that a 
political authority rules on behalf of citizens who ‘base their appeals on loyalty to a 
set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective.’171 A 
civic nation is a ‘territorially bounded, sovereign legal-political community (...) 
whose members are citizens participating in a mass public national culture.’172 The 
opposite of civic nationalism is ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on 
the idea that a political authority rules on behalf of a particular ethnic group which 
shares ‘a common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or 
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the myth of a shared kinship.’173 In contrast to civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism 
defines ‘citizen’ as a member of a particular ethnic community rather than as a 
member of a legal-political community. Ethnic nationalism was a driving force 
behind the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the sense that it was used by 
politicians to mobilize the different ethnic groups. Consequently, at the start of 
both international administrations the political culture was dominated by ethnic 
nationalism.  
The OHR and UNMIK have tried to replace the ethnic nationalist value 
system with a civic nationalist (or multi-ethnic) value system. The extent to which 
the international administration succeeded in establishing civic nationalism as the 
dominant value system, can help determine whether the political system can be 
considered to be institutionally congruent. One outcome of institutional congruency 
would be that the international administration has indeed succeeded in creating a 
civic nationalist political culture. Another outcome of institutional congruency 
would be when the international administration would have given up on civic 
nationalism, and when ethnic nationalism would be the remaining value system 
dominating the institutions. The third possible outcome would be one of 
institutional incongruency which would be the case when ethnic nationalism and 
civic nationalism would still exist as competing and incongruent value systems.  
 
2.4.3 Institutional support 
 
Domestic institutional support is the third indicator to assess the level of 
institutionalization. Support manifests itself in positive attitudes and in positive 
behavior (compliance) among the elites and the majority population towards the 
institutions. Attitudinal support for a political institution is defined as: a 
predisposition to act on behalf of the interests of the institution.174 Compliance is 
defined as: ‘(…) the congruence between authoritative prescription and subject 
action.’175  
Institutional support is problematic in the context of international 
administrations. Since the domestic political institutions are created by the 
international administration and since they must operate in a post-war environment 
it is not unthinkable that the institutions are challenged by opposing domestic 
actors. There is institutionalization when there is substantial support for and 
compliance with the political institutions. In order to make the analysis as specific 
as possible, a distinction is made between support and compliance on the elite level 
and support and compliance on the mass level of society. Although one could argue 
that, because of their disproportionate power and influence, political elites matter 
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most when it comes to support for and compliance with political institutions, it is 
not sufficient to include the elite level only. Especially in the long term, the support 
and the compliance of the population at large may be highly relevant.176  
Establishing just how much support is substantial enough always includes 
some degree of arbitrariness.177 In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, it would make 
little sense to adopt quantitative thresholds when assessing the level of support for 
and compliance with political institutions. As far as the attitudes of the political 
elite are concerned, it requires that all significant political leaders (of all major 
communities) believe in the legitimacy of the institutions and believe that the 
institutions merit their support. These attitudes should be expressed in public 
rhetoric, ideology, writings, and symbolic gestures.178 As far as elite compliance is 
concerned, all significant political leaders need to comply with the institutions. 
With respect to the majority of the population, it is equally important that it 
massively supports and complies with the political institutions in order to be able to 
speak of institutionalization.  
On top of the indicators of support and compliance, two additional conditions 
are to be taken into account when analyzing to what extent the political institutions 
in Bosnia and Kosovo are supported by the population. First, support and 
compliance should exist for some period of time. For this study, the period of time 
examined begins when the institutions were first established and continues until the 
autumn of 2008. Second, those rejecting the political institutions should not be 
politically relevant. With these conditions in mind, then one can speak of 
institutionalization in both territories once all significant political leaders and the 
overall majority of the population support and comply with the political 
institutions.  
 
2.5 Research design and methodology 
 
As already stated in the introduction, the research objective of this study is to 
understand how the OHR and UNMIK have attempted to create sustainable 
political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo and whether they have achieved their 
objective. The explicit research question guiding this research is: have the OHR 
and UNMIK succeeded in creating domestically embedded political institutions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo? In order to answer this question the multiple (or comparative) 
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case study method is used.179 To be more exact, the method is applied of structured 
focused comparison as developed by Alexander George, Timothy McKeown and 
Andrew Bennett.  
Within the method of structured focused comparison the importance of 
theoretically informed research questions in qualitative research is underscored. 
The term ‘focus’ refers to the selection of data based on explicit research objectives 
and data requirements. It assumes that one particular case can be studied from 
many different angles and that therefore the research should be guided by explicit 
research questions. In this study, the theoretical focus is provided by the conflict 
management and institutionalization models presented above. The term ‘structure’ 
refers to a standardization of the research strategy. In every case study, the same 
type of research questions are asked and the same type of data are used.180 In this 
study that is done by asking the following sub questions for each case: 1) what 
level of institutional autonomy can be observed?; 2) what level of institutional 
congruency can be observed?; and 3) what level of institutional support can be 
observed? All three sub questions are logically related to the main research 
question and thus to the three indicators of institutionalization.  
The analysis of both cases is based on written primary sources such as 
publications from the international administrations, research reports from 
(independent) research institutes, and newspaper articles.181 Added to this material 
is relevant academic literature and interviews with officials from the OHR, 
UNMIK and other appropriate international organizations. When it comes to more 
particular data sets, the following are used. For assessing the autonomy of Bosnia’s 
and Kosovo’s political institutions (Chapter four) the decisions of the OHR and the 
regulations of UNMIK are used. All decisions and regulations have been published 
on the websites of the international administrations. For assessing the institutional 
congruency (Chapter five), data on the general elections in both cases is used. 
Finally, the chapter on institutional support (Chapter six) includes the results of 
opinion polls on popular satisfaction with the major political institutions made by 
the UN Development Program.  
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The method of structured focused comparison is used in this study, because 
it can be applied very well to research which involves case studies trying to study 
processes rather than static points in time.182 The method of structured focused 
comparison actually consists of several sub-methods, such as process tracing, 
controlled comparison and the congruence method. In this study, the process 
tracing method is used. In the first instance, process tracing is a method that is used 
for within-case (or ‘single’) case analysis. Nonetheless, it can also be used for 
comparative case studies when the results of the individual cases are drawn 
together within a common theoretical framework. 183  
Four important limitations resulting from this research design should be 
mentioned. First, the objective of this study is not to establish a theory of 
international administration, conflict management or institutionalization. What this 
research aims to do is to explain how the OHR and UNMIK have attempted to 
create sustainable political institutions in the particular cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo. The comparative perspective might lead to some general insights about 
international administration, conflict management or institutionalization, but since 
the analysis includes only two cases broad generalizations are not possible. A 
second limitation of this research is that it is confined to an analysis of 
institutionalization defined as institutional autonomy, congruency and support. 
Using these three indicators in the analysis means that other factors that could also 
be studied in the context of institutionalization are being left out. That being said, 
these three indicators can be considered as crucial for understanding how 
institutions evolve into embedded institutions under international administration. 
The third limitation is that the study does not offer an irrefutable explanation of the 
process of institutionalization. The objective is to determine whether the 
institutions have become embedded in domestic society. In addition a plausible 
explanation is presented by linking the process of institutionalization with the 
process of conflict management. However, this should be understood as a 
proposition that could possibly inform future research, rather than a definite 
empirical claim. Finally, it must be emphasized that the conclusions presented here 
are tentative conclusions. In December 2008, neither the OHR, nor UNMIK had 
been (officially) closed down so that their international administrations had not 
ended yet. Nonetheless, both international administrations were arriving at the end 
of their mandates as the EU had positioned itself as the principal conflict manager 
in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
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3 The Establishment of the OHR and UNMIK 
 
After having introduced the basic concepts of this study in Chapter two, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the OHR and UNMIK as the two specific 
international administrations analyzed in this study. This chapter presents the 
background of both international administrations as well as an introduction to 
Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political institutions. First, the historical background of the 
OHR and UNMIK is elaborated upon. This includes a section which explains how 
the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were not resolved and how the non-resolution 
of conflict ultimately led to the establishment of international administrations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo of control and governance types. Secondly, the mandate and 
organization of the international administrations are described. An analysis is 
included of how the OHR and UNMIK have proceeded in implementing their 
mandates and the role of other international actors. Thirdly, the political 
institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo are introduced. The focus of this examination is 
put on constitutional design and on those political institutions that are under 
scrutiny in this study: the presidency, the government and parliament at the central 
level of government. By presenting these institutions, the first phase of 
institutionalization (the creation of institutions) under international administration 
is elaborated upon. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks on this first 
phase of institutionalization.  
  
3.1 The Office of the High Representative 
 
3.1.1 The historical background of the OHR 
 
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which ended the war that had torn Bosnia apart between 1992 and 
1995. The war in Bosnia should be placed in the broader context of the break-up of 
the former Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia). The demise of 
Yugoslavia was the result of a long process of fragmentation which accelerated at 
the end of the Cold War. Since the Second World War, there has been the 
occasional revival of ethnic nationalist feelings in Yugoslavia in general and in 
Bosnia in particular. In the 1970’s, for example, Serb and Croat ethnic nationalists 
spoke openly about carving pieces of territory off Bosnia in order to incorporate 
them in Serbia and Croatia respectively.1 Nationalism was the primary language of 
the political opposition and when the third Yugoslav Constitution (1974) granted 
more autonomy to the six republics (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia) and the two autonomous regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo) of 
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Yugoslavia, it indirectly provided ambitious nationalist politicians the opportunity 
to build a personal power base.2 Although Joseph Tito was able to keep the 
republic together for several decades, his death in 1980, the worldwide demise of 
communism at the end of the 1980’s and the economic crisis that emerged in 
Yugoslavia shifted power to the hands of ethnic nationalist politicians.   
When in 1990 the first democratic elections were organized in the six 
republics, ethnic nationalist parties won the vote.3 As president of Serbia Miloševi 
developed an ethnic nationalist political agenda and warned that the Serb nation 
was in great danger. In 1989, Miloševi had disbanded the autonomy of Vojvodina 
and Kosovo. Combined with the vote of Montenegro, the decision left him with 
four out of the eight votes in de federal presidency of Yugoslavia.4 Serb ethnic 
nationalism was primarily aimed at creating a single state that would unify all 
Serbs. As such, Miloševi was not principally opposed to the secession of 
individual republics from Yugoslavia. In fact, he insisted that Serbs living in 
Croatia had the same right to secession as Croatia.5  
The four other republics in the federation developed their own ethnic 
nationalist politics and eventually this led to war and the break-down of 
Yugoslavia. Of all six republics, only Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia without 
violent conflict. Following a referendum on 8 September 1991, in which the 
Macedonians voted in favor of independence, a constitution was adopted on 17 
November 1991.6 In the republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia, war broke out 
after their independence declarations. In both Croatia and Slovenia the intention to 
secede from Yugoslavia developed at the end of the 1990’s. Ethnic nationalists 
regarded their republics as being part of Europe and different from Yugoslavia 
which represented in their eyes an Asiatic form of government.7 As such, Slovenia 
adopted a new constitution in October 1989, which gave the republic legislative 
sovereignty and the right to secede.8 Secession was supported by the population; a 
referendum in December 1990 showed that the majority of the Slovenians were in 
favor of independence.9 The same support for secession also existed in Croatia. A 
popular vote that was organized in May 1991 showed that ninety three percent of 
those who voted (with a turnout of 82 percent) were in favor of secession from 
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Yugoslavia.10 In line with this, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 
June 1991.  
In Slovenia, secession was followed by a war that lasted for only a few 
days. The federal army, the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna 
Armija, JNA), which started operations on 27 June, met well prepared Slovenian 
resistance. Ten days later the war was over and was officially concluded with the 
Brioni Agreement between Slovenia, Croatia and the remaining parts of 
Yugoslavia on 8 July, 1991. The Brioni Agreement was mediated by the European 
Community and called for a three-month moratorium on the implementation of 
Slovenian and Croatian independence. However, based on a political deal between 
Slovenia’s member of the federal presidency Milan Kuan and Miloševi, Slovenia 
was allowed to secede whereas Croatia was not.11  
Therefore, the secession of Croatia was more violent than Slovenia’s 
secession had been. In contrast to Slovenia, Croatia had large Serb communities in 
its territory and Serb ethnic nationalism was aimed at giving these communities the 
right to secede. In the first instance, Miloševi pursued a two-track policy. On the 
one hand, there was an attempt at military intimidation and on the other hand the 
areas dominated by Serb communities were strengthened.12 This policy escalated 
into a full-scale war at the end of August 1991.13 The war lasted until January 1992 
when a cease fire was negotiated by UN-negotiator Cyrus Vance. On 15 January 
the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was recognized by the European 
Community. The UN deployed the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
to supervise and maintain the cease fire agreement. As agreed, the JNA left Croatia 
and concentrated its forces in Bosnia. 
In Bosnia, the upsurge of ethnic nationalism roused fears of Serbian and 
Croatian plans to carve up Bosnia.14 Bosnia consisted of three large identity groups 
or nations, which were later officially recognized as such in the Dayton 
Agreement: the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniaks (or Bosnian 
Muslims).15 Whereas the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs could identify 
themselves with Croatia or Serbia respectively, the absence of a Bosniak state 
made the Bosniaks firmly committed to Bosnia as a single political entity. 
Especially the (Bosniak) Party for Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske 
Akcije, SDA), founded in May 1990, felt that it was its task to defend the interests 
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of Bosniaks by keeping Bosnia together. Placed between Serbian and Croatian 
ethnic nationalism, Bosniaks emphasized that they wanted to preserve the multi-
ethnic and multi-religious republic.16 At first, the integrity of Bosnia’s borders was 
also supported by the Bosnian Croat ethnic nationalist party, the Croat Democratic 
Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) which had been created a 
few months before the SDA. However, after an internal power struggle, more 
radical ethnic nationalists increased their influence in the party and presented plans 
for the ‘cantonization’ (read carving up) of Bosnia.17 These plans were a reaction to 
the cantonization plans of the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska 
Stranka, SDS), the Bosnian Serb ethnic nationalist party which had been 
established in June 1990.18  
On 6 April 1992, the day Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as an 
independent state by the European Community, the country was on the brink of a 
full scale war.19 In February and March of the same year, minor armed clashes 
between the three large ethnic communities, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, started 
occurring on a regular basis. On 6 April, large scale fighting erupted when Serbs 
started to lay siege to Sarajevo. From that moment to the end of the war in 
December 1995 none of the conflicting parties were strong enough to enforce a 
total victory. The war became even more complicated when the initial coalition 
between the Bosniaks and the Croats broke down in January 1993, only to be 
renewed in January 1994 with the American brokered Washington Agreement.  
An agreement to end the war was only achieved in December 1995. Prior 
to this international peace making efforts were characterized by failures. The 
presence of UNPROFOR, a UN arms embargo, a no fly zone enforced by NATO 
(operation Deny Flight) and several comprehensive peace proposals could not stop 
the violence. It took decisive air power from NATO (operation Deliberate Force) 
and a ‘favorable situation’ on the ground to impose a comprehensive peace 
agreement. 20 The thorny territorial issues that had blocked negotiations for almost 
three years had now been settled by force. Among these ‘settlements’ were the 
Bosnian Serb conquest of the Bosniak enclaves of Srebrenica (8 July - 12 July 
1995) and Žepa (25 July 1995). While the Bosniaks made considerable gains to the 
South and North of Sarajevo. In addition, Croatia had successfully started a large 
offensive which resulted in the conquest of the Serbian enclave Krajina on 4 
August 1995. Regular Croat troops were also active in Bosnia and together with 
Bosnian Croat forces they carried out a successful offensive against Bosnian Serb 
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troops in western Herzegovina.21 As a result of these strategic developments it 
became possible to establish a line of demarcation between the Bosnian Serbs on 
the one side and the Bosniak-Croat Federation on the other side. The balance had 
shifted in favor of the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, which made all parties to the 
conflict ‘ripe’ for negotiations. 22  
The ripeness was stimulated by NATO’s air power. Air power was used 
after the USA had taken over the diplomatic initiative from the Europeans with the 
formation of the so called Contact Group (consisting of the USA, Russia, France, 
the UK and Germany) in April 1994.23 The locus of the international peace effort 
up to this point had been the European dominated International Conference for the 
Former Yugoslavia.24 The Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group peace plans 
in July 1994 and in February 1995, together with the failure of NATO to deter a 
Bosnian Serb attack on Biha in November 1994, increased the USA’s willingness 
to consider using air power to support a political settlement of the conflict.25 The 
Bosnian Serb offensive which led to the fall of the UN ‘safe area’ Srebrenica in 
July 1995, the potential threat that other ‘safe areas’ such as Goražde and Biha 
might also fall and the continued Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo in the summer 
of 1995 made the USA even more committed to using force. After a Bosnian Serb 
mortar attack on the Markale Market in Sarajevo which killed 37 people and 
wounded 84 people, the UN Security Council authorized NATO to conduct air 
strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. NATO operation Deliberate Force 
started on 30 August and lasted until 14 September after which NATO suspended 
its air attacks as Bosnian Serb heavy artillery was being withdrawn from around 
Sarajevo. Six days later, NATO announced the end of Deliberate Force after the 
Bosnian Serbs had complied with NATO’s demands. Subsequently, on 5 October 
1995 a cease-fire in entire Bosnia was announced by US President Bill Clinton 
after which negotiations were planned for a comprehensive peace agreement. 26 
  
3.1.2 International control 
 
The negotiations were held at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton 
(Ohio, USA) between 1 and 21 November 1995. They were led by US diplomat 
Richard Holbrooke and the Swedish EU representative Carl Bildt. The Bosnian 
Croats were represented by Croatian President Franjo Tuman and by Bosnian 
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Croat Krešimir Zubak, with Tuman clearly being the more influential of the two 
leaders.27 The Bosnian Serbs were represented by Momilo Krajišnik, Nikola 
Koljevi and general Zdravko Tolimir, as well as by Slobodan Miloševi and 
Momir Bulatovi (President of Montenegro). From the beginning of the 
negotiations it was clear that Miloševi would be the one taking the decisions and 
the Bosnian Serb delegation was effectively isolated.28 The Bosniaks were 
represented by President Alija Izetbegovi and Prime Minister Haris Silajdži of 
the war-time Bosnian state.  
The positions and interests of the three parties were different and often 
incompatible. Bosniaks recognized the fait accompli of the existing entities, but 
were committed to strong state level institutions, one single economic space, the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the handover of all areas that 
had contained a Bosniak majority, and the control over the strategic area Brko.29 
The Bosnian Serbs wanted to keep the central government as weak as possible, to 
keep ethnically cleansed territories as they were at the end of the war and to avoid a 
massive return of refugees and internally displaced persons. An important objective 
of the Bosnian Serbs was to keep the option of unification with Serbia open.30 
Finally, the Croat delegation to the Dayton negotiations was skeptical towards the 
Bosniak-Croat Federation. The objective was to unite the Croat dominated areas 
with Croatia, or at least create a third Croat entity. The Bosniak-Croat Federation 
was mainly a formal agreement, without concrete initiatives of actual cooperation 
between the Croats and Bosniaks. Even during the joint offensive against the 
Bosnian Serbs in September 1995, Bosniak and Croat army units had clashed.31  
 Given these different standpoints of the conflicting parties, the conclusion 
of an agreement at Dayton was uncertain until the very end of the negotiations. 
Holbrooke and Bildt had to keep pressure on the conflicting parties in order to keep 
the negotiations going.32 The outcome was a compromise. The Dayton Agreement 
produced a constitution which recognized the two entities that had been created 
during the war: the Bosniak-Croat Federation (a product of the Washington 
Agreement in 1994) and the Bosnian Serb Republic (proclaimed by the Bosnian 
Serbs on 27 March 1992). A weak federal state would unite both entities.  
As such, Dayton was an internationally coerced compromise and the local 
conflicting parties’ decision to settle was a tactical decision.33 As Burg and Shoup 
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point out: ‘The Dayton agreement reflected the interest of the US administration in 
bringing the fighting to a halt, rather than the readiness of the three warring parties 
to settle their political differences.’34 David Chandler identifies Dayton as: ‘a 
settlement imposed on Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Serbs by the international 
community.’35 Ivo Daalder recalls that ‘what Washington desired most was to see 
an end to the conflict in Bosnia; the details of the settlement achieving that goal 
were distinctly secondary.’36 These citations show that the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was internationally imposed and that ending the war was the first 
priority. Thus, although formally the conflict was settled with the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, it should not be regarded as an agreement which resolved the conflict. 
Rather, the Dayton Agreement incorporated the incompatibility between the 
existing parties in the post-war political system.  
The imposed nature of the settlement gave birth to international concerns 
regarding the implementation phase. As Holbrooke commented at the end of the 
negotiations: “On paper we have peace. To make it work is our next great 
challenge.”37 The choice for an international administration of the control type was 
mainly determined by the USA. Given the key role the USA had played in stopping 
the war, it was likely that it would also have a great say in the implementation 
phase. Doing so, it had to take into account the positions of the other members of 
the Contact Group and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Within 
the Security Council, Russia and China had little interest in influencing the course 
of events in Bosnia. Throughout the war the Russian diplomatic interventions 
regarding Bosnia focused on presenting Russia as ‘a major power and constructive 
partner of the West’, not on presenting concrete proposals for ending the conflict.38 
China made its voice heard by abstention. By abstaining (rather than using its veto 
power) for Security Council decisions regarding Bosnia, China communicated its 
dissatisfaction with the UN’s growing interventionism in general. China’s chief 
priority was to protest against what it regarded as the erosion of the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of UN member states.39  
With China and Russia mainly abstaining from the specific issues 
surrounding the peacemaking efforts in Bosnia, the major policy differences 
existed between on the one hand the USA, and on the other hand, the UK and 
France.40 This also became clear during the Dayton peace negotiations. When the 
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civilian implementation of the peace agreement was considered, the Americans in 
first instance opted for a strong High Representative who would have ‘direct 
authority over the international organizations that would contribute to the 
implementation effort.’41 This would have come down to a structure very similar to 
the one chosen in Kosovo: one umbrella organization (in the case of Kosovo the 
UN) which would direct the implementation of the peace agreement. However, the 
design was based on the conviction that the High Representative would be an 
American. After it was agreed that the EU would adopt the larger share of 
reconstruction and economic assistance, the UK, France and other EU members 
insisted that the post of High Representative should go to a European. This was 
accepted by the Americans, upon which Washington set out to limit the authority 
and responsibility of the High Representative as much as possible.42 However, 
there were no deep differences of opinion regarding the choice of a control type 
international administration.  
  
3.1.3 The mandate and organization of the OHR 
 
When the OHR started operations in 1996, it was expected to last for only one 
year.43 Back then, the mission could hardly be called an international 
administration. At this time, the OHR’s mandate, included as Annex 10 of the 
Dayton Agreement, and its powers were interpreted in a limited way. However, 
due to the lack of the conflicting parties’ commitment to the Dayton Agreement it 
proved to be necessary to reinterpret the mandate in 1997. That reinterpretation 
made it possible for the OHR to establish itself as the most important international 
agency in Bosnia and as a true international administration of the control type, as 
will be further elaborated upon in Chapter four.  
 The Annexes to the Dayton Peace Agreement include several provisions on 
the implementation of the treaty. The establishment of the function of High 
Representative, as the head of the mission of the OHR, is explicitly mentioned in 
Annex 10.44 The establishment of the High Representative was requested by the 
parties to the conflict, in order to: ‘facilitate the parties’ own efforts and to 
mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations 
and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement.’45 Hence, the 
role of the High Representative was to monitor the implementation of the treaty 
                                                 
41 Daalder, Getting to Dayton. The Making of America's Bosnia Policy, 157. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Chandler, Faking Democracy, 1. 
44 The following persons have occupied the position of High Representative: Carl Bildt (8 December 
1995 - 18 June 1997), Carlos Westendorp (19 June 1997 – 31 July 1999), Wolfgang Petritsch (1 
August 1999 – 27 May 2002), Paddy Ashdown (28 May 2002 – 31 January 2006), Christian Schwarz-
Schilling (1 February 2006 – 30 June 2007), and Miroslav Laják (1 July 2007). 
45 ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (1995), Annex 10. 
The results of international administration in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo 
 56
and to coordinate the international efforts in Bosnia. The High Representative was 
also given the power to interpret the treaty and given the final authority in theatre.46 
It is important to note, however, that the High Representative’s responsibility for 
implementation was strictly limited to the civilian part of the peace treaty; the 
military part was left to NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR).47 
 Although the establishment of a High Representative was endorsed by and 
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (15 December 1995) it did 
not become an international administration led by the UN. Instead, the High 
Representative was made accountable to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). 
The PIC was created during the ‘International Peace Implementation Conference’ 
that had been held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995. The conference 
elaborated on the structure of the implementation process of the Dayton 
Agreement. It decided that the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
had achieved important objectives, but that a new structure had to be established in 
order to implement the Dayton Agreement. This new structure would be the PIC, 
consisting of a group of 55 states, international organizations and agencies. A PIC 
Steering Board, under the chairmanship of the High Representative and being 
composed of representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
UK, the USA, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission and the 
Organization of Islamic Conferences was established in order to give political 
guidance on implementation to the High Representative. It would meet on a regular 
basis and report to the PIC. The expectation was expressed that the Steering Board 
would also be closely associated with the UN and the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during the implementation process.48 
Moreover, political representatives from Bosnia were also allowed to attend 
Steering Board meetings.49 The Steering Board chaired by the High Representative 
would meet every three months at the level of political directors and every week at 
the level of ambassadors in Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo. 
   
3.1.4 The major international partners of the OHR 
 
Although the High Representative had received coordinating powers with respect 
to the international presence in Bosnia, until December 1997 he was dependent on 
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the cooperation of other international actors that were active in Bosnia. In the 
course of time, the number of actors even increased and their roles were 
strengthened to such an extent that Bosnia became to be regarded as the ‘world 
capital of interventionism.’50 The most important international institutional actors 
were the OSCE, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), the EU and NATO. All these organizations had been explicitly 
mentioned in the Dayton Peace Agreement as implementing agencies.  
 The OSCE mission was created in December 1995 and headed by an 
ambassador who reported to the OSCE’s Permanent Council and coordinated its 
actions closely with the OSCE’s Chairman in Office.51 As a regional security 
organization, the OSCE mission in Bosnia was responsible for regional 
stabilization through confidence and security building measures, for 
democratization, and for the promotion of human rights.52 In fact, the OSCE was 
active in all three areas pursuing its concept of comprehensive security which 
includes a politico-military dimension, a human dimension, and an economic and 
environmental dimension.53 First, regarding the politico-military dimension the 
OSCE was among others involved in the supervision over and reform of Bosnia’s 
defense sector. The OSCE focused on budget transparency and parliamentary 
oversight of the entity-based military forces. Further, the mission supported the 
NATO-led defense reform process which abolished the entity-based armed forces 
and created a single state level Ministry of Defense in 2004.54 Secondly, the OSCE 
was occupied with the human dimension by supporting democratization and human 
rights. With regard to democratization, initially much attention was given to the 
organization of elections, but as Bosnians became increasingly responsible for 
organizing elections themselves, more attention was given to good governance and 
the development of a civil society. Among others, the OSCE started a 
Parliamentary Support Programme. In the field of human rights, the OSCE dealt 
(often in cooperation with the OHR and other international organizations) with 
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property restitution, the development of the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
Human Rights Chamber of the State Court, action against the trafficking of human 
beings, securing economic and social rights, support for the rule of law, monitoring 
war crimes cases tried by Bosnian courts, assisting with the establishment of a War 
Crimes Chamber of the State Court, and education reform. Finally, the OSCE took 
some action within the economic and environmental dimension, including 
corporate governance (promoting quality in the application of legislation in the 
workplace) and empowering citizens in environmental endeavors such as initiatives 
to improve water quality or preserve nature.55 
UNMIBH was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1035 in 
December 1995. The mission was headed by a Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General (UN Special Representative).56 The largest part of the mandate 
involved a police mission. The specific mandate evolved with the passage of 
successive UN Security Council resolutions, but in general it included the 
following tasks: monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities 
and facilities, advising and training law enforcement personnel and forces, 
facilitating the parties’ law enforcement activities, assessing threats to public order, 
advising governmental authorities on the organization of effective civilian law 
enforcement agencies, and assisting by accompanying the parties’ law enforcement 
personnel as they carry out their responsibilities.57 These advisory tasks (the 
mandate did not involve executive policing) were carried out by the International 
Police Task Force (IPTF) whose commissioner fell directly under the authority of 
the UN Special Representative.58 Next to functions related to law enforcement and 
police reform, UNMIBH also coordinated other UN activities, such as 
humanitarian relief efforts and the return of refugees and displaced persons, 
humanitarian (as opposed to military) de-mining, human rights promotion, 
technical advice on elections, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic 
reconstruction.59 Humanitarian relief and refugee return were carried out by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
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The EU had started its operations in Bosnia already during the war. Before 
the OHR was established as an international administration, the EU had 
administrated the divided city of Mostar. Next to this early involvement the 
European Community had established the European Community Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) in 1991. During and after the war, the ECMM was expected to 
monitor political, humanitarian, security, military and economic developments and 
report these to the European Community/EU.60 The EU was also closely involved 
in many other policy fields. One of the salient characteristics of the EU mission in 
Bosnia (and Kosovo for that matter) was that its role slowly expanded. First, the 
EU took over the police mission from the IPTF in 2002 when the European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM) was established. Second, the High Representative also 
became the EU Special Representative in 2002. Third, the EU took over the 
military mission from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR; see below) in 
December 2004 when it established with Operation Althea the European Union 
Force (EUFOR).61 Finally, the role of the EU became more prominent with the 
Stability and Association Process which aimed at the integration of South Eastern 
Europe (including Bosnia) within the EU (see below).  
NATO established its Implementation Force (IFOR) right after the 
cessation of hostilities. IFOR is mentioned in Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement 
and the annex made IFOR responsible for the implementation of the military 
aspects of the peace agreement.62 The NATO troops consisted of no less than 
60.0000 troops and initially focused on ensuring the cessation of hostilities and 
monitoring the retreat of the troops behind the inter-entity boundary lines. In the 
fall of 1996, IFOR was replaced by SFOR. SFOR remained operational until 
December 2004 when it was replaced by EUFOR..63  
 Next to these four international organizations discussed many more were 
involved in Bosnia. In the annexes of the Dayton Agreement the following 
organizations are mentioned as being responsible for some policy area: the 
European Court of Human Rights (for the Constitutional Court, refugees and 
displaced persons), the International Monetary Fund (IMF, for the Central Bank), 
the Council of Europe (for the Human Rights Chamber of the State Court) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Commission on Public 
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Corporations).64 Additionally, hundreds of non-governmental organizations were 
active in Bosnia. The four major organizations mentioned above, however, were 
the most important ones with respect to political institution-building.  
That being said, the list of the OHR’s partners is not complete without 
mentioning the role of the USA. International officials often characterized the 
international administration in Bosnia as a ‘US led mission.’65 Being the architect 
of the Washington Accord and the Dayton Peace Agreement, the USA was closely 
involved in the implementation of the settlement.66 Apart from the post of High 
Representative, all other international key positions were held by Americans. The 
Commander of SFOR/IFOR, the Principal Deputy High Representative and the 
head of the OSCE mission have always been Americans. Among the ambassadors 
stationed in Sarajevo, the American ambassador has proven to be the most 
influential. Almost all major reforms had the decisive engagement of the USA; 
even OHR-led reforms were frequently back up by American policy behind the 
scenes.67 The attempt to reform Bosnia’s Constitution in 2005 and 2006 was almost 
exclusively driven by the USA.68 Thus, although the OHR could be considered as 
the principal political component of the international presence in Bosnia it should 
be emphasized that its actions were influenced not only by other international 
bodies, but above all by the USA.  
 
3.1.5 A stronger coordination of efforts 
 
The differences in the reporting lines, the funding structures and the agendas of the 
major international partners, made it difficult for the OHR to devise a coherent 
policy.69 All the above mentioned missions were totally independent from the OHR 
structure and were also much larger. Especially NATO and the UN had deployed 
large missions; consisting of about 60.000 and 2000 persons respectively. As such, 
at least until December 1997, the international presence in Bosnia was dominated 
by the UN and NATO rather than by the OHR.70 Whereas the OHR had to start 
from scratch, the field missions of the UN and NATO had ample institutional 
support from their parent organizations.  
 Despite its weak institutional position, the OHR tried to coordinate the 
civilian implementation process. From the end of July 1996, the OHR organized 
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regular meetings with the principal organizations, including IFOR, OSCE, 
UNMIBH, IPTF and UNHCR.71 The PIC supported this coordination effort 
explicitly in December 1996, by providing the OHR with reinforced coordinating 
functions.72 However, coordination of so many different actors remained 
problematic. This led the International Crisis Group (an international think tank) to 
conclude in 2001 that: ‘the current international presence lacks both an efficient 
structure and a strategic vision.’73 In reaction to such criticism, the PIC requested 
the OHR conduct a study on how to increase the effectiveness of the international 
presence in Bosnia. The result of this study was the beginning of a streamlining 
process aimed at eliminating overlapping functions and responsibilities and at 
increasing the overall effectiveness of the international community.74  
 During the meetings of the PIC Steering Board in December 2001 and 
February 2002, High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch presented the OHR’s 
action plan. The proposal included the establishment of policy coordination 
taskforces in the following policy areas: the rule of law, institution-building, 
economic policy, and return and reconstruction. The taskforces would be 
complemented by a High Representative led Cabinet, later called Board of 
Principals.’75 The task force model was endorsed by the PIC Steering Board in 
February 2002. The Board of Principles met once a week and served as the main 
coordinating body of the international community in Bosnia. It consisted of the 
heads or deputies of SFOR (from December 2004 onwards, EUFOR), UNMIBH, 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNHCR, OSCE, the European 
Commission, the World Bank and the IMF.76 Bosnian authorities were also 
integrated within the framework of closer international cooperation. As a result of 
the new coordination structure, the turf wars between the different organizations 
decreased.77 
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Another important aspect of the streamlining process was a closer 
association between the OHR and the EU. This change in policy was recognized 
and endorsed by the PIC in February 2002.78 On 11 March 2002, the Council of the 
EU decided to appoint the British politician Paddy Ashdown as the EU Special 
Representative in Bosnia. Thus, when assuming the function of High 
Representative on 27 May 2002, Ashdown became the first to be simultaneously 
the High Representative and the EU Special Representative.79 As both High 
Representative and EU Special Representative, an important policy objective of 
Ashdown was to stimulate the integration of Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
As a result, during Ashdown’s tenure the High Representative’s part of the office 
has been downsized and more emphasis has been put on the role of the EU.80 An 
acceleration of the transfer of functions from the High Representative to the EU 
Special Representative took place in 2005.81 In the same year, the PIC explicitly 
recommended that the position of the High Representative be gradually replaced by 
the EU Special Representative.82 In July 2006, the PIC officially decided to phase 
out the OHR, with the deadline initially set for 30 June 2007. 83 However, due to 
the stagnation of important reforms the deadline was extended to June 2008. When 
in February 2008 it became clear that this deadline would not be met, the PIC 
decided to continue with phasing out the OHR, but without mentioning a concrete 
date for its definite closure. Instead, the PIC formulated two conditions and five 
objectives which must be delivered before the OHR is replaced by the EU Special 
Representative.84 While the PIC was satisfied with the progress that had been 
achieved in June 2008, by November the PIC ‘expressed its deep concern’ about 
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the lack of progress since the June meeting.85 As a result, the OHR has continued 
its tasks alongside the EU Special Representative.  
In spite of the continued existence of the OHR, the establishment of an EU 
Special Representative reflected the increased importance of the EU as an 
international actor in Bosnia. The year 2000 was a watershed in that respect. First, 
the PIC decided to meet in Brussels on the level of ministers of foreign affairs and 
explicitly referred to the EU’s road map with respect to a closer association 
between the EU and Bosnia.86 Secondly, during the European Council meeting in 
Feira (June 2000), the EU expressed its commitment for a closer association and 
eventual integration of South Eastern Europe (and thus Bosnia) into the EU. This 
was reiterated during the European Council meeting at Thessaloniki (June 2003). 
The EU’s Stability and Association Process (SAP) resulted in the decision to start 
negotiations on a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia in 
November 2005. Further, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.4, the EU took over 
several important tasks from the UN and NATO. In 2002, the UN-led IPTF was 
replaced by the EUPM. And in December 2004, SFOR was replaced by EUFOR. 
Finally, the increased role of the EU in Bosnia is reflected in the OHR reports 
addressed to the High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Javier Solana) and the EU Enlargement Commissioner (Olli Rehn).87  
  
3.1.6 Developing implementation strategies 
 
Streamlining the coordination between the OHR’s international partners was 
important, but devising a coherent strategy to implement the Dayton Agreement 
was crucial. There did not exist such a plan when the OHR started operations. 
During the first year of the international administration, a lot of time was lost due 
to the lack of a coherent implementation strategy. It seemed as if the international 
community was not fully committed to Bosnia. The USA, for example, declared in 
1995 that American troops would only stay in Bosnia for one year.88 It was also 
anticipated that the OHR would turn over power to the domestic institutions once 
the first elections were held in the fall of 1996. Soon, however, it became clear that 
this exit strategy was not realistic.  
 During the first months of the mission, High Representative Carl Bildt 
focused on setting up his office, starting economic reconstruction and organizing 
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elections.89 The ad hoc policy of the early days was replaced by a concrete 
implementation plan in the fall of 1996; the Quick Start Package. The Quick Start 
Package was a collection of regulations for the new domestic state institutions that 
were established after the September 1996 elections. The Package was created by 
the OHR in cooperation with the IMF and the European Commission.90 The 
regulations varied from economic and financial reforms to matters related to state 
symbols and provisions for regulating communications.91 
 The Quick Start Package was followed by action plans for 1997 and 1998 
as part of the Civilian Consolidation Plan. The Civilian Consolidation Plan 
included thirteen policy priorities: regional stabilization, security, human rights, 
democratization, elections, freedom of movement, refugees and displaced persons, 
war crimes, reconstruction, market economy, reconciliation, education and 
landmine-removal.92 The PIC meeting in December 1996 endorsed the action plan 
for 2007 and added the issues of policing, the construction of a central bank, free 
and independent media, the strategic Brko territory and customs.93 The action plan 
for 1998 was dubbed ‘Self Sustaining Structures’ and it focused on the same policy 
areas as its predecessor.94 During the Luxembourg meeting in June 1998, the PIC 
evaluated the progress and presented the implementation agenda for the remainder 
of 1998.95 In December 1998, during the PIC meeting in Madrid, the end of the 
Civilian Consolidation Plan was announced, while recognizing that a domestically 
sustained peace had not yet been achieved.96 
 The following implementation plan of the PIC, announced in Madrid, was 
dubbed ‘Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Way Ahead.’ Its 
policy priorities were refugee return, establishing the rule of law, strengthening the 
common domestic institutions, creating a self sustaining economy, 
democratization, developing closer relations between Bosnia and Europe, 
addressing military and security issues, the strategic Brko territory, state 
succession issues, and ensuring international support for the civil (as opposed to 
the military) implementation of the Dayton Agreement.97 In May 2000 in Brussels, 
the PIC concluded that the security situation had stabilized, major reconstruction 
was completed, the return of refugees and displaced persons was accelerating, the 
Brko district had been established and political pluralism was gaining strength. 
Three key strategic areas were defined as focus of the implementation effort: 
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economic reform, the return of displaced persons and fostering functional and 
democratically accountable common institutions.98 One and a half years later, High 
Representative Petritsch presented a new action plan during a PIC Steering Board 
meeting in December 2001. The action plan not only included a framework for 
stronger international coordination (as discussed above), but also presented 
benchmarks and end-states for the OHR. It allowed the PIC Steering Board to 
review and evaluate progress and provide timelines for the transfer of authority to 
the Bosnians.99 The action plan was endorsed on 28 February 2002 and was one of 
the most important priority areas for implementation of judicial reform with the 
objective to strengthening the rule of law.100  
Paddy Ashdown, who was Petritsch’s successor, put a special emphasis on 
judicial reform and the economy. Under the heading Jobs and Justice he presented 
his implementation plan in 2002. However, Jobs and Justice was soon to be 
replaced by a new implementation strategy which was presented in January 2003. 
The objective of the so called Mission Implementation Plan was to establish the 
core tasks for the OHR and to provide the OHR with a method to evaluate 
progress.101 New versions of the Mission Implementation Plan were developed in 
2004 and 2005, but the four core objectives remained the same: entrenching the 
rule of law, reforming the economy, strengthening the capacity of (Bosnia’s) 
governing institutions, especially at the state level and embedding defense and 
intelligence reforms so as to facilitate (Bosnian) integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures.102 In the Mission Implementation Plan for 2006/2007 the number of 
tasks was reduced to three, since the defense and intelligence reforms had been 
completed. The Mission Implementation Plan stated: ‘Consistent with efforts to 
transfer responsibility for running the country to the BiH authorities, no new 
reforms have been added to the OHR MIP [Mission Implementation Plan, NvW] 
for 2006/2007. However, the MIP has been and remains an important tool for OHR 
to assess the pace and effectiveness of progress in peace implementation.’103 When 
the German politician Christian Schwarz-Schilling assumed office as High 
Representative in January 2006, he emphasized that the OHR would continue to 
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prepare for a transition to an ‘Office of the EU Special Representative.’ By doing 
so, the OHR would not undertake new commitments and would focus on executing 
existing tasks.104 Given the gradual transfer of authority from the OHR to the EU 
Special Representative, the Mission Implementation Plan became increasingly 
associated with the SAP requirements.  
 
3.2 Building Bosnia’s political institutions  
 
3.2.1 Transitional executive institutions  
 
The state level institutions in Bosnia were only set up after the first post-war 
elections in September 1996. Until that time, the Constitution embedded in the 
Dayton Agreement envisioned interim structures. The highest domestic authority 
was the Joint Interim Commission, which was allowed to: ‘discuss practical 
questions related to the implementation of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes, and to 
make recommendations and proposals.’105 The Joint Interim Commission included 
the Prime Ministers of the war-time governments of Bosnia. The body was merely 
consultative and the meetings were chaired by the High Representative. Until the 
PIC meeting in Florence in June 1996, they only met a few times with the first 
meeting being in Sarajevo on 24 January 1996. However, after the PIC meeting, it 
was decided that the Joint Interim Commission would meet on a weekly basis.106 
Next to the Joint Interim Commission a Joint Civilian Committee was established. 
The Joint Civilian Committee was chaired by the Principal Deputy High 
Representative and included ministerial representatives from the war-time Bosnian 
governments, the commander of IFOR and, upon invitation of the High 
Representative, representatives of international agencies. The Joint Civilian 
Committee was meant to advise the Bosnian representatives on the results of the 
meetings of the Contact Group and the PIC, as well as to apply pressure on the 
domestic members to implement the Dayton Agreement. The OHR also created 
regional Joint Civilian Committees which were all run by the Principal Deputy 
High Representative.107  
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3.2.2 Bosnia’s constitutional design 
 
After the September 1996 elections, the Joint Interim Commission and the Joint 
Civilian Committee were disbanded and replaced by permanent institutions. When 
assessing Bosnia’s institutions as they are presented in the Constitution, it is 
necessary to make a clear distinction between the institutions at the federal (state) 
level and the political institutions at the entity and sub-entity levels. The Dayton 
Agreement created what has been called: ‘the most decentralized state of the 
world.’108 The decentralized character of Bosnia has aptly been summarized by 
Solioz: ‘To sum up: Bosnia contains one state, two entities, three constituent 
peoples, around four million inhabitants and five levels of authority.’109 As a result 
of the decentralized governance structure, no less than fourteen Bosnian 
institutions have been given legislative powers.110 
Bosnia under the Dayton Constitution consists of a federal state with two 
political entities; the Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina (Federation) and the 
Republika Srpska (Serb Republic).111 In addition a condominium of both entities 
has been established in the form of the Brko district. The state level is composed 
of three political institutions: a collective Presidency (consisting of one Bosniak, 
one Bosnian Croat and one Bosnian Serb), the Council of Ministers (the 
government) and a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly; consisting of the House of 
Representatives and the House of Peoples. Further, the Constitution establishes a 
Constitutional Court, a Standing Committee on Military Matters and the Central 
Bank, which are not elaborated upon in this analysis.  
Before describing the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the 
Parliamentary Assembly it is necessary to point out the relatively weak position of 
the state level when compared to the two entities. When the Bosnian Constitution 
was drafted during the Dayton negotiations, the Serb Republic and the Federation 
already existed. That limited the possibility of establishing strong state level 
institutions.112 The Constitution established strong entities compared to the state 
level and both entities enjoy many characteristics of a state, including citizenship, 
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defense, taxation, and justice. Especially the Constitution of the Serb Republic 
reflects the concept of a unitary state.113 In turn, the state level was left with 
traditional federal powers, including: foreign policy; foreign trade policy; customs 
policy; monetary policy; finances of the institutions and for the international 
obligations of Bosnia; immigration, refugee and asylum policy; international and 
inter-entity criminal law enforcement; establishment and operation of common and 
international communications facilities; regulation inter-entity transportation; and 
air traffic control.114 On top of its limited authority, the state level lacked 
enforcement mechanisms and powers of taxation to enable it to finance its 
activities.115 As a result, the power of the three state level political institutions has 
been limited from the beginning. 
Nonetheless, the state level institutions form the highest level of authority 
in Bosnia. First, the Presidency is the highest state institution. Among others it is 
responsible for conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia, for nominating the chair of 
the Council of Ministers and for executing civilian command over the armed 
forces. The members of the Presidency are elected by their constitutive peoples. 
Thus, the Bosnian Serb member is elected by voters from the Serb Republic, 
whereas the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak members are elected by the inhabitants of 
the Federation. Moreover, each member has to be a representative of one of the 
three so called constituent peoples (i.e. Bosniak, Bosnian Croat or Bosnian 
Serb).116  
Secondly, the Council of Ministers functions as the government. Two 
thirds of its members come from the Federation and one third comes from the Serb 
Republic. Based on the law of 1997 on the Council of Ministers the decisions were 
taken by consensus, the institution had a rotating chair with two co-chairs (all from 
a different constituent people) and every minister had two deputy ministers from 
another constituent people. The law on the Council of Ministers was amended 
twice in 2000 and in 2002. In 2002, the second deputy ministers were abolished as 
well as the rotating chair. The rotating chair was replaced by one chair and two 
vice-chairs (from different constituent peoples). 
In the meantime, the size of the Council of Ministers had increased 
significantly since 1997. It started with three ministries: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry for Civil Affairs and 
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Communications.117 In 2000, the Council of Ministers was expanded with a 
Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the Ministry for Treasury of State 
Institutions, and the Ministry for European Integration and the Stability Pact. 118 In 
2002, two new ministries, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Security, 
were added. The Ministry for European Integration was downscaled to a directorate 
under the direct supervision of the chair of the Council of Ministers in 2002, while 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communications had been split in to a Ministry of 
Civil Affairs and a Ministry of Communications and Transport.119 The ninth 
ministry was added in 2004 with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense.120  
The Parliamentary Assembly, finally, consists of two chambers: the House 
of Representatives and the House of Peoples. The 42 member House of 
Representatives is directly elected by the voters of the entities. Two thirds of the 
seats are elected in the Federation and one third in the Serb Republic. Each 
constituent people has a representative in the Presidency of the House of 
Representatives. The House of Peoples consists of 15 members and gets elected by 
the parliaments of the entities (see below). Every constituent people has five 
representatives in the House of Peoples and one member in the Presidency. The 
Presidency of both the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives consists 
of one rotating chair (every eight months) and two deputy chairs, each from a 
different constituent people.121 The Parliamentary Assembly became operational in 
January 1997 after the first general elections had been organized in September 
1996.122 From 1996 to 2008, no less than twelve elections have been organized, as 
is shown in Table 3.1. The table also shows that out of the twelve elections, five 
elections were general elections which included elections for the state level 
parliament.123  
The general elections also included elections for the entity political 
institutions. On the entity level, the Federation consists of a President and a Vice-
President, a Government, a bicameral Parliament (the House of Representatives 
and the House of Peoples), a Constitutional Court and a Supreme Court. The Serb 
Republic is composed of a President and Vice-President, a Government, a National 
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Assembly, a Constitutional Court and a Supreme Court. Both entities have their 
own constitution, which was first drafted during the war and remained roughly 
unchanged during the Dayton negotiations.  
 
Table 3.1: Elections in Bosnia 1996 - 2008 
Date Type of Election 
30 June 1996 Municipal elections in the city of Mostar 
14 September 1996 General elections (State level: Presidency, 
and House of Representatives; Federation: 
House of Representatives and cantonal 
Assemblies; Serb Republic: Presidency and 
National Assembly) 
13 September 1997 Municipal elections   
23 November 1997 Extraordinary elections for the National 
Assembly of the Serb Republic 
12-13 September 1998 General elections (see above) 
8 April 2000 Municipal elections   
11 November 2000 General elections, municipal elections in 
Srebrenica 
5 October 2002 General elections, municipal elections in 
Žepe 
2 October 2004 Municipal elections   
2 October 2004 Elections in the Brko district 
1 October 2006 General elections (see above) 
5 October 2008 Municipal elections   
 
More levels of government can be found below the entity levels. As an 
entity, the Federation is a decentralized unit, existing of ten cantons with equal 
rights and responsibilities. The lowest level of government within the Federation is 
the municipal level. The municipalities, which amount to over eighty, have far less 
power than the cantons.124 The Serb Republic does not have cantons, but has about 
sixty municipalities that are not very powerful compared to the entity government. 
Their role is limited to policy implementation and administration. Decision making 
is left to the Serb Republic as an entity.125 Thus, whereas a citizen in the Federation 
has to deal with four levels of government (municipality, canton, entity and state), 
a citizen living in the Serb Republic has three levels of government (municipality, 
entity and state). 
A special status was created for Brko. Brko is a strategic area between 
the Serb Republic and the Federation; it actually splits the Serb Republic in two 
parts. Because of its strategically important position, a special regime for the 
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territory was established. In the Dayton Agreement, the status of Brko was left 
unresolved and subjected to international arbitration. In 1996, an Arbitration 
Tribunal was formed with the American diplomat Robert Owen as presiding 
arbitrator and azim Sadikovi and Vitomir Popovi as local members, appointed 
by the Federation and the Serb Republic respectively. It proved not to be possible 
to decide on the status of Brko before 14 December 1996, which was the deadline 
established by Dayton. The resolution of the issue was postponed several times, 
until the Final Award of 5 March 1999. The Final Award made Brko a special 
district under the exclusive sovereignty of the state of Bosnia. Hence, Brko 
belongs simultaneously to both entities in condominium. Brko is self-governing 
and, given its strategic position, entirely demilitarized. The international 
supervisory regime was maintained in order to implement the Final Award.126 
Given the fact that the Brko supervisor had extensive powers at his disposal, the 
regime could be seen as an international administration separate from the OHR. 
Among others, the Brko supervisor established a multi-ethnic police force and a 
judiciary.127 On 8 March 2000, after one year of preparations by a joint 
implementation commission, the District of Brko (encompassing three 
municipalities) was inaugurated.128 In the same month, an Interim Government and 
Assembly were established by appointment. The appointed administration was 
replaced by an elected authority in October 2004. 
 
3.3 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
 
3.3.1 The historical background of UNMIK 
 
UNMIK was established after Kosovo had become the scene of violent conflict 
between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian government in 1998 and 1999. The 
issue at stake was the Kosovo Albanian quest for independence and the Serbian 
wish to keep the territory under the authority of Belgrade. The Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1974 had provided Kosovo with the status of an autonomous 
province, but this autonomy had been abolished by Miloševi in 1989. During the 
1990s, when the former Yugoslavia violently fell apart, the situation in Kosovo 
was characterized by rising tensions and occasional violence between on the one 
hand Kosovo Albanians and on the other hand Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian 
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authorities. A new Kosovo Albanian party, the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(Lidhja Demokratike te Kosovës, LDK) was created on 23 December 1989.129 
Ibrahim Rugova (1944 - 2006), president of the Association of Writers of Kosovo, 
became its political leader. Under his leadership, the Kosovo Albanians organized 
a campaign of ‘passive resistance.’ That involved the creation of parallel 
institutions such as education, health and security structures. Rugova even 
managed to organize an underground referendum for independence in September 
1991 and underground presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1998. 
These elections were won by the LDK and resulted in his election as President. 
Rugova was supported by a coalition government-in-exile in Bonn (Germany) 
under the leadership of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bujar 
Bukoshi from 1992 to 1999. The government was comprised of five other 
ministers; on information, education, finance, justice and health.130 An important 
task of the government was to raise funds among the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in 
order to finance the parallel government’s activities.131 Although the Kosovo 
Albanian parallel state was more or less tolerated by Miloševi, it was recognized 
by no other country except Albania. 
The situation in Kosovo deteriorated in 1998 when the irregular Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) started an insurgency. The KLA had been created in the 
beginning of the 1990’s and - in spite of Rugova’s call for using the instrument of 
passive resistance only - grew steadily. Small numbers of KLA members went to 
Albania in order to get military training in secret camps. These camps formed a 
basis out of which the army conducted several raids into Kosovo. The 
disappointing outcome of the Dayton Peace Agreement (which ignored the tensions 
in Kosovo), the easy availability of weapons in Albania after the state breakdown 
in 1997, and the lack of concrete results achieved by Rugova’s strategy of passive 
resistance changed the character and intensity of the insurgency.132 Especially after 
the Drenica massacre of 5 March 1998 when 58 Kosovo Albanians were killed by 
Serbian troops, the KLA started to carry out attacks on a more regular basis and 
became better organized.133 At the same time, Serbian forces became more 
determined in their efforts to defeat the KLA.134  
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In 1998, the escalation of the conflict finally drew the attention of the 
international community. The resulting diplomatic efforts to end the conflict were 
characterized by confusion and mixed signals.135 UN Security Council Resolution 
1160 (31 March 1998) called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and was full 
of uncertainty about how to deal with the Kosovo issue. It condemned both Serbia 
and the KLA (which was considered to be a terrorist organization) for using 
violence, but at the same time also recognized the territorial integrity of Serbia.136 
Responding to Resolution 1160, Miloševi and Rugova made an attempt at a 
peaceful settlement by holding talks in the summer of 1998. After that had failed, 
UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1999) increased the pressure 
on Belgrade and called for an immediate ceasefire. The resolution, together with 
crisis diplomacy by US diplomats, led to an agreement in which Miloševi agreed 
to withdraw 4000 Serbian troops, to allow a 2000 strong observer mission of the 
OSCE (the Kosovo Verification Mission, KVM) that would monitor the 
withdrawal, and to undertake further negotiations with the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership.137  
Neither Miloševi, nor the KLA proved to be committed to the agreement. 
The violence continued and culminated in the Raak/Reçak massacre of 15 January 
1999. After 45 bodies of Kosovo Albanian civilians were discovered near the 
village of Raak/Reçak and a vicious circle of violence had begun, did the 
international community realize that continuing the attempt for reaching a peaceful 
settlement under Resolution 1199 would not be possible. As a result, the Kosovo 
Albanians and Miloševi were summoned by the Contact Group (the same group of 
nations that had been involved in Bosnia) to participate in negotiations for a 
political solution at the castle of Rambouillet (France) in February and March 
1999.138 The negotiations failed, because of a lack of consensus within the Contact 
Group and the lack of preparedness among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs to find a 
solution. Only as a result of tremendous international pressure, the internally 
divided Kosovo Albanian delegation agreed to sign a compromise solution 
proposed by the Contact Group. The Serbian delegation had based its negotiation 
strategy on internal differences within the Kosovo Albanian delegation. The 
Serbian delegation accepted many elements of the Contact Group’s plan in the 
expectation that the Kosovo Albanians would not find internal agreement and so 
they could then be blamed for failed negotiations. However, faced with sudden 
Kosovo Albanian unity, Miloševi refused to sign on the grounds that the final plan 
had been drafted during secret consultations with the Kosovo Albanians and that he 
could not sign an agreement that violated the basic rights of Serbia. While the US 
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government continued to persuade Miloševi to sign the plan, Serbia reacted by 
stepping up the military campaign in Kosovo.139  
Serbia’s refusal to accept the Rambouillet plan and its intensified military 
campaign in Kosovo left little room for maneuver for the Contact Group.140 
Moreover, the Western world was in danger of loosing credibility as on several 
occasions NATO had threatened Miloševi with force if he would not withdraw 
Serbian troops from Kosovo.141 This threat was actually carried out after the 
Rambouillet negotiations had failed. From 24 March to 10 June 1999, NATO 
carried out air strikes (Allied Force) to force Miloševi to accept the Rambouillet 
Agreement and to withdraw his military forces from Kosovo.  
NATO’s intervention had not been authorized by the UN Security Council 
which was paralyzed by a lack of consensus among the (permanent) members. 
Whereas the USA and the UK had been supporters of the Kosovo Albanian case, 
Russia opposed any resolution to the conflict that would impose a settlement on 
Serbia.142 As a result, NATO’s campaign was condemned as an act of aggression 
and support was expressed for Serbia.143 Not only Russia condemned the NATO 
operation; Allied Force was also interpreted as an infringement on Serbia’s 
sovereignty by China and India.144 Two days after the start of the operation, the 
Russians circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution which called for an 
immediate end to the bombings since they violated the UN-charter. The draft was 
co-sponsored by India and Belarus, but rejected by the twelve other members of the 
Security Council.145 However, confronted with a fait accomplit, the Russian 
government realized at the end of April that it was also in Russia’s interest to end 
the war as soon as possible. During the meeting of the G8 of 6 May 1999, Russia 
agreed with the establishment of a peace-keeping force for Kosovo after the NATO 
bombings would end (an idea which the Russian government had opposed up to 
that date).146 The Russian policy change led to the creation of a team of diplomatic 
envoys consisting of former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
President of Finland Marthi Ahtisaari (representing the EU), and US deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Together they drafted a peace plan which was 
based on the G8 principles that had been formulated during the meeting of May.147 
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The peace plan was presented to Miloševi on 3 June and included the following 
elements: 148 
 
1)  Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.  
2)  Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary 
forces according to a rapid timetable.  
3)  Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective 
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of 
common objectives.  
4)  The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and 
control, and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in 
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced 
persons and refugees.  
5)  Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as part of the 
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy a 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be 
decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim 
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo.  
6)  After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel 
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: Liaison with 
international civil mission and international security presence; 
Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial 
sites Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7)  Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the 
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations.  
8)  A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for 
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization 
of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay 
or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.  
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9)  A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization 
of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact 
for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to 
further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and 
regional cooperation.  
10)  Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set 
forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, 
required elements, which are specified in the footnote below. A military-
technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among 
other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and 
functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo.  
 
This peace plan was unconditionally accepted by the Serbian government. On 5 
June talks started on a Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the 
Serbian military and on 9 June the Agreement was signed. It divided Kosovo into 
three separate zones and created a demilitarized zone on the Serbian side of the 
Kosovo border. It also included a timetable under which Serbian forces would 
withdraw from each zone. The withdrawn troops would be replaced with a NATO 
force of about 50.000 troops which was allowed to use all necessary force to 
enforce the Military Technical Agreement.149 While military experts were drafting 
the Military Technical Agreement, the G8 Foreign Ministers were working to draft 
a UN Security Council resolution based on the G8 peace plan. On 8 June there was 
agreement among the G8, including Russia, for a draft resolution. On 10 June the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244. Soon after Serbia started to 
withdraw its forces (withdrawal was completed on 20 June) and NATO suspended 
its air campaign.150 
  
3.3.2 International governorship 
 
The end of operation Allied Force in June 1999 did not result in a final settlement 
of the conflict. In the end, the only document which was signed by the Serbian 
government was the Military Technical Agreement which was not much more than 
a cease-fire.151 NATO’s intervention did not mean that the incompatibility would 
be solved by making Kosovo independent. Although NATO’s intervention and the 
earlier UN involvement is sometimes explained in terms of political support for 
independence by the KLA, the position of the Western powers was much more 
ambivalent.152 First, the initial reason for the Western involvement in the conflict 
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was to preserve the stability of South Eastern Europe as a region.153 Secondly, 
when it became clear that the conflict erupted into ethnic cleansing and a 
humanitarian tragedy for hundreds of thousands of people, the principal objective 
became to stop the humanitarian suffering. As such, Allied Force was not started 
with the aim to make Kosovo independent.154  
Despite the lack of international consensus on the issue of Kosovo both 
types of international administration were discussed. First, international 
administration of the control type, the model used in Bosnia, was considered. That 
model emerged in the text of the failed Rambouillet Agreement. The Rambouillet 
Agreement (accepted by the Kosovo Albanians, but rejected by Miloševi) 
determined that Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia, but that Kosovo would also 
be allowed to have a substantial amount of self-government. The Rambouillet 
Agreement called for an assembly, a government and even a president of Kosovo. 
At the same time, the territorial integrity of Serbia would remain intact. The 
implementation would be monitored by an implementation mission of the OSCE 
and the EU. The Chief of the Implementation Mission would have the following 
tasks and authorities: 155 
 
(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian aspects of this 
Agreement pursuant to a schedule that he shall specify; 
 
(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance with those 
aspects of this Agreement; 
 
(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of difficulties arising in 
connection with such implementation; 
 
(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, including on issues of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, in particular by putting forward proposals and 
identifying priorities for their consideration as appropriate; 
 
(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Kosovo 
assisting in the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting 
fully their specific organizational procedures; 
 
(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for constituting the Mission on 
progress in the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and 
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(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement pertaining to police and 
security forces. 
 
Like the High Representative in Bosnia, the Chief of the Implementation 
Mission would be ‘the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the 
civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his 
determinations as binding on all Parties and persons.’156 However, an international 
administration of the control type which would be based on a peace agreement 
proved to be impossible to realize after the NATO operation. The control type 
international administration in the Rambouillet text presumed the continuation of 
Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo. Yet it was unthinkable that Serbian sovereignty in 
Kosovo could be restored given the atrocities carried out during the war in 1998 
and 1999. Discussions within the UN Security Council showed an international 
consensus that in the case of Kosovo humanitarian norms prevailed over the norm 
of sovereignty.157 Therefore, the UN Security Council decided to launch a UN 
mission that would (temporarily) act as the sovereign government in Kosovo; i.e. 
an international administration of the governorship type. 
Belgrade protested against a governorship type international 
administration, but within the Security Council it only got support from China. 
However, China did not make use of its veto power due to the Serbian acceptance 
of the general principles of the peace plan and the acknowledgement that a joint 
adoption of a Security Council resolution would restore the Security Council’s 
unity. Moreover, China (and Russia for that matter) feared a NATO-led 
international administration if Resolution 1244 would be vetoed. In that way, a 
UN-led international administration was considered to be the lesser evil and China 
abstained from voting so that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 could be 
adopted by consensus. 158  
Russia had voted in favor of Resolution 1244, because it left the final 
status undecided. The Russians, having protested against the NATO operation, had 
finally decided to cooperate with Western countries to broker a deal between 
NATO and Miloševi, but they could not accept an independent Kosovo. As such, 
there was no international consensus regarding the status of Kosovo. In contrast to 
the case of Bosnia, the Russian government tried to influence the course of events 
in a substantial way. The Russian interventions were not merely focused on 
emphasizing its position in the world, but also on supporting the Serbian 
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government in its claim that the territorial integrity of Serbia could not be harmed. 
Therefore, postponing a decision on the political status of the territory proved to be 
the only politically realistic policy option at the end of NATO’s air campaign. The 
UN Security Council hoped that during the period of international administration it 
would be able to find a solution to the conflict together with the conflicting parties. 
Having achieved the postponement of a status decision, Russia reluctantly agreed 
with an UN-led international administration and a military mission led by NATO, 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR).159 Kosovo would be administered and prepared for self-
government by UNMIK, while KFOR would maintain peace and security. The 
status of the territory (the incompatibility) was left to the UN Security Council to 
handle, although no exact timeframe was given.  
 
3.3.3 The mandate and organization of UNMIK 
 
The mandate of UNMIK was based on Resolution 1244. The resolution was 
decided upon by the Security Council on 10 June 1999 and was meant to restore 
the authority of the Security Council in the wake of NATO’s intervention.160 The 
resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and it 
authorized the establishment of: ‘an international civil presence in Kosovo in order 
to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo 
can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional democratic self governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.’161 In 
addition to the international administration, it authorized the presence of KFOR 
with initially about 50.000 troops. 
 Partly based on ‘lessons learned’ from the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement in Bosnia, all tasks were brought under one umbrella 
organization.162 As it was established in 1999, UNMIK consisted of four pillars: 
humanitarian assistance (pillar 1); civil administration (pillar 2); democratization 
and institution-building (pillar 3); and economic reconstruction (pillar 4).163 The 
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first two pillars were led by the UN, the third by the OSCE and the fourth by the 
EU. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UN Special 
Representative) had the final responsibility for all these pillars.164 He reported 
directly to the Secretary-General of the UN, who in his turn informed the UN 
Security Council. Within the UN Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations was responsible for the policy coordination between the UN 
headquarters in New York and UNMIK. While the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations served an operational function, the politically strategic decisions were 
taken by the UN Security Council.165  
 
3.3.4 The major international partners of UNMIK 
 
In contrast to the OHR, UNMIK started with a strong operational mandate and it 
was not necessary to strengthen it in the course of time. The pillar structure was 
also an improvement compared to the structure of the international administration 
in Bosnia in the sense that it facilitated coordination between the major 
international organizations in the territory. Two principal international partners of 
the UN, i.e. the OSCE and the EU, were embedded in the pillar organization. 
The main function of the OSCE in Kosovo was to support the institution-
building process.166 It did so by organizing elections and setting up capacity 
building programs for the Assembly, especially through the so called Assembly 
Support Initiative. Through its Institute of Civil Administration, the OSCE trained 
a few thousand civil servants between 2000 and 2002.167 Since 2003, the OSCE 
supported and cooperated with the Kosovo Institute of Public Administration 
(KIPA), which was responsible for training and educating a multi-ethnic civil 
service. The OSCE also fostered the creation of independent media and the 
promotion of human rights. Finally, the organization was also active in the field of 
security and helped establish the Kosovo Police School.168 Since the OSCE mission 
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was integrated in UNMIK’s structure, its head of mission reported to the UN 
Special Representative.169  
 Since the EU member states were the greatest donors to Kosovo, the EU 
became responsible for economic reconstruction. It carried out its task through the 
fourth UNMIK pillar and through a specialized agency called the European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR).170 Among the achievements of the EU were the 
introduction of a new currency (first in 1999 the German Mark and in 2002 the 
Euro), the establishment of the Customs Service (executed by the international 
administration), the creation of the Banking System and Payments Authority and 
the reconstruction of water and electricity facilities.171 The EU also set up the 
Central Fiscal Authority as Kosovo’s new treasury.172 Finally, the EU was involved 
in the transformation of Kosovo’s socialist economy to a modern market economy. 
Similar to the Head of Mission of the OSCE, the EU Head of Mission reported to 
the UN Special Representative.173 
Unlike the OSCE and the EU, NATO did not have its mission integrated in 
the pillar structure. Nonetheless, since UNMIK was totally dependent on KFOR for 
maintaining peace and security, smooth cooperation was essential. To that extent, 
regular consultations took place between the KFOR commander and UNMIK.174 In 
the field, coordination between KFOR troops and UNMIK was organized through 
Civil Military Cooperation teams and security meetings.175 Next to maintaining 
peace and security, NATO was involved in the demilitarization of the KLA.  
 Next to NATO and the pillar organizations, there were other relevant 
international organizations active in Kosovo. The World Bank, for example, 
committed approximately 95 million US Dollars to Kosovo between 2000 and 
2006.176 Moreover, an important political role has been played by the Contact 
Group in general and the so called Quint (the Contact Group minus Russia) in 
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particular.177 Until the renewed outbreak of ethnic violence between Kosovo 
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in March of 2004, the Contact Group was only 
modestly involved and provided some political guidance to UNMIK. The Contact 
Group increased its involvement after March 2004 and by the start of preparations 
for status negotiations in 2005 it could be considered the most important 
international actor in Kosovo. As in Bosnia, within the Contact Group, the USA 
again played a crucial role.  
 
3.3.5 Developing implementation strategies  
 
NATO’s operation Allied Force had been started without a clear vision of what 
would come after the bombings.178 When UNMIK was deployed in June 1999, it 
did not have a concrete implementation plan. As in Bosnia, the first year of 
UNMIK’s presence was largely devoted to setting up its offices. A first 
deployment mission was organized under the direction of Sergio Veira de Mello 
and consisted of about 200 officials, mainly drawn from the UN mission in Bosnia 
(UNMIBH).179 The main difference between the implementation process in Bosnia 
and in Kosovo was that UNMIK was not allowed to solve the status issue and to 
work towards an end state since that would require a new resolution of the UN 
Security Council.  
The primary task of the international administration was to create 
provisional governmental institutions. That process started with the development of 
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure and was followed by the Provisional 
Institutions of Government in 2002 (see below). After the provisional institutions 
had formally been established, UNMIK threatened to become a mission without 
any vision.180 Consequently, UN Special Representative Michael Steiner devised a 
comprehensive implementation strategy in the course of 2002. In April, Steiner 
presented the first draft of what was called Benchmarks for Kosovo to the UN 
Security Council. The benchmarks became known in the press as the Standards 
before Status policy.181 It pointed to the necessity that the Standards would have to 
be implemented by Kosovo’s authorities before a decision on the final status of the 
territory could be taken. The Standards before Status policy had been designed as a 
tool to manage the interim period until the international community would be ready 
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to address the political status of Kosovo.182 The initial benchmarks included eight 
directives on: functioning democratic institutions; the rule of law (police and 
judiciary); freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property 
rights; dialogue with Belgrade and the Kosovo Protection Corps.183  
 Initially, after their announcement, little was done to implement the 
benchmarks. According to the International Crisis Group, they were ‘a vague 
pronouncement of UNMIK, rather than tangible, realistic objectives for the 
provisional institutions to work towards.’184 However, encouraged by the UN 
Security Council, UNMIK established a concrete work plan for the Standards in 
2003.185 This resulted in the Standards for Kosovo document, which was presented 
by UNMIK on 10 December 2003 and endorsed by the UN Security Council two 
days later.186 The Standards for Kosovo summed up the same eight issues as the 
Benchmarks for Kosovo had done, with one slight modification; the fourth 
standard had become ‘sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their 
members.’187  
Four months later, on 13 March 2004, the Standards for Kosovo were 
followed by the Standards Implementation Plan. This document was meant to 
specify the actions and policies that would be necessary to reach the Standards.188 
The Standards Implementation Plan, consisting of 120 pages and mentioning 484 
individual actions proved to be too ambitious.189 Therefore, UNMIK decided to 
prioritize several actions within the eight Standards. The focus was on the core 
principle of minority protection and on fostering a multi-ethnic society.190 The first 
prioritization occurred in the field of refugee return in the wake of the large scale 
ethnic violence in March 2004.191 Prioritization in the other Standards materialized 
in the summer of 2004 when UN Special Representative Sören Jessen-Petersen 
replaced Harri Holkeri.192 One year later, a comprehensive review of the Standards 
process was made with the objective to determine whether Kosovo was ready to 
start negotiations on the final status. This review was carried out by the Norwegian 
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diplomat Kai Eide, who concluded that much work still remained to be done. 
Nonetheless, the report also recognized that the political status of Kosovo had to be 
decided in order to achieve further results. As a result, the UN Security Council 
decided to start a new implementation policy which was called Standards and 
Status. This policy is elaborated upon in Chapter six which examines in detail the 
final status negotiations. 
  
3.4 Building provisional political institutions in Kosovo  
 
3.4.1 Transitional executive institutions  
 
As had been the case in Bosnia, new political institutions could only be established 
after the first elections had been organized. Therefore, until 2001 transitional 
executive institutions were established in order to consult domestic politicians. A 
few weeks after its establishment in June 1999, UNMIK created the Kosovo 
Transitional Council, which under the chairmanship of the UN Special 
Representative brought together the representatives of Kosovo’s political parties 
and ethnic communities. The Kosovo Transitional Council had two primary 
functions. First, as the highest consultative body to UNMIK, it offered the main 
political parties and ethnic communities in Kosovo an opportunity for input in the 
international decision making process. Second, it was designed to be a forum 
where parties could work on achieving consensus on a broad range of issues, 
related to civil administration, institution-building, reconstruction and essential 
services.193  
 This transitional arrangement was changed with the establishment of the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure. The term ‘joint’ referred to the combined 
membership of international and domestic officials. After months of negotiations 
within the Kosovo Transitional Council, an agreement was reached to establish the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure on 15 December 1999. It consisted of 
several political institutions. First, the Kosovo Transitional Council remained and 
continued to carry out its role as highest consultative body. It was expanded to 36 
members in order to better reflect the pluralistic composition of Kosovo’s 
population.194 Second, the Interim Administrative Council, a kind of proto 
provisional government, was formed. It consisted of four international members, 
three Kosovo Albanians and one Kosovo Serb.195 Third, the agreement created 
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fourteen and later twenty administrative departments that were jointly administered 
by international and domestic staff.196  
The Joint Interim Administrative Structure had merely an advisory 
function and little actual political authority. Since elections had not been held yet at 
the time of their formation, the Kosovo Transitional Council and Interim 
Administrative Council were formed on the basis of perceived electoral strength of 
Kosovo’s political parties.197 Both interim institutions were orientated to the elite 
and badly connected with the general public. In addition, the joint administrative 
departments were poorly staffed and had little authority.198 The departments were 
co-headed by an UNMIK representative and a domestic representative who were 
expected to take joint decisions. However, in case of a lack of consensus, the 
Deputy UN Special Representative would be responsible for making the decision. 
Moreover, the co-heads had to report directly to UNMIK rather than to the Kosovo 
Transitional Council or Interim Administrative Council.199  
 
3.4.2 Kosovo’s provisional constitutional design 
 
The Joint Interim Administrative Structure was replaced after the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government had been drafted. During the process 
towards the first (municipal) elections in October 2000, UNMIK realized that it 
would need to develop a legal framework which would define the ‘substantial 
autonomy’ mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and which would 
include provisions regarding the protection of minorities. The UN Special 
Representative promised that this step towards greater responsibility and autonomy 
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would be taken if the elections would lead to the ‘proper conditions.’200 After an 
intensive drafting process by a Joint Working Group, the UN Special 
Representative signed the Constitutional Framework on 15 May 2001.  
The Constitutional Framework established two levels of government: the 
municipal level and the central level. The municipalities are mentioned as the basic 
territorial units of self-government. In contrast to the decentralized state in Bosnia, 
however, the Constitutional Framework established a rather centralized state in 
Kosovo. The central level Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in 
Pristina form the main locus of power. These institutions are the Presidency, the 
Government and the Assembly.    
The creation of a Provisional Presidency was of major symbolic 
importance for the Kosovo Albanians. Having a President affirmed the Kosovo 
Albanian aspiration for statehood and for that reason the creation of such an 
institution was opposed by UNMIK and the Kosovo Serb community.201 
Nonetheless, the Kosovo Albanians succeeded in getting a provision for a President 
in the Constitutional Framework. The Framework stated that: ‘The President shall 
represent the unity of the people and guarantee the democratic functioning of the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.’202 The Assembly elected the 
President for a three year term (during the government coalition negotiations in 
2008 this was changed to five years). The President was to possess authority in 
external relations. The President was responsible (after consultation with the 
political parties) for nominating the Prime Minister to the Assembly. He was 
expected to communicate to the UN Special Representative a request of the 
Assembly if required to dissolve the Assembly. He also was responsible for 
presenting the annual report on the state of affairs in Kosovo to the Assembly, as 
well as fulfilling his ceremonial functions.203 Taking its functions into account, the 
Provisional President of Kosovo played above all a symbolic role. The symbolic 
nature of the Presidency was reinforced with the election of Ibrahim Rugova as 
President after the Assembly elections of 2001 and 2004. As the former leader of 
Kosovo’s passive resistance movement for many Kosovo Albanians, Rugova was a 
symbol of an independent Kosovo in waiting. Consequently, he attained 
importance beyond his limited role in the Constitutional Framework.  
 The role of the Provisional Government was to exercise executive 
authority, to implement laws within the scope of responsibilities of the 
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Constitutional Framework and to propose draft laws to the Assembly.204 The 
Government was led by a Prime Minister, who was nominated by the President and 
chosen by the Assembly with a simple majority. In turn, the Prime Minister 
nominated the ministers, who were also chosen by the Assembly based on a 
majority vote. In contrast to the Bosnian chair of the Council of Ministers, 
Kosovo’s Prime Minister represented the government (as appropriate), defined the 
general policy line and coordinated the work of the government.205 Within the 
government decisions would normally be taken by consensus, but if consensus was 
absent decisions would be taken by the majority of the ministers present and 
voting. In case the ministers were divided equally, the Prime Minister would cast 
the decisive vote.206  
 After the first general elections in November 2001, the twenty 
administrative departments of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (see 
above) were consolidated into nine Ministries: Agriculture, Forestry and Rural 
Development; Culture, Youth and Sports; Education, Science and Technology; 
Labor and Social Welfare; Health, Environment and Spatial Planning; Transport 
and Communications; Public Services; Trade and Industry; and Finance and 
Economy. 207 On 2 December 2004, the number of ministries was extended from 
nine to eleven when the Ministry of Health was separated from the Ministry of 
‘Environment and Spatial Planning’ and when the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
was created. After the Assembly elections of 2004 the Ministry of Returns and 
Communities and the Ministry of Local Government Administration were added.208 
The fourteenth and fifteenth ministry were the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. Initially, it was planned to establish both ministries in 
December 2005. Due to political discontent within the government coalition over 
the appointment of senior officials that objective was not reached.209 Only after a 
government reshuffle in March 2006 was it possible to appoint both ministers.210  
The Provisional Assembly consisted of one chamber with 120 seats, out of 
which twenty were reserved for non-Albanian communities. These latter seats 
included ten seats for the Serb community, four for the Roma, Ashkali, and 
Egyptian communities, three for the Bosniak community, two for the Turkish 
community and one for the Gorani community. The Presidency of the Assembly 
existed of seven members, which included one member from the Serb community 
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and one member from another minority community.211 The functions of the 
Assembly included: ‘the adoption of laws and resolutions, endorsing or rejecting 
the prime minister and government, and establishing committees to oversee 
legislation.’212 The Assembly started its first mandate after the first Assembly 
elections had been held on 17 November 2001. Its inaugural session was on 10 
December 2001.213 New elections were organized in 2004 and 2007, as is shown in 
Table 3.2. 
  
Table 3.2: Elections in Kosovo 1999 - 2007 
Date Type of Election 
28 October 2000 Municipal elections  
17 November 2001 Assembly elections  
26 October 2002 Municipal elections  
23 October 2004 Assembly elections 
17 November 2007 Assembly and Municipal elections 
 
The municipalities, which form the second level of government in Kosovo, were 
established after the elections in October 2000. Since then, Kosovo officially 
consisted of thirty municipalities. As the basic territorial units of the territory, they 
were responsible for government tasks ranging from providing primary health care 
and social services, to licensing of building activities and urban and rural planning. 
The main political institutions on the municipal level were the Assembly, the 
President, the Chief Executive Officer and the Board of Directors. The Assembly 
was the legislative organ of the municipality. It elected the President (and his 
deputy) who chaired the sessions of the Assembly. The most important task of the 
President was to maintain general oversight of the execution of the Assembly’s 
decisions and of the financial administration of the municipality. The Chief 
Executive Officer and the Board of Directors formed the executive authority at the 
municipal level. The Chief Executive Officer was elected by the Assembly at the 
recommendation of the President and chairs the Board of Directors. The Board of 
Directors was made up of the heads of the municipal Departments.214   
  
3.5 Concluding remarks on the creation of political institutions  
 
By 2008, the OHR had accomplished an enormous achievement regarding the 
establishment of political institutions. The international administration had been 
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able to implement the Dayton Constitution and establish institutions such as the 
Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the bicameral Assembly. Further, together 
with the OSCE, no less than twelve successful elections had been organized on 
different levels of government. Therefore, High Representative Ashdown could 
positively conclude: ‘By the time I left Bosnia at the end of 2006, VAT [Value 
Added Tax, NvW] was up and running, the customs services had been unified into a 
single state-wide service, the Bosnian judiciary was working under a single state-
wide framework of law, the courts were beginning to try even the highest in the 
land for corruption (…), a single army was operating under state control, a single 
state intelligence service, accountable to parliament, had been created, and the 
country had entered on to the long road that, hopefully, will lead it to Europe.’215 
A similar picture can be drawn for Kosovo. The review on the status 
process acknowledged in 2005 that: ‘After the end of the conflict in 1999, there 
was a total institutional vacuum in Kosovo. Today, a comprehensive set of new 
institutions has been established. This represents a tremendous achievement.’216 
Indeed, an entire institutional infrastructure had been constructed and between 
1999 and 2008 five elections had been successfully organized. At the time of the 
unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosovo had all the 
political institutions it needed to function as an independent and modern state. In 
the report in which the UN Secretary-General announced the restructuring and de 
facto phasing out of UNMIK, he concluded: ‘During those nine years, the 
international civil presence (…) helped Kosovo make significant strides in 
establishing and consolidating democratic and accountable Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government and in creating the foundations for a functioning economy.’217 
However, in spite of these positive accounts, the creation of institutions 
says little about their sustainability. As has been explained in Chapter two, the 
mere presence of political institutions is not sufficient to create a sustainable 
political entity. Therefore, in the next three chapters, the second phase of 
institutionalization, the process during which institutions become domestically 
embedded, is analyzed. This is being done by studying the extent to which the 
institutions have become autonomous, have become congruent and are supported 
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4 Institutional Autonomy 
 
Given the extensive powers of international administrations it is not difficult 
to create domestic political institutions. However, it is more difficult to 
ensure the sustainability of these institutions. A political institution created 
by an international administration needs to become autonomous in order to 
become embedded in domestic society. An international administration is of 
a temporary nature. This means that an institution that is not autonomous in 
the sense of being independent from the international administration and 
having capacity will likely crumble and collapse when the international 
administration ends. In this chapter, the question is answered whether 
Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political institutions have become autonomous. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first part answers the question for the 
case of Bosnia and the second part focuses on Kosovo. In both parts a 
similar line of argument is presented. First, it is shown how the control and 
governorship types of international administration are reflected in the 
mandates of the OHR and UNMIK respectively. This is necessary in order to 
show that given the extensive powers of both international administrations, 
one at least cannot speak of autonomous institutions at the beginning of both 
operations. In other words, autonomy is something that must be gained 
during the international administration of a territory. Secondly, an overview 
of the OHR’s decisions and UNMIK’s regulations and directives is 
presented, because these are the formal instruments through which both 
international administrations exercised their authority. Thirdly, the 
independence of the political institutions is assessed, after which the same is 
done for the institutional capacity. Finally, each part ends with a possible 
explanation of the outcome based on the particular conflict management 
strategy for each case.  
 
4.1 Bosnia  
 
4.1.1 The powers of the OHR 
 
The imposed character of the Dayton Agreement made the establishment of 
an international implementation mission necessary. Since the Agreement had 
come about as a result of external intervention and a specific strategic 
balance on the ground, it could not be taken for granted that the conflicting 
parties would comply with it and implement it. The Contact Group members 
expected that the establishment of the Bosnian state would be a challenge 
and the OHR had to ensure that the conflicting parties would comply with 
the Dayton Agreement in word and in deed. As a result, it was determined 
that the High Representative would need to have a robust mandate. Annex 
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10 to the Dayton Agreement gave the High Representative the power to 
interpret his own authorities and powers.1 This power of interpretation was 
confirmed in the Bonn powers (see below). Thus, whereas the Bosniaks, the 
Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, as well as Croatia and Serbia, were 
bound to the Dayton Agreement as signatories, the international institutions 
involved in the implementation of Dayton were not.2 As the ‘final arbiter’ of 
the civilian implementation in Bosnia, the High Representative could not be 
challenged on any clause of the Bosnian Constitution.3  
 Some observers have pointed out that the main fault line in Bosnia 
has not been between the three communities, but based on overwhelming 
power at the disposal of the OHR, it was between the three communities and 
the international community.4 The extensive power of the OHR in Bosnia 
inspired Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin to write an article in the Journal of 
Democracy, in which they compared the international presence in Bosnia 
with the British Empire in the nineteenth century. Their argument is based on 
the observation that the international administration sets the agenda of 
reform, imposes it and punishes those who obstruct the implementation of 
the Dayton Agreement.5 This resembles a system of indirect rule which 
existed in India when it was part of the British Empire. According to the 
authors, the ambitious character of the mission, the belief in progress and the 
assumption that outsiders know what would be best for the population, are 
three additional similarities with the British Raj.6 Knaus and Martin were not 
alone in their analogy with colonialism. High Representative Carlos 
Westendorp was depicted as the ‘Euro-Spanish viceroy’ of Bosnia by The 
Economist.7 In ethnic nationalist Bosnian Serb newspapers, he was referred 
to as ‘the dictator.’8 Westendorp himself preferred the term ‘friendly 
arbiter.’9 In the Bosnian press, Wolfgang Petritsch has been referred to as a 
                                                 
1 ‘Interview: Carlos Westendorp reveals his opinion about the Bosnian politicians’, Slobodna 
Bosna/OHR Press Office 30 November 1997. 
2 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (London/Sterling: Pluto Press, 
1999), 52. 
3 Ibid., 70. 
4 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6. 
5 Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, ‘Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Travails of the 
European Raj’, Journal of Democracy 14:3 (2003) 60-73, 61. 
6 Ibid., 62. 
7 ‘Charlemagne. Carlos Westendorp, Bosnia's Euro-Spanish Viceroy’, The Economist/OHR 
Press Office (4 September 1998). 
8 Carlos Westendorp, ‘'Don't Bargain With Bosnia'’, The Wall Street Journal/OHR Press 
Office 6 April 1999. 
9 ‘Interview: Carlos Westendorp reveals his opinion about the Bosnian politicians.’ 
The results of international administration in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo 
 92
‘merciless protector.’10 Finally, Petritsch’ successor Ashdown has been 
referred to as a ‘proconsul.’11  
 Since 1995, the imposed character of the Dayton Agreement and the 
robust mandate of the OHR has contributed to OHR’s increased involvement 
and its international partners in the domestic affairs in Bosnia. As described 
in Chapter three, the Joint Interim Commission and the Joint Civilian 
Committee were set up and chaired by the OHR and executed only 
consultative functions. It was the OHR, in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Commission, which created the Quick 
Start Package that was the first collection of regulations for the new state 
institutions,12 Moreover, the working groups that were established by the 
Presidency in order to consider a variety of policy issues were actually set up 
and chaired by the OHR. When Bosnian representatives opposed elements of 
the Quick Start Package, international economic pressure was applied to 
counter their opposition. Thus, from the beginning of the international 
administration, the Bosnian political institutions had little influence over 
either policy development or implementation.13  
 The same counted for the two entities. Policy making in the 
Federation was heavily influenced by the OHR and the USA. Federation 
policy was mostly created in the Federation Forum, which was co-chaired by 
the Senior Deputy High Representative and the US Assistant Secretary of 
State. The Forum included the Presidency of the Federation, the state level 
Presidency, the OSCE head of mission, and other senior international 
officials. De facto, the Federation Forum and its sub-committees sidestepped 
the domestic representative bodies.14 In the Serb Republic, autonomous 
policy making was restricted by the OHR-drafted Law on the Government of 
the Serb Republic and the Law on the Ministries. As a result of the victory of 
the SDS in the September 1996 Assembly elections, the Government of the 
Serb Republic was transferred from Pale to Banja Luka with the objective of 
weakening the influence of Bosnian Serb ethnic nationalist hardliners.15  
  Despite the OHR’s early involvement, a reinterpretation of its 
powers was judged to be necessary in 1997. The original mandate was not 
strong enough to enforce implementation of the Dayton Agreement in case 
of resistance by ethnic nationalist hardliners. Between December 1995 and 
                                                 
10 Dejan Jazvic, ‘Interview: Wolfgang Petritsch: "A hero of our time or a merciless 
protector"’, Hrvatska Rijec/OHR Press Office 21 May 2001. 
11 ‘Paddy's Passions’, The Economist (28 June 2007). 
12 Chandler, Faking Democracy, 62. Wolfgang Petritsch, Bosnien und Herzegowina 5 Jahre 
Nach Dayton. Hat Der Friede Eine Chance? (Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 2001), 89. 
13 Chandler, Faking Democracy, 62 and 63 and 64. 
14 Ibid., 73. 
15 Ibid., 75. 
 Institutional Autonomy 
 
 93
December 1997, little progress had been achieved with respect to some of 
the reforms including issues of power sharing, unification of (state level) 
institutions and the return of minorities.16  
 It was during the PIC meeting in Paris in November 1996 where 
extending the powers of the OHR was first mentioned. ‘The Steering Board 
and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize the need for the 
High Representative to continue to perform his tasks throughout the entire 
consolidation period. His task needs to be reinforced in the following areas 
in particular; as Chairman of the Principals’ meetings, as Chairman of the 
Economic Task Force and as Chairman of other meetings with key 
Implementation Agencies; in case of conflicting interpretations of the 
civilian implementation of the peace settlement, as the final authority in 
theater in accordance with Article V of Annex 10. In case of dispute, the 
High Representative may give his interpretation and make his 
recommendations known public.’17  
 During the meeting of the PIC Steering Board in Sintra (Portugal) in 
May 1997, the reinvigoration of the implementation effort was put explicitly 
on the agenda.18 During the summit, the High Representative received 
explicit powers to: ‘curtail or suspend any media network or program whose 
output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of 
the Peace Agreement.’19 The creation of these powers was the result of non-
compliance with the Dayton Agreement by ethnic nationalist hardliners and 
the general frustration at the weak performance of Bosnia’s institutions.20 
The Sintra powers were the first concrete powers at the disposal of the High 
Representative to counter ethnic nationalist rhetoric in the media. They were 
used on 4 October 1997 by requesting SFOR to occupy the transmission 
towers of the Serb Republic’s Radio and Television Station, which had until 
then been an important political instrument of the SDS.21  
 The Sintra powers proved not to be substantial enough to make large 
steps forward. Thus, the path was paved for giving the High Representative 
more power during the Bonn PIC meeting.22 During the meeting, High 
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Representative Westendorp gave a speech in which he summed up the huge 
challenges after two years of peace implementation. With respect to the state 
level, he pointed out that: ‘Two years after the war, the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina still has: no permanently located, properly functioning common 
institutions; no new flag; no common license plate; no common passport; no 
currency of its own; no legal definition of citizenship; no law adopted on 
foreign investment; no adopted permanent laws on a customs code and 
customs tariffs; no full definition or adequate protection of human rights; no 
strong, multi-ethnic, country-wide political parties, and no structured civil 
society. Extremist leaders, although their influence is declining, continue to 
intimidate the population, to sow discord, and to frustrate economic and 
political reconstruction. Bosnia has no established public corporations; in 
particular, the Transportation Corporation, which covers railroads, is not 
operating.’ 23  
The Bonn meeting resulted in the actual extension of the High 
Representative’s powers with respect to the authority to make binding 
decisions on the following issues: 24 
 
1)  timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common 
institutions;  
2) interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach 
agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or 
Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the 
Peace Agreement on the issue concerned;  
3)  other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the 
smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may 
include actions against persons holding public office or officials who 
are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by 
the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments 
made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its 
implementation.  
 
The so called ‘Bonn Powers’ represented an innovation when compared with 
the mandate expressed in the Dayton Agreement, to the extent that in 
addition to the authority to oversee the implementation of the Agreement’s 
provisions and to interpret them, the OHR was asked to exercise its mandate 
                                                                                                                   
Frederic Labarre, eds. (Vienna: National Defence Academy Vienna Austria, 2004) 118-150, 
122. 
23 Office of the High Representative, ‘Speech by the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, 
to the Peace Implementation Council’, (Sarajevo: 9 December 1997). 
24 Peace Implementation Council, ‘PIC Bonn Conclusions’, (1997). 
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more robustly.25 In the end, the Bonn powers provided the OHR with more 
flexibility to push reforms forward.26 
 The Bonn powers have been widely used by the High Representative 
as an instrument for imposing the peace implementation process. By using 
these powers, the OHR developed itself into a central pillar of the 
constitutional order.27 Since December 1997, the OHR has played a pivotal 
role in Bosnia, especially as far as political institution-building is concerned. 
More than any other international agency, the OHR has been focused on (the 
functioning) of the state level institutions.28 Among the large number of 
international organizations present in Bosnia, the OHR can be regarded as 
the most influential especially since 1997.29 During the years of international 
administration, the Bosnians have shown more trust in the OHR than in their 
indigenous institutions and foreign governments have treated the High 
Representative as the locus of power in Bosnia.30 The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe concluded in 2004 that: ‘The scope of 
the OHR is such that, to all intents and purposes, it constitutes the supreme 
institution vested with power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’31 The influential 
position of the OHR can be explained by the fact that it is the only 
international institution with the power to impose decisions and make 
legislative changes.32 It could do so, because the Dayton Agreement and the 
Bonn Powers empowered the OHR to substitute for domestic institutions 
when necessary.33  




                                                 
25 Cousens and Cater, Peace in Bosnia, 131. 
26 Kurt W. Bassuener, ‘Lost Opportunities and Unlearned Lessons. The Continuing Legacy of 
Bosnia’, After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies. From 
Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. 
(Vienna: DCAF et al., 2005) 101-137, 108. 
27 Knaus and Cox, ‘Whither Bosnia’, 7. 
28 Chandler, Faking Democracy, 147. 
29 Cousens and Cater, Peace in Bosnia, 129. 
30 International Crisis Group, Thessaloniki and After II (Sarajevo/Brussels, 2003), 10, Balkans 
briefing. 
31 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the 
Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative (Venice, 11 March 2005), 2. 
32 Walter A. Dorn and Jeremy King, ‘Taking Stock of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia 
1995-2002’, Bridges of Peace. Ten Years of Conflict Management in Bosnia, Charles C. 
Pentland, ed. (Kingston: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 2003) 63-96, 
73. 
33 Interview with an OHR official (6), Sarajevo 8 May 2006, (8). 
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4.1.2 The OHR’s decisions  
 
Since December 1997, the High Representative intervened in Bosnian 
politics by way of making official ‘decisions.’ The High Representative’s 
decisions can be split into two categories: legislative acts and executive acts. 
The legislative acts comprise the imposition of political, economic and 
judicial legislation and the executive acts include among others the dismissal 
of Bosnian officials deemed to obstruct the peace process, the blocking of 
bank accounts of persons suspected to aid indicted war criminals, and the 
appointment of Bosnian officials. Table 4.1 shows the number of decisions 
made yearly by the High Representative from 16 December 1997 to 5 
September 2008:  
 
Table 4.1: OHR decisions from 16 December 1997 to 5 September 200834 















In total, between the first decision (16 December 1997) and the last decision 
(5 September 2008) included in this analysis, a number of 864 decisions 
were made. The years 2002 and 2004, when Ashdown was High 
Representative, show a clear peak. Since 2005 the number of decisions made 
has started to decline significantly. In order to better understand the 
development of the OHR’s interventions, it is necessary to know what kind 
of decisions have been made. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the 
decisions as related to specific policy fields. 
                                                 
34 Obtainable from: www.ohr.int (last visited on 20 January 2009) 





According to the overview presented in Table 4.2, most decisions were made 
in the judicial field and in the field of ‘removals and suspensions from 
office.’ However, among the 108 decisions made in the category of 
‘individuals indicted for war crimes’, a number of 68 decisions were in fact 
removals. Adding these 68 cases to the category of ‘removals and 
suspensions from office’, it shows that most decisions made by the High 
Representative were concerned with removals and suspensions. As is argued 
below, every removal or suspension should be considered as an infringement 
on the autonomy of the institution where the specific action takes place.  
 As is shown by Table 4.3, there are substantial differences between 
the different High Representatives when it comes to the number of decisions 
made in the implementation process. The first High Representative, Carl 
Bildt, did not have the Bonn Powers at his disposal and therefore did not 
have to make any decisions for his record.37 The Bonn powers were created 
during the office of the Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorp and on 16 
December 1997, imposing the Law on Citizenship, Westendorp was the first 
High Representative who made a decision based on the Bonn powers. In 
total, Westendorp would make 71 decisions in 25 months time. The 
successor of Westendorp, the Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch made a 
number of 252 decisions in about 34 months. The absolute record however 
for decisions made was set by Paddy Ashdown. He made no less than 446 
                                                 
35 Obtainable from: www.ohr.int (last visited on 20 January 2009) 
36 The category ‘removals and suspensions from office’ also includes the rehabilitation of 
officials.  
37 In this respect, it could be argued that during Bildt’s term in office as High Representative, 
Bosnia was only an international administration de jure. The Bonn Powers were implicit in 
the Dayton Agreement, but were not actually used. 
Table 4.2: OHR decisions from 16 December 1997 to 5 September 2008 as 
related to specific policy fields35 
Decisions related to: Number of 
decisions 
State symbols and state level matters 102 
The economic field 95 
The judicial field 177 
The Federation, Mostar and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton 71 
Removals and suspensions from office36 175 
The media 18 
Property laws, return of displaced persons/refugees, and 
reconciliation 
118 
Individuals indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia 108 
Total 864 
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decisions during his administration of almost 43 months. High 
Representative Schwarz-Schilling made 46 decisions in 11 months and his 
successor Miroslav Laják 28 decisions in 15 months.  
 





Months in office39 Average of 
decisions 
Bildt - - - 
Westendorp 71 25 2,8 
Petritsch 252 34 7,4 
Ashdown 446 43 10,4 
Schwarz-
Schilling 
46 11 4,1 
Laják 28 15 1,9 
 
Looking at the average number of interventions per year made by 
every single High Representative, a steady increase can be detected until the 
office of Ashdown; from 2,8 decisions a month (Westendorp), to 7,4 
decisions a month (Petritsch), to 10,4 decisions a month (Ashdown). Only 
with Schwarz-Schilling the average number decreased to 4,1 decisions a 
month. This decrease had actually started in the last year of Ashdown’s 
administration (2005), when he reached an average of 7.5 decisions a month. 
On the one hand, the initial increase indicates that from December 1997 to 
December 2004, the independence of Bosnia’s institutions from the OHR 
decreased. On the other hand, the decline in the number of interventions 
from January 2005 shows that Bosnia’s institutions were becoming more 
independent.  
 The OHR’s decisions were directed at the implementation of the 
Dayton Agreement. Given the imposed nature of the Dayton Agreement, any 
progress at the state level institutions depended heavily on the initiatives and 
work of the international administration. In its Luxembourg declaration of 9 
June 1998, the PIC concluded that substantial progress had been achieved 
since the Bonn meeting. Among the achievements listed were: the common 
flag, passports, common license plates, a growing number of arrested war-
crimes suspects, the creation of a number of multi-ethnic assemblies after the 
municipal elections of 1997, and new legislation on customs, privatization, 
                                                 
38 Obtainable from: www.ohr.int (last visited on 20 January 2009) 
39 The number of months is calculated by counting the months between the first and the last 
decision of the High Representative. For Westendorp, 16 December – 30 July 1999; for 
Petritsch, 1 September 1999 – 24 May 2002; for Ashdown; 14 June 2002 – 31 January 2006; 
for Schwarz-Schilling, 9 February 2006 – 29 June 2007; and for Laják, 9 July 2007 – 5 
September 2008.  
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foreign investment and state and entity budgets. However, the PIC 
acknowledged that almost all of these achievements had required 
international pressure or intervention and that the pace of implementation by 
the Bosnian institutions themselves was a serious matter of concern .40  
Half a year later, during the Madrid meeting, the PIC was even more 
explicit: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s structure remains fragile. Without the 
scaffolding of international support, it would collapse.’41 During the Brussels 
meeting in May 2000, the PIC was more positive about the stabilization of 
the security situation, the completion of the major physical reconstruction, 
the accelerating return of refugees and displaced persons, the establishment 
of the Brko District, and the strengthening of political pluralism. At the 
same time, however, it was acknowledged that these achievements were 
largely the result of intensive international efforts and the PIC expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of implementation since the preceding 
ministerial PIC meeting in Madrid in 1998.42  
By the time Petritsch assumed the office of High Representative, 
there was widespread pessimism about the direction Bosnia was heading. 
Bosnia needed a firm strategy in order to push the reform forward: ‘the 
pivotal factor in breaking the inertia in Bosnia was the decision that the 
status quo was untenable, and could only be changed by catalytic 
intervention from the OHR, with appropriate international backing.’43 The 
lack of support for the Dayton Agreement was reflected in the legislative and 
executive decisions that were made from 1997 to 2008. The Dayton 
Agreement and the Bonn Powers mandated concerning legislative decisions 
that the OHR substitute for domestic legislative authorities and impose 
legislation by initiating, amending or repealing laws. A law that was passed 
by the OHR went immediately into effect. In all cases, the text of the 
decision stated that it was prohibited to amend the law until it had been 
adopted as such by the domestic institutions. With that provision, domestic 
institutions were strongly encouraged to adopt the law themselves even after 
its imposition.44 In fact, the imposed law had entered into effect on an 
interim basis and it would only receive a permanent status once it was 
adopted by the Bosnian parliament. A clear example of a legislative decision 
of the OHR is the imposition on the Law on the Council of Ministers of 3 
December 2002. The decision states: ‘The Law which follows, and which 
forms an integral part of this Decision shall come into effect as provided for 
                                                 
40 Peace Implementation Council, ‘PIC Luxembourg Declaration’, (1998). 
41 Peace Implementation Council, ‘PIC Madrid Declaration’, (1998). 
42 Peace Implementation Council, ‘Brussels Declaration’, (2000). 
43 Bassuener, ‘Lost Opportunities and Unlearned Lessons. The Continuing Legacy of Bosnia’, 
119. 
44 Interview with an OHR official (6), Sarajevo 8 May 2006. 
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in Article 47 thereof on an interim basis, until such time as the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopts this Law in due form, without 
amendment and with no conditions attached.’45 
The first imposition of legislation occurred on 15 December 1997 
when the Law on Citizenship was imposed.46 The PIC had established a 
deadline for adopting the law which was not met. The Law on Citizenship 
clearly was a law with an integrationist objective. Much of the legislation 
imposed was legislation aimed at integrating the three constitutive peoples, 
such as the Law on the Flag (3 February 1998), the Law on a Uniform 
License Plate for Vehicles (20 May 1998) and the Law on the National 
Anthem (26 June 1999). Most laws and by-laws (or rule books) that have 
entered into effect have been initiated and drafted, at least for the most part, 
by the OHR.47 In the case of the Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct 
Investment for example, the draft law was written by the OHR and submitted 
to the House of Representatives on 12 February 1998. The House of 
Representatives, however, removed the draft from the agenda, after which 
the High Representative decided to impose it.48 The above mentioned Law 
on the Council of Ministers was jointly drafted by the OHR and by 
representatives of the House of Representatives in November 2002.49 
While the imposition of legislation in the initial years of 
international administration might not be that surprising, the OHR was still 
issuing legislative decisions even after twelve years of international 
administration. Sometimes imposition was judged necessary, because of the 
lack of attention given by the Bosnian authorities to a certain issue. This was 
for example the case with the Decision enacting the Law on amendments to 
the criminal procedural code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the decision, the 
High Representative deplores ‘that the changes to legislation necessary to 
facilitate the prosecution and adjudication of the cases transferred from the 
ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, NvW] 
have not been given the attention it requires by the authorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’50 In other cases, such as in the Decision amending the Law on 
the Temporary Prohibition of Disposal of State Property of Bosnia and 
                                                 
45 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision enacting the Law on the Council of Ministers 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (Sarajevo: 3 December 2002). 
46 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision imposing the Law on Citizenship of BiH’, 
(Sarajevo: 16 December 1997). 
47 Interview with an OHR official (6), Sarajevo 8 May 2006. 
48 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision imposing the Draft Law on the Policy of 
Foreign Direct Investment in BiH’, (Sarajevo: 5 March 1998). 
49 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision enacting the Law on the Council of Ministers 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ 
50 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision enacting the Law on Amendments to the 
Criminal Procedural Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (Sarajevo: 13 April 2007). 
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Herzegovina, the OHR imposed legislation, because Bosnian authorities 
were not able to reach a compromise: ‘Recalling that, in its Declaration of 19 
June 2007, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council 
expressed deep dissatisfaction with “the three-year failure of the State and 
Entity authorities to reach an agreement on the issue of apportionment of 
State Property.’51  
In addition to the legislative acts of the OHR, many decisions of the 
High Representative were executive decisions. The contents and character of 
these executive decisions varied considerably. The first executive decision 
was the establishment of an interim arrangement to manage the airport of 
Mostar (1 March 1998). Other examples of executive decisions are: the 
establishment of an independent experts commission to prepare the election 
law (1 August 1998); the decision to abolish the illegal municipality of 
Skelani and restoring the pre-war boundaries of the municipality of 
Srebrenica (5 December 2000); and the decision on police disciplinary 
proceedings (24 January 2003). However, the most salient and most 
discussed executive decisions were the decisions made concerning the 
removal and suspension from office of individuals who were accused of 
obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. 
 Between March 1998 and May 2008, the High Representative 
removed and suspended hundreds of officials. The first removal from office 
took place on 8 March 1998, when High Representative Westendorp 
removed Pero Raguz the Mayor of Stolac and a member of the HDZ. He was 
accused of hindering the return of Bosniak refugees to Stolac.52 A similar 
kind of non-cooperation in the field of refugee return led to the dismissal of 
the mayor of Drvar on 16 April 1998.53 The third dismissal took place on 28 
August 1998 when the mayor of Orasje was accused of: ‘creating a political 
atmosphere in his municipality detrimental to the holding of free and fair 
elections.’54 In the end, most removals were based on non-cooperation with 
                                                 
51 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision amending the Law on the Temporary 
Prohibition of Disposal of State Property of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (Sarajevo: 19 
December 2007). 
52 This first dismissal by the OHR caused a polemic in Bosnian politics. The issue was raised 
to the highest political level and was discussed between Westendorp and the President of 
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. Mirsad Fazlic, ‘Interview: Hanns H. Schumacher, Senior Deputy 
HR: "Unreal Dreams Of Separation Of The HDZ Hard-liners”’, Vecernje Novine/OHR Press 
Office 3 March 1998. 
53 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision removing Drago Tokmakcija from his 
position as Deputy Mayor of Drvar’, (Sarajevo: 16 April 1998). 
54 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision removing Marko Benkovic from his position 
as Mayor of Orasje’, (Sarajevo: 28 August 1998). 
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).55 In 
practice that meant that many of the officials removed came from the Serb 
Republic. At the same time, a considerable number of Bosnian Croat and 
Bosniak ethnic nationalist hardliners was removed also. During an interview 
with the newspaper Dani, Senior Deputy High Representative Hanns 
Schumacher made very clear that the OHR would not tolerate Bosnian Croat 
obstruction within the Federation: ‘I am simply not interested in who does 
not want the Federation: this is a concept that we will implement, despite the 
resistance on the field, which undoubtedly exists!’56 In answer to the 
question whether the Bosniak community obstructed the Federation, 
Schumacher replied: ‘We dictate what will be done! Therefore, this [the 
Federation, NvW] is a concept that will be implemented jointly and we 
simply do not pay attention to those who obstruct! I think we have already 
proved that we can use the authorities that Dayton gives us and all those who 
resist will have to face the consequences.’57  
 When firing twenty two Bosnian officials on one day in November 
1999, Wolfgang Petritsch declared: ‘Four years after Dayton, many of the 
forces who divided this country still remain in place. With their corrupting 
presence, those who wish progress find they are prevented or even 
threatened from abandoning parochial hatreds and shady practices. 
Ambassador Barry and I concluded that ownership could not take root with 
obstructionists still in positions of authority. It was with regret that we 
concluded we had no alternative but to remove 22 officials from their posts 
on Monday.’58 A peak of the number of officials fired in one day was 
reached with these removals.59 The first record number of officials removed 
in one day had been set by Westendorp with his dismissal of sixteen officials 
in March 1999. After the November 1999 removals, a new record was set by 
High Representative Ashdown on the first of July 2004. On that day, 
Ashdown fired sixty high ranking officials from the Serb Republic. He 
argued that they had failed to cooperate with the ICTY in The Hague, they 
provided assistance to war crime suspects (including Radovan Karadži and 
Ratko Mladi) and they were responsible for the failure of Bosnia to be 
                                                 
55 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the 
Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative, 23. 
56 Emir Suljagic, ‘Interview: Hanns H. Schumacher, Senior Deputy HR: "We will break the 
hardliners of the HDZ!"’, Dani/OHR Press Office 11 April 1998. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Christophe Solioz, ‘The fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina: an inclusive interview of 
Christophe Solioz with Wolfgang Petritsch’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5:3 
(2003) 355-373. 
59 Ebner, ‘The Bonn Powers - Still necessary?’ 125. 
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included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program.60 For more or less the 
same reasons, Ashdown again fired sixteen officials from the Serb Republic 
in December 2004. 
 The dismissed officials could not appeal against the decision of High 
Representatives and the OHR. Until May 2005 it has occurred only once that 
the OHR decided to lift a ban against a Bosnian official who had been 
removed earlier. However, that decision was at the High Representative’s 
own discretion.61 This policy changed in 2005. In a report of the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the 
Council of Europe, a review of the High Representative’s removal decisions 
was recommended. The report welcomed the announcement of Ashdown 
that he would initiate a process of rehabilitation of persons that were 
removed or suspended from office.62 These developments led to a massive 
lifting of bans imposed on dozens of officials from May 2005 on. As a 
result, dozens of formerly removed or suspended persons have been 
rehabilitated.  
  In addition to removing officials, the OHR has been very active in 
making appointments in its executive decisions. These appointments were 
often related to the new institutions established by the international 
administration, such as the appointment of the director of the State 
Investigation and Protection Agency in June 2005.63 Appointments were also 
made in case the political parties could not agree on filling high profile 
executive positions. This occurred, for example, in the case of the director of 
the State Border Service in 2005. The Bosnian authorities could not agree on 
a director within the time limit of six months so in the end the OHR decided. 
64  
The OHR still executed executive acts as of 2007 and 2008. It even 
found it necessary to remove two more officials. The first removal took 
place in July 2007 (being the first removal since October 2005) and was 
                                                 
60 Ian Traynor, ‘Ashdown purges Bosnian Serb Leadership’, The Guardian 1 July 2004. 
61 After High Representative Westendorp had removed Dragan Cavic as a member of the Serb 
Republic’s National Assembly on 10 August 1998 for obstructing the Dayton Agreement, the 
ban against him was lifted on 30 July 1999 by Westendorp’s successor Petritsch. Office of the 
High Representative, ‘Decision to lift the ban on Dragan Cavic's activities’, (Sarajevo: 30 July 
1999). 
62 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the 
Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative, 24.  
63 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision on appointment of the Director of the State 
Investigation and Protection Agency’, (Sarajevo: 8 June 2005). 
64 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision on appointment of the Director of the State 
Border Service’, (Sarajevo: 9 September 2005). 
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followed by a second removal in May 2008.65 Together with the continued 
imposition of legislation, the continued interference of the OHR in executive 
issues indicates that Bosnia’s political institutions were not acting 
independently from the OHR in 2008. 
 
4.1.3 The independence of Bosnia’s political institutions 
 
The independence of Bosnia’s political institutions increased gradually 
between 1995 and 2008. Institutional independence increased in two ways. 
First, the number of decisions imposed by the international administration 
declined after 2005. Second, the transfer of authority from the international 
administration to the local institutions increased their independence. This is 
also reflected in the increasing participation of Bosnian officials in the 
internationally driven processes of reform.  
From 2005, Bosnian political institutions were increasingly allowed 
and expected to take ‘ownership’ over their own affairs. Despite the large 
number of OHR interventions between 1996 and 2005, the High 
Representatives were aware of the limits of their interventions. In speeches 
and public documents, they have often acknowledged that their capacity to 
govern Bosnia was limited. Westendorp said: ‘People who know a country 
best are people who live in it. We cannot understand you as much as you 
can, but we can help create mutual trust here.’66 With similar words 
Ashdown declared to the Bosnian parliament: ‘I do not have the monopoly 
of wisdom on what is right for this country. There will always be room for 
compromise between us if this parliament comes up with sensible and 
workable solutions that push the reform agenda forward.’67 Finally, 
Schwarz-Schilling stated in March 2007: ‘But Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration will be determined by its own 
achievements and those alone. It will not be determined by outside factors.’68 
 The concept of ‘ownership’ was introduced by Petritsch in 2000. 
Petritsch attempted to increase the responsibility of the domestic institutions 
                                                 
65 Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision to remove Dragomir Andan from his position 
as Deputy Head of Administration for Police Education of the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republika Srpska’, (Sarajevo: 10 July 2007). Office of the High Representative, ‘Decision to 
remove Mr. Predrag erani from his current position in the Intelligence and Security Agency 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (Sarajevo: 30 May 2008). 
66 Tomo Maric, ‘Interview: Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative in BiH: "To Build a 
Better Life With Confidence"’, Glas Sprski/OHR Press Office 31 July 1998. 
67 Office of the High Representative, ‘Speech by the High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown to the BiH House of Representatives’, (17 December 2002). 
68 Office of the High Representative, ‘Speech by the High Representative and EU Special 
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schwarz-Schilling to the UN Security 
Council’, (Sarajevo: 16 May 2007). 
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for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Ownership was adopted 
by the PIC which defined it as: ‘a self sustainable BiH [Bosnia, NvW], 
serving its citizens, meeting its international obligations, and integrating into 
Europe.’69 At the time, it was judged right to start the process of ownership. 
In an interview Petritsch claimed that the conditions for ownership had been 
created: ‘Ownership is a process that requires a framework, and I first had to 
lay the solid foundations to get this process going and create the conditions 
for ownership to take root.’70 
A serious test case for ownership was the implementation of a 
decision taken in 2000 by Bosnia’s Constitutional Court which determined 
that entity constitutions should be amended. The decision had declared the 
entity constitutions to be in violation of the state level Constitution. The 
implementation of the decision was seen as a test case for Bosnia’s 
development towards ownership. It was expected given the incumbent 
moderate government coalition (the Alliance for Change) that the time had 
come to give more responsibility to Bosnia’s domestic institutions. However, 
after two years there was still no agreement on the implementation of the 
decision. In February 2002, the Steering Board of the PIC declared: ‘The 
Steering Board therefore strongly urges the political leadership in the 
country to focus on achievable solutions and to reach a final agreement on 
this matter [Constitutional Court Decision, NvW] (…). Failure to 
demonstrate ‘ownership’ on this issue would have serious negative 
consequences and would retard BiH's [Bosnia’s, NvW] integration into 
European structures.’71 With ‘European structures’, the PIC referred to the 
fact that implementation of the Constitutional Court decision had been 
declared a condition for Bosnia’s membership in the Council of Europe. Yet 
despite such an incentive, the Bosnians still were unable to assume 
ownership. Although an agreement among all major political parties had 
finally been reached on 27 March 2002, subsequent disagreements made it 
necessary for High Representative Petritsch to impose the agreement on 19 
April 2002.72 
Given these problems with implementing the Constitutional Court 
decision, it is not surprising that High Representative Ashdown did not 
continue with the ownership policy when he took over from Petritsch in June 
2005. According to Ashdown, ownership had been introduced too soon and 
                                                 
69 Peace Implementation Council, ‘Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council’, 
(Sarajevo: 24 May 2000). 
70 Solioz, ‘The fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 361. 
71 Peace Implementation Council, ‘Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board’, (28 February 
2002). 
72 Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia. Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (New 
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he emphasized the necessity to establish the rule of law before domestic 
democracy could develop further.73 As has been shown in the analysis 
above, Ashdown was the most interventionist High Representative and as a 
result he became essentially part of the political process in Bosnia.74  
The number of interventions started to decline in the last year of 
Ashdown’s term in office, only after he had initiated and sometimes even 
completed difficult and controversial reforms (mainly regarding the rule of 
law).75 The number of OHR decisions decreased from 158 decisions in 2004 
to ‘only’ 91 decisions in 2005. This trend continued in 2006, when no more 
than 57 decisions were taken (see Table 4.1) by Ashdown’s successor 
Schwarz-Schilling.76 In 2007 the number of decisions fell to 37 and in 2008 
it fell further to 12. Moreover, many of the decisions made from 2005 to 
2008 concerned rehabilitations of earlier dismissed and suspended Bosnian 
officials.77 In this way, such decisions can be considered measures to 
strengthen rather than to weaken domestic ownership since they reversed 
earlier decisions.78 It is also important to note that few of the decisions made 
between 2005 and 2008 included reforms necessary for achieving closer 
association and cooperation with the EU, which at one point was one of the 
most important policy objectives in Bosnia.  
Whereas the policy of ownership in terms of a decreasing number of 
decisions was back on the international administration’s agenda in 2005, 
stimulating ownership in terms of the transfer of authority from the 
international level to the domestic level had continued through out the 
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Ashdown period. The transfer of authority had actually started under Bildt in 
1996 when the first elections had been organized. However, it took another 
eight years before the first elections took place that were entirely organized 
and financed by the Bosnians. These were the 2004 municipal elections and 
the only international involvement was the presence of international 
members in the Bosnian Elections Commission. These international 
members were withdrawn in 2005, which made the elections in 2006 the first 
elections without any official involvement of the international 
administration.79 In 2004 and 2005, several human rights institutions were 
also transferred from international administration to the domestic level.80 
This included the state level Ombudsman which had been transferred to the 
domestic level in January 2004.81 It also included the transfer of the 
competences of the international Commission for Real Property Claims to 
the Bosnian state level.82 Finally, in 2007, within the field of justice Bosnia 
made substantial progress in reducing its dependence on the international 
administration by the replacement of several international judges and 
prosecutors with domestic ones.83 
The transfer of authority is also reflected in increasing Bosnian 
membership of expert commissions dealing with specific internationally 
driven reforms.84 Although most of the commissions were chaired by an 
international official the remainder of the members were Bosnians. Most 
commissions were established in 2003; the Defense Reform Commission, 
the Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar (which was also chaired 
by a Bosnian), the Indirect Tax Policy Commission and the Expert 
Commission on Intelligence Reform. In addition, a second reform 
commission on Mostar (this time chaired by an international) was 
established in 2004. In 2005, a second Defense Reform Commission and a 
Police Restructuring Commission were established. The existence of these 
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commissions gave the domestic authorities the opportunity to administer 
several of the reform processes.85 
The results of these commissions were mixed. The commissions 
dealing with defense reform, intelligence reform and indirect tax were more 
successful since they led to the adoption of relevant laws and the successful 
establishment of new institutions. Moreover, the laws and institutions were 
genuinely owned by the Bosnians. The two Mostar commissions, however, 
were unable to produce a statute that would unite the divided city; as a result, 
a statute was imposed by the OHR in the summer of 2004. Also, the Police 
Restructuring Commission produced a reform proposal in December 2004, 
but this was rejected by the Serb Republic. The OHR chose not to impose a 
decision, but rather to continue the ownership policy. Thus, negotiations on 
police reform continued and were concluded on 28 October 2007 in Mostar. 
The implementation of the Mostar Agreement involved the establishment of 
a Bosnian working group which prepared the necessary legislation. The laws 
were adopted on 16 April 2008.86 
The decreasing number of decisions and the increasing transfer of 
authority (including Bosnian participation in important reform commissions) 
point to an evolving exit strategy of the international administration. 
Especially since 2006, the concept of ownership was put prominently, and 
almost impatiently, on the OHR’s agenda. In February 2006, Senior Deputy 
High Representative Martin Nye stated: ‘The need for intrusive international 
action via OHR and its Bonn Powers is decreasing and there is consensus 
that the time is approaching for the Bosnians to increasingly assume full 
ownership and responsibility.’87 Similar ideas were expressed by High 
Representative Schwarz-Schilling when he said: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has traveled a long way over the past decade as the country has sought to 
rebuild itself with international support in the wake of Europe’s most 
devastating conflict since World War II. But progress will only be 
irreversible when Bosnians themselves take responsibility for the peace 
process. It is my task as Bosnia and Herzegovina’s last High Representative 
to oversee the transition from today’s quasi-protectorate to local 
ownership.’88  
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In line with Nye’s and Schwarz-Schilling’s positive analysis of 
Bosnia’s institutional capacity, the Steering Board of the PIC decided to 
close down the OHR by July 2007. The OHR had already started to 
downsize in 2005. In that year, the organization’s staff had been cut by 
nearly half compared to its peak in 2002. Moreover, compared to the 2004 
budget of 26 million Euros, the budget was halved to some 13 million Euros 
in 2006. The OHR declared: ‘We are now actively looking at ways in which 
OHR can transfer many of the functions that have fallen to it in the course of 
the last decade – from vetting ministers to drafting key pieces of legislation – 
to the domestic authorities.’89 In spite of these plans, in February 2007, the 
closure of the OHR was postponed by one year. By that time, the High 
Representative Schwarz-Schilling and the Steering Board of the PIC deemed 
Bosnia’s commitment to the implementation of Dayton to be insufficient. 
There was especially much concern about the secessionist tensions within 
the Serb Republic.90 In February 2008, the closure of the OHR was 
postponed again. The PIC Steering Board concluded that due to renewed 
tensions over the constitutional design of the country and the lack of 
cooperation among the different communities the OHR could not be 
closed.91  
 
4.1.4 The capacity of Bosnia’s political institutions 
 
Officially, ownership was linked to the achievement of progress by Bosnia’s 
institutions. As Westendorp stated in 1997: ‘The faster the progress, the 
sooner we will be able to leave matters in the hands of the people of Bosnia 
and those they elect, in free and fair elections, to lead and represent them.’92 
Initially, the PIC had planned to finish the international administration and 
transfer all authority to the domestic institutions in December 1996. 
However, given the lack of institutional progress and commitment to the 
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implementation of the Dayton Agreement the mandate of the OHR was 
extended by two years in December 1996 and in December 1997 the OHR’s 
mandate was extended indefinitely.93 With the abolition of an explicit 
deadline for ending the mission, the strategy of the OHR became focused on 
achieving benchmarks.94 The achievement of these benchmarks would 
become the test for whether domestic institutions were ready to assume 
ownership. As has been mentioned in Chapter three, the benchmarks were 
embedded in several annual action plans, finally culminating in the Mission 
Implementation Plan in 2003. The action plans were meant to: ‘pave the way 
towards further progress during the next two years, with the authorities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina increasingly assuming greater responsibility for the 
functions now undertaken or coordinated by the international community.’95 
And the Mission Implementation Plan was devised to function as a method 
to establish: ‘benchmarks for determining when domestic capacities have 
developed to the extent that will warrant the transfer of power to local 
authorities in the various core areas.’96 In other words, the Mission 
Implementation Plans were meant to create the ‘right conditions for Bosnian 
ownership.’97 
 In general, the capacity of Bosnia’s principal political institutions 
has increased during the twelve years of international administration. At the 
same time the acceleration of institutional independence since 2005, has not 
been matched by an increase in institutional capacity. On the contrary, it 
seems that since the failure of the Parliamentary Assembly to adopt a 
constitutional reform package in April 2006 (see Chapter seven), Bosnia has 
gone into a period of political stagnation which had not ended as of autumn 
2008. 
The institution of the Presidency will be first discussed. The 
Presidency had reached only a limited capacity to act by 2008. During the 
first few years of its existence the greatest challenge had been to let the 
Presidency meet on a regular basis. For the entire duration of the first 
Presidency (1996-1998) the chairmanship was executed by the Bosniak 
leader Alija Izetbegovi. He had received the highest number of votes in the 
1996 general elections and according to the Constitution he was entitled to 
hold the chair. However, his chairmanship reduced the support for the 
institution among the other two constituent peoples. The Bosnian Serb 
member, for example, held office in Pale (the war-time capital of the Serb 
Republic) rather than Sarajevo. As a result, the work of the Presidency was 
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minimal at best.98 Next to the frequent political deadlocks, the institution 
lacked an organizational infrastructure. 
Only in 1999, during the second Presidency (1998 - 2002) was an 
agreement reached to establish a joint secretariat. Another organizational 
innovation was that from 1998 the chair rotated among the three members; 
the first chairmanship to be held by the candidate who had received most 
votes in the elections. The decision to have a rotating chair increased the 
support for the institution among the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs 
during the second Presidency. At the same time the institution’s popular 
legitimacy was negatively affected by the way in which two Presidency 
members were replaced. Based on an amended election law, drafted by the 
OHR, they were replaced by parliament rather than by popular vote.99 
Further, as had also been the case during its first term, the Presidency did not 
meet very frequently. On 15 April 1999, for example, after it had not met for 
several months, High Representative Westendorp had to order the 
Presidency to resume its work.100  
 The third Presidency (2002-2006) was characterized by an increased 
role for the chairmanship. Between 1996 and 2002 the different Presidency 
members had represented their respective constituent peoples rather than the 
entire state.101 In reaction the OHR had tried to make it a more state-
representing institution. Despite the OHR’s policy, the Presidency was not 
able to meet on a regular basis until 2005. Nonetheless, in the same year the 
institution proved to be able to take key decisions in the area of defense 
reform. In addition, it played a substantial role in the discussion on 
constitutional reforms in 2006.102 However, both reforms were driven by the 
international community and hence the Presidency’s involvement was not 
autonomous. Moreover, the Bosnian Croat Presidency member, Dragan 
ovi, had to be removed from office by the High Representative as a result 
of corruption charges.103  
 Finally, the fourth Presidency (formed after the elections of 2006) 
has been characterized by political paralysis. After the Presidency had been 
inaugurated in November 2006, the institution met on a regular basis. 
However, the Presidency members continued with the well established 
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practice of showing political allegiance to their entities rather than to Bosnia 
as a state. As a result, it proved to be difficult to adopt common positions on 
policy issues. Among others, the Presidency members failed to adopt a 
common position on how to present Bosnia abroad (particularly concerning 
the 2007 verdict of the International Court of Justice that Serbia had 
conducted genocide during the Bosnian war) and on the status of 
Srebrenica.104  
 The institutional development of the Council of Ministers was as 
sporadic as the development of the Presidency. In 2008 the institutional 
capacity of the institution was still very weak. The first Council of Ministers 
(1996 – 1998) started as a very fragile joint institution. The institution had 
been dubbed Council of Ministers, because during the Dayton negotiations 
the Serb delegation had objected to calling it a government.105 When it was 
inaugurated on 3 January 1997, it did not even have a location where it could 
convene its sessions.106 Moreover, the chair of the Council rotated every 
week.107 More substantially, it proved to be very difficult to reach consensus 
on how many ministries should be created. Whereas the Bosnian Serbs 
preferred to have only the two ministries explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution (foreign affairs and foreign trade), the Bosniaks wanted 
additional ministries.108 In the end, agreement was reached in November 
1996 that with the addition of a Ministry for Civil Affairs and 
Communications, the Council would start with three ministries.109 
 The second Council of Ministers (1998 – 2000) was haunted by 
similar problems. In September 1998, the OHR initiated a discussion 
concerning the functioning of the Council of Ministers. Especially the issues 
of chairmanship, the number of ministerial portfolios, the state budget and 
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cooperation with the entities were to be addressed.110 The OHR was 
confident that it had the support of all parties concerned.111 However, the 
reform was inhibited by the elections in the fall of 1998 and the subsequent 
slow formation of the new Council of Ministers.112 Still, in February 1999 
the first reform could take place when the weekly rotation of the 
chairmanship was substituted for a monthly rotation.113 One year later, a new 
Law on the Council of Ministers was adopted by parliament; the chair would 
rotate once in eight months and three ministries were added including the 
Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the Ministry for Treasury of State 
Institutions, and the Ministry for European Integration and the Stability 
Pact.114  
The third Council of Ministers (2000 – 2002) relied heavily on 
political support of the international community; especially of the USA and 
the UK.115 When High Representative Petritsch introduced his concept of 
‘ownership’, this term was rhetorically adopted by Bosnian ministers. In 
practice however, the government coalition relied heavily on the OHR for all 
the reforms which it could not or dared not to undertake by itself.116 The 
government coalition, the so called Alliance for Change, was made up of an 
uncomfortable alliance between several moderate political parties that were 
unable to implement its reform plans before the next elections in 2002. It 
was even dependent on the OHR for formulating its manifesto which they 
tried to use to win the 2002 elections.117 
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The fourth Council of Ministers (2002 – 2006) remained a weak 
institution. During the formation of the Council of Ministers after the 
elections of 2002, the SDS candidate for the Ministry of Justice was rejected 
by the High Representative.118 Moreover, during the same formation, it 
proved to be necessary to impose the new Law on the Council of Ministers 
rather than to have it adopted by the Council of Ministers itself.119 The new 
law strengthened the authority of the chair of the Council of Ministers, by 
abolishing the system of rotation. It was expected that the chair would be 
able to develop authority and effectively become a Prime Minister. In turn, 
that would encourage long-term planning and policy consistency.120 In line 
with that objective, High Representative Ashdown started to address the 
chair as ‘Prime Minister.’ Nonetheless, in his second report as High 
Representative, Ashdown had to conclude about the Council of Ministers: 
‘Prime Minister Terzic’s administration is hampered by the constitutional 
dysfunction of the Council of Ministers (he does not appoint and cannot 
remove Ministers – they owe their existence and loyalty to Parties, not the 
Government) and lack of capacity and support within the institution of the 
CoM [Council of Ministers, NvW] as a whole.’121 In addition, in the 2003 
Feasibility report, the European Commission identified ‘institutional 
capacity’ and ‘political will’ as the two major factors inhibiting the proper 
functioning of the institution.122  
Internal tensions and deadlocks (as a result of the veto powers) have 
continued to hinder the capacity for autonomous action in the following 
years.123 At the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005 the functioning of the 
Council of Ministers was hindered by the resignation of two Bosnian Serb 
ministers, after which the work of the Council was blocked for almost two 
months. In the course of 2005, further problems occurred when a minister 
resigned following corruption charges and when an open conflict erupted 
between Prime Minister Adnan Adnan Terzi and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mladen Ivanovi.124 Confronted with these problems High 
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Representative Ashdown declared in December 2005: ‘In order for BiH’s 
[Bosnia and Herzegovina’s, NvW] European path to be more successful, 
authorities must be more efficient. This particularly applies to the Council of 
Ministers. For the last three months it had only five sessions. If this is not 
changed, the success cannot be expected (…) Out of nine ministers, we have 
two acting ministers as the result of political games. This must be solved.’125  
In addition to the problems on the ministerial level, the general 
secretariat of the Council of Ministers faced continued shortages in staff and 
a politicized environment. A same lack of staff was identified with respect to 
the legislative office, which prevented it from addressing all required 
legislation. Also the bureaucracy was hindered by a lack of capacity. In 
September 2004, the PIC urged the Bosnian authorities to make sure that by 
the end of the year an adequate number of staff were hired and allocated to 
the state level ministries and agencies.126 In 2004, the PIC developed the 
State Government Strengthening Plan, which was designed to improve the 
capacities of the Council of Ministers, but made little substantial progress in 
2005. In April 2005 the PIC Steering Board welcomed progress with regard 
to civil service legislation and the staffing of the Council of Ministers, but 
stressed that a further increase in qualified staff was still needed.127 In 2006, 
serious shortcomings were identified by the European Commission. The 
consolidation of the state level ministries and institutions had proceeded too 
slow in 2006. With respect to finances, operation and equipment (in terms of 
premises and staff), too little progress had been achieved. Limited budgets 
and premises continued to delay the recruitment of personnel. As a result, 
Bosnia was far from having recruited the required number of staff for its 
state ministries in 2006. Moreover, the quality of staff, in terms of capacity 
and skills, was too low and funds for training were lacking; the annual 
training budget amounted to approximately 40.000 Euros. Despite the 
importance of having knowledge of European legislation and despite the 
Council of Ministers having adopted a training program on European 
Integration in May 2005, large-scale implementation was impeded due to the 
lack of funds. Moreover, the European Commission concluded: ‘Work 
towards a professional and apolitical civil service with recruitment and 
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promotion based on experience and merit has been limited.’128 A positive 
development, though, was the adoption of the National Strategy for the 
Reform of the Public Administration which had been a key priority of the 
European Union’s Partnership program. 
Finally, the fifth Council of Ministers (formed after the elections of 
2006) was plagued by internal tensions and deadlocks during its first year in 
office (2007). In line with the tradition of long coalition formations in post-
war Bosnia, the Council of Ministers was established in mid-February 2007. 
This was almost four months after the elections were held. In its 2007 
progress report the European Commission concluded: ‘Complicated 
decision-making procedures, capacity problems, lack of political will and 
diverging national interests in government and parliament continue to delay 
the adoption of legislation.’129 Moreover, the bureaucracy remained hindered 
by a lack of capacity. The general secretariat of the Council of Ministers was 
only partly operational in 2007 and was slow to take up a coordinating role. 
The legislative office functioned better, but was hindered by a lack of 
professional staff, premises and office equipment. More crucially, in the 
wider public administration there was a substantial lack of knowledge of 
EU-law, European integration processes and foreign languages.130 Although 
the European Commission noted some positive developments regarding 
public administration in 2007 (such as the professional manner in which the 
negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU took 
place), in general it concluded: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina remains affected by 
cumbersome administrative structures. The National Strategy for the Public 
Administration Reform has yet to be properly implemented. There has not 
yet been any systematic or coherent action driven by local ownership.’131 
 Finally, the institutional capacity of the Parliamentary Assembly in 
2008 was also weak. During the first mandate of the Parliamentary 
Assembly (1996-1998) little legislation was produced autonomously. Guided 
by the OHR’s Quick Start Package, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted its 
first laws in the spring of 1997.132 Only in December 1997 was the High 
Representative given the Bonn powers that allowed him to impose 
legislation. This was extensively done in the second (1998 – 2000) and third 
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(2000 – 2002) mandates of the Parliamentary Assembly. Capacity for 
autonomous parliamentary action was limited. For example, the election law 
of 2001 was only adopted after enormous pressure from the international 
community.133 Nonetheless, the Parliamentary Assembly’s legislative 
capacity increased between 2000 and 2002 and also the work of the 
committees improved gradually; making emergency ordinances and the 
adoption of legislation through accelerated procedures less necessary. Within 
the legislative period 2000-2002, three times more laws proposed by the 
Council of Ministers were adopted than in the legislative periods 1996-1998 
and 1998-2000. Nonetheless, even in the period 2000-2002 the 
Parliamentary Assembly met infrequently; often less than two times a 
month. 134 In order to address these problems and to increase the institutional 
capacity of the Parliamentary Assembly (and of the parliaments on the entity 
level) the OSCE initiated the Parliamentary Support Programme in January 
2001. The main objective of the program was ‘to increase the competency of 
Members of Parliament and staff in the exercise of their legislative, 
oversight and representative functions as well as to improve the public 
profile of the BiH [Bosnian, NvW] Parliamentary Assemblies.’135 
The fourth mandate of the Parliamentary Assembly (2002-2006) 
started with a large number of laws being imposed by the OHR in April and 
May 2002. The objective was to lighten the burden of the new High 
Representative (Ashdown) in the first months of his term.136 However, as has 
been pointed out above, Ashdown continued with a strong interventionist 
policy which included the imposition of much legislation. During the fourth 
legislature, parliament was institutionally weak. This lack of institutional 
capacity was clearly illustrated by Ashdown in his farewell speech to the 
Bosnian parliament in January 2006: ‘You, and yes often even we in the 
International Community have grown used to expecting OHR to solve 
problems if consensus cannot be reached: indeed the ‘backstop’ of an HR 
[High Representative, NvW] imposition has often been adopted by all sides 
as the default position. BiH’s [Bosnia’s, NvW] politicians feel free to argue 
the case for one side, without any effort to build consensus, secure in the 
knowledge that in the end the HR will ride to the rescue.’137 In an earlier 
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speech, Ashdown had referred to the Bonn powers as a wonder drug with 
questionable side effects for the parliament: ‘Put simply, the Bonn Powers 
shattered the long ascendancy of obstructionism, through which those 
opposed to the rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to sabotage 
the country’s recovery. At the same time, however, the Bonn Powers created 
a dangerous dependency both in the Bosnian political establishment and in 
the international community. The powers have acted like a wonder-drug that 
radically improves the patient’s condition, but weakens the patient’s natural 
powers of resistance – in this case the robust development of a civil society 
and effective parliamentary opposition capable of reigning in the worst 
excesses of nationalism and intolerance.’138  
In November 2006, the European Commission concluded that 
Bosnia’s Parliamentary Assembly was still hampered by ‘insufficient 
technical resources, an unqualified parliamentary administration and 
cumbersome parliamentary procedures.’139 The European Integration 
Committee was especially criticized for having remained largely inactive. 
The relationship between the executive and the legislative organs was also 
not sufficient and cooperation with the Council of Ministers remained 
inadequate.140 As a result of these deficiencies, the Parliamentary Assembly 
failed to agree on the creation of two new ministries within the Council of 
Ministers in September 2006.141 In the end, during the first half a year of 
Schwarz-Schilling’s term in office (2006), parliament had not even passed 
one single law.142  
Finally, the fifth mandate of the Parliamentary Assembly (after the 
elections of October 2006) proved unable to convincingly demonstrate that it 
had sufficient institutional capacity. After the general elections, seven-and-a-
half weeks elapsed between the first inaugural session of the House of 
Representatives on 20 November 2006 and its continuation on 7 January 
2007. The inauguration was suspended after the parties had failed to agree 
on the election of the speaker of the House of Representatives.143 This 
inactivity was heavily criticized by High Representative Schwarz-Schilling: 
‘Rightly or wrongly, parliamentarians have given the impression that they 
believe Bosnia and Herzegovina is not facing any pressing problems. They 
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must now act to change that perception and set an example to others (…) I 
will not do their work for them, nor will it be done by others in the 
international community. Members of parliament must now demonstrate that 
they can take their country and all its citizens forward from division and 
despair and lead them to prosperity, security and full Euro-Atlantic 
integration. That is what they were elected to do.’144 Comparable problems 
delayed the assembly of the House of Peoples to mid-March 2007.145 During 
the entire year, both chambers of parliament met infrequently and progress 
on parliamentary activities was slow. Only a limited number of laws were 
adopted in part due to the slow input from the Council of Ministers. 
Efficiency was hindered by the continuing rotation of the Presidency of the 
House of Representatives and the House of Peoples on an eight-month basis. 
Finally, parliament was still hindered by inadequate technical and human 
resources, cooperation with the Council of Ministers remained inadequate 
and there was no coordination of legislative agendas between the State and 
the entity level of government.146 
 
4.1.5 Conflict management and institutional autonomy in Bosnia 
 
The analysis above shows that Bosnian autonomy in terms of independence 
has increased gradually between 1996 and 2008. The transfer of authority 
from the international to the domestic level and the decreasing number of 
OHR-decisions has increased the independence of Bosnia. It was shown that 
especially since 2005, the interference of the OHR declined and the 
independence of Bosnia’s political institutions increased. Autonomy in terms 
of institutional capacity has also gradually increased. In 2008, Bosnia’s key 
institutions - the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly - were better able to ‘plan and execute policies and to enforce 
laws cleanly and transparently’ than they had been in 2000.147  
Nonetheless, in 2007 and 2008 the international administration was 
still a dominant actor in Bosnia’s domestic political order. It still imposed 
legislation, such as an amendment on the Law on the Council of Ministers in 
November 2007, and it issued executive acts, such as the removal from 
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office of a Serb Republic’s official from the Ministry of the Interior.148 In 
addition, the analysis showed that Bosnia’s institutional capacity was still 
very weak. The Presidency proved not to be able to adopt common positions 
on important issues such as representation and the status of Srebrenica. The 
Council of Ministers was paralyzed by internal tensions and deadlocks and 
was haunted by complicated decisions-making procedures, capacity 
problems and the lack of political will. The Parliamentary Assembly was 
rather inactive in 2007 and in 2008, and only a few laws were adopted. As a 
result, it must be concluded that Bosnia’s political institutions were not 
autonomous in 2008. 
How can this outcome be explained? A plausible explanation is that 
the development of institutional autonomy was impeded by the incorporation 
of the incompatibility in the Dayton Agreement. As elaborated upon in 
Chapter three, the Dayton Peace Agreement settled and contained the 
conflict rather than resolved it. The Dayton Agreement was an 
internationally imposed agreement in which the incompatibility was 
incorporated. An international administration of the control type was 
established in order to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. The 
OHR received substantial executive powers and became strongly involved in 
Bosnian domestic politics. The contested nature of the Dayton Agreement 
and its Constitution has led to continued challenges by the conflicting parties 
to the post-war political order. In February 2008, more than twelve years 
after the OHR had started its operations, the PIC Steering Board concluded: 
‘There have been attempts to weaken progressively the institutions and 
legitimacy of the state. There have been renewed tensions between political 
actors over the future constitutional make-up of the country as well as the 
role and competencies of the state. The limited degree of cooperation among 
BiH [Bosnian, NvW] actors shown in late 2007 has deteriorated. There have 
also been unacceptable challenges to the Dayton Peace Agreement.’149  
As a result of these constant challenges and the interventions by the 
OHR, the international administration developed itself into the central pillar 
of the Bosnian constitutional order. As such, Bosnian state institutions 
became dependent on the international administration for executing their 
tasks. In 2005, the Venice Commission had warned the OHR that it had 
created a dependency culture in Bosnia. According to the Venice 
Commission, the powers of the OHR enabled Bosnian politicians to avoid 
accepting painful political compromises, because they knew that every time 
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political consensus was not achieved, the High Representative would impose 
legislation.150 The contested nature of the post-war order probably prevented 
the political institution from taking ownership and from developing 
significant institutional capacity. It can therefore be argued that due to the 
incorporation of incompatibility in the internationally imposed Dayton 
Agreement, Bosnia’s political institutions have not been institutionalized in 
terms of autonomy by 2008. To that extent, High Representative Schwarz-
Schilling was right when he stated: ‘Institutions that have been created by 
imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities 
buy in to them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not international 
organizations, to deliver reform, exercise democratic rules and procedures 




4.2.1  The powers of UNMIK  
 
The non-resolution of the conflict in Kosovo required the establishment of 
an international administration of the governorship type. It was necessary for 
Kosovo to be governed by an international authority because of its lack of 
political status as a territory. As in the case of Bosnia, it was to be expected 
that the conflicting parties would not be satisfied with the status quo. The 
Kosovo Albanians wanted independence while the Kosovo Serbs and the 
Serbian government wanted Kosovo to remain a Serbian province. It was up 
to the international administration to ensure the compliance of both 
conflicting parties with UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  
 Given the absence of conflict resolution, UNMIK received a 
mandate which was even more robust than OHR’s mandate. Based on 
Resolution 1244, UNMIK had the power to issue legislative acts 
(regulations) and implementation acts (administrative directions) in order to 
fulfill its mandate. The first regulation confirmed the powers of UNMIK: 
‘All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General.’152 Thus, UNMIK was 
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established as the ultimate authority in Kosovo’s development towards an 
autonomous self-governing political entity.  
UNMIK’s powers were clear from the beginning and did not need to 
be reinterpreted as had been the case with the OHR’s powers in 1997. After 
the Constitutional Framework had been drafted and the PISG had been 
established in 2001, a number of responsibilities were transferred from the 
international level to the PISG. The Constitutional Framework had become 
bigger than originally intended by UNMIK as a consequence of the Kosovo 
Albanian determination to secure as many responsibilities for the domestic 
institutions as possible.153 Nonetheless, a large number of powers and 
responsibilities remained exclusively in the hands of UNMIK as ‘reserved 
powers.’ Moreover, under the Constitutional Framework, each primary law 
adopted by the Assembly needed to be promulgated by the UN Special 
Representative in order to become effective. This allowed UNMIK to check 
the compatibility of a particular law with UN Security Council Resolution 
1244, the Constitutional Framework and international standards. In this way, 
UNMIK and in particular its Office of the Legal Advisor, were allowed to 
change laws in the promulgation phase. This happened, for example in 2003 
with the Laws on External Trade, Telecommunication, Higher Education, 
and Management of Public Finances and Accountability. In April 2003, UN 
Special Representative Steiner wrote a letter to the speaker of the Assembly, 
Nexhat Daci, in which he requested adjustments of the laws; all of which 
had already been adopted by the Assembly. In May, the Assembly accepted 
the adjustments of UNMIK with respect to the first two Laws and these were 
promulgated as such. The Laws on the Management of Public Finances and 
Higher education were also promulgated, but based on an unilateral 
adjustment by UNMIK, since it had proved to be impossible to reach 
parliamentary consensus on UNMIK’s adjustments.154  
From the beginning, Kosovo’s politicians have been critical about 
UNMIK’s prerogative of changing laws after they had been adopted by the 
Assembly. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratik te Kosovës, 
PDK) was the most outspoken critic of the Constitutional Framework and 
after its adoption Hashim Thaçi declared: “this document will hold hostage 
the aim of the people of Kosovo, which is political independence”.155 Bajram 
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Kosumi of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca Për Ardhmërine e 
Kosovës, AAK) called UNMIK’s authority to change laws a ‘bad habit’ and 
argued that it ran counter to the right of a parliament to draft laws without 
external interference.156 Such criticism led to an agreement between UN 
Special Representative Steiner and Daci in 2003 to improve the procedure. It 
was agreed that: (1) UNMIK would submit its remarks before the law was 
accepted by the Assembly; (2) the remarks would be returned by UNMIK to 
the Assembly with detailed explanations; (3) the work of the Assembly and 
Government would be better coordinated; and (4) the creation of a working 
group including UNMIK representative to aid the Government in drafting 
laws in accordance with UNMIK’s demands, before would be send to the 
Assembly.157 This improved the relationship between UNMIK and the 
Assembly considerably.158 
Even though the above mentioned political agreement shows that 
Kosovar politicians tried to gain more influence, UNMIK’s vast authority 
could not constitutionally be challenged by any Kosovar institution. The 
international administration was the supreme authority in Kosovo; no single 
law could come into force without the signature of the UN Special 
Representative. UNMIK’s powers were merely restricted by Resolution 
1244 and the obligation to respect international human rights standards.159 
Further, UNMIK was only politically accountable to the UN Security 
Council. However, it did always not live up to the standards of democratic 
and accountable governance it was imposing on Kosovo. Therefore, UNMIK 
– like the OHR – has been criticized for being ‘colonial’ or ‘absolutist.’ The 
International Crisis Group, for example, referred to the UN Special 
Representative as a tyrant in the classic sense; meaning a despot without any 
checks and balances.160 
 The claim regarding the absolutist nature of UNMIK must be 
qualified since a significant amount of Kosovars participated in the 
international administration. Within the civil administration pillar (pillar 2), 
the number of local staff members even exceeded the international staff in 
the years 2000 and 2001. It should be realized however, that the senior 
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functions were mostly occupied by internationals. Since 2002, the total 
number of staff decreased, but then international staff exceeded local staff in 
numbers (and still in seniority of positions).161 The decreasing number of 
local staff is explained by the transfer of local personnel to the established 
domestic institutions in 2002. 
 
4.2.2 UNMIK’s regulations and administrative directions 
 
UNMIK’s decisions were presented in so called ‘regulations’ and 
‘administrative directions.’ The regulations and administrative directions of 
the UN Special Representative are the equivalent of the High 
Representative’s decisions in Bosnia. In its first regulation, UNMIK defined 
‘regulation’ as a ‘legislative act.’ A regulation would remain in force until it 
would be amended or repealed by UNMIK or superseded by decisions of 
domestic institutions established after the status of Kosovo would have been 
resolved. Moreover, the regulations would have immediate effect after their 
promulgation by UNMIK.162 The term ‘administrative direction’ is not 
explicitly defined, but should be understood as an executive act which 
implements a specific regulation. The administrative direction is not 
necessarily issued right after the regulation. On the contrary; several weeks, 
months or even years may go by before an administrative directions is 
proclaimed. For example, the administrative direction 2006/1 (11 January 
2006) implements UNMIK Regulation 2002/13) that was already passed in 
2002. It should also be realized that not all regulations are followed by an 
administrative direction. When a regulation promulgates a law it is 
implemented by a secondary law made by Kosovo’s PISG, not by an 
administrative direction. The period of time that elapses between a 
regulation and an administrative direction explains the difference between 
the total number of regulations (409) and the total number of administrative 
directions (204) as presented in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 shows that from 2004 to 2006 the number of regulations 
remained relatively stable (with a slight increase in 2006), while the number 
of regulations declined significantly in 2007. The number of administrative 
directions already decreased in 2005 and dropped subsequently to 23, 18 and 
14 directions a year. The year 2008 is an exception to the declining trend in 
the number of regulations and administrative directions. The 34 regulations 
and 7 administrative directions were made between January and 14 June 
2008, so that in the first five and a half months of 2008 about as many 
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regulations and half of the administrative directions were issued compared to 
entire year 2007. This sudden increase can be explained by the need to 
complete the regulations and directions before the Constitution of Kosovo 
came into effect on 15 June 2008. However, the overall decreasing trend of 
regulations and administrative directions seems to correspond with the 
developments in Bosnia, where the number of decisions also declined in the 
last few years. 
 
Table 4.4: UNMIK regulations and administrative directions from 25 July 1999 
to 14 June 2008163 
Year Number of Regulations Number of Administrative Directions 
1999 27 4 
2000 69 29 
2001 41 26 
2002 23 27 
2003 41 32 
2004 56 31 
2005 56 23 
2006 61 18 
2007 35 14 
2008 34 7 
Total 443 211 
 
As in the case of Bosnia, the development of UNMIK’s regulations 
and administrative directions is better understood when specific policy fields 
are taken into account. Table 4.5 shows UNMIK’s regulations and 
administrative directions as related to specific policy fields.164 The table 
shows that most regulations concerned the promulgation of laws. This differs 
from Bosnia in which executive rather than legislative acts were more 
predominant (removals and suspensions from office). The domination of 
legislative acts in the case of Kosovo can be explained by the governorship 
mandate; UNMIK was actually mandated to govern the territory and to be 
extensively involved in legislation. The governorship type of international 
administration also explains why the UN Special Representative has never 
dismissed or banned domestic officials from office, although he had the 
authority to do so.165 Whereas in Bosnia domestic politicians were 
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‘corrected’ by the decisions of the OHR after they had failed to live up to 
international expectations, in Kosovo the decisions were predominantly 
taken by the international administration itself.166 In other words, the 
difference between Bosnia and Kosovo concerns the difference between 
international administration as control (Bosnia) and international 
administration as governorship (Kosovo). 
 
Table 4.5: UNMIK regulations from 25 July 1999 to 14 June 2008 as related to specific 
policy fields167 






6 8 7 9 6 - 4 6 26 5 71 
The economic 
field (including 
fiscal affairs and 
budget) 





5 3 9 5 8 8 6 13 15 9 76 
Education  - - - - - - - 1 - 1 
Promulgation of 
laws 
19 16 33 25 32 24 4 - - - 134 







- - 3 1 3 1 - - 4 1 13 
Municipal 
Matters 
- 2 2 - 1 1 1 - 3 1 11 
Total 34 35 60 56 56 41 23 41 69 27 442168 
                                                 
166 Most regulations were directly decided upon by the UN Special Representative and his 
team. However, the politically most contentious ones had to be approved by the UN 
Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and 
the Office of Legal Affairs. Ilir Dugolli and Lulzim Peci, Enhancing civilian management and 
oversight of the security sector in Kosovo (Pristina: KIPRED/Saferworld, 2005), 16. 
167 Obtainable from: www.unmikonline.org (last visited on 20 January 2009) 
168 Regulation 29/2006 is not available and could thus not be categorized. Otherwise the total 
number of regulations would add up to 443 and correspond with the total number of 
regulations in Table 4.4. 




A third difference with Bosnia is the absence of any significant difference 
between the number of regulations and administrative directions issued by 
each successive UN Special Representative. Table 4.6 shows the monthly 
average of regulations and administrative directions for each UN Special 
Representative and acting UN Special Representative.169  
 
Table 4.6: Monthly average of regulations and administrative directions by 
each Special Representative 170 













Kouchner 19 100 5,3 33 1,7 
Haekkerrup 11 37 3,4 26 2,4 
Brayshaw - 2 - 1 - 
Steiner 16 47 2,9 41 2,6 
Brayshaw - - - 5 - 
Holkeri 10 33 3,3 25 2,5 
Brayshaw - 12 - 9 - 
Jessen-
Petersen 
23 120 5,2 43 1,9 
Schook - 10 - 1 - 
Rücker 21 82 3,9  27 1,3  
 
Table 4.6 shows that until 14 June 2008 Kouchner and Jessen-Petersen have 
been the most interventionist UN Special Representative’s when it comes to 
issuing regulations. Steiner has the highest average of administrative 
directions, followed by Holkeri and Haekkerrup. The differences, however, 
are rather insignificant compared to the differences in the case of Bosnia.  
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4.2.3 The independence of Kosovo’s provisional political institutions 
 
The analysis above shows that in Kosovo the number of administrative 
directions started to decrease in 2005, while the number of regulations 
started to decrease in 2007. Unlike the case of Bosnia, the decreasing 
number of regulations and administrative directions cannot be seen as an 
indication of increasing institutional independence. The big difference when 
compared to Bosnia is that Kosovo was not sovereign and therefore an 
ownership policy like the one in Bosnia was not possible. Moreover, the 
position of UNMIK in Kosovo’s provisional constitutional order differs 
significantly from the OHR’s position in Bosnia. Whereas the OHR was 
expected to intervene ex post (for example in case the Bosnians acted against 
the letter and spirit of the Dayton Agreement), UNMIK was obliged under 
UN Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework to intervene ex ante 
(and promulgate every law made by the PISG). Institutional independence 
could thus only be generated by the official transfer of authority from 
UNMIK to the PISG, and not by a decreasing the number of regulations and 
administrative directions. In order to assess whether PISG has become more 
independent from UNMIK during its international administration, it is 
necessary to look at the transfer of authority, including the extent to which 
Kosovars were involved in institution-building processes.  
The transfer of authority started with the adoption of the 
Constitutional Framework in 2002. The document itself was drafted by a 
working group with international and Kosovar members. Nonetheless, 
UNMIK contributed the larger part of the document.172 Although the 
Constitutional Framework can be criticized for creating binding rules for the 
PISG while failing to limit the powers of UNMIK, it transferred many 
competencies to the new Kosovar institutions. Among others, these 
authorities were: the responsibility for economic and financial policy; 
education, science and technology; labour and social welfare; health; 
environmental protection; and public administration services.173 Some 
reserved powers remained exclusively in the hands of UNMIK. These were 
the powers that were closely associated with sovereignty; such as foreign 
affairs, interior affairs, justice and defense. Concrete examples of powers 
reserved for the UN Special Representative were the right to dissolve the 
Assembly and to call for new elections, to exercise final authority regarding 
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the appointment, removal from office and disciplining of judges and 
prosecutors, to conclude agreements with states and international 
organizations and to enforce public safety and order.174 Moreover, in the 
preamble of the Constitutional Framework it was stated very clearly that ‘the 
exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self 
Government in Kosovo shall not in any way affect or diminish the ultimate 
authority of the UN Special Representative for the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).’175 With that provision, the 
Constitutional Framework gave UNMIK the power to reverse the transfer of 
authority.  
A distinction should be made between the political transfer of 
authority, which was immediate, and the executive transfer of authority, 
which was incremental.176 The first political transfer of authority occurred at 
the municipal level after the municipal elections in October 2000. 
Municipalities gained authority in the fields of healthcare, education and 
public services.177 The second political transfer of authority (and the first at 
the level of the central government institutions) took place in 2002, when the 
PISG was established after Assembly elections had been held in the fall of 
2001. For facilitating the process, UNMIK had set up a Transfer Council 
together with the PISG. The Transfer Council established specialized 
working groups which met on a regular basis.178  
 As arranged for in the Constitutional Framework, the executive 
control over the transferred areas was to be handed over to the PISG, while 
UNMIK kept control over the reserved powers. However, the executive 
transfer of authority evolved slowly.179 In October 2003, almost two years 
after the first Assembly elections, UNMIK was still in the middle of the 
process of transferring authority; out of the 44 competencies, 19 had been 
transferred, 17 had been identified for transfer and the remaining 8 were 
expected to be transferred in December 2003.180 It took until the summer of 
2004 for most of the identified competencies to be transferred to the 
domestic level.  
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According to the Kosovo Albanian leaders, the transfer process 
lacked ambition and they wanted to go beyond the non-reserved 
competencies. In a speech to the Assembly on 13 March 2003, Prime 
Minister Bajram Rexhepi called for closer cooperation between UNMIK and 
the Government in the areas reserved for the UN Special Representative, 
such as foreign policy, internal affairs, the justice system, security and 
energy issues.181 This call was repeated several times and on 30 October 
2003, the Assembly approved the creation of a working group to recommend 
changes to the Constitutional Framework allowing for a speedier transfer of 
competencies.182 By the end of 2003, UNMIK proved willing to consider the 
involvement of the PISG in reserved areas. Plans to implement these 
changes were developed parallel to the standards implementation plan.183 
UN Special Representative Holkeri had introduced the concept of 
partnership, which involved among others five joint UNMIK/PISG working 
groups on the implementation of the standards.184  
The outbreak of large-scale ethnic violence between (mainly) 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in March 2004 threatened to block the 
transfer process. The violence was triggered by two separate events; the 
blocking of the main highway to Skopje by Kosovo Serbs in reaction to a 
drive-by shooting which had wounded a Kosovo Serb, and the drowning of 
three Kosovo Albanian children who had allegedly been chased into the Ibar 
river by a group of Kosovo Serbs.185 According to UNMIK, nineteen persons 
were killed; eleven Kosovo Albanians and eight Kosovo Serbs. The 
destruction and damage to property amounted to: 36 orthodox churches, 
monasteries and other cultural and religious sites, and 730 houses belonging 
to minorities (mainly Kosovo Serbs). More than 1000 persons were injured, 
including dozens of international police officers.186 Despite the March 
violence, the Kosovar call for partnership (and ownership) was even stronger 
than in 2003. Reacting to this political pressure from the PISG, Norwegian 
                                                 
181 Bajram Rexhepi, ‘Prime Minister Adresses the Assembly’, Assembly Support Initiative 
Newsletter 6 (2003). 
182 Vrieze, ‘Recent developments in the Assembly ASI 2003/9’, 14. 
183 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2003/996, 2. 
184 Ilir Deda, ‘UNMIK and Kosovo Institutions, finding a way towards partnership’, Assembly 
Support Initiative Newsletter, 11 (2004) 10. 
185 Franklin de Vrieze, ‘Rolling back the collapse’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, 11 
(2004) 2. 
186 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2004/348 (New York, 2004), 1 and 2. 
During the March violence members from the Roma and Ashkali communities were also 
attacked. Gani Sadik, ‘We asked ourselves: who is next?’ Assembly Support Initiative 
Newsletter, 11 (2004) 15. 
 Institutional Autonomy 
 
 131
diplomat Kai Eide identified the further transfer of authority (or 
‘Kosovarization) as one of the ‘tests’ or ‘challenges’ facing the international 
administration after the March violence in 2004. In his ‘Report on the 
situation in Kosovo’, Eide wrote: ‘An ambitious policy of transferring 
further competencies should be launched without delay, giving the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government a greater sense of ownership and 
responsibility as well as accountability.’187  
After recognizing this, the UN Security Council and UNMIK 
adopted Eide’s recommendation and another set of competencies was 
identified to be transferred to the PISG by the end of 2004. None of the 
competencies would impinge on sovereignty and the transfer would be 
accompanied by robust monitoring and oversight on behalf of UNMIK. This 
included the use of sanctions and interventions by the UN Special 
Representative when necessary; as had also been recommended in the Eide 
report.188 In addition, Eide had proposed a separate Ministry of Energy, a 
Ministry for Community matters, Human rights and Returns, a Ministry of 
Justice and a transition strategy for the Kosovo Police Service.189 As has 
been mentioned in Chapter three, the Ministry of Energy and Mining was 
established in December 2004 and the Ministry of Returns and Communities 
was established in 2005.  
On 19 July 2005, the UN Special Representative presented to the 
government his plans for transferring competencies in police and justice to 
the PISG.190 Consequently, two new ministries, justice and interior, were 
established in March 2006.191 Both ministries had been created after the 
Contact Group and the EU had put political pressure on the UN to do so.192 
The Ministry of Interior was given the task of supervising the Kosovo Police 
Service. However, the international police commissioner continued to lead 
the institution. 
 Parallel to the transfer process, UNMIK started to scale down its 
operations. This increased the involvement of Kosovars in the institution-
building process. The scaling down of pillar 2 had started already in 2002. In 
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that year the total number of staff (international and local) amounted to 
1143, whereas there had still been 3100 staff members in 2001. Since 2002, 
the number of staff has gradually decreased and in 2006 only 261 staff 
members remained. Pillar 2 was dissolved in 2006 and replaced by a much 
smaller Department of Civil Administration.193 The phasing out of pillar 2 
was based on the executive transfer of authorities from UNMIK to the PISG. 
Especially since 2004, this transfer has accelerated significantly. In 2006, 
pillar 1 was also closed down and replaced by the Rule of Law Section in the 
UN Special Representative’s office. 
In accordance with the transfer of authority (including the increasing 
role of Kosovars in the institution-building process) public opinion polls 
show that Kosovars are increasingly starting to perceive their own 
institutions as being responsible for the political situation. In June 2004, 72 
percent of the respondents in a poll considered UNMIK to be the institution 
that was responsible for the political situation rather than the PISG, which 
was held responsible by only 15 percent of the respondents. In September 
2006, a majority still thought that UNMIK was responsible for the political 
situation, but the percentage of respondents had decreased significantly to 46 
percent. In the same month, the share of the population that held the PISG 
responsible had increased to 30 percent.194 In December 2006, the 
respondents attributed almost equal responsibility to UNMIK and the PISG, 
but in 2007 a reverse trend occurred. In June 2007, 58 percent of the 
respondents attributed responsibility to UNMIK and only 19 percent 
attributed responsibility to the PISG.195 This changed a little in the second 
half of 2007, but the majority of respondents kept attributing the main 
responsibility for the political situation to UNMIK.196  
 The reverse trend in attributing responsibility to the PISG went hand 
in hand with increased calls to end the international administration and to 
declare independence. In 2005, a protest movement called Vetëvendosje 
(Self Determination Movement) was formed. It depicted UNMIK as a neo-
colonial institution and accused the international administration of 
‘repressing the people’s will of self-determination.’197 Especially during the 
status negotiations in 2006 and 2007, the Self Determination Movement was 
active in rallying support (sometimes violently) for an end to the 
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international administration and for an independent Kosovo.198 The 
movement proved successful in voicing its protest, because in general 
support for the international administration had decreased considerably. The 
share of the population that had been satisfied with the work of UNMIK had 
declined from around 60 percent in 2002 to 31 percent in June 2007.199 
Nonetheless, as the analysis below shows, Kosovo’s political institutions 
were not self-sustainable yet. 
 
4.2.4 The capacity of Kosovo’s provisional political institutions 
 
As with Bosnia, the transfer of authority from the international to the 
domestic level was explicitly linked to the progress that would be achieved 
by Kosovo’s provisional institutions.200 The progress was measured in terms 
of compliance with UN Resolution 1244 and UNMIK’s decisions. That 
conditionality was reflected in UNMIK’s standards before status policy 
mentioned in Chapter three. This policy was only reluctantly accepted by the 
PISG and by the Kosovo Serb community.201 One of the reasons was that the 
standards were developed by internationals rather than by domestic 
officials.202 More important, the Kosovo Albanians were in first instance not 
really interested in standards; they preferred to have unconditional 
administrative responsibility. The Kosovo Albanians regarded the standards 
policy as a process with an open end and as an international strategy to avoid 
discussing the final status of the territory. The Kosovo Serb community 
criticized the Standards for Kosovo document for its own reasons; it 
regarded the document to be a concrete step towards an independent Kosovo 
which it strongly rejected.203 
Based on the lessons learned in Bosnia, the UN had not aimed at an 
early withdrawal from Kosovo. In contrast with Bosnia, institutional 
progress in Kosovo would not be followed by the end of the mission, but 
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with the start of negotiations on a final settlement of the territory’s status. 
The extent to which the PISG implemented the Standards for Kosovo was 
used to assess their institutional progress. Given this conditionality, one 
would expect that the transfer of authority, especially since its increase in 
2004, and the start of negotiations on a final status in 2006, would be 
matched by an increased institutional capacity. The analysis below shows 
that this was not the case.  
The institution of the Presidency is first discussed. During the first 
two years of the institution’s existence, it failed to guarantee the democratic 
functioning of the PISG. Although considered to be one of the President’s 
main functions President Rugova failed to regularly address the Assembly. 
According to the Constitutional Framework the President was obliged to 
submit at least one report yearly.204 The first time the President submitted a 
report was almost two years after his election on 22 January 2004.205 Only 
since 2004, the annual address has been made according to the 
Constitutional Framework; by Rugova in 2005 and his successor Fatmir 
Sejdiu in the following years. The President has also been blamed for 
exceeding his authority. In 2005, UNMIK had to pressure Rugova to give up 
his position as President of the LDK, because according to the Constitutional 
Framework the President of Kosovo is not allowed to have another official 
political position.206 The same situation occurred at the end of 2006 when 
Fatmir Sejdiu was elected as the new President of the LDK. UNMIK 
requested that he assume his responsibility under the Constitutional 
Framework and choose between his functions of President of Kosovo and 
President of the LDK.207 
With respect to the other main function of the institution, 
representing the unity of the people, the institution has performed well since 
the autumn of 2005. Earlier, Rugova had lost the opportunity to act 
decisively after a conflict over procedures had emerged between the 
Government and the parliamentary opposition in 2005. It was the UN 
Special Representative rather than Kosovo’s president who took the 
initiative to mitigate the conflict by creating a Political Forum that included 
governmental and oppositional political parties (see below). However, on 13 
September 2005, Rugova took the initiative to create a unified negotiation 
team for the final status negotiations. The team consisted of governmental 
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and oppositional political representatives and was an important 
accomplishment in view of the problematic relationship between the 
opposition and Government. After Rugova passed away in January 2006, the 
Team of Unity was successfully continued by Sejdiu. 
The institutional capacity of Kosovo’s Government developed very slowly. 
The establishment of the first Government (2002 – 2004) would have been 
unthinkable without the intervention of the American liaison office and 
UNMIK. The grand coalition between the LDK, the PDK, the AAK, and the 
Kosovo Serb Coalition Return (Koalitija Povratak, KP) was only possible 
after three months of intensive international mediation. The LDK was clearly 
the winner of the elections. However, when the results were compared with 
the municipal elections of 2000, the LDK had lost votes. Due to the 
opposition of the PDK and AAK to a LDK President, and the opposition of 
the LDK to a PDK Prime Minister, a political deadlock was created. In an 
attempt to break the deadlock, a first meeting between the representatives of 
the LDK, PDK, AAK and the KP was held at the US liaison office in 
Pristina on 18 January 2001.208 Several other American mediation efforts 
followed, added with meetings between the main contestants (the LDK and 
PDK) and UN Special Representative Steiner.209 At the end of February, 
consensus emerged on a deal which would make Rugova President and a 
PDK member Prime Minister. On 4 March, Kosovo’s Government under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi (PDK) and President Rugova 
were elected by the Assembly.210 The Government was a grand coalition of 
the LDK (with four minister posts), PDK (with two minister posts), AAK 
(with two minister posts), KP (with one minister post) and the Bosniak 
Democratic Party Vatan (Demokratska Stranka Vatan, DSV) one minister 
post).211  
The nine ministries that were established in March 2002 remained 
under tight control of UNMIK. All ministries would be ‘looked after’ by 
UNMIK pillars 2 and 4. In practice that meant that the pillars would recruit 
domestic staff and develop administrative guidelines and administrative 
instructions. Moreover, the ministries would have an international staff, 
headed by a senior international officer. This international staff performed 
line functions until the Government was established, after which it would 
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remain in order to advise domestic civil servants.212 As a result of the 
international involvement, the first Legislative Strategy of the Kosovo 
Government was mainly prepared by internationals.213  
The Government was aided in it is capacity building by the EAR 
Support Team that had been placed within the Office of the Prime 
Minister.214 The Office of the Prime Minister was also the institution within 
which special support offices were created in order to assist the PISG in 
developing capacities in the reserved areas. In 2002, five of such offices 
existed: (1) Legal Support Services; (2) Public Information; (3) Good 
Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunity and Gender; (4) 
Communities; and (5) Senior Public Appointments.215 The six offices created 
in 2004 were: (1) Office of International Cooperation and Regional 
Dialogue; (2) Office of European Integration; (3) Advisory Office of Public 
Safety; (4) Energy Office, (5) Office on Judicial Affairs; and (6) Strategic 
Policy Research, and Planning Office.216  
 Despite international assistance, the formation of ministries proved 
to be a long process which was not yet completed under the second mandate 
of the Government (2004 - 2007). Between 2000 and 2002, some 5200 
persons were trained by the OSCE Institute of Civil Administration.217 
However, a professional civil service did not yet exist in 2002. When 
ministers were getting appointed in 2002, their ministries had yet to be 
created and the subsequent recruiting process of civil servants was far from 
transparent.218 As a result, the civil service became politicized as civil 
servants were appointed according to political party lines.219 An attempt was 
made to improve the professional level of the civil service with the 
establishment of the KIPA. However, in 2007 the European Commission 
concluded: ‘Overall, Kosovo’s public administration remains weak and 
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inefficient. Some progress has been made in reforming the public 
administration, but reforms are at an early stage.’220 
The PISG proved to be slow in nominating ministers and assigning 
office space.221 For example, by October 2002, only five out of the 11 
permanent secretaries for the ministries had been appointed.222 The OSCE 
identified serious shortcomings with respect to the staffing of the ministerial 
legal offices between 2002 and 2006. Only in 2006 did complaints about the 
level and quality of staff start to decrease. Nonetheless, special attention 
remained necessary for the Ministry of Justice and the Office of European 
Integration Processes within the Office of the Prime Minister. The OSCE 
also recommended that the international donor community involved in 
capacity building efforts better coordinate their programs with the KIPA. 
That was necessary, because the KIPA, being Kosovo’s primary institution 
for training its civil servants, often lacked sufficient funding to attract well 
qualified trainers.223 
 With respect to the Government’s policy making, the Kosovar 
Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) concluded in 2006 
that: ‘the current process is limited to a rushed setting of legislative agenda 
without the necessary analysis of which laws are truly needed and which 
ones take priority.’224 In addition, the OSCE criticized the technical 
deficiencies in the legislative drafting process and advised that the rules of 
procedure be revised.225 
 Next to the critique on the drafting process, KIPRED also criticized 
the lack of implementation of the laws and monitoring of their effects.226 
KIPRED’s conclusions were supported by the findings of the OSCE. Since 
2002, the OSCE had monitored the implementation of Assembly laws.227 
Throughout the years, a steady progress in implementation was identified by 
the several ministries. Nonetheless, with respect to the implementation 
responsibilities of the Office of the Prime Minister, the OSCE concluded in 
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2006 that: ‘There is still an apparent imbalance between drafting primary 
legislation and implementing these laws by drafting secondary 
legislation.’228 An illustration of these problems was the slow pace of the 
implementation of the Law on Access to Public Documents. Although the 
Law had already been adopted on 6 November 2003, the OSCE concluded in 
the summer of 2004 that important deadlines mentioned in the Law had not 
been kept and obligations had not been fulfilled.229 A second example of 
slow implementation concerned the official languages of Kosovo (Albanian 
and Serbian). Although an elaborate language policy had been established by 
law in 2001, major shortcomings concerning its implementation were noted 
in 2004. In 2007, the European Commission concluded that the Law on the 
Official Languages was still not completely implemented.230 Contributing 
factors that were used to explain the slow implementation of these and other 
laws were the lack of financial, legal and human resources, the lack of 
political will on behalf of Kosovo Albanian officials and the tendency of 
ministries to prepare new draft laws rather than to implement existing 
ones.231  
 Another point of concern was the transparency of policy making. 
Kosovo’s citizens complained about the lack of information concerning the 
status process in 2006. A public opinion poll showed that the Kosovars 
expected the PISG to communicate more with the people.232 The OSCE 
added that the publication of laws should be more accurate. And in 2003, the 
International Crisis Group noted that ministers often reported to their party 
leaders, rather than the Prime Minister.233 Government transparency 
improved when new rules of procedure for the government were adopted on 
1 February 2005, that were clearer and more comprehensive than the old 
rules.234 
  Finally, the Assembly has developed a weak institutional capacity. 
The Assembly started its work slowly during its first mandate (2002 - 2004). 
Until the first Government was formed in March 2002, the institution was 
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effectively frozen. Subsequently, between March and June 2002, the 
institution only met once a month. It was only after international pressure 
was applied that the Assembly started to meet once every week.235 As with 
all PISG, the Assembly had been put under the tight control of UNMIK. The 
most important limitation of its authority was that the Constitutional 
Framework reserved some powers exclusively for the UN Special 
Representative. Assembly involvement with respect to these powers did not 
extend further than reviewing and commenting on UNMIK’s draft laws. By 
engaging the PISG in the legislative work regarding reserved areas as much 
as possible, UNMIK aimed at creating broad support for its policies. In the 
end, however, UNMIK was responsible for legislation dealing with the 
reserved powers.236  
During the first two years of existence, the relationship between 
UNMIK and the Assembly was characterized by frequent clashes that were 
often caused by the Assembly’s determination to adopt (non-binding 
resolutions) concerning issues that fell outside its competencies.237 Personal 
animosity sometimes also played a role. It is well known that the tense 
relationship between UN Special Representative Steiner and Nexhat Daci 
fuelled some of the conflict concerning Assembly resolutions.238 
Occasionally, UNMIK was prepared to take the Assembly’s wishes with 
respect to the reversed powers into consideration. The UN Secretary-
General’s report in 2004 stated: ‘The 38 proposed amendments to the 
Constitutional Framework adopted on 8 July by the Assembly were 
forwarded in September to UNMIK for its consideration. UNMIK continues 
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to object to the comprehensive review undertaken of the Constitutional 
Framework, but will study specific areas in which amendments can be 
considered.’239 
With the objective of preventing misunderstandings between 
UNMIK and the PISG and with the desire to increase the institutional 
capacity of the Assembly, Kosovo’s parliamentarians were supported, 
trained and coached by international staff. This was primarily done by a 
variety of non-governmental organizations, governmental organizations and 
the diplomatic offices of individual countries. These organizations were 
coordinated by the OSCE in the Assembly Support Initiative. The Office of 
the Prime Minister and the Assembly Secretariat also participated in the 
program.240 The aim of the Assembly Support Initiative was to avoid the 
typical coordination problems that plague most international assistance to 
transitional societies. A number of six main lines of activities (pillars) were 
developed: (1) advice on the basic components of parliamentary life; (2) 
advice on procedural questions; (3) technical support to the committees; (4) 
assistance to international working visits of Assembly delegations; (5) the 
role and participation of non-majority communities; and (6) advice and 
training to various departments in the secretariat. The actual work was done 
through four types of consultations: (1) regular bilateral consultations with 
Members of the Presidency, Committee chairpersons, and Assembly 
secretariat; (2) monthly coordination meetings with Assembly Support 
Initiative partners, Assembly and Office of the Prime Minister; (3) two-
monthly meetings of Assembly Support Initiative partners and country 
liaison offices; and (4) weekly internal meetings with key-partners and daily 
bi-lateral contacts.241 Nonetheless, complaints about long promulgation 
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processes remained.242 Moreover, the presence of these international 
advisors created a strange situation in that the Assembly laws which had 
been drafted with the help of internationals could eventually be turned down 
and overruled by UNMIK during the promulgation phase.243 
 The capacity building programs led to an increased performance of 
the Assembly, but as a negative side effect its administrative infrastructure 
became overburdened.244 First, the Assembly Secretariat (responsible for 
providing administrative and legal support) was understaffed. Secondly, it 
was not until the summer of 2003 that parliamentary group leaders received 
their own office. Other members of parliament did not have a room of their 
own. They had to meet in the Assembly’s coffee bar.245 Only by the end of 
2004, when the Government relocated to the new government building, did 
more office space become available for the members of parliament.246 
Thirdly, in addition to the shortage of meeting rooms, was added limited 
access to phone lines, computers and the internet. Fourthly, it was only in 
2003 that, under the supervision of the UNDP and the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, an attempt was made to introduce a document management system 
and electronic archives. The support for the Parliamentary Electronic 
Archives Project also included the launching of a website.247 Finally, the 
poor translation of draft laws hindered communication with the international 
community and the speed with which UNMIK could promulgate 
legislation.248 Several reports pointed to a lack of implementation regarding 
language policy in Kosovo. In September 2004, the OSCE organized a 
conference to discuss the issue. In general, the bulk of the problems 
concerned the printing of forms and documents in only one language, the 
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lack of translation services, the lack or non-existence of street, road, and 
public signs in other languages than Albanian (i.e. English and Serbian). 
This was not only caused, because of the lack of human and financial 
resources, but also because of the lack of commitment on the part of Kosovo 
Albanian officials.249 More specifically for the Assembly, it was estimated 
that 60 to 80 percent of the amendments to draft laws addressed linguistic 
inconsistencies rather than the substance of the law in question.250 
Despite these shortcomings, during its first mandate the Assembly 
was able to adopt more than 80 laws.251 In his report the UN Special 
Representative concluded: ‘During its three year mandate, the Assembly 
adopted 83 laws, of which 74 have been formally submitted to UNMIK and 
51 promulgated to date.’252 Nonetheless, with the approaching end of the 
First Assembly’s mandate in 2004, it was concluded that: ‘the Assembly of 
Kosovo, neither from political, nor from procedural point of view has 
reached the stage of a fully stable, functional and productive legislature 
(…).’253 Especially the oversight over the executive, one of the core tasks of 
any parliament, was judged to have been weak during the Assembly’s first 
mandate.254 
The second mandate of the Assembly (2004 – 2007) was plagued 
with similar institutional problems as the first mandate had been. For the 
period March 2004 – September 2005, the Assembly was criticized by the 
European Commission for: (1) a dysfunctional Parliamentary Committee on 
Rights and Interests of Communities; (2) a lack of free access to official 
documents for members of parliament and the public; (3) underperformance 
in executive oversight; (4) being not transparent and inclusive enough when 
important decisions (such as budgetary spending) had been made; (5) having 
convened too few times for guaranteeing full political debate and performing 
its basic functions.255 The OSCE reached similar conclusions.256  
In its 2006 Progress Report, the European Commission was slightly 
more positive on the Assembly. In 2005, the Assembly had shown 
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encouraging signs of maturity in the calm and effective reshuffling of 
Kosovo’s government after Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj (AAK) had 
resigned due to his indictment by the ICTY. Within three weeks a new 
government, continuing the LDK/AAK coalition was formed under the new 
Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi (AAK). Only minor changes were made in 
the cabinet.257 The UN Security Council judged: ‘Throughout those difficult 
days and weeks, the political leaders and citizens of Kosovo managed a 
highly unusual situation with maturity and without any disorder or 
instability.’258 Moreover, the election of the new President after the death of 
Rugova in January 2006 also ran smoothly. On 10 March 2006, the 
Assembly elected Fatmir Sejdiu (LDK) as the new President of Kosovo. A 
few weeks later Kosumi resigned as Prime Minister and was democratically 
replaced by Agim Çeku. The dismissal of a request of seven Assembly 
members for a referendum on independence and the calm debate on a 
Serbian constitutional referendum were also highly appreciated by the 
international administration.259  
In June 2006, a reform package mostly drafted by the OSCE was 
adopted which aimed at addressing oversight within the executive, financial 
accountability and transparency. The package involved the creation of more 
parliamentary meetings, better preparation of the parliamentary sessions and 
an increased role of parliament in scrutinizing the government.260 Moreover, 
public hearings had been introduced in order to enable members of 
parliament the opportunity to address the government without interference of 
the Assembly Presidency. A wider participation of political groups and 
committees to determine the budget was ensured and a document 
management system was created. At the same time, the European 
Commission criticized the lack of qualified staff working for the secretaries 
of the parliamentary committees and the insufficient executive oversight 
over the implementation of laws.261 The OSCE also concluded that a 
comprehensive oversight of the implementation of primary legislation was 
lacking and similar findings were presented by the International Crisis 
Group.262  
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Next to the institutional shortcomings identified by the European 
Commission and the OSCE, the Assembly in its second mandate was 
characterized by violations of the rules of procedure. Already during the first 
mandate of the Assembly, the speaker of the Assembly, Nexhat Daci, had 
been criticized for keeping too much control over the debate. He defended 
his tight control with the argument that it was necessary in order to ensure 
the stability and smooth functioning of the institution.263 He continued this 
approach during the second Assembly, when technical issues became easily 
politicized, because the grand coalition had been replaced by a government 
with parliamentary opposition.264 For the government it seemed hard to 
accept that a parliamentary opposition has its own value in a democracy.265 
Consequently, a conflict erupted between Daci (being a member of the 
governing LDK) and the parliamentary opposition parties PDK and Partia 
Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA) in the first months of 2005. Daci 
was accused of violating rules of procedure by allowing too little speaking 
time for the opposition parties. The conflict resulted in a turbulent plenary 
session on 21 and 22 April 2005, when PDK and ORA walked out after their 
proposal for the agenda had been overruled.266 UN Special Representative 
Jessen-Petersen reacted by expressing UNMIK’s concern over the Assembly 
session. In a letter, Jessen-Petersen called on Daci to take more into account 
the interest of the opposition parties. He also expressed concern over recent 
actions such as denial of the right to speak during a debate, unilateral 
decisions to delete statements from the records of the proceedings, and 
threats to remove members of parliament from future plenary sessions.267 
The intervention by UN Special Representative Jessen-Petersen and the 
adoption of new rules of procedure in May 2005, solved the crisis and 
improved the relationship between the government and the opposition.268  
The improved relationship between the government and the 
opposition did not prevent the apparent necessity to establish a Kosovo 
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Political Forum in May 2005.269 Under the chairmanship of the UN Special 
Representative or his deputy, this forum functioned as a de facto grand 
coalition (all be it without decision making powers), since it included 
government and opposition representatives.270 It was an attempt to unite the 
Kosovo Albanian factions in order to properly implement the UN’s 
standards and to prepare for the final status negotiations.271 The apparent 
need for such a Political Forum illustrates the weak functioning of Kosovo’s 
parliament at the time. Despite denials by UN Special Representative Jessen-
Pettersen and Kosovar politicians that the forum was a parallel political 
structure, it actually was. It was regarded as such by the LDK, who argued 
that the forum had exclusively been set up in order to please the 
opposition.272 At the same time, support for the body by the PDK (as the 
main opposition party) was also limited, because it had failed to reach its 
objective to give the Forum decision making powers.273 Thus the first two 
meetings of the Forum focused on the issue whether the Forum should exist 
at all. Nonetheless, during the second meeting (30 June 2005) a step towards 
institutionalization was taken with the decision to create a secretariat.274 
During the third meeting (21 July) several proposals drafted by the 
secretariat were adopted. The proposals aimed at preparing for status 
negotiations and included the establishment of five working groups 
(constitutional and judicial affairs, economy, minority issues, cultural 
heritage, and missing persons and war damage).275 In August, however, the 
continuation of the Forum became uncertain when three meetings were 
cancelled. On 13 September, the Forum was practically replaced when 
Rugova announced the establishment of a Team of Unity that would lead the 
Kosovo Albanian delegation for the status negotiations (see Chapter seven).  
 Finally, the third mandate of the Assembly (after the elections of 
2007) started in a difficult period. The final status negotiations led by Martti 
Ahtisaari had failed and at the time of the elections a troika of the EU, the 
USA and Russia made a last effort to arrive at a negotiated solution. 
Nonetheless, elections were successfully organized on 17 November 2007. 
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The new Assembly held its inaugural session in early January 2008, during 
which it re-elected Fatmir Sejdiu as President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi as 
Prime Minister and Jakup Krasniqi as President of the Assembly. After the 
inauguration, the Assembly was above all occupied with preparing Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence which materialized on 17 February 2008. That 
included also work on the approval of laws which derived from Ahtisaari’s 
Comprehensive Proposal.276 Part of the Comprehensive Proposal was the 
adoption of a constitution that would replace the Constitutional Framework. 
On 9 April 2008, the Assembly passed the Constitution which would come 
into effect on 15 June. However, in spite of these big steps towards a 
functioning Assembly, the new Assembly faced huge challenges. The 
European Commission had concluded in November 2007 that, despite some 
progress being made, the Assembly’s administrative and policy-making 
capacities remained limited.277 Therefore, the Assembly could not be 
regarded as an autonomous institution by June 2008.  
 
4.2.5 Conflict management and institutional autonomy in Kosovo 
 
The analysis above shows that since 2003 the independence of Kosovo’s 
three political institutions has gradually increased. After the transfer of 
authority had commenced with the Constitutional Framework, it accelerated 
further in 2003 and 2004. The involvement of Kosovar officials in the 
institution-building process also increased. The number of regulations and 
administrative directions fluctuated over time and did not experience a 
decline as in the case of the OHR decisions. Nonetheless, the PISG 
increasingly received more room for independent action since most of the 
approved regulations concerned the promulgation of laws made by the PISG. 
The capacity of the PISG had also gradually increased. Since 2005, the 
President, Government and Assembly have all started to perform better. In 
2006, the European Commission recognized the PISG’s increased 
commitment to standards implementation. It concluded among others that 
progress had been made in strengthening the Assembly’s role and working 
methods and in improving the governing capacities of the government. This 
increased commitment had a positive effect of the status negotiations that 
dominated social and political life in 2006.278  
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Despite its gradual increase in autonomy, in February 2008 when 
Kosovo declared independence it was a weak state with political institutions 
heavily dependent on the UNMIK. UNMIK was still the final authority in 
Kosovo and had the final say over all legislation and executive acts coming 
from the PISG. None of the three PISG studied in this chapter had reached a 
sufficient level of institutional capacity. Although formally the decision to 
start negotiations on the final status of Kosovo had been made dependent on 
institutional progress, political motives seemed to have been the primary 
reason to start negotiations. In its 2005 enlargement strategy paper, the EU 
Commission concluded that: ‘Kosovo’s institutions still lack the political 
maturity necessary to build a truly democratic, secure, and multi-ethnic 
society.’279 A few months earlier, Kai Eide had found a serious lack of 
experience and expertise among the Kosovar institutions in his 
comprehensive review.280 Nevertheless, in 2005 the decision was taken to 
start negotiations, mainly because of a perceived political necessity as the 
result of the ethnic violence that had occurred in March 2004.  
 In Section 4.1.5, it was argued that in the case of Bosnia the 
incorporation of incompatibility in the Dayton Agreement could possibly 
explain the absence of institutional autonomy in 2008. Similarly, the absence 
of institutional autonomy in Kosovo, could also be explained by the 
persistence of unresolved issues of incompatibility. There is, however, a 
difference. Whereas the incompatibility in the case of Bosnia was 
incorporated in a peace agreement, in Kosovo there was never any 
settlement at all. The absence of a settlement made it necessary for the UN to 
establish an international administration of the governance type, rather than a 
control type of international administration. That made the PISG even more 
dependent on UNMIK, than the Bosnian institutions had been dependent on 
the OHR. UN Resolution 1244 was the only reason for their existence and 
without UNMIK there would not have been PISG. As a result, UNMIK 
established itself as the most important political institution in Kosovo. Since 
1999, the international administration has been part of the (provisional) 
constitutional order and like in Bosnia this has allowed the political 
leadership to evade responsibility. The presence of UNMIK had enabled 
politicians to focus on other issues, including the status issue, to divert 
public attention from the weak functioning of the PISG. 281 Even after the 
status issue was resolved unilaterally with Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, Kosovo remained under international administration. As will 
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be elaborated upon in Chapter seven, a control type of international 
administration was established by an International Steering Board (the 
Office of the International Civilian Representative) and the EU in order to 
ensure the implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal on the basis of 




5 Institutional Congruency 
 
Next to being autonomous, a political institution created by an international 
administration needs to have congruent value systems. As explained in Chapter 
three, value systems associate an institution with its environment and govern the 
behavior within the institution. Institutional congruency exists when there is either 
one predominant value system or several different value systems that are neither 
competitive nor mutually exclusive. An institution might have different and 
competing value systems. Such a situation is defined as institutional incongruency. 
This chapter analyzes the value systems of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political 
institutions at the level of the political system. That means that not all three 
institutions are analyzed separately, but that an analysis is made of Bosnia’s and 
Kosovo’s political culture as a whole. The question is examined whether Bosnia’s 
and Kosovo’s political culture is dominated by congruent or incongruent value 
systems. Similar to Chapter four, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first 
part focuses on institutional congruency in Bosnia and the second on Kosovo. Both 
parts start with the observation that in Bosnia and Kosovo, the post-war 
(provisional) constitutional structure has been characterized by power sharing 
arrangements in which the basic rights and obligations are primarily based on 
ethnicity rather than on individual citizenship. Secondly, an analysis is made of 
how the international administrations have attempted to transform the ethnic 
nationalist political culture into a civic nationalist political culture. Thirdly, the 
institutional congruency is assessed by investigating whether the domestic ethnic 
nationalist political culture has been replaced by an internationally stimulated civic 
nationalist political culture. If that is not the case, then two mutually exclusive 
value systems exist and this results in institutional incongruency. Each discussion 
ends by offering a possible explanation of the outcome based on the particular 
conflict management strategy of each case. 
 
 5.1 Bosnia 
 
5.1.1 Power sharing in Bosnia 
 
The Dayton Agreement has been described as: ‘an awkward child of the marriage 
between the realities of power on the ground and the international ideal of a unitary 
multi-ethnic state.’1 In 1995, it was recognized that more than a power sharing 
arrangement could not be achieved. The Dayton Agreement established a Bosnian 
state in which power was to be shared by the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian 
Serb community. The Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats would not have accepted 
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a central state which, given their numerical strength, would de facto be dominated 
by the Bosniaks. It was only logical that after three and half years of armed conflict 
the different parties would fear each other’s intentions and that the range of 
acceptable institutions would be limited.2 The Dayton Agreement was only signed 
because it kept the state level institutions weak in comparison to the entities.  
 The power sharing character of the Dayton Agreement resulted in the 
rights and obligations in Bosnia’s Constitution being essentially based on ethnicity, 
rather than on citizenship. In essence, Bosnia’s polity became based on an ethnic 
principle.3 The Constitution recognizes Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs as constituent peoples.4 By doing so, it puts ethnicity in the form of group 
rights above individual human rights; which are also mentioned in the Bosnian 
Constitution. For example, the Constitution contains an ethnicity-based restriction 
to suffrage and citizens’ ability to stand for office. First, citizens who do not 
identify themselves as one of the three constituent peoples are barred from standing 
for the Presidencies of the Federal State and the Serb Republic. Secondly, voters 
registered in the Federation are not allowed to vote for a Serb Presidency member, 
and likewise, Serb Republic voters are not allowed to vote for a Bosniak or a Croat 
Presidency member.5 
The dominance of group rights and the power sharing element is 
manifested in the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the 
Presidency. First, the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly is determined by territory 
and national group adherence.6 The 42 seats in the House of Representatives are 
two thirds filled with Federation members and one third with members of the Serb 
Republic. Out of the 15 members of the House of Peoples, five are Bosniak, five 
are Bosnian Croat and five are Bosnian Serb. Moreover, each chamber elects one 
Bosniak, one Bosnian Serb and one Bosnian Croat to serve as chair and deputy 
chairs. The chair rotates among the three members. All legislation to be adopted 
requires the approval of both chambers, to be achieved by a simple majority vote 
by those present and voting. However, in case the majority does not include one-
third of the members of each entity, the procedure changes. The chairs will have 
three days to try to get approval of the law with over one third of the vote from 
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each entity. If that attempt fails, the law will only pass, if there is no dissenting 
vote of two thirds or more of the members of either entity.7  
The Parliamentary Assembly has been given the task of protecting the so 
called vital interests of each of the three constituent peoples. A majority of the 
Bosniak, Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat delegates in the House of Peoples may 
declare a parliamentary decision to be harming their vital interests. In order to 
adopt the decision, a majority of all three ethnic groups is necessary. It is also 
possible that a majority of one of the ethnic groups may object to the invocation of 
the vital interest provision. In that case, a joint commission of three delegates, one 
from each ethnic group, has to be convened by the chair of the House of Peoples. If 
the issue does not get solved within five days, it will be referred to the 
Constitutional Court.8  
 The salience of group rights is also reflected in the tripartite Presidency, 
which is allowed to invoke a provision to protect vital interests. A Presidency 
member can block a decision based on a declaration that the decision harms the 
vital interests of a constituent people. In that case, the decision would be referred to 
the National Assembly of the Serb Republic or the Federation’s Parliament. If 
either body confirms the declaration with a two-thirds majority, the Presidency 
decision cannot be taken.9 
Finally, because of power sharing considerations, the Council of Ministers 
is not headed by a Prime Minister, but by a chairing Minister. Until 2002, the chair 
did not have the power to propose the dismissal of a minister to the Parliament. The 
chair was nominated by the Presidency and approved by the House of 
Representatives. The chair nominated the ministers who in turn had to be approved 
by the House of Representatives. The Constitution states that no more than two-
thirds of all ministers were allowed to be appointed from the territory of the 
Federation. The remaining one third had to be recruited from the Serb Republic. 
The chair of the Council of Ministers appointed deputy ministers (two to each 
ministry until 2002) who were not allowed to be of the same constituent people as 
their minister.10 Moreover, every decision had to be supported by the minister and 
his deputy ministers. Finally, the ministerial positions were equally divided among 
Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.11 
The emphasis on group rights in Bosnia’s key political institutions shows 
that Bosnia’s institutional design is based on a power sharing arrangement or 
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consociational settlement.12 Consociationalism, as defined by Arend Lijphart, is 
characterized by four principles: government by grand coalition (all segments of 
society are included), segmental autonomy, proportional representation, and 
minority veto on decisions that affect the essential interests of minority 
communities.13 Because consociationalism emphasizes the importance of the 
autonomous segments in a divided society, it has been criticised for entrenching 
cleavages and divisions based on ethnic identities. Moreover, critics have 
emphasized that consociationalism only functions when there is overarching 
cooperation at the elite level.14 An alternative for consociationalism is the 
integrative approach adopted by Donald Horowitz.15 Horowitz argues that in 
ethnically divided societies, moderation should be fostered by making politicians 
reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of other groups than their own.16 
Whereas Lijphart’s model argues for making the different societal segments (ethnic 
groups) in Bosnia and Kosovo autonomous, Horowitz argues for their segmental 
disintegration. In the next section, it will be argued that while Bosnia’s institutional 
design was based on a consociational settlement, the OHR has executed a policy 
which focuses on the integration of all three major ethnic groups rather than 
stimulating their segmental autonomy. 
 
 5.1.2 The OHR’s attempts to create a civic nationalist political culture 
 
The Dayton Agreement led to the establishment of a state which was multi-ethnic 
in design.17 However, it was multi-ethnic only in the sense of co-existing ethnic 
communities, rather than integrated ethnic communities. Integration of the different 
ethnic communities in one civic nation is what the OHR actually aimed to achieve. 
Increasingly, the Dayton Agreement was considered an instrument that was suited 
to end the war, but not as a foundation for peace. Therefore, the PIC and the OHR 
chose an integrative civic nationalist approach, rather than an ethnic nationalist 
power sharing approach. In other words, the international administration did not 
want the three different ethnic groups merely to coexist, but also to integrate into a 
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functioning society. It represented an attempt to undue the results of the ethnic 
cleansing that had occurred during the war.18 
The objective to create a civic nationalist political culture in Bosnia is 
reflected in official speeches and documents of the PIC and the OHR. First, in June 
1996, in response to the refugee flow that had started in March out of Sarajevo 
because of the transfer of authority over some quarters of the city from the Serb 
Republic to the Federation, Carl Bildt stated: ‘As the capital of all of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Sarajevo must reflect the multi-cultural and tolerant ideal we are 
trying to defend. As the standard bearer by which we measure progress, Sarajevo 
must be the example held up to combat the forces of ethnic separation and hostility 
that dominate so many other places - Mostar, Prijedor, Doboj, or Bugojno.’19 
Secondly, in its Bonn Declaration of December 1997, the PIC stated: ‘The Council 
considers multi-ethnicity a fundamental goal for the consolidation of a stable and 
democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina. It therefore recognizes the need to support the 
establishment of new multi-ethnic parties and to strengthen the existing ones. It 
invites the High Representative, the OSCE and the Council of Europe to take due 
account of this need when reviewing the draft Election Law.’20 Finally, when 
answering the question from a journalist about what Bosnia needed most, Petritsch 
declared: ‘I think that the most important thing for BiH [Bosnia, NvW] at this 
moment is the strengthening of the political, intellectual and cultural elite's 
orientation towards a multinational and democratic state.’21  
 An important instrument for the creation of a civic nationalist political 
culture was electoral engineering. In other words, using elections and the electoral 
system in such a way that moderation is stimulated. The ethnic nationalist leaders 
of the war-time political parties were seen as obstructing the peaceful development 
of the country. In 1998, Carlos Westendorp stated: ‘I have always said that the 
problem of Bosnia is that the leaders who started the war are still in power. 
Therefore the only solution for Bosnia would be that its people change their leaders 
at the elections.’22 In May 2005, Ashdown declared: ‘I believe that the current BiH 
[Bosnian, NvW] authorities cannot take it through the door to the EU (…) you 
cannot complete this journey to the EU unless the country gets rid of 
nationalism.’23 Therefore, elections were regarded as a useful tool for removing 
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ethnic nationalist politicians from the political scene and for creating functioning 
civic nationalist institutions.  
 Based on the Dayton Agreement, the OSCE was delegated an important 
role in the electoral system. The OSCE emphasized that political parties should 
comply with the letter and intent of the Dayton Agreement. Among others, calling 
for the independence and territorial separation of parts of Bosnia was regarded as a 
breach of the Dayton Agreement. By regulation of the OSCE managed Provisional 
Elections Commission (PEC), the political institutions established by Dayton were 
not allowed to be challenged by Bosnia’s domestic institutions. Political parties 
that wanted to register were obliged to make a statement that the particular party 
would comply with the Dayton Agreement. Consequently, the PEC actually 
determined which party could run for elections and which could not.24  
 The PEC drafted election rules and regulations, which gave the OSCE vast 
powers in managing the election process.25 Under the election rules, the OSCE was 
empowered to put pressure on parties that behaved undemocratically and could 
remove persons from the ballot. For instance, one month before the 1997 municipal 
elections took place, the OSCE removed about fifty candidates mostly from the 
SDS and HDZ.26 Another example of the OSCE’s authority was the voter 
registration restrictions that were established for refugees and internally displaced 
persons in 1996. During the first post-war national elections, ordinary Bosnians 
were supposed to be allowed to vote at their pre-war residence, at their current 
residence, or where they wished to live in the future. However, in order to 
encourage refugees and displaced persons (who made up to 36 percent of the 
electorate) to vote in their pre-war municipalities, where it was more likely they 
would vote against the dominant ethnic nationalist party and thus stimulate civic 
nationalist political institutions, so they were strongly discouraged from voting 
where they wished to live in the future. They could only do so, if they could prove 
with relevant and convincing documentation to have genuine ties with their future 
place of residence. Only few refugees and internally displaced persons could do so, 
and this meant that as a result of the promotion of multi-ethnic political structures, 
the right to choose a place of residence was withheld from refugees and internally 
displaced persons.27  
The OHR was also involved in electoral engineering. First, it tried to limit 
the control of the ethnic nationalist parties over the political institutions as much as 
it could.28 In 1996, for example, enormous pressure was exercised on SDS-
President Radovan Karadži to step down as the Serb Republic’s President. The 
OSCE threatened to bar the SDS from the elections if it mentioned Karadži’s 
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name at public rallies or if Karadži’s face appeared on election material.29 After a 
public show down between the OSCE and the SDS, Karadži was forced to step 
down as President of the Serb Republic and party leader of the SDS because of a 
deal reached between American negotiator Richard Holbrooke, Slobodan 
Miloševi and leaders of the Serb Republic in July 1996.30  
Secondly, the OHR openly supported moderate and non-nationalist 
political parties (see below). In that sense, the largest project of electoral 
engineering centered on the general elections of October 2000. Beginning in April 
2000, the OSCE and OHR started encouraging Bosnians to vote for the opposition 
rather than for the incumbent ethnic nationalist parties.31 In the same year, the OHR 
openly supported the relatively moderate Milorad Dodik in the elections to the 
Presidency in the Serb Republic. During the general elections of 2002, the 
international administration’s support for moderate parties was more indirect and 
covert, but nonetheless clearly present. A few weeks before the elections, the PIC 
Steering Board declared: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future lies in a successful 
unified and stable state fully integrated into European and transatlantic structures. 
We are committed to helping Bosnia and Herzegovina reach that destination. But 
how fast you get there depends on your commitment to reform (…) It is for you to 
choose your political future. And we call on all of you to use the elections on 5 
October to shape the future, not be shaped by the past.’32  
 Thirdly, the OHR wanted to use the electoral system to foster moderation. 
The OHR introduced three major experiments including the introduction of open 
lists, multi-member constituencies and preferential voting.33 With the open list 
system, voters were able to vote for individual politicians, rather than political 
parties. The idea behind the introduction of open lists was that it would increase the 
accountability of elected officials and put more decision-making power in the 
hands of the voters. The objective was to reduce the control of political parties 
(mainly ethnic nationalist political parties) over the voting process. However, 
although the open list system increases accountability, it does not necessarily 
promote moderation in a deeply divided society.34 In the case of Bosnia, voters 
continued to vote for their own ethnic candidates as is pointed out below. 
 The same objective of stimulating moderation also motivated the 
introduction of multi-member constituencies. Before 2000, Bosnia had consisted of 
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two electoral districts: the Federation and the Serb Republic. The new election law 
created five multi-member electoral districts in the Federation and three in the Serb 
Republic. Again, this measure hardly fostered inter-ethnic moderation. That was 
especially difficult as the constituencies were created in such a way that a clear 
ethnic majority was preserved in each constituency.35  
 The third tool that was used for fostering moderation was preferential or 
alternative voting. This was introduced on the occasion of the Serb Republic’s 
Presidency elections in 2000. It was hoped that this would promote the relatively 
moderate Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik. However, the system did not 
work as intended. Second preferences proved to be irrelevant given the huge 
support for the SDS (49,8 percent) in the first round. Moreover, the system did not 
convince minorities to vote for a moderate candidate from another ethnic group. 
Given this disappointing result from the perspective of the OHR, the preferential 
voting system was not introduced in the 2001 Election Law.36 
As a result of the international engineering the results of the general 
elections of 2000 have been described as: ‘a vote against incumbents, whatever 
their political views.’37 At the same time, the effects of the changes in the electoral 
system were very limited.38 In the next section it is explained that the HDZ and 
SDS were actually strengthened compared to the Municipal elections in 1997 and 
that the resulting multi-ethnic and moderate Alliance for Change coalition was only 
short-lived. Nonetheless, electoral engineering did not stop in 2000. The election 
law of 2001 was amended several times. In April 2006, for instance, the active 
voter registration system was changed into a passive registration system.39 
 Next to electoral engineering, the OHR used constitutional engineering as 
a tool to stimulate civic nationalism in Bosnian politics. First, it stimulated (and 
finally imposed) the amendment of the entity constitutions. The entity constitutions 
had almost remained unchanged after the war. As a consequence, the Federation’s 
entity constitution included discriminating provisions concerning Bosnian Serbs 
and the Serb Republic’s Constitution contained discriminating provisions 
concerning Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. In 1997, this was addressed by the Serb 
Civil Council, an organization which represented Bosnian Serbs in the Federation, 
and subsequently taken up by Alija Izetbegovi in February 1998. Izetbegovi, 
then member of the Bosnian Presidency, brought the issue to the Constitutional 
Court.40 Izetbegovi argued that fourteen provisions of the Serb Republic’s 
Constitution and five provisions of the Federation’s Constitution violated the 
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Bosnian state level Constitution. The most important of these provisions concerned 
the status of Bosnia’s constituent peoples. The Federation Constitution included 
only Bosniaks and Croats as constituent peoples. The Serb Republic’s Constitution 
made no reference to constituent peoples as such, but only referred to the ‘Serb 
people.’ Neither did it mention Bosniaks, nor Bosnian Croats. The question was 
whether the three peoples were only constituent on the level of the nation state, or 
also on the lower levels of government (the entity, cantonal and municipal 
levels).41 
 In four partial decisions (in January, February, July and August 2000) the 
Constitutional Court declared with a five-to-four majority that the constituent 
peoples provisions within the entity constitutions were unconstitutional.42 The 
judges that had supported the case included two Bosniak judges and three 
international judges. The two Bosnian Croat and two Bosnian Serb judges opposed 
the decision. Their main line of argument was that since the three groups are 
mentioned as constituent peoples in the preamble of the state level Constitution 
only the provisions were not legally binding. They also argued that the decision 
altered the governing structure of the country fundamentally. That was indeed the 
case. In the decision the Court argued that the Bosnian state was not based on the 
existence of two entities and their respective nations, but on a multi-ethnic society. 
It also found that territorial ethnic autonomy was not in conformity with 
democratic principles and human rights. As such, implicitly the decision criticized 
the ethnically organized basis of the Dayton Constitution.43  
 The entity parliaments and governments refused, given the controversial 
character of the decision, to amend their constitutions. Consequently, the OHR 
intervened and created two constitutional commissions in January 2001: one 
commission with 16 members (4 from each constituent people and 4 from other 
communities) for each entity. The commission members were selected by the entity 
parliaments and nominated by the OHR. The commissions were responsible for 
safeguarding the rights of the three constituent peoples and other communities and 
to develop recommendations for constitutional amendments to implement the 
decision of the Constitutional Court.44 The recommendations were negotiated 
among the major political parties in January 2002 (Mrakovica) and in February 
2002 (Sarajevo). An agreement was reached on 27 March 2002, but the HDZ and 
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SDA were not part of it. Moreover, many parties from the Serb Republic had 
reservations over the compromise which eventually led to amendments weakening 
the agreement. In addition, the moderate Alliance for Change coalition failed to get 
the support of the HDZ and SDA in the Federation House of Peoples.  
These deadlocks were only overcome on 19 April 2002, when High 
Representative Petritsch imposed the 27 March 2002 Agreement on both entities. 
However, the HDZ and SDS objected to the decision and seriously slowed down 
implementation in the following months.45 In the end, the constitutional 
amendments did not lead to a strengthened civic nationalist political culture. 
Instead, the result of the amendments was that Bosnia’s constitutional arrangement 
became even more complicated and due to the changes the Bosnian Croats and 
Bosniaks were now able to engage in a similar degree of obstruction at the state 
level, as some of the Bosnian Serb parties had done before. Moreover, the effect of 
the decision led to little more than window dressing.46 
 A second case of constitutional engineering was the (failed) attempt to 
change the Dayton Constitution itself. This attempt will be elaborated upon in 
Chapter eight; for now, suffice it to say that the reform attempted to make the state 
level institutions more integrative and less based on a power sharing agreement. 
For example, the agreement of the draft constitutional amendments of 18 March 
2006 included a single President with two Vice Presidents, rather than a collective 
Presidency. Also the powers of the House of Peoples would be curtailed and the 
powers of the Prime Minister would be expanded. However, the draft amendments 
failed to be adopted by the state level House of Representatives and the 
constitutional reform process was postponed until after the general elections in 
October 2006.  
  
5.1.3 Bosnia’s persisting ethnic nationalist political culture 
 
Despite the OHR’s attempts to establish a civic nationalist political culture, the 
dominant political culture remained based on ethnic nationalism. Bosnia has a 
history of voting along ethnic nationalist lines which goes back to 1910, when the 
first multi-party elections were organized by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Subsequently, between 1920 and 1938 the votes that were cast in seven multi-party 
elections in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia went to ethnic nationalist parties.47 The 
multi-party elections in 1990 led to a victory of the newly established ethnic 
nationalist parties; the SDA, the SDS and HDZ which together won 75 percent of 
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the vote.48 Given this tradition, it is not surprising that Bosnians continued to 
support ethnic nationalist parties after the war.49 With the exception of the general 
elections of 2000 and 2006, Bosnian politics has been dominated by ethnic 
nationalist parties and therefore an ethnic nationalist political culture since 1995.  
 The three main ethnic nationalist parties were introduced in Chapter three; 
the Bosniak SDA, the Bosnian Croat HDZ and the Bosnian Serb SDS. Following 
the war, the three parties had areas under their control where they were able to 
exercise nearly a complete hold on power. The SDS ruled in the Serb Republic, the 
HDZ in those cantons of the Federation that were controlled by Bosnian Croats and 
the SDA in central Bosnia. Moreover, all three ethnic nationalist parties were 
closely connected to the three separate armies and war-time economic structures.50 
Despite their dominant position, the ethnic nationalist political parties were faced 
with competition from three other types of political parties: moderate (ethnic) 
nationalist parties, non-nationalist (civic nationalist) parties, and extreme (ethnic) 
nationalist parties. 51  
First, moderate ethnic nationalist parties will be discussed. Although these 
parties have a certain commitment to cross-ethnic cooperation and pursue an 
agenda which is not exclusively ethnically defined, they are primarily committed to 
one ethnic community. Therefore, they can be regarded as multi-ethnic political 
parties, but not as civic nationalist parties. The former Prime Minister of the war-
time Bosnian Republic, Haris Silajdži, established the Party for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, SBiH). Although the SBiH was 
ethnic nationalist in the sense that it appealed to Bosniak voters, it was more 
moderate in its agenda than the SDA. Among the moderate ethnic nationalist 
parties with a Croat background, few proved to be viable. Most of these parties had 
split from the HDZ. They include the New Democratic Initiative (Nova Hrvatska 
Iniciativa, NHI), established by Krešimir Zubak, and the People’s Party ‘Working 
Towards Progress’ (Narodna Stranka ‘Radom Za Boljitak’, NSRZB). Whereas the 
moderate ethnic nationalist parties with a Bosniak and Croat background have their 
voter base mainly in the Federation, the voter base of the Alliance of Independent 
Social Democrats (Savez Nezavisnih Socialdemokrata, SNSD) has been in the Serb 
Republic. This party was established by Milorad Dodik in 2001. Like the SBiH, it 
is an ethnic nationalist party (supporting the autonomy of the Serb Republic), but 
less so than the SDS and therefore classified as moderate. Other moderate ethnic 
nationalist parties with a voter base in the Serb Republic are the Serb People’s 
Assembly (Srpski Narodni Savez, SNS) of former Serb Republic President Biljana 
Plavši, the Party of Democratic Progress (Partija Demokratskog Progresa, PDP) 
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which was established in 1999 by Mladen Ivanovi and the Socialist Party of the 
Serb Republic (Socijalistika Partija Republike Srpske, SPRS) which used to be 
affiliated with Miloševi’s Socialist Party of Serbia, but which broke with Belgrade 
in 1999.52  
 Amid the moderate ethnic nationalist parties in the Serb Republic and 
Federation, only one politically relevant non-nationalist party emerged. In contrast 
to the ethnic nationalist and moderate ethnic nationalist parties, non-nationalist 
parties do not have a group-specific program and potentially appeal to more than 
one ethnic community. In this way, non-nationalist parties can be considered as 
civic nationalist parties. This is the case with the Social Democratic Party 
(Socijaldemokratska Partija, SDP). Its leadership and voter base are multi-ethnic 
and the party succeeded in attracting voters from all constituent peoples. Moreover, 
the SDP has argued in favor of the strengthening of the state-level institutions and 
supports the abolition of ethnicity as an organizing principle for Bosnia’s 
institutions.53 However, despite its civic nationalist character, the SDP has in fact 
only succeeded in attracting voters from the cities in the Federation. In 2000, for 
example, the SDP gained 27 percent of the vote in the Federation and only five 
percent in the Serb Republic. Moreover, despite the multi-ethnic voter base, most 
supporters of the party come from the Bosniak community.54 Thus, whereas the 
SDP is formally civic nationalist, in practice it cannot be regarded as such.  
Finally, a few extreme ethnic nationalist parties have been established. 
These parties in general ‘advocate a change of the status quo, usually secession, 
threaten other nations [ethnic communities, NvW] and endorse the use of force.’55 
Two main extreme ethnic nationalist political parties can be identified. First, within 
the Serb Republic the Serb Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS) tried to 
outflank the SDS in its ethnic nationalist agenda. The SRS was a branch of the SRS 
in Serbia and was led by Nikola Poplasen. Secondly, within the Federation the 
Croat Democratic Union 1990 (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990, HDZ 
1990) split off from the HDZ under the leadership of Božo Ljubi in April 2006. 
By appealing to the ‘original’ HDZ as established in 1990, it wanted to follow a 
more radical ethnic nationalist course than the HDZ.56  
Despite the presence of these alternative political parties, the three main 
ethnic nationalist parties have dominated the Presidency, the House of 
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Representatives and the Council of Ministers between 1996 and 2006.57 To begin 
with an examination of the Presidency, Table 5.1 shows that the three main ethnic 
nationalist parties lost some terrain during the 1998-2002 mandate of the 
Presidency, but regained their positions in 2002. A significant change, however, 
occurred in 2006, when the SDA, SDS and HDZ lost the Presidency. Instead, its 
members came from two moderate ethnic nationalist parties (SBiH and SNSD) and 
from the non-nationalist SDP. At the same time, as has been argued above, the 
SBiH, SNSD and SDP cannot be regarded as civic nationalist political parties. 
Therefore, despite the absence of the SDA, SDS and HDZ, ethnic nationalist 
agenda’s continued to dominate the Presidency after 2006. 
 
Table 5.1: Members of the Bosnian Presidency and political party affiliation58 
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Ante Jelavi, HDZ 
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Jozo Križanovi, 
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Dragan ovi, HDZ 
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The House of Representatives shows similar development as has occurred 
with the Presidency. Table 5.2 shows the number of seats occupied by the three 
main ethnic nationalist parties in the House of Representatives from 1996 to 2006. 
As with the Presidency, it shows a dominant position for the SDA, HDZ and SDS. 
At the same time, the table shows decreasing support for the three ethnic nationalist 
parties in favor of the moderate ethnic nationalist political parties and the SDP. 
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Table 5.2: Number of seats of major political parties in the Bosnian House of 
Representatives61 
Election year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2006 
SDA 16 - 7 9 9 
KCDB (SDA, 
SBiH and others) 
- 14 - - - 
HDZ 8 6 5 5 - 
HDZ-Croat 
Coalition-HNZ 
- - - - 3 
SDS 9 4 6 5 3 
Total share of 
seats (percentages) 
78,57 57,14 42,85 45,23 35,7  
SBiH - 2 4 5 8 
SDP - 4 8 4 5 
PDP - - 2 2 1 
SNSD - - 1 3 7 
Total share of 
seats (percentages)
- 14,28  35,71  33,33  50  
HDZ 1990 - - - - 2 
Total share of 
seats (percentages)
- - - - 4,76  
 
It is important to take a closer look at the decreasing support for the SDA, HDZ 
and SDS, since it suggests a decreasing ethnic nationalist political culture. In 
August 1996, the International Crisis Group argued in favor of the postponement of 
the 14 September 1996 elections. The think-tank found that the minimum 
conditions for free and fair elections had not been reached, because refugee return 
and reintegration had not begun yet, indicted war criminals were able to exert 
influence behind the scenes and the freedom of movement and expression 
remained severely restricted. Bosnia was de facto ethnically partitioned, leading to 
a situation in which voters were more motivated to vote in favor of the ethnic 
nationalist parties.62 Nonetheless, following the strict time schedule of the Dayton 
Agreement which determined that elections should take place within six months of 
signing of the Agreement, the elections were actually held and confirmed ‘the 
effective division of the country on ethnic lines (…).’63 With the SDA, HDZ and 
SDS gaining a large victory, Bosnia’s polarized society had resulted in polarized 
                                                 
61 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 93 and 102. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Elections 1 October 2006. OSCE/ODIHIR Election Observation 
Mission Final Report, 29. 
62 International Crisis Group, The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srprska, 8. 





mono-ethnic voting blocks.64 As in 1990, the Bosnians sought security within their 
own ethnic group. In addition, the ethnic nationalist parties had executed a policy 
of ethnic engineering by encouraging internally displaced persons to vote in their 
current place of residency. Moreover, the parties effectively mobilized mass media 
to get their message across.65  
The ethnic nationalist victory meant for the Presidency that its three 
members were chosen from the SDA, HDZ and SDS. For the Council of Ministers 
this meant that the three parties had to establish a coalition, which was difficult. 
The ethnic nationalist parties had strongly campaigned against each other and were 
now expected to cooperate. The appointment of a chair was especially difficult. It 
proved to be impossible to reach consensus on the issue and therefore it was 
decided that two co-chairs and one vice-chair would be established from all 
different constituent peoples.  
Since the international community had anticipated a difficult electoral 
environment after the war, the mandate of the postwar incumbents was limited to 
two years instead of four years.66 Therefore, new elections were held again on 12 
and 13 September 1998. During the second general elections, the moderate ethnic 
nationalist parties made some gains at the expense of the SDA, HDZ and SDS. In 
the Presidency, the SDA and HDZ were able to deliver a member, but the Bosnian 
Serb member, Živko Radiši, came from the SPRS rather than the SDS. In the 
House of Representatives, the moderate ethnic nationalist opposition was better 
organized and stronger. In the Council of Ministers, the SDS and HDZ had to 
cooperate with a pre-election alliance: the Coalition for the Unified and 
Democratic Bosnia (Koalicija za Cjelovitu I Demokratsku BiH). This alliance 
included the SDA and some moderate ethnic nationalist parties such as the SBiH.67 
Nonetheless, the ethnic nationalist parties continued to dominate the 
political institutions with their ethnic nationalist policies. For example, on 8 
October 1998, High Representative Westendorp dismissed Dragan avi the Vice-
Chairman of the SDS for having made ethnic nationalist statements about the tense 
situation in Kosovo.68 The SDS was more or less forced to appeal to ethnic 
nationalist voters, because the major challenge for the ethnic nationalist parties did 
not come from the moderate ethnic nationalist opposition, but from within. The 
SDS had been weakened by a split between a more radical wing under the 
leadership of Momilo Krajišnik and a less radical one under the leadership of 
Biljana Plavši, who eventually established the SNS. The SDS was also in 
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competition with the SRS under the leadership of Nikola Poplasen, which was even 
more openly ethnic nationalist than the SDS. Similar internal difficulties haunted 
the HDZ, which was somewhat weakened when Krešimir Zubak, the Bosnian 
Croat member of the state level Presidency, left the party and founded the more 
moderate NHI in 2002.  
It seemed that a real change was made after the third general elections in 
2000. During these elections, the moderate ethnic nationalist political parties made 
significant gains which resulted in the Alliance for Change coalition. The Alliance 
was formed by the SDP, SBiH and eight (later nine) other small moderate ethnic 
nationalist parties; including the SNSD and PDP from the Serb Republic.69 This 
Alliance was enthusiastically received by the PIC. During its meeting on 7 May 
2002, the PIC Steering Board concluded: ‘The Steering Board notes that substantial 
progress was made in Bosnia and Herzegovina during Wolfgang Petritsch’ three-
year mandate, which has been marked by the decline of nationalism and the 
strengthening of tolerance and multi-ethnicity.’70 
 However, such optimism was not really warranted. First, in comparison to 
the municipal elections which had been organized in the same year, the HDZ and 
SDS were actually strengthened.71 Secondly, the Alliance for Change appealed 
mainly to Bosniak voters and was perhaps moderate, but not substantially multi-
ethnic.72 Thirdly, the Alliance for Change only had 17 out of the 42 seats in the 
House of Representatives and thus formed a minority government. It had to enter 
into an arrangement of mutual support with four parties from the Serb Republic. 
Three of these parties were also part of the SDS led government in the Serb 
Republic, which confused voters and made the Alliance suspicious by 
association.73 Fourthly, the Alliance for Change was primarily the result of 
international electoral engineering and it is doubtful whether it could have been 
formed without international interference.74  
The general elections of 2000 did not include elections for the Presidency. 
However, new members had to be found since Izetbegovi had retired and Jelavi 
was dismissed by the High Representative. They were replaced by Beriz Belki 
and Jozo Križanovi, both from moderate ethnic nationalist political parties (the 
SBiH and the SDP respectively), became members of the Presidency in 2001. 
Together with Živko Radiši who was elected in 1998, the three moderate ethnic 
nationalist politicians controlled the institution until 2002. The Alliance for Change 
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coalition, in combination with electoral engineering by the OHR, had ensured the 
election of Belki and Križanovi. The election law called for the election of a new 
Presidency member by the members of the same constituent people in both houses 
of parliament. However, the High Representative amended the law in such a way 
that the consent of the House of Peoples was only required for the first two rounds 
of voting. If two rounds failed to result in the election of a nominated candidate, 
the House of Representatives would be allowed to decide on the matter.75 That is 
what eventually happened. 
 The general elections of 2002 showed that the Alliance for Change 
coalition and the moderate ethnic nationalist Presidency was of a short duration; 
the fourth general elections resulted in a return of ethnic nationalistic parties. Prior 
to the elections, the Alliance for Change could not agree on a joint election 
campaign and fell apart. As a result, the three main ethnic nationalistic parties 
returned to power; for the first time since 1996, and mainly due to the SDA, the 
percentage of ethnic nationalists in Bosnia’s parliaments increased from 46 percent 
in 2000 to 48 percent in 2002. Nonetheless, although the SDA, SDS and HDZ won 
the elections, in absolute terms of voter turnout they lost votes (together the loss 
amounted to more than 92.000 votes) in comparison with the general elections of 
2000. In comparison to those elections, only the SDA won more votes (2249) in 
absolute terms in the Federation parliament. At the same time the party lost 11.000 
votes in the National Assembly of the Serb Republic, so that in the end the SDA 
lost almost 9000 votes. The SRS was the only extreme ethnic nationalist party that 
won votes compared to the elections of 2000. The party had been banned from 
participating in the elections of 2000, but gained 22.396 votes in 2002.76 
 The victory of the ethnic nationalist parties was mainly based on the 
weakness of the moderate ethnic nationalist parties which simply lost more votes in 
absolute terms than the ethnic nationalist parties. The general disillusionment with 
the political process, evidenced by a low voter turnout of 54 percent, made the 
ethnic nationalist victory possible.77 After the elections, a coalition was formed 
between the SDA, HDZ, SDS, PDP and SBiH.78 Theoretically, it would have been 
possible to form a Council of Ministers without the ethnic nationalists, but that 
would have involved too many small and heterogeneous parties; making the 
coalition even less coherent than the Alliance for Change had been. Thus, in 
practice, the formation of an ethnic nationalistic government could not be avoided. 
It took until 13 January 2003 before the coalition had been formed, mainly because 
of the participation of the SBiH. Its leader, Haris Silajdži rejected the offered 
chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, due to which the political deals between 
                                                 
75 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 49 and 50.  
76 National Democratic Institute, Bosnia Herzegovina: Election Results Signal Voter Frustration, Not 
Return to Nationalism (Washington, 10 May 2002). 
77 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 101. 
78 Ibid., 54. 
The results of international administration in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo 
 
  166
the parties - especially between the SDA (who eventually delivered the chair) and 
the HDZ - had to be renegotiated.79  
The 2006 elections were the first elections to be finally administered 
entirely by Bosnians themselves. They were declared to be generally in line with 
international standards for democratic elections.80 Nonetheless, the campaign 
included fierce ethnic nationalist rhetoric. The failed constitutional reform of 
spring 2006, led to an election campaign in which key questions of the 
constitutional structure prevailed over economic issues, education or social 
welfare. This contributed to the increase in use even among politicians considered 
as moderates of ethnic nationalist rhetoric.81 Several Bosnian Serb politicians 
pleaded for an independent Serb Republic. SNSD leader Milorad Dodik received a 
warning from High Representative Schwarz-Schilling for linking the status of the 
Serb Republic to the ongoing status talks in Kosovo.82 Further, several Bosniak 
politicians pleaded for the abolishment of the Serb Republic. Haris Silajdži argued 
openly for the abolition of the entities, which he called a ‘genocidal creation.’83 On 
their turn, Bosnian Croat politicians raised the possibility of a third Croat entity. 
Moreover, Bosnian Croat parties objected to the SDP’s decision to put forward 
only a Bosnian Croat candidate for the state level Presidency. They argued that 
such a candidate might be elected mainly by Bosniak voters, given the party’s 
predominant Bosniak voter base. They declared that they would not recognize the 
Presidency member as a legitimate representative of the Croat people.84 
Examining the election results shows that the three traditional ethnic 
nationalist political parties lost substantial ground. As Table 5.2 shows, only the 
SDA managed to hold on to its 9 seats, whereas the HDZ and SDS both lost two 
seats compared to the results of 2002. Together, the major ethnic nationalist 
political parties constituted 35,7 percent of the House of Representatives. 
Nonetheless, new ethnic nationalist parties such as HDZ 1990 and populist parties 
such as SNSD and SBiH solidified the divisions between the different 
communities.85 The elections resulted in a grand coalition which was formed on 9 
February 2007 and existed of the Bosniak SDA and SBiH, the Bosnian Serb SNSD 
and PDP, and the Bosnian Croat HDZ, HDZ 1990 and the new NSRZB. The 
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Presidency was occupied by candidates from the SBiH, the SNSD and the SDP 
(see Table 5.1).  
Despite the loss of the three traditional ethnic nationalist parties, ethnic 
nationalist politics continued to dominate Bosnian politics in 2007 and 2008. In the 
tri-part Presidency, the individual members remain allegiant to their respective 
entities and constituent peoples.86 This was not very surprising, because the Dayton 
Constitution based the Presidency on territorial and ethnic national representation. 
In a weekly column High Representative Schwarz-Schilling concluded about the 
Presidency: ‘This institution – which should represent and speak on behalf of the 
entire population of this country – came to the Steering Board meeting in 
disarray, its three members presenting positions that were totally incompatible with 
one another.’87 The Council of Ministers did not do much better. As the result of 
ethnic nationalist differences, it experienced serious internal tensions and 
deadlocks in 2007.88 The public administration, which falls under the responsibility 
of the Council of Ministers, was also dominated by an ethnic nationalist political 
culture. The European Commission concluded: ‘There are still insufficient 
safeguards against political interference in public administration, where ethnic 
identity and party membership play a significant role.’89 The Parliamentary 
Assembly, finally, was still controlled by political parties with ethnic nationalist 
voter bases. The share of moderate ethnic nationalist parties has increased since 
1995, but like the SDS, SDA and HDZ they appeal to a specific constituent people. 
As a result, the European Commission had to conclude: ‘Overall there has been 
limited progress in improving the efficiency of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its work has been adversely affected by the tense political 
climate, systematic voting along ethnic lines and insufficient administrative 
resources.’90  
 
5.1.4 Conflict management and institutional congruency in Bosnia 
  
In 2003, High Representative Ashdown declared: ‘It is relatively easy, relatively 
quickly, to change the hardware of the state – its institutions. It is much more 
difficult to change the software – peoples’ attitudes. But here, slowly, changes 
appear to be occurring too. A shift in the political culture – in the political 
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mindset.’91 Perhaps the year 2003 was too early, but a slow decline of the ethnic 
nationalist political culture is apparent when one looks at the outcomes of the 
general elections between 1996 and 2006. In general, the election results show 
some improvement with respect to the creation of a civic nationalist political 
culture. Nevertheless, in 2008 ethnic nationalism had far from disappeared in 
Bosnia. In his farewell speech at the beginning of 2006, Ashdown stated: ‘And one 
other very tough thing has to happen in BiH [Bosnia, NvW] before the European 
journey is over. It requires a change of mental attitude and that is the toughest thing 
to change of all. But BiH has no option. BiH has to learn that in Europe individual 
rights are protected individually not collectively. That each citizen is defined by 
their individuality, not their ethnicity.’92 The analysis shows that the ethnic 
nationalist parties still dominated the political system in 2008 and thus the 
Presidency, the Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly. At the same 
time, the OHR continued to stimulate a political culture of civic nationalism. Thus, 
in Bosnia there was no institutional congruency by the summer of 2008.  
The different conflict management strategies that were adopted in Bosnia 
and Kosovo can plausibly explain the reasons behind this institutional 
incongruency. As explained in Chapter three, the incompatibility of the Bosnian 
conflict was incorporated in the Dayton Peace Agreement. This resulted in a 
constitution that mainly focused on the interests of specific ethnic communities 
rather than on individual citizens. The constitutional emphasis on ethnicity was 
reflected in the design of the three major institutions. At the same time, the 
international administration expected these institutions to defend the interests of all 
Bosnians as one civic nation. The objective of the international administration was 
to go beyond ethnicity and to create a civic nationalist political culture in which 
citizenship rather than ethnicity would be the organizing principle. This objective 
was not achieved due to the Dayton Constitution which Bosnian politicians used to 
legitimate and back their ethnic nationalist policies. The ethnicity based 
Constitution led the OHR to support constitutional reforms (see Chapter seven). By 
reforming the Constitution, the OHR hoped to diminish the emphasis placed on 
ethnicity and to increase the role of citizenship in Bosnia’s society. Although 
constitutional reforms may have strengthened the international administration’s 
attempt to create a civic nationalist political culture, the reforms had not 
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5.2.1 Provisional power sharing in Kosovo 
 
Whereas a power sharing arrangement was the maximum that could be achieved 
among the conflicting parties in Bosnia, in the case of Kosovo only a cease-fire 
could be agreed upon. Any (provisional) power sharing arrangement had to be 
made at a later stage. That was done through the establishment of the Interim 
Administrative Council which included, next to the four international 
representatives, four Kosovo Albanians and one Kosovo Serb.93 Secondly, the 
Constitutional Framework was drafted in 2001. Just like Bosnia’s Constitution, 
Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework emphasized the importance of ethnicity and 
group rights. The preamble states: ‘Recognizing the need to fully protect and 
uphold the rights of all Communities of Kosovo and their members’94 As in 
Bosnia, ethnic identity became embedded in the political system and was regarded 
as the defining social characteristic in Kosovo.95 However, the difference with 
Bosnia is the ethnic balance. Instead of three ethnic groups which all by themselves 
form a minority, Kosovo has a large majority (about 90 percent of the population) 
of Kosovo Albanians and a small minority (between 5 and 7 percent) of Kosovo 
Serbs. As is pointed out below, that has influenced the design of Kosovo’s 
provisional institutions. 
 The institution of the Presidency in Kosovo is not collective, but unitary. In 
contrast to Bosnia, the Presidency has not been ‘divided’ between the dominant 
ethnic groups. The President is also not elected by popular vote as in Bosnia, but 
indirectly by Kosovo’s Assembly. Since the President is chosen by a two third 
majority, it is possible to elect a President without the approval of the Kosovo Serb 
delegates, who are unlikely to occupy more than one third of the seats in the 
Assembly. Moreover, given the Kosovo Albanian majority, it is highly unlikely 
that a Kosovo Serb will ever be elected President. At the same time, the official 
authority of Kosovo’s President is much smaller than Bosnia’s collective 
Presidency. The constitutional role of the President of Kosovo has been designed 
by the international administration to be symbolic since the Kosovo Serbs had been 
against the creation of the institution.96  
 The power sharing arrangement element in the Assembly is expressed by 
the fact that out of the 120 seats, 100 are distributed according to a system of 
proportional representation. Ten seats are reserved for the Kosovo Serb minority 
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and ten seats are reserved for the other minorities. Political parties or coalitions 
need to declare themselves as representatives of the minority in question in order to 
be eligible for these seats. The system is skewed in favor of the minorities, because 
they are entitled to an additional ten seats on top of the number of seats they gain 
out of the 100 seats which are divided among all parties.97 The power sharing 
arrangement is also reflected in the Presidency of the Assembly. It consists of 
seven members, out of which at least one must be a Kosovo Serb and one a 
member from another community than the Albanian or Serb community.98 
 Finally, power sharing in the Government is expressed by similar quota for 
minority representation as in the Assembly. The Constitutional Framework states 
that at least two of the ministers should be from another community than from the 
community having a majority in the Assembly and at least one of these should be 
from the Kosovo Serb community. In case the number of ministers increases to 
more than twelve, a third minister shall be from a non-majority community.99 The 
ministries are apportioned along ethnic lines.100 Further, the Government and its 
bureaucracy use both the Albanian and Serbian languages in their meetings and 
official documents.101 
As with the Dayton Constitution in Bosnia, the Constitutional Framework 
stressed group rights. The difference with Bosnia is that it does not mention a legal 
category similar to the constituent peoples in the Bosnian Constitution. It 
recognizes that there is a majority population with several minorities which are all 
given minority rights. As such, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework was focused 
on co-existence, rather than integration. Consequently, UNMIK has been criticized 
for entrenching ethnic conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, by 
making ethnicity an important factor in the institutions.102 For example, by starting 
a process of decentralisation in 2002 in order to motivate the Kosovo Serbs to 
participate in Kosovo’s elections, UN Special Representative Steiner ended up 
promoting the institutionalisation of ethnic politics in post-war Kosovo after 
territorially based local self-government was put on the table for Kosovo Serbs.103 
Decentralisation remained an issue in the following years and was one of the most 
important topics in the status negotiations of 2006 and 2007 (see Chapter seven). 
Despite the constitutional focus on ethnicity as an organizing principle, UNMIK, 
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just like the OHR, has executed a policy that emphasizes integration and civic 
nationalism.  
 
5.2.2 UNMIK’s attempt to create a civic nationalist political culture 
 
Creating a civic nationalist political culture has been an important policy objective 
of the international community in general and UNMIK in particular. The objective 
is reflected in the Rambouillet Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 
the Standards for Kosovo policy and the several Contact Group statements.104 
However, it was not explicitly formulated as such until about April 2002. 
Immediately after the war neither of the two ethnic communities were able to 
commit themselves to a multi-ethnic society. Therefore, specific references to a 
multi-ethnic society were avoided. Instead, in December 1999 UN Special 
Representative Kouchner launched the Agenda of Coexistence. When announcing 
the Agenda during a press briefing, he stated that UNMIK would not impose 
anything the Kosovars were not ready for. He added: “It is for this reason that we 
no longer talk about reconciliation, but rather about the first step of co-
existence.”105 The successor of Kouchner, Haekkerup continued this policy. During 
Haekkerup’s term in office, the Constitutional Framework was created and by 
negotiating the Common Document with Belgrade, he ensured Kosovo Serb 
participation during the first Assembly elections in November 2001.106 However, 
although the Constitutional Framework contains explicit references to the 
protection of minority communities, it does not refer to the creation of a multi-
ethnic society as such.  
Since 2002 explicit references to a multi-ethnic society have been made. 
The head of the UN Security Council mission that visited Kosovo in December 
2002 declared: ‘Nothing is more important than a demonstrated commitment to 
multi-ethnicity, not only in words but also in deeds.’107 UN Special Representative 
Steiner has also been explicit in stating their objective of establishing a multi-
ethnic society rather than pursuing co-existence. During his first address to the UN 
Security Council, Steiner said: “We need to follow a dual track approach. Multi-
ethnicity and integration are the two mutually reinforcing elements here. On the 
one hand, the Kosovo Albanians as the majority community have to practice what 
their leaders preach. Multi-ethnicity means doing everything they can to encourage 
the smaller communities to stay in Kosovo and to make returns possible. On the 
other hand, the smaller communities have to participate in the institutions that we 
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have set up under Resolution 1244. They must integrate and abandon parallel 
structures.”108 Steiner’s successors have continued this policy.109 They have been 
supported by the EU, whose foreign ministers declared during the EU General 
Affairs and External Relations Council held from 21 to 22 February 2005 that the 
future of the territory ‘can only be conceived in the form of a multi-ethnic and 
democratic Kosovo, which ensures effective protection for minorities, preserves 
the cultural and religious heritage of all its communities, and respects the right of 
refugees and displaced persons to return, contributing to the stability of the region 
and adhering to the values and standards of the EU.’110  
There have also been setbacks in the belief in the possibility of creating a 
multi-ethnic Kosovo. After the March 2004 violence, Harri Holkeri declared: “The 
concept of multi-ethnic Kosovo that the international community has been 
persistently attempting to implement in recent years is no longer tenable”.111 In 
addition, Holkeri welcomed proposals from the Serbian Government for ethnic 
separation as “a good basis for resuming dialogue”.112 However, international faith 
in a multi-ethnic Kosovo was restored with the arrival of UN Special 
Representative Jessen-Petersen in the summer of 2004. The creation of a multi-
ethnic society and a civic nationalist political culture remained a long-term 
objective of the international community.  
 In contrast to Bosnia, electoral engineering in Kosovo was not aimed at 
replacing ethnic nationalist war-time political leaders in favor of more moderate 
ones. In Kosovo, the focus was on minority participation, rather than on 
stimulating the emergence of multi-ethnic political parties. As in Bosnia, a large 
role was played by the OSCE, which as UNMIK pillar III was made responsible 
for institution-building and democratization. Together with the office of the UN 
Special Representative, it established the independent Central Election 
Commission (CEC) which served as the primary electoral regulatory body in 
Kosovo. The CEC was responsible for the voter registration and certification of 
political parties.113 For the municipal elections of 2000, some one million voters 
were registered and 39 political parties, coalitions, citizen’s initiatives and 
independent candidates were certified.114 For the first Assembly elections in 2001, 
a total of 26 political parties, coalitions and citizen’s initiatives were certified.115 
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UNMIK and the OSCE had a large influence on which parties were allowed to 
register and which were not. However, in contrast with Bosnia, no political parties 
have been denied participation.  
 UNMIK tried to make Kosovo’s political institutions more responsible to 
their minority communities. The most important instrument was the Standards 
before Status policy. The essence of the policy was that the PISG would take 
responsibility for ensuring that minority communities could live safely in Kosovo. 
The Standards were primarily directed at the creation of a multi-ethnic society.116 
The Standards forced the PISG to adopt far reaching legislation in the field of 
human rights. For example, since 20 August 2004, Kosovo has one of the most 
comprehensive anti-discrimination laws in Europe.117 Thus, the treatment of 
minorities in Kosovo was considered to be a litmus test; the Kosovo Albanians and 
their institutions would be judged based on how they would deal with the 
minorities in Kosovo.118 
   
5.2.3 Kosovo’s persisting ethnic nationalist political culture 
 
Despite the Standards before Status policy, Kosovo’s political landscape has been 
dominated by ethnic nationalist Kosovo Albanian political parties which appealed 
almost exclusively to Kosovo Albanian voters. Two political parties have been 
dominant in post-war Kosovo; Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK as the oldest and largest 
political party and Hashim Thaçi’s PDK as the political successor of the KLA.119 In 
post-war Kosovo, the LDK derived much of its strength from its record as a non-
violent protest movement during the 1990’s. Many observers thought that the party 
had become politically irrelevant in the aftermath of operation Allied Force. First, 
Rugova had been accused of appeasement after he had appeared on television with 
Miloševi. Second, Rugova did not immediately return to Kosovo after the end of 
the NATO-bombings and as a result the KLA was able to fill the political and 
military vacuum and gained much support. Nonetheless, loyalty to the LDK was 
stimulated by widespread revulsion of perceived arrogance of the KLA in seeking 
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to dominate post-war Kosovar politics.120 Even then, support for the KLA proved 
large enough to build a political party. In September 1999, the PDK was 
established by Hashim Thaçi, who had represented the KLA during the 
Rambouillet talks. KLA fighters had taken control over all 26 municipalities after 
Serbian troops had left. However, due to a lack of experience, the KLA take-over 
came to be regarded as usurpation. Thaçi and the PDK were held responsible and 
this led to disappointing results in the municipal elections for the party.121  
Next to the LDK and PDK, there proved to be enough room for another 
large political party. In 2000, former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj 
established the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërine e 
Kosovës, AAK) as an alternative for the ‘party of non-violence’ (LDK) and the 
‘party of war’ (PDK).122 It started as a coalition of Kosovo Albanian political 
parties and citizen movements and in 2002 it was transformed in to a genuine 
political party.123 As is pointed out below, the AAK proved to be able to appeal to a 
sufficient number of voters to get elected during the three Assembly elections. Like 
the LDK and PDK, the AAK had an uncompromising attitude on independence and 
appealed exclusively to Kosovo Albanian voters. 
Next to the AAK, several other new Kosovo Albanian parties were 
established. The first was the New Party of Kosovo (Partia e Re E Kosovës, 
PREK). It was established in April 2002 (before the municipal elections) by the co-
founder of the LDK and former Prime Minister in exile Bujar Bukoshi. PReK 
described itself as a rightist centre party with a focus on the rule of law and 
liberalism: ‘PReK engages for a free market economy and a parliamentary 
democracy where the law protecting rights and interests of all the people 
dominates.’124 Again, PRek evolved into an exclusive Kosovo Albanian political 
party. Secondly, in 2004 publisher Vetton Surroi established his Partia Reformiste 
ORA (Reformist Party ORA). ORA (‘hour ’or ‘clock’) was relatively successful 
and received 6.2 percent of the vote for the Assembly elections of that year.125 
ORA depicted itself as a new reformist party which aimed to bring Kosovo out of 
the ‘vicious circle of stagnation and degradation and direct it towards a 
contemporary Western society.’126 However, ORA was not able to pass the 
electoral threshold of 5 percent of the votes during the 2007 elections.  
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In addition to PReK and ORA, two smaller Kosovo Albanian parties were 
established: the Justice Party (Partia e Drejtësisë, PD) in 1999 and the Democratic 
Alternative of Kosovo (Alternativa Demokratike e Kosovës, ADK) in 2004. Other 
small Kosovo Albanian parties had existed for a longer period of time, such as the 
Party of Albanian National Unity (Partia e Unitetit Kombëtar, UNIKOMB), the 
Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partija Shqiptare Demokristiane 
e Kosovës, PSHDK), the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia 
Socialdemokrate e Kosovës, PSDK) and the Liberal Party of Kosovo (Partia 
Liberale e Kosovës, PLK). All these parties were ethnic nationalist in the sense that 
they appealed to Kosovo Albanian voters and supported Kosovo’s independence. 
This was also the case with the Democratic League of Dardania (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Dardanisë, LDD) that split of from the LDK. Former Speaker of the 
Assembly Nexhat Daci founded the LDD in 2007 after internal conflicts within the 
LDK. The LDD was quite successful in the 2007 elections and gained 11 seats in 
the Assembly. Another relative new Kosovo Albanian political party, established in 
2006, was the Kosovo New Alliance (Aleancë Kosova e Re, AKR), which proved 
to be successful during the elections. As with the other Kosovo Albanian parties, 
its voter base was Kosovo Albanian.  
All Kosovo Albanian parties strongly supported the independence of 
Kosovo and competed with each other over the best way to achieve that objective. 
Given their commitment to Kosovo’s independence, it is understandable that none 
of these parties appealed to Kosovo Serb voters. Instead, the Kosovo Serb 
electorate voted mainly for Kosovo Serb political parties which all opposed 
independence. Among the Kosovo Serb political parties, the Serb National Council 
(SNC) was a successful political party at the beginning of the international 
administration. However, due to the fall of the Miloševi regime in Serbia, it lost 
political influence to Kosovo Serb parties that were associated with the anti- 
Miloševi Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska Opozicija Srbije, 
DOS).127 Although the SNC was not able to compete with the DOS-related parties 
in the two Assembly elections, the party remained influential in the Kosovo Serb 
enclaves in northern Kosovo.128  
Prior to the Assembly elections of 2001, a coalition of five Kosovo Serb 
parties associated with DOS jointly registered as the Kosovo Serb citizens’ 
initiative Coalition Return (Koalicija Povratak, KP).129 Rada Trajkovi became 
leader of the parliamentary group after the elections.130 She resigned on 30 
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December 2002 and was succeeded by Dragiša Krstovi.131 Prior to the Assembly 
elections of 2004, however, KP split into the Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija 
(Srpska Lista za Kosovo i Metohiju, SLKM) and the Graanska Inicijativa Srbija 
(Civic Initiative of Serbia, GIS). Whereas the SKLM was closely associated with 
Belgrade, the GIS followed a course which was more independent from Serbia’s 
government and decided to participate in the PISG after the 2004 elections while 
the SKLM did not. The GIS was primarily aimed at supporting and assisting 
internally displaced Kosovo Serbs; most candidates on the list were internally 
displaced persons themselves.132  
The GIS transformed into the Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and 
Methohija (Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosova i Metohije, SDSKIM) in 2007. In 
the meantime, five new Kosovo Serb political parties were established and 
competed and gained seats in the 2007 elections. These were the Serbian Liberal 
Party (Srpska Liberalna Stranka, SLS), the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska 
Narodna Stranka, SNS), the New Democracy (Nova Demokratija, ND), the Serbian 
Party of Kosovo and Metohija (Srpska Kosovsko Metohijska Stranka, SKMS) and 
the Independent Social Democratic League of Kosovo and Methohija (Savez 
Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata Kosova i Metohije, SNSDKIM). All these parties 
focused exclusively on the Kosovo Serb electorate. The president of the SLS stated 
for example: ‘The essence of our programme is the survival of the Serbian 
community in Kosovo, and there is no alternative to this.’133 The main difference 
between the different parties was that while the SDSKIM and the SLS decided to 
join the PISG after the 2007 elections, the other parties complied with Belgrade’s 
request to boycott the institutions. 
The other ethnic communities, including Bosniaks, Gorani, Turks, Ashkali, 
Roma and Egyptians also established their own parties. In 2004, Coalition Vakat 
was formed, which was made up of three Bosniak minority parties: Democratic 
Party of Bosniaks (Demokratska Stranka Bošnjaka, DSB), Democratic Party Vatan 
(Demokratska Stranka Vatan, DSV) and Bosniak Party of Kosovo (Bošnjaka 
Stranka Kosova, BSK).134 Bosniaks were also represented by the Bosniak Party of 
Democratic Action in Kosovo (Bošnjaka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova, 
BSDAK) and by the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratska Akcije, 
SDA).135 In 2000, a party had been established by and for Gorani called the Civic 
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Initiative Gora (Graanska Inicijativa Gore, GIG).136 Turks were represented by a 
party which had already been established in 1990 that was called the Kosovo 
Democratic Turkish Party (Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi, KDTP).137 Roma 
were represented in the United Roma Party of Kosovo (Partia Rome e Bashkuar E 
Kosovës, PREBK) which had been established in the summer of 2000.138 The 
Ashkali, have their Democratic Ashkali Albanian Party of Kosovo (Partia 
Demokratike Ashkanli Shqiptare e Kosovës, PDASHK) and the Democratic 
Ashkali Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike Ashkanli e Kosovës, PDAK).139 
Finally, the Egyptian community established the New Democratic Initiative of 
Kosovo (Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës, IRDK) in 2001. 
The fact that Kosovo Serbs and the other minorities only form a small 
portion of Kosovo’s society has resulted in the domination of the Kosovo Albanian 
political parties in the PISG between 2001 and 2006. Moreover, Table 5.3 shows 
that among the Kosovo Albanian parties the LDK and PDK have dominated the 
Assembly elections in 2001 and 2004 and to a lesser extent also in 2007.  
 
Table 5.3: Number of seats of major political parties in the Kosovar Assembly140 
 2001 2004 2007 
Major Kosovo Albanian parties in the Assembly 
LDK 47 49 25 
LDD - - 11 
PDK 26 30 36 
AAK 8 11 10 
AKR - - 13 
ORA - 7 - 
Kosovo Serb parties in the Assembly
KP 22 - - 
SLKM  - 8 - 
GIS / SDKISM - 2 2 
SLS - - 4 
ND - - 1 
SKMS - - 1 
SNS - - 1 
SNSDKIM - - 1 
 
It is interesting to take a closer look at how the LDK and PDK have dominated the 
Assembly until 2008. Starting with the elections of 2001, the electorate mainly 
voted for the LDK, PDK and AAK. Together with the Kosovo Serb KP and the 
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Bosniak DSV, the three parties formed a coalition. This coalition had only been 
possible, because of large international pressure as has been explained in Chapter 
four. Within the coalition, the LDK, PDK and – to a lesser extent – the AAK 
dominated as the largest parties. As will be further elaborated upon in Chapter six, 
Kosovo Serb voters only hesitantly participated in the elections of 2001. Two 
weeks before the elections, Belgrade called on the Kosovo Serbs to vote, but many 
opposed this decision. In addition, in some areas Kosovo Serbs were intimidated 
not to vote by Kosovo Albanian hardliners.141 Thus, the first general elections were 
characterized by bad conditions. It is difficult to speak of free and fair elections for 
at least the Kosovo Serbs. In contrast with Bosnia, it would probably not have 
made a difference if the first post-war elections had been postponed. Belgrade’s 
influence and Kosovo Serb security concerns remained important determinants for 
Kosovo Serb participation in the years after 2001.  
 All three major Kosovo Albanian parties had an uncompromising position 
towards independence. During the election campaign repeated calls for 
independence were made. For example, Rugova stated during an election speech: 
“As you know, we declared independence in 1991 and we have built our state for 
more than ten years. Therefore we ask for the official recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence by the United States, the EU and the international community”.142 In 
general, this attitude was reflected in the functioning of the PISG between 2002 
and 2004. 
 The President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, formally had a limited role, but 
was nonetheless influential. It is with Rugova that the office of the Presidency 
attained importance beyond its limited competencies in the Constitutional 
Framework. As President, Rugova has mainly lobbied for international support for 
Kosovo’s independence. Only occasionally he called on Kosovars to build a multi-
ethnic society. To that extent, a positive symbolic action was taken in July 2003, 
when the President, together with Kosovo’s main leaders (including Prime Minister 
Rexhepi, Assembly President Daci, Hashim Thaçi (PDK), Ramush Haradinaj 
(AAK), Bujar Bukoshi (PReK), Agim Çeku (then heading the Kosovo Protection 
Corps), and Kosovo’s non-Serb minority leaders) sent an open letter appealing to 
all displaced persons from Kosovo to return. Designating Kosovo as ‘homeland’ 
for these displaced persons, the political leaders committed themselves to a multi-
ethnic Kosovo. The initiative, however, had been taken by Thaçi rather than 
Rugova.143  
During the ethnic violence of March 2004, President Rugova expressed his 
deepest regret for the wounded UNMIK and KFOR personnel, but failed to 
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mention Kosovo Serbs.144 Almost one year later during his annual address to the 
Assembly, he did not even refer to the March violence at all. Although he referred 
to the Government’s commitment to Standards implementation and to the 
integration of minorities, he also declared that the achievement of independence 
would be a priority and that the Government would consider establishing 
diplomatic representation of Kosovo abroad.145  
 That did not happen since it would have meant a violation of the 
Constitutional Framework. However, from 2002 to 2004, the Assembly violated 
the Constitutional Framework on a regular basis.146 In 2003, UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan criticized the Assembly for continuing to show a tendency to go 
beyond its institutional role as legislative body by adopting positions on symbolic 
matters, such as the endorsement of a divisive resolution on ‘war values’ in 2003. 
The Secretary-General judged that such acts hindered efforts at cooperation among 
political representatives of Kosovo’s communities.147  
 The ‘war values’ affair followed the conviction for war crimes in 
December 2002 of Daut Haradinaj, the brother of AAK’s leader Ramush 
Haradinaj, and the arrest by the ICTY in February 2003 of the leader of the 
parliamentary group of the PDK, Fatmir Lidaj. This led to tensions between the 
main Kosovo Albanian parties since the AAK and PDK wanted a resolution that 
would recognize the efforts of the KLA in liberating Kosovo. The LDK and the 
Assembly’s President Nexhat Daci refused to support such a resolution. As a 
consequence, the stability of the coalition was seriously challenged because the 
AAK and PDK considered resorting to a vote of no-confidence. However, that 
could be avoided with the adoption of the resolution on the Liberation War of the 
People of Kosovo for Independence and Freedom in May. This resolution was a 
compromise in which not only the armed resistance of the KLA was recognized, 
but also the peaceful resistance of the LDK. The resolution was condemned by the 
international community. Especially, the sentence: “the war was waged for the 
freedom and independence of Kosovo”, caused international agitation.148 The 
resolution immediately strained relations with UNMIK, and the UN Special 
Representative called it ‘divisive and against the reconciliatory spirit of UNSC 
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[UN Security Council, NvW] Resolution 1244.’149 The Kosovo Serb KP interpreted 
the resolution as a signal to displaced Kosovo Serbs that their return was unwanted. 
Given these tensions, the resolution disrupted regular legislative work for many 
weeks. The USA’s chief of mission in Kosovo declared that such kind of 
resolutions only served to ‘further remove the PISG from its stated goal of ethnic 
integration (…).’150 As an immediate sanction of the international community, the 
PISG were declared not to be welcome at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council 
meetings of NATO, the Stability Pact Parliamentary Conference in Brussels, and 
the EU/NATO/OSCE/Stability Pact Regional Conference in Ohrid.151 
Next to the war values discussion, other controversial and divisive issues, 
based on ethnic nationalist politics, prevented a good relationship between the 
Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in the Assembly. First, there was the issue of 
whether the University of North Mitrovica that used the Serb language as its 
language of instruction should be included in Kosovo’s Higher Education system. 
The Assembly had opposed such an inclusion, after which UNMIK had to 
promulgate its inclusion unilaterally. Secondly, a draft law on holding a housing 
and population census also proved to be controversial, since it did not include 
internally displaced Kosovo Serbs who were living outside Kosovo.152 Therefore, 
the KP argued that a census based on the draft law was unrealistic and undermined 
the interests of the Serb community in Kosovo.153 Other laws that were challenged 
on that basis were the Law on Access to Official Documents, the Law on Public 
Procurement, and the Law on Postal Services.154  
The persistence of ethnic-nationalist politics in the Assembly led to the 
following conclusion by the UN Secretary-General in 2004: ‘The support of the 
Kosovo Albanian-dominated Provisional Institutions for the concept and practice 
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of multi-ethnicity remained inconsistent.’155 He expressed this after the ethnic 
violence that erupted in March 2004. The Kosovo Albanian political elite did not 
unanimously condemn the March violence.156 Although on 18 March the Assembly 
had condemned the violence, it had above all voiced its disagreement “with the 
lack of commitment by UNMIK to provide security for all Kosovar citizens.” And 
it stated that: “The tolerance for Serb parallel structures and criminal gangs that 
murder Kosovar citizens is the wrong policy, and will destabilize Kosovo.”157 
Further, calls for independence and demands for the immediate transfer of 
authority to domestic institutions were made.158 A few days later, on 25 March, the 
Assembly condemned the violence against Kosovo Serbs and supported the 
Government’s initiative to create a fund to repair damaged houses and churches. 
The President and several Assembly committees began visiting municipalities that 
were affected by the violence.159 Finally, in the wake of the violence, the Assembly 
initiated an investigation committee with the mandate to investigate the causes and 
consequences of the violence.160 However, despite these intentions, in July 2004, 
Nexhat Daci admitted that the Assembly had not yet overcome the crisis between 
the different ethnic communities.161  
The second general elections on 3 December 2004 led to the re-election of 
Rugova as President, but only after he had received 64 votes in the third round.162 
This time a political package deal was made before the voting for the President and 
Government took place. The LDK was again able to become the largest party 
having managed to gain more votes than in 2001. Arguably that was partly caused 
by its pre-electoral alliance with the smaller PSHDK. Having learned from the 
political deadlock in 2001, the LDK/PSHDK tried to make a political deal with the 
AAK before the Assembly would vote for a President and Government. 
Consequently, instead of three months of political negotiations, a coalition could be 
formed within one month. On 3 December 2004, the Assembly approved the 
coalition government of LDK/PSHDK, AAK, KDTP, Coalition Vakat and IRDK. 
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Also the Assembly voted in favor of the re-election of Rugova as President.163 
Within the coalition, the LDK/PSHDK received six ministries and the post of 
Deputy Prime Minister. The AAK received four ministries and the post of Prime 
Minister which would be filled by Ramush Haradinaj. The minority communities 
would receive three ministries; two for Kosovo Serbs (Ministry of Returns and 
Ministry of Agriculture) and one for the ‘others.’164 As will be further elaborated 
upon in Chapter six, only one Kosovo Serb Minister (Slaviša Petkovi of the GIS) 
was included in the cabinet, because the SKLM decided to boycott the institutions.  
 As a result of the boycott by SKLM, minority representation in the PISG 
was problematic. Not only on the level of ministers, but also with respect to the 
public administration which had to be apportioned along ethnic lines according to 
the Constitutional Framework.165 The target for minority representation was 16.6 
percent, of which the Kosovo Serbs as largest minority formed the largest share. In 
November 2004, the UN Secretary-General reported: ‘Minority employment in the 
Provisional Institutions continued to be low and confined to areas below the 
decision-making level, and mostly in the offices catering to minorities themselves. 
In the central ministries of the Provisional Institutions, the minorities occupied only 
about 9.6 percent of total posts but the minimum stipulated percentage was 16.6 
percent. The overall percentage of minorities in ministries has declined.’166 After 
2004, minority representation slowly increased until 2007. In May 2005, it was 
reported that the percentage of minorities working within the PISG at the central 
level had increased a little to 10,2 percent, for June 2006 a percentage of 11,4 
percent was reported, and in June 2007 there was a minority representation of 11 
percent was reported.167 However, by the end of 2007 participation had decreased 
again to 10.5 percent and after the declaration of independence in February 2008, 
the UN Secretary-General expressed concerns about the future participation of the 
Kosovo Serbs in the civil service.168  
 The elections of 2007 broke the dominance of the LDK. Because the LDD 
split from the LDK, the PDK became the largest political party in the Assembly for 
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the first time in its history. The PDK’s leader, Hashim Thaçi, presented a new 
coalition on 9 January, 2008 made up of the PDK and LDK. Through their reserved 
seats, Kosovo Serbs could participate in the coalition. As a result, the Kosovo 
Serbs got the Ministry for Returns and Communities and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Welfare. However, the Assembly continued to be dominated by Kosovo 
Albanian political parties with Kosovo Albanian voter bases.  
 
5.2.4 Conflict management and institutional congruency in Kosovo 
 
In 2003 the report Kosovo’s ethnic dilemma, the International Crisis Group 
concluded: ‘The human rights culture has not been internalised by politicians and 
political structures are not mature enough to accommodate the mobilisation of 
minority groups.’169 Moreover, in the report it was argued that the protection of 
minority rights cannot be guaranteed.170 Two years later, in April 2005, the 
International Commission on the Balkans stated in its report: ‘A multi-ethnic 
Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic assessments of the international 
community.’171 The Commission cited a survey which indicated that 72 percent of 
the Kosovo Albanians preferred to live in an ethnically homogenous state and the 
Commission claimed that the Kosovo Albanian leadership had not made any effort 
to counter this public opinion.172  
The analysis of institutional congruency presented above confirms this 
picture. It has shown that in 2008 Kosovo’s political culture was still dominated by 
ethnic nationalism. All political parties appealed to specific ethnic communities 
(whether Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb or any other community) instead of to a 
civic nation. As a result, ethnic nationalism dominated the political system and thus 
the three PISG. At the same time, UNMIK stimulated a civic nationalist political 
culture. In 2008 the International Civilian Representative and the Special 
Representative of the EU continued this policy, as the incoming control type of 
international administration (see Chapter seven). Thus, given the two competing 
and mutually exclusive value systems it is not possible to speak of institutional 
congruency in the case of Kosovo.  
 Like in the case of Bosnia, the way the conflict in Kosovo was managed 
can provide a plausible explanation for the absence of institutional congruency. 
The unsuccessful attempt of UNMIK to make civic nationalism the dominant 
political culture in Kosovo can be explained by the non-resolved status of Kosovo. 
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First of all, a civic nation was defined as ‘a territorially bounded, sovereign legal-
political community’ (see Chapter two). Since Kosovo was not sovereign, one 
could argue that it was technically impossible to create a civic nationalist political 
culture. Secondly and more importantly, the absence of conflict resolution in 1999 
led to continued uncertainty over the political status of Kosovo. This uncertainty 
motivated both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs to cling to ethnic nationalism 
as the organizing mechanism for the political system. Therefore, instead of 
identifying themselves with a civic nation, they continued to identify themselves in 
terms of being Kosovo Albanian or Kosovo Serb. As in Bosnia, the international 
administration did not succeed in replacing the ethnic nationalist culture with a 
civic nationalist culture which resulted in the continued presences of two 

























6  Institutional Support 
 
This chapter examines institutional support which is the last indicator of 
institutionalization. Institutional support manifests itself through positive attitudes 
and positive behavior (compliance) towards the institutions. Support is assessed at 
two levels of the population: the (political) elite level and the mass level of 
Kosovo’s society. In this chapter the question is answered whether Bosnia’s and 
Kosovo’s political institutions are supported by the population on both levels of 
society. Like in the preceding two chapters, the analysis is split in two parts. The 
first part discusses institutional support in Bosnia, the second part discusses the 
situation in Kosovo. In each part it is first discussed whether there exists elite level 
support for the state level political institutions. In the case of Bosnia, this is done 
by separately looking at each of the three large ethnic communities. This is 
necessary, because every particular ethnic group had its own vision of the Bosnian 
institutions. For Kosovo the focus is exclusively on the Kosovo Serb political elite. 
Institutional support among the Kosovo Albanian political elite can safely be 
assumed to be high, because every Kosovo Albanian politician pursued a policy of 
independence for Kosovo. Therefore every domestic political institution - however 
imperfect - can be expected to be welcomed as another step towards that goal 
among the Kosovo Albanian political elite. The Kosovo Serb political elite, in 
contrast, had every reason not to support the provisional political institutions. For 
them the institutions also represented a step towards independence, but that was 
judged to be a step in the wrong direction. After the elite level has been assessed, 
the mass level of support among the people for Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s political 
institutions is analyzed by using opinion polls and voter turnouts. As in the two 
preceding chapters, both sections end by offering a plausible explanation for the 





6.1.1 Elite level support for Bosnia’s state level institutions  
 
In general, the imposed nature of the Dayton Agreement made the conflicting 
parties in Bosnia hesitant to accept the state level institutions. On the one hand, 
immediate humanitarian and military imperatives proved to be relatively 
unproblematic to implement. Especially the degree of compliance by the entities’ 
armed forces with the military measures agreed upon at Dayton was remarkable.1 
However, whenever the OHR tried to strengthen the central state, it encountered 
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fierce political resistance.2 As a result, the first OHR reports are full of complaints 
about a lack of progress in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. After the 
Civilian Consolidation plan had been launched, the PIC stated in May 1997: ‘In 
London, the countries of the PIC reaffirmed their willingness to help and assist 
with the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on the clear condition that 
all the authorities of the country fulfilled their own binding commitments to move 
the peace process forward. Having reviewed developments since then, the Steering 
Board unanimously agreed that all the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
failing to live up fully to their obligations under the Peace Agreement, and that this 
is unacceptable.’3  
 As a reaction to the lack of progress, the PIC invited High Representative 
Westendorp, to make a list of the cases of non-compliance by Bosnian authorities 
as well as to recommend in each case specific action to be taken by the 
international community.4 Subsequently, the PIC Steering Board reiterated the 
PIC’s wish to receive recommendations on non-compliance measures. This 
resulted in OHR recommendations on international action regarding the 
appointment of Bosnian ambassadors and the adoption of citizenship and passport 
laws.5 The PIC realized that more robust action had to be taken during its meeting 
in Bonn in 1997. The Bonn Powers were adopted, because of a lack of progress in 
the priority areas identified in the Civilian Consolidation Plan.  
 However, the Bonn Powers did not result in significantly increasing 
support among the elite for the domestic institutions. In 2000, the PIC concluded: 
‘The Council expresses its dissatisfaction with the slow pace of domestic peace 
implementation since its Madrid meeting in 1998. The responsibility for this 
insufficient progress lies squarely with obstructionist political parties and their 
allies, both within and outside of BiH.’6 In October 2006, the PIC Steering Board 
concluded that: ‘the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have failed to deliver 
the expected level of reform in recent months.’7 This was reiterated by Schwarz-
Schilling during a TV-address in which he explained the PIC’s decision not to 
close down the OHR as had originally been planned for the summer of 2007: 
‘Though Bosnia and Herzegovina has made progress, the country’s political 
leaders have not assumed full responsibility for completing the process of Dayton 
implementation and fulfilling the remaining requirements necessary for the signing 
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of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement.’8 Finally, in February 2008 the PIC 
Steering Board noted that political leaders were not only refusing to carry out 
essential reforms, but they were also attempting to ‘weaken progressively the 
institutions and legitimacy of the state.’9 
Most reform attempts by the OHR have been countered by strong domestic 
opposition from political elites of all ethnic communities. However, differences in 
elite support for the central state can be distinguished between the three constituent 
peoples. The Bosniaks are considered the most supportive of the central state. 
Especially the SDA has portrayed itself in post-war Bosnia as the defender of the 
Bosnian state level institutions.10 Part of this support can be explained by the 
legacy of the war. Between 1992 and 1995, the Bosniaks governed the war-time 
Bosnian state while the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs had established their 
own republics. Furthermore, Bosniak support for the central state can be explained 
by the numerical strength of their community. Because the Bosniaks constitute a 
majority over every other single constituent people, they have been the most 
enthusiastic supporters of the joint institutions from the beginning of the 
international administration.11  
The Bosniak support for the central state has manifested itself in a 
willingness to cooperate with the international community and even an acceptance 
of the OHR’s impositions.12 Further, it led to attempts by Bosniak political parties 
to strengthen the central government and to election campaigns by Bosniak 
political parties in both entities.13 Finally, Bosniak politicians strongly supported 
the constitutional reform attempt in 2006 (see Chapter seven). At the same time, 
however, Bosniak enthusiasm for the central state has led to repeated attacks on the 
Serb Republic and its institutions.14 For instance, as already mentioned in Chapter 
five, during the elections campaign of 2006 several Bosniak politicians called for 
the abolishment of the Serb Republic. 
 The Bosnian Croat politicians have been more critical of the central state 
institutions. Especially the ethnic nationalist HDZ became well known for its lack 
of support. The most hard-line Bosnian Croats, mainly living in Herzegovina 
(Southwestern Bosnia), have regularly called for a separate Croat entity. They 
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preferred to return to the wartime entity Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna which 
had been declared in July 1992. In the eyes of Bosnian Croat politicians, Dayton 
did not provide equal rights to all three major ethnic groups, because it created only 
two entities, instead of three entities including a Croat one. As a result, Bosnian 
Croats have felt themselves outnumbered by the Bosniaks within the Federation.15  
 During the first post-war years, Croat hardliners were considered the 
largest problem in Bosnia. Deputy High Representative Paul Klein stated in 1998: 
‘It should be said that the RS [Serb Republic, NvW] became more open for 
cooperation than the leadership in Herzegovina. And it seems quite senseless to 
me, for it should be vice versa.’16 Moreover, as was explained in Chapter four, the 
first officials fired by the OHR were the Croat majors of Stolac (4 March 1998) 
and Drvar (16 April 1998). In August 1998 the International Crisis Group 
concluded: ‘The reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) has been 
consistently obstructed by the main Bosnian Croat party, the Croat Democratic 
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZBiH). The HDZBiH is dominated by hard-
liners who emphasise the consolidation of a pure Croat-inhabited territory centred 
in western Herzegovina, with the eventual aim of seceding and joining Croatia.’17 
 Bosnian Croat nationalist hardliners continued to operate parallel structures 
after 1995. In April 1998, Hans Schumacher stated: ‘It is clear that there are still 
structures of HB [Herzeg-Bosna, NvW] and RBiH [Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, NvW]. All those institutions must be abolished urgently.’18 The 
parallel structures were a legacy of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. The 
entity was formally disbanded by the Washington Agreement in 1994, but it 
exercised de facto control over Croat institutions and public finances. The PIC 
ordered the dissolution of all parallel structures (including the Bosniak parallel 
structures) in the Federation. It stated: ‘The Council reiterates that remaining 
parallel and para-constitutional structures in the territory of the Federation ("Croat 
Republic of Herceg Bosna", "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina") are illegal and 
must be dissolved immediately. The authorities in the Federation should publicly 
announce that all these former institutions have stopped functioning. The bank 
accounts of such structures must be closed. Remaining seals must be destroyed. 
The Council invites the High Representative to report to the Steering Board on 
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progress on this issue by 1 March 1998.’19 Despite this order, the structures 
continued to exist.  
  In 2001 a serious crisis occurred when Bosnian Croat hardliners from the 
HDZ and from some other smaller Croat ethnic nationalist parties proposed to 
secede from the Federation.20 The crisis was caused by the fear that Bosnian Croats 
would be marginalized within the Federation.21 On 3 March 2001, a coalition of 
seven Croat nationalist parties referred to as the Croat National Congress (HNS), 
voted under the leadership of HDZ-president and Presidency member Ante Jelavi 
for secession from the Federation and the establishment of a third (Croat) entity. 
Already during the elections of November 2000, the HDZ had organized a 
referendum in which Bosnian Croats were asked whether they preferred to have 
their own institutions within Bosnia. According to the HDZ, 71 percent of the 
registered Bosnian Croats participated in the referendum and 98,96 percent voted 
in favor of establishing their own institutions.22 In practice, the Croat third entity 
had never ceased to exist and the decision of the HNS was little more than an 
attempt to formalize the Croat parallel structures within the FBiH.23 Jelavi’s 
initiative was supported by Croatian military units of the Federation army. In spite 
of the six years of confidence building measures since 1995, Bosnian Croat 
soldiers decided to side en masse with Jelavi.24  
The crisis was resolved with the decisive action of the OHR. First, High 
Representative Petritsch ordered the dismissal of Jelavi as a member of the 
Presidency on 7 March.25 In an article in The Financial Times Petritsch explained 
his decision in the following words: ‘Mr. Jelavic, the Croat member of Bosnia's 
three-member presidency and the leader of the nationalist Croat Democratic Union 
(HDZ), has behaved in an unacceptable manner for the head of a state committed 
to punishing war crimes. He has repeatedly called for the partition of the country. 
He attended a rally last week where he sang the praises of Dario Kordic and Mario 
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Cerkez, two war criminals convicted for crimes against humanity by the 
International Tribunal in The Hague last month. At the weekend, Mr. Jelavic called 
on Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats to cease all cooperation with the legally 
elected government in the Federation half of the country, dominated by Bosniacs 
(Muslims) and Croats. This threatened to tear up the Dayton Accords and put Mr. 
Jelavic on a collision course with the rest of the country's citizens and with the 
international community.’26 In addition to Jelavi, other Bosnian Croat politicians 
were dismissed or banned from holding public and party offices, including House 
of Representatives delegate Ivo Andri Luzanski and Zdravko Batini who had 
accepted the position of Vice-President of the Croat Self-Government.27 Secondly, 
Petritsch put the Bosnian Croat Bank Hercegovaka Banka under international 
oversight and appointed a provisional administrator on 5 April 2001. The bank was 
considered the most important financial source for Bosnian Croat separatists and 
was put under investigation.28  
 After the March 2001 crisis, the policy of the HDZ towards the unity of 
Bosnia changed. Starting with the general elections of 2002, the HDZ repeatedly 
expressed support for the central state and called for the creation of state level 
armed forces and a state level intelligence agency. The party proposed 
constitutional changes during which the entities and cantons would be abolished 
and replaced by strong, competent municipalities (or cantons) to balance the central 
state.29 The HDZ became also more supportive of the OHR’s impositions, although 
not as supportive as the SDA; arguing that the OHR should use its powers 
sparingly and that decisions should be bound by time limits. In addition, the HDZ 
was of the opinion that Bosnia’s domestic authorities should be allowed more time 
for the decision making process before the OHR would intervene.30 
This more constructive course adopted by the HDZ towards state level 
institutions has been maintained since 2002. Although occasional calls for a 
separate Croat entity continued (for example on 6 September 2005 by Ivo Miro 
Jovi and by several Bosnian Croat politicians during the campaign for the general 
elections of 2006), they became much less frequent.31 The change of course of the 
Bosnian Croat hardliners was also reflected in the diminished political importance 
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of the parallel structures. Although in 2006 parallel structures could still be 
identified in the cantons dominated by the HDZ, things had improved considerably 
since the crisis of 2001.  
An important factor for the decreasing importance of parallel structures 
had been the defeat of the HDZ in Croatia in 2000.32 The existence of Croat 
parallel structures had been strongly linked to the availability of support for these 
structures from Croatia; since 1995 the influence of the Croatian Government on 
the Bosnian Croat politicians had been significant.33 Therefore, the OHR made 
serious efforts to change the policy of Croatia in supporting these structures.34 
However, that proved only be possible after the death of Tuman in 2000. At the 
time Petritsch stated: ‘I am an optimist regarding the future conduct of financial 
transfers from Croatia to the Croats in BiH. The Croats in BiH [Bosnia, NvW] 
cannot develop their feeling of belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as 
Zagreb secretly ‘jumps in’ with payments for salaries to the Croat leadership, for 
the Croat military forces in BiH; it pays pensions to war victims, disabled war 
veterans, pays for Croat Television Erotel, allocates dubious economic loans.’35 
Following the regime change, an important role in the diminishing Croatian 
interference in Bosnia was played by Croatia’s President Stipe Mesi who publicly 
renounced claims on Bosnia.36  
Finally, whereas the Bosnian Croats may have been very uncooperative in 
the beginning of the international administration, Bosnian Serb politicians, and 
especially the SDS, were at least as difficult in the later phases. Support for the 
central Bosnian state has been low among Bosnian Serb politicians from the 
beginning. Since 1995, they interpreted Dayton in such a way to consider the entity 
to be a sovereign state.37 As with the Bosnian Croats, this was a legacy of the war. 
A war-time Bosnian Serb entity had been created on 14 October 1991 when 
Radovan Karadži, the party leader of the SDS in Bosnia, marched out of a 
meeting of the Bosnian Assembly and set up Bosnian Serb government structures 
in Banja Luka.38 Out of these the Serb Republic was created. Consequently, 
numerous laws enacted by the entity Government referred to the sovereignty of the 
Serb Republic until they had to be changed by the OHR. In addition, as late as 
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2007, politicians regularly referred to the sovereign status of the Serb Republic in 
speeches.39 
 Consequently, the state level institutions were thought of as institutions 
that should remain weak.40 The opposition to the central state was manifest, for 
example, on 4 February 1999, when during the session of the House of 
Representatives in which the new Council of Ministers was approved after the 
general elections in October 1998, all delegates of the SDS and SRS walked out in 
protest.41 In general, the Bosnian Serb political elite has strongly opposed the 
strengthening of the state level, which they regard as ideas primarily coming from 
the Bosniaks and the OHR.42 Over the years, the Bosnian Serb opposition to a 
strong central state has led paradoxically to a stronger commitment to the 
Constitution agreed upon in Dayton. Whereas Bosnian Serb politicians used to 
oppose the Constitution, because they wanted to secede or join Serbia, they became 
serious defenders of it as soon as they realized that the Dayton Constitution was a 
guarantee for the protection of their entity. By taking a strict legalistic approach 
towards the Constitution, Bosnian Serb politicians hoped to prevent the central 
state from obtaining more powers.43 The SDS has repeatedly warned that Bosnian 
Serb support for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement depends on the 
OHR’s policy; the more the OHR focuses on strengthening the state level 
institutions, then the more the issues of secession or unification with Serbia would 
remain on the agenda.44 
 Since the Bosnian Serbs had been granted their own entity at the Dayton 
negotiations, it was not really necessary for them to operate parallel structures. 
Nonetheless, in 1996, Human Rights Watch published a report in which it claimed 
that an underground parliamentary organization under the control of SDS existed 
(although concrete evidence was thin).45 The danger of these parallel structures was 
that hard-line ethnic nationalist Bosnian Serbs would promote the secession of the 
Serb Republic. Right after 1995, the city of Pale served as powerbase (as it had 
been during war) for Bosnian Serb ethnic nationalist hardliners. The OHR 
attempted to break this powerbase in favor of the more moderate Bosnian Serb 
political elite in Banja Luka.46 One of the measures was to transfer the Serb 
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Republic’s Government officially from Pale to Banja Luka which happened in 
1997.47 Further, the OHR has tried to isolate the ethnic nationalists and to promote 
the creation of moderate Bosnian Serb political parties.  
 Things were expected to improve significantly when - as a result of 
political engineering - Milorad Dodik (SNSD) became Prime Minister of the Serb 
Republic in January 1998. In first instance, Dodik seemed to be cooperative.48 
Westendorp declared: ‘During its rule, SDS did not bring normal living conditions 
to the people. On the other hand, the new Government has already done more for 
improving such conditions than the former leadership did during its whole 
mandate.’49 Nonetheless, despite the initial hope of improvement, Dodik proved 
not to be much more committed to Dayton than his predecessors. A few months 
after he had taken office, it was concluded by High Representative Westendorp: ‘A 
common flag now exists for eight months in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, on 
the official buildings of the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic, NvW] that we visited 
this week it was impossible to find one that was not Serbian.’50 The International 
Crisis Group concluded in 2001: ‘The money poured into the RS [Serb Republic, 
NvW] during the Dodik years did not create economic stability or push the 
government to pay more than lip service to the basic requirements of Dayton.’51 
Finally, Dodik refused to support any legislation designed to enhance the 
competencies of the state level.52 
 In December 2000, the SDS leadership pledged to support the Dayton 
Agreement and signed an agreement to do so with the OHR. Among other things, 
the agreement included support for the state level institutions. In the autumn of 
2001, however, the Serb Republic in general, and the SDS in particular, were 
accused by High Representative Petritsch of not implementing their pledge. 
Petritsch visited Banja Luka as a warning and recalled that since 1995, the Serb 
Republic had obstructed the implementation of Dayton. No less than thirty seven 
laws in the National Assembly had been blocked by a SDS veto; despite the non-
political, technical nature of these laws.53 Moreover, Petritsch wrote in his report to 
the UN Secretary General in 2002: ‘Regrettably, during the reporting period, this 
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lack of commitment to State institutions was reflected in the behavior of most RS 
politicians. In my many meetings with the RS leadership, I have underlined that a 
functional and viable State is the only possible framework for the RS and its 
citizens to achieve their political and economic aspirations.’54  
This lack of support still existed in 2004. In an interview, High 
Representative Ashdown said: ‘The RS [Serb Republic, NvW] must understand it is 
an entity and not an independent state. The Dayton Agreement is a two-way street. 
One part of the Dayton Agreement protects the entities, the other part deals with 
development of a joint state. RS does only what is suitable for strengthening the 
entity and avoids things relating to the joint state. I have clearly said to RS I shall 
not change the Dayton Agreement, only the people of Bosnia can change it. 
Nevertheless, should RS or anyone else in Bosnia make the state non-functional in 
relation to Dayton, then it too must be changed.’55  
As has been the case with the Croatian support for the parallel Bosnian 
Croat structures, the suspension of support from Serbia’s Government to Bosnian 
Serb ethnic nationalist hardliners in Pale was politically relevant.56 The fall of the 
Miloševi regime in 2001 changed much in that respect. Nevertheless, from time to 
time the Serbian political leaders continued to come up with the suggestion that the 
Serb Republic could secede from Bosnia. On 10 September 2002, for example, 
with Serbian presidential elections scheduled for 29 September, Vojislav Koštunica 
described the Serb Republic as ‘a part of the family…only temporarily separated 
from Yugoslavia.’57 Bosnian Serb politicians have also regularly voiced there 
willingness to consider secession from Bosnia. During the general elections of 
2006, Milorad Dodik stated that the Serb Republic would have to become 
independent in case Kosovo would become independent. Dodik proposed to 
organize a referendum on independence, modeled after the 2006 referendum which 
had led to the independence of Montenegro. This was immediately countered by 
High Representative Schwarz-Schilling as being in conflict with the Dayton 
Agreement and the Constitution.58 Dodik’s call for the secession of the Serb 
Republic was not merely to cater to his electorate for the October 2006 elections. 
After the elections (which were won by Dodik’s party, the SNSD) he continued to 
express his wish for secession.59  
                                                 
54 Office of the High Representative, 21st Report by the High Representative for Implementation of 
the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations: 26 august 2001 - 19 february 
2002 (Sarajevo, 2002), 17. 
55 The Bosnian Institute, ‘Chronology of Events: February -June 2004’, Bosnia Report (8 June 2004). 
Obtainable from: www.bosnia.org.uk (last visited on 20 January 2009). 
56 Knaus and Cox, ‘Whither Bosnia’, 10. 
57 The Bosnian Institute, ‘Chronology of Events: May - October 2002’, Bosnia Report (10 September 
2002). Obtainable from: www.bosnia.org.uk (last visited on 20 January 2009). 
58 International Crisis Group, Montenegro's Referendum (Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels, 2006), 9, ICG 
Europe Briefing No.42. UNDP, Early Warning Report Bosnia: April - June 2006 (Sarajevo, 2006), 8. 
59 ‘On the boil. The politics get messy, even for an old hand’, The Economist (27 January 2007), 26. 
 Institutional Support 
 195  
  A major issue preventing Bosnian Serb politicians from supporting the 
state level institutions has been the issue of war crimes. Since 1995, the Serb 
Republic and its politicians had been accused by the international community for 
not fulfilling their obligations under the Dayton Agreement regarding cooperation 
with the ICTY. For example, it took until 24 December 2001 - six years after the 
conclusion of the Dayton Agreement – before the SDS amended its statute and 
banned persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY, including Radovan Karadži 
and Momilo Krajišnik, from membership.60 By the middle of 2004, the Serb 
Republic had not arrested any single individual indicted by the ICTY. Some arrests 
had been made on the Serb Republic’s territory, but these had been carried out by 
NATO troops.61 Furthermore, on 30 November 2004, it became clear that the 
indicted Ratko Mladi had been on the payroll of the Serb Republic’s armed forces 
until 2002.62 
The continued lack of cooperation with the ICTY led to increased political 
pressure on the Serb Republic by High Representative Ashdown.63 As a result, 
cooperation with the ICTY started in 2005. Nearly two weeks after Ashdown had 
complained to Serbia’s President Boris Tadi about the fact that the Serb Republic 
had not delivered any war crimes suspects to the ICTY since 1995, the Serb 
Republic transferred Savo Todovi to the ICTY.64 Ashdown commented: ‘Nine 
years after Dayton Peace Agreement I commend RS authorities on making this 
significant step forward (...) But many other indictees, including Karadzic and 
Mladic, remain at large. It is essential that the transfer of Mr. Todovic to The 
Hague should now mark the beginning of a process, which will see the other 
indictees transferred without delay to the ICTY.’65 On 11 March 2005, a second 
suspect Mito Staniši was transferred by the Serb Republic’s authorities to the 
ICTY and a third transfer of Gojko Jankovi took place on 14 March.66 Since then, 
the Serb Republic has gradually intensified its efforts to arrest indicted war 
criminals as a result of which Bosnia was declared to be in cooperation with the 
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61 Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares. Bringing Peace to the 21st Century. (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 293. 
62 Office of the High Representative, ‘BiH Media Round-up: 30 November 2004’, (Sarajevo). Office 
of the High Representative, ‘Press Release: HR Sets March 15 Deadline To RS MoD’, (Sarajevo: 24 
February 2005). 
63 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 293. 
64 Office of the High Representative, ‘Press Release: Statement: High Representative Emphasizes 
Dayton Must Be Respected ’, (Sarajevo: 6 January 2005). 
65 Office of the High Representative, ‘Press Release: Statement by the High Representative for BiH, 
Lord Paddy Ashdown, with regard to the transfer by the authorities of Republika Srpska (RS) of 
ICTY indictee Savo Todovic’, (Sarajevo: 18 January 2005). 
66 Office of the High Representative, ‘Press Release: Statement: HR welcomes Stanisic Transfer to 
the Hague ’, (Sarajevo: 11 March 2005); Office of the High Representative, ‘Press Release: HR's 
Statement on Jankovic’s transfer’, (Sarajevo: 14 March 2005). 
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ICTY by prosecutor Carla Del Ponte.67 However, as long as Mladi and Karadži 
would not be arrested, the negative stigma attached to the Serb Republic when it 
comes to cooperation with the ICTY would persist.68 
  
6.1.2 Mass level support for Bosnia’s state level institutions 
 
According to the polls of the UNDP, the level of mass support among the people 
for the political institutions has been low since it was measured in 2000 for the first 
time. As is shown by Table 6.1 the approval of the performance of the institutions, 
most of the time does not rise above 50 percent and only one time above 70 percent 
(in December 2002 among the Bosniaks). Based on the results, it must be 
concluded that support among all three constituent peoples for all Bosnia’s 
domestic political institutions has been low. Neither of the two conditions of 
institutionalization were met (i.e. support for some period of time and those 
rejecting the political institutions should not be politically relevant). There has not 
been continuous support for the state level institutions between 2000 and 2008, and 
those rejecting the institutions are all but politically irrelevant. Within all 
communities the rate of approval in 2007 had increased only a little compared to 
the year 2000. The biggest increase was among the Bosnian Croats. Measured over 
the years, however, the Bosnian Serbs were more supportive of the state level 
institutions than the Bosnian Croats were. The public opinion polls show that the 
Bosnian Serbs apart from the years 2003, 2004 and 2007 were more supportive 
than the Bosnian Croats. At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs were less supportive 
than the Bosniaks (with the exception of the years 2000, 2006, 2007 and 2008 
when they were more supportive). This mixed picture makes it impossible to say 
which community supports the state level institutions most.  
Overall, however, among all three communities the support for the state 
level institutions has been very low. Especially in 2007 support declined 
significantly; the highest rate of satisfaction with the institutions was 45,9 percent 
(Bosnian Croat support for the Council of Ministers). Although especially among 
the Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs the support for the state level institutions had 
declined in 2007, the Bosnian Croats were also less satisfied with the institutions 
than in 2006. The UNDP therefore concluded in its annual Early Warning System 
Report: ‘Political life in BiH suffered its most severe political and institutional 
crisis of the past ten years in 2007, which may certainly be considered a highly 
unstable period that highlighted all the weakness of the current constitutional and 
political system.’69 In 2008, support among the Bosnian Croats declined with 
                                                 
67 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 294. 
68 Office of the High Representative, 33rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of 
the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(Sarajevo, 2008). 
69 UNDP, Early Warning System Bosnia. Annual Report 2007 (Sarajevo, 2008), 17. 
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another 10 percent and a small decrease can be noted among the Bosniaks. Support 
among the Bosnian Serbs, however, increased by a few percentages. According to 
the UNDP, this can be explained by the institutional paralysis that is a result of the 
continuing political crisis; Bosnian Serb support for the state level institution is 
interpreted as actually being support for ‘the politics of division’. In other words, 
the weaker the state level institutions are the more support they can expect from the 
Bosnian Serbs.70  
 
Table 6.1: Approval of respondents with the work of several political institutions in 
Bosnia – respondents who approve of the work (weighted %)  
Bosniak Majority Areas 
Institution 12/00 12/01 12/02 12/03 12/04 11/05 12/06 11/07 09/08 
Presidency 32,3 40,4 71,5 50,9 45,7 40.6 45,5 33,6 31,8  
Parliamentary 
Assembly 
32,2 35,0 67,1 49,3 52,3 40,3 46,0 32 30,5  
Council of 
Ministers  
30,7 40,7 67,1 50,0 49,1 39,2 44,6 31,6 30,8  
Bosnian Croat Majority Areas
Institution 12/00 12/01 12/02 12/03 12/04 11/05 12/06 11/07 09/08  
Presidency 16,5 17,5 44,9 65,1 58,6 36,9 47,2 42,2 32,4 
Parliamentary 
Assembly 
16,3 15,7 39,3 58,6 41,7 33,6 47,3 42,6 33,4  
Council of 
Ministers  
17,3 16,9 38,9 56,7 49,7 32,9 46,9 45,9 35,0  
Bosnian Serb Majority Areas 
Institution 12/00 12/01 12/02 12/03 12/04 11/05 12/06 11/07 09/08 
Presidency 34,9 18,1 53,4 38,4 33,7 39,5 53,3 38,8  45,7 
Parliamentary 
Assembly 
35,6 16,5 49,8 38,0 32,4 37,0 52,0 38,5  44,7  
Council of 
Ministers  
36,0 16,4 53,2 38,2 30,9 36,9 51,2 38,2 45,9 
Source: PRISM Research (for the UNDP) - December 2000 to September 2008.71 
 
The weak level of support among the people as evidenced by the public 
opinion polls is confirmed by the voter turnouts during the five general elections 
that have been organized between 1996 and 2006. Since the elections in 1998 (for 
1996 the voter turnout is not available) voter turnout decreased until 2002 after 
which it stabilized at a rather low level during the 2002 and 2006 elections as is 
shown by Table 6.2. 
                                                 
70 UNDP, Early Warning System Bosnia. Third Quarterly Report - September 2008 (Sarajevo, 2008), 
11. 
71 See UNDP’s Bosnia Early Warning Reports December 2000 – September 2008. Obtainable from: 
www.undp.ba (last visited on 20 January 2009). 




Table 6.2: Voter turnout in Bosnia’s general elections from 1996 to 2006 
 (weighted %)72 
Date  Type of Elections Voter turnout 
14 September 1996 1) State level: Presidency and 
Parliamentary Assembly 
2) Federation: Parliamentary Assembly 
and cantonal Assemblies; 
3) Serb Republic: Presidency and 
National Assembly 
70-75 
12-13 September 1998 (see above) 70 
11 November 2000 (see above) 64,4 
5 October 2002 (see above) 54,7 
1 October 2006 (see above) 54,5 
  
Compared to the results of 1998 elections, the voter turnout in 2002 and 
2006 was very low. The result in 2002 was an expression of the population’s 
general frustration with the political institutions. In Chapter five it was explained 
that the ruling Alliance for Change coalition was punished for having failed to live 
up to the expectations of the Bosnian electorate. According to the smaller members 
of the coalition, the dominant SDP and SBiH cared little for them and they accused 
both parties of treating them as ‘vote fodder.’ Internal disagreements with the 
Alliance made a common election campaign in 2002 impossible, which fed the 
popular disappointment with the coalition. Moreover, during the first months of 
2002, several political affairs helped the SDA to return to power.73 Moderate voters 
remained at home, while those supporting ethnic nationalist parties went to the 
polling stations. SDA voters were particularly motivated to participate in the 
elections. The well organized and rurally based SDA had succeeded in selling the 
slogan: “It’s a tough time to be Muslim in Bosnia, Europe and the World. We have 
to stick together.”74 Bosniaks who were not supporting the SDA, but who had 
voted for the moderate SDP and SBiH, stayed at home in large numbers, and thus 
allowed the SDA to win.75 
                                                 
72 The voter turnouts are based on the following sources: For 1996 (being estimated): Noel Malcolm, 
‘Observations on the Bosnian Elections’, Bosnia Report 17 (1996/1997). For 1998: Office of the High 
Representative, 11th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Sarajevo, 1998). For 2000 and 2002: Office of the High 
Representative, 23rd Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Sarajevo, 23 October 2002). For 2006: OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Elections 1 
October 2006. OSCE/ODIHIR Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw, 2007).  
73 International Crisis Group, Bosnia's Nationalist Governments, 5. 
74 National Democratic Institute, Bosnia Herzegovina: Election Results Signal Voter Frustration, Not 
Return to Nationalism (Washington, 10 May 2002). 
75 Ibid. 
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 The voter turnout proved to be even lower in 2006. A comparable 
dissatisfaction with Bosnia’s institutions can be detected. The failed constitutional 
reform in the spring of 2006 and the ethnic nationalist rhetoric that dominated the 
election year paralyzed the political institutions. For example, the work of the 
House of Representatives was blocked for four weeks after the Bosnian Serbs had 
walked out on 24 May 2006.76 Moreover, the work of the Presidency was hindered 
as individual Presidency members showed allegiance to their ethnic groups rather 
than to the people of Bosnia as a whole.77 Finally, progress in the Council of 
Ministers has been slowed down by internal tensions and deadlocks.78 As a result, 
Bosnians were not inclined to vote during the 2006 elections.  
 
6.1.3 Conflict management and institutional support in Bosnia 
 
The analysis above shows that Bosnia in 2008 had come a long way as far as the 
elite and mass level support for its political institutions is concerned. On the elite 
level, the Bosniaks were the most enthusiastic supporters of the state level 
institutions. The Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb political elite, however, did not 
accept the Dayton Agreement as far as its provisions on the state level institutions 
were concerned. Nonetheless, after 2001 the cooperation of the Bosnian Croats 
with the OHR and the state level institutions improved. While the Bosnian Serbs 
remained primarily committed to their entity and continued to regard it as a 
separate state with sovereign qualities. In fact, the more powers were attributed to 
the state level, the less committed Bosnian Serb politicians became to that level. 
That was especially the case in 2007, when open calls for secession were made by 
the Serb Republic’s National Assembly. This reflected the preference of the 
Bosnian Serb political elite for either a strong Serb Republic within Bosnia, or for 
an independent state.79  
At the mass level the picture was more complex. The most important 
conclusion drawn from the public opinion polls and the data on voter turnout was 
that support was low among all three ethnic communities. Especially in 2007, the 
state level institutions were weak in terms of mass level support. Among the people 
support for the central state institutions gradually increased over the years. Again, 
on average the Bosniaks proved to be the most enthusiastic supporters, followed by 
the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Due to a general political crisis, a 
significant decline in support occurred in 2007 among all three communities.  
                                                 
76 The decision to boycott parliament for a month was taken in reaction to the delays in establishing a 
‘Truth Commission on the sufferings of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Jews and Others’ in Sarajevo during 
the war. Commission of the European Communities, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report 
(Brussels, 2006), 6. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 7. 
79 International Crisis Group, Ensuring Bosnia's Future, 10. 
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  As with institutional autonomy and institutional congruency, the weak 
institutional support for Bosnia’s political institutions can plausibly be explained 
by the absence of a conflict resolving settlement in 1995. The incorporation of the 
incompatibility in the internationally imposed Dayton Agreement made all ethnic 
communities reluctant to accept and support the post-war political institutions. 
Instead, the political institutions became the new battleground. A sustainable 
institution is able to accommodate the different interests of conflicting parties by 
definition (otherwise it would not be sustainable). Bosnia’s institutions have been 
created under the authority of the OHR and were challenged domestically from the 
very first day they were established. Regarding the second phase of 
institutionalization (embedding the institution) they proved not to be sustainable 
from the institutional support point of view. This is illustrated by the fact that by 
2008, all three communities wanted to get rid of the Dayton Constitution. 
However, they had very different ideas on what the new constitution would look 
like and whether Bosnia would have to continue as one state, or whether it would 




6.2.1 Elite level support for the provisional political institutions 
 
In general, support for Kosovo’s political institutions has been high among the 
Kosovo Albanian political elite and does not need much scrutiny. Every Kosovo 
Albanian political party mentioned ‘independence’ in their manifestos as their most 
important objective to achieve. Kosovo Albanian political leaders strongly 
supported Kosovo’s interim and provisional institutions, because every single 
institution was perceived as a step towards independence and proper statehood. 
That has been exactly the same reason why Kosovo Serb politicians were very 
reluctant to support the provisional institutions established by UNMIK. The weak 
Kosovo Serb support has manifested itself in two ways: in frequent boycotts of the 
PISG and in the establishment of parallel institutional structures. 
The lack of Kosovo Serb support started with the establishment of the Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure in December 1999. The Kosovo Serbs had been 
willing to cooperate in the Kosovo Transitional Council, but they rejected the 
creation of the more extensive administrative structure. The Kosovo Serb boycott 
lasted until 2 April 2000, when the SNC was prepared to join the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure.80 However, the decision was taken only by a local branch 
of the party: SNC-Graanica. Both the SNC in the ethnically divided Mitrovica and 
                                                 
80 The SNC was established in January 1999 in opposition to Slobodan Miloševi’ SPS. OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo and Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute, The Changed Kosovo-Serb 
Political Landscape after the March Crisis. Trends, Analysis and Policy Suggestions. (Pristina, 2004), 
4. 
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the pro-Belgrade (pro-Miloševi) Serb National Assembly (SNA), condemned this 
decision and refused to follow the example of SNC-Graanica.81 Despite the 
involvement of SNC-Graanica, Kosovo Serb participation could not be taken for 
granted. Boycotts occurred on a regular basis. For example, on 4 June 2000, the 
Kosovo Serb delegation to the Kosovo Transitional Council decided to leave the 
forum for three weeks because of the serious violence that had been directed 
against members of the Kosovo Serb community.  
 One of the more serious Kosovo Serb boycotts was the decision not to 
participate in the Joint Working Group on the Constitutional Framework. The 
Kosovo Serbs walked out after the inaugural session of the Working Group on 7 
March 2001.82 They returned on 11 April, and used the occasion to change their 
representative.83 In official reports by the chairperson, the Working Group 
repeatedly expressed its disappointment with the absence of a representative of the 
Kosovo Serb community. At the same time, the reports reflect the opinion that the 
drafting of the text proceeded constructively.84 Therefore, when the Kosovo Serbs 
returned, most of the work had already been done. Kosovo Serb efforts to 
renegotiate results achieved during their absence were countered by all other 
members of the Working Group.85 
As a result of the boycott the influence of the Kosovo Serb community on 
the document was limited, despite its informal contacts with UNMIK. In order to 
ensure the representation of their interests, the international members of the 
Working Group acted partly on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs.86 In the end, the 
Kosovo Serb minority rights were protected with provisions that ensured their 
participation with in the institutions. Within the Assembly, for instance, ten seats 
were reserved regardless of the election results for the Kosovo Serb community. 
Further, one position within the Presidency of the Assembly (totalling eight 
members) was reserved for a Kosovo Serb. With respect to the Government it was 
decided that at least one minister would be a Kosovo Serb.87 
Despite these safeguards, Kosovo Serb politicians have suspended their 
participation in the Assembly and Government on a regular basis. During the 
October 2001 elections, Kosovo Serb politicians participated after a great effort of 
                                                 
81 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration in Kosovo: S/2000/538 (New York, 2000), 2. 
82 UNMIK Press Release 529. According to an UNMIK official, they never gave a sound explanation 
for the boycot. Interview with an UNMIK official (2), Pristina 6 May 2005.  
83 UNMIK Press Release 559. 
84 UNMIK Press Release 522. 
85 Interview with an UNMIK official (2), Pristina 6 May 2005.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Ten other seats and one ministerial post were reserved for other minority communities. Moreover, 
it was decided that in case there would be more than twelve ministers, a third minister would be 
appointed from a non-majority community. UNMIK, ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo’, (Pristina: 2001). 
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the OSCE to get them on board; only eight days before the election they agreed to 
participate.88 The elections resulted in 22 Assembly seats (including the ten 
reserved seats) for the Kosovo Serb political party KP, a Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Rural Development, the position of inter-ministerial Coordinator for 
Returns, two seats in the Presidency of the Assembly and proportional 
representation in all nineteen Assembly Committees.89  
From the start, the relationship between the KP and the Kosovo Albanian 
parties was tense. On 4 July 2002, the KP deputies walked out the Assembly for 
the first time as the result of disagreement over a procedural issue. In September, 
the KP invoked the special procedure for the legal protection of the interests of 
minorities. The issue was the objection of the Kosovo Albanian majority in the 
Assembly to include the University of Northern Mitrovica in the educational 
system of Kosovo.90 In November, the KP finally acted on its repeated threat to 
boycott the Assembly.91 
The boycott ended in February 2003, when the KP was ‘warmly 
welcomed’ back.92 Nonetheless, the KP was sceptical about the proper functioning 
of the Assembly. During an interview the new KP chairman, Dragiša Krstovi 
stated: ‘Our relations with other political entities are not better than when we left 
the Assembly, perhaps worse now. This is because some issues not foreseen for 
discussion in the Assembly are being proposed or people are talking of them being 
proposed for discussion on the agenda.’93 Krstovi referred to the repeated attempts 
of Kosovo Albanian parties to discuss issues related to the status of Kosovo.94  
                                                 
88 Interview with an UNMIK official (2), Pristina 6 May 2005. 
89 The Minister of Agriculture was Goran Bogdanovic, the Coordinator for Returns was Milorad 
Todorovic. OSCE Mission in Kosovo and Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute, The 
Changed Kosovo-Serb Political Landscape after the March Crisis, 3.  
90 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2002/1126 (New York, 2002), 2. 
91 Next to the KP, Kosovo Albanian parties sometimes decided to boycott specific sessions of the 
Assembly, including the PDK and AAK. Sven Lindholm and Franklin de Vrieze, ‘We need a road 
map to help us achieve our goals’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, 7 (2003) 4-5, 4. 
92 Franklin de Vrieze, ‘Latest Developments in the Assembly’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter 
5 (2003) 4-5, 4. KP’s return was only possible after the OSCE had agreed with the presence of an 
OSCE Assembly monitor during plenary sessions and presidency meetings. Ibrahim Makolli, 
‘Citizens watch: Monitoring the Assembly of Kosovo’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, 7 
(2003) 20-21. 
93 Jonathan Browning, ‘Interview with Mr. Dragisa Krstovic, Head of the Parliamentary Group of 
Coalition Return (KP). ’ Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, 5 (2003) 8-9, 9. 
94 This was the case for example in February 2003. On 4 February the Federal Parliament in Belgrade 
approved the Constitutional Charter that established the new state union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
The Charter made reference to Kosovo in the preamble. In reaction, a group of Kosovo Albanian 
Assembly members started collecting support for a declaration of independence. This resulted in an 
official Assembly resolution (supported by the LDK, PDK, AAK and political parties from the other 
communities) which was promptly declared invalid by SRSG Steiner. Vrieze, ‘Latest Developments 
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 Despite KP’s scepticism, Kosovo Serb participation after their first 
Assembly boycott was characterized by a period of increased interaction and 
cooperation, especially at the Assembly committee level.95 This commitment was 
acknowledged and praised by Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs alike. In an 
interview KP Member of Parliament Oliver Ivanovi declared: “Earlier we reacted 
emotionally, tempestuously and often irrationally, thus it happened that we even 
missed the dates for filing the objections on some draft laws. Today we react more 
rationally.”96 Nonetheless, impediments for genuine cooperation remained. In the 
same article, a member of the Office of the Prime Minister wanted KP to start 
initiating law proposals and to operate more independently from Belgrade. From 
the KP side, the Kosovo Albanians were accused of creating (through the operation 
of the PISG) a foundation for an independent Kosovo before the status issue was 
even resolved. Related to that, Ivanovi stated: ‘As far as they insist on 
independence, we are going to insist on return of full Belgrade authority here. Both 
options are extreme and therefore highly negative and such a climate is not 
contributing to the democratic processes and economic development, which is a 
vital need in Kosovo. Instead of dealing with serious economic issues, we still have 
the practice that the Assembly is misused for political promotion.’97  
 Despite the overall commitment shown in 2003, the politicising effect of 
the status issue led to frequent walk-outs by KP parliamentarians. On 27 February 
2003, for example, when the Assembly put two items on its agenda which 
according to the KP fell outside the mandate of the Assembly, Kosovo Serb 
Members of Parliament left the meeting.98 A walk out occurred again on 22 
December 2003, when the Assembly voted on and adopted a declaration that called 
for the abolition of the right of Kosovo Serbs to vote in Serbia’s parliamentarian 
elections of 28 December.99  
 In the beginning of 2004, relations between the KP and Kosovo Albanian 
parties deteriorated again. First, tensions emerged during the first session of the 
Assembly in 2004, when the 45 Kosovo Albanian victims of the attack of Serb 
                                                                                                                            
in the Assembly’, 5; International Crisis Group, Two to Tango. An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG 
(Pristina/Brussels, 2003), 7, ICG Balkans Report No.148. 
95 OSCE Mission in Kosovo and Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute, The Changed 
Kosovo-Serb Political Landscape after the March Crisis, 3. Interview with an OSCE official (1), 
Pristina 7 May 2005.  
96 As quoted in: Zoran Culafic, ‘"Coalition Return" at a cross-road"’, Assembly Support Initiative 
Newsletter 10 (2004) 8-9. 
97 Ibid. 
98 These issues were a declaration on the arrest by the ICTY of Fatmir Limaj, head of the PDK 
parliamentary group, and a declaration opposing the creation of the Union of Serb Municipalities. 
Vrieze, ‘Latest Developments in the Assembly’, 4. 
99 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2004/71 (New York, 2004), 3. Franklin de Vrieze, 
‘Recent Developments in the Assembly’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter, 10 (2004) 10-12, 
11. 
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forces in the village of Raak/Reçak on 15 January 1999 were commemorated. The 
KP did not attend the meeting.100 Only one month later, a second boycott was 
launched. The immediate cause for this boycott was the inclusion of three murals in 
the renovated Assembly building, which depicted Kosovo Albanian history, 
without any reference to the history of the Serb community in Kosovo. This time, 
only the plenary sessions of the Assembly were boycotted; the Kosovo Serbs 
continued to participate in the Assembly Committees. 101 The boycott received new 
impetus as a result of the inter-ethnic violence of March 2004. 
The boycott after the March violence intensified in the sense that all PISG 
were boycotted.102 The Kosovo Serb Member of the Presidency of the Assembly 
Oliver Ivanovi declared after 17 March that the international community would 
have to invest more efforts to regain the shattered trust of the Kosovo Serb 
community.103 However, the trust in the PISG remained low in 2004. Accordingly, 
the voter turnout among the Kosovo Serbs during the 2004 elections was very low 
(see next section). The institutional guarantees established in the Constitutional 
Framework ensured ten seats within the Assembly. The KP had split into the 
SKLM, led by Oliver Ivanovi, and the GIS, led by Slaviša Petkovi.104 Whereas 
the SKLM was closely associated with Belgrade, the GIS followed a course which 
was more independent from Serbia’s government and decided to participate in the 
PISG after the elections.105 
The new Government enlarged the number of ministries and in accordance 
with the Constitutional Framework two ministerial posts were reserved for Kosovo 
Serbs. Petkovi, became Minister of Communities and Returns.106 He was widely 
ignored by other Kosovo Serb politicians and Belgrade. They claimed that he had 
only received 269 votes in the 2004 election and had only become minister by the 
virtue of the election boycott.107 In one of his first speeches, Petkovi laid out his 
independent position towards Belgrade: “It’s us and not somebody from Belgrade 
who lives here; therefore we must take responsibility for our own future. We 
people from Kosovo and Metoha should no longer allow Belgrade to tailor our 
                                                 
100 Vrieze, ‘Recent Developments in the Assembly ASI 2005/10’, 11. 
101 Senad Sabovic, ‘Kosovo Serbs between Belgrade and Pristina’, Assembly Support Initiative 
Newsletter, 12 (2004) 20-21, 20. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Zoran Culafic, ‘How to reinstate trust’, Assembly Support Initiative Newsletter 11 (2004) 8 - 9. 
104 In June 2005 the GIS was succeeded by Petkovic’ ‘Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and 
Metohija’ (SDS-KiM). Zoran Culafic, ‘Controversial Kosovo-Serb minister’, Assembly Support 
Initiative Newsletter, 18 (2005), 14. 
105 Interview with an OSCE official (1), Pristina 7 May 2005. 
106 Petkovic was forced to resign in November 2006 after an audit had uncovered evidence of 
financial irregularities and mismanagement. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2007/134 
(New York, 2007), 2. 
107 Culafic, ‘Controversial Kosovo-Serb minister.’ 
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destiny by its policy. We should no longer allow Belgrade parties to order us to 
choose their party cadres as our representatives in Kosovo and Metoha.”108 
However, Petkovi did not succeed in decreasing the influence of the Serbian 
Government on the Kosovo Serb community.   
The second ministerial post, Agriculture, was reserved for the SKLM, just 
as with the Vice Minister position and a seat in the Presidency of the Assembly. 
None of these posts were filled. The official explanation of the SKLM was that 
because the political party had not participated in the elections, it did not have a 
mandate to conduct executive or legislative tasks. However, if Belgrade had urged 
them to participate, they would have done so.109 The absence of such a sign from 
can be explained by the Serbian Government’s official standpoint that there should 
be more guarantees to protect the vital interests of Kosovo Serbs. However, in the 
course of 2005, the recognition was growing among members of the SKLM that 
Belgrade’s policy of abstention did not serve the interests of the Kosovo Serbs 
either. In February 2005, SKLM already openly considered returning to the 
Assembly. The party stated that it wanted to do so in order to improve the situation 
of the Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and to demonstrate that the Standards for Kosovo 
were not being respected.110 This was reiterated during a meeting with the Contact 
Group members in April and then again during the summer months.111 However, a 
concrete return did not materialize. In 2006 and 2007 the SKLM continued to 
boycott the PISG. As a result, between the election years 2004 and 2007 the 
position of Minister of Agriculture was not filled. 
The situation improved somewhat after the Assembly elections of 2007. The 
SKLM did not return to the Assembly, but the GIS, renamed SDKISM, did. Five 
newly established Kosovo Serb parties gained seats in the Assembly. The largest of 
them, the SLS, gained 4 seats and two ministries (the Ministry of Communities and 
Returns, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare). The reason the SLS 
joined the PISG was to protect the interests of the Kosovo Serb community. In an 
interview, the President of the SLS Slobodan Petrovi declared: ‘We are in the 
institutions, because we want to deal with the real life; because we want a better 
tomorrow. It is easiest to give up, walk out, you can always do that.’112 Petrovi 
emphasised the difficult position his party was in. Because Belgrade urged people 
not to participate in the 2007 elections, the SLS did not have the full support of the 
                                                 
108 As quoted in: Ibid., 14. 
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Serb community in Kosovo. The SLS also had no contact with the Serbian 
government.113 Together with the SDKISM, the SLS represented the Kosovo Serb 
community with six seats in Parliament. The four other new Kosovo Serb political 
parties did not take the oath of office and boycotted the PISG.114 Therefore, the 
participation of the SDKISM and SLS in the PISG was only a minor improvement 
in terms of support for the PISG by the Kosovo Serb community. Especially when 
it is considered that no Kosovo Serb politicians attended the Assembly meeting 
where independence was declared in February 2008.115 
  Instead of supporting political parties like the SLS and the SDKISM, 
Belgrade preferred to exercise direct political influence in Kosovo. The main effect 
of Belgrade’s increased involvement was at the municipal level, where Kosovo 
Serb parallel institutions have existed since 1999. Parallel institutions are 
institutions that have been operational in Kosovo after 10 June 1999 (the start of 
UNMIK) and that are not mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 
1244.116 Due to limited capacity and experience, UNMIK lost vital time in 
establishing its authority at the local level in the early days of international 
administration. The authority vacuum, created by the withdrawal of the Serb 
military forces, was filled by Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb institutions in 
their respective municipalities. Whereas the Kosovo Albanian parallel institutions 
have been included in the international administration through the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure and the Provisional Institutions of Government, the 
Kosovo Serb parallel institutions continued to exist. These structures are not 
mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and operate in the majority of 
cases under the de facto authority of the Serbian Government. In Belgrade, a 
Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohia was created in the summer of 2001, 
with the aim of strengthening the Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo.117  
Kosovo Serb parallel institutions are mainly found in the north of Kosovo 
in the northern part of the de facto ethnically partitioned city of Mitrovica and in 
the three northern Kosovo Serb dominated municipalities: Leposavi/Leposaviq, 
Zubin Potok and Zvean. South of the Ibar River, there are the Kosovo Serb 
municipalities of Štrpce/Shtërpca and Novo Brdo. The so called bridge-watchers of 
Mitrovica became well known as a security organization that guarded the bridge 
over the Ibar River, in order to prevent Kosovo Albanians from returning to the 
northern part of the city which is mainly inhabited by Kosovo Serbs. Next to 
parallel security structures, there exist parallel courts, schools, healthcare systems 
                                                 
113 Ibid. 
114 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2008/211 (New York, 2008), 1. 
115 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2008/354 (New York, 2008). 
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and local administrations. Although these institutions are mainly present in the 
Kosovo Serb dominated municipalities in the north of Kosovo, since 2003 they 
have expanded to the south.118  
In March 2003 the so called Union of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo was 
formed with Marko Jakši as elected President. At its inauguration the Union had 
about 250 members from a variety of Kosovo Serb political parties. A ‘Declaration 
of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Serbia and the State of Serbia and 
Montenegro’ was adopted. Support for parallel structures was expressed and it was 
demanded that a significant decentralization of government be implemented by 
June 2003. The Union’s concept of decentralization came down to the creation of 
two entities: a Kosovo Serb one and a Kosovo Albanian one. Failure to do so 
would mean the election of parallel municipal Assemblies and the end of 
cooperation with UNMIK. However, UNMIK choose to ignore the Union and it 
was also condemned by Kosovo Serb members of the Assembly.119   
 As a result of the expansion of parallel structures, the UN Secretary-
General reported the following to the UN Security Council in 2003: ‘The existence 
of Belgrade-supported parallel structures, in violation of Resolution 1244 (1999), 
which now exist in virtually all municipalities that have a sizeable Kosovo Serb 
population, continued to hamper the functioning of the legitimate institutions. In 
the Kamenica municipality (Gnjilane region), the Republic of Serbia Post, 
Telecommunication and Telegraph Provider employs 12 workers, the Republic of 
Serbia Power Supply Company employs four workers, the Serbian employment 
office employs three workers and there are six Serbian civil registration officers. 
On 19 March, a Public Health Institute was opened by Belgrade officials in the 
northern part of Mitrovica, in breach of Belgrade’s obligation not to support 
parallel administrative structures. However, parallel structures were removed from 
the Strpce municipal building, with the support of the Kosovo Serb President of the 
Municipal Assembly. This operation faced no major problems from the 
population.’120 
In 2006, the parallel institutions were strengthened. In April, the 
Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija demanded that Kosovo Serb 
municipal employees choose between either being on the payroll of Kosovo’s 
PISG or on the payroll of parallel institutions.121 As a result by the end of April, no 
less than 70 percent of all Kosovo Serb employees of the PISG had cut their ties 
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with the institutions and had closed their bank accounts where their salaries were 
deposited.122 Furthermore, the municipalities Leposavi/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok 
and Zvean/Zveçan declared a ‘state of emergency’ in June. In response to an 
unresolved murder of a Kosovo Serb, they cut off all ties with the PISG and 
UNMIK. A few days after the declaration of the ‘state of emergency’, Jakši 
declared that the boycott concerned only the PISG (and not UNMIK) and that it 
would result in the discontinuation of all financial transactions of the above 
mentioned municipalities with the PISG.123 A few days later, Northern Mitrovica 
also suspended all cooperation with the PISG.124 A report stated that members from 
the Serbian Ministry of Interior carried out security patrols in the area, and that 
local Kosovo Serb defense forces were organized. A paramilitary force of about 
360 former Yugoslav army reservists (with combat experience) was reportedly 
formed and paid by the municipal budgets furnished by the Serbian government.125  
The three municipalities continued to boycott most contact with the PISG 
in 2007 and were almost fully dependent on financial support from Belgrade.126 
During the status negotiations, Belgrade tightened its grip on the Kosovo Serbs in 
the north.127 In contrast to the north, the southern Kosovo Serb municipalities 
continued to work with the PISG.128 Nonetheless, they maintained there own 
parallel institutions.129 Since the parallel institutions enabled the Kosovo Serb 
political elite to undertake effective political action and duplicate, or even obstruct 
the policy of Kosovo’s PISG, their existence was a serious obstacle to Kosovo’s 
institutional development.  
  
6.2.2 Mass level support for the provisional political institutions  
 
Whereas the Kosovo Albanian political elites were very supportive of the central 
political institutions, the Kosovo Albanian population was more reserved in its 
support. Initially, the level of mass support increased after the establishment of the 
PISG in 2002. Table 6.3 shows that, since 2002 satisfaction with the performance 
                                                 
122 Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report 
(Brussels, 2006), 6. 
123 Kosovo Perspectives Bulletin 6, ‘News in Brief’, (9 June 2006). Obtainable from: 
www.kosovoperspectives.com (last visited on 20 January 2009). 
124 Kosovo Perspectives Bulletin 8, ‘News in Brief’, (23 June 2006). 
125 UNDP, Early Warning Report Kosovo 13: January - June 2006 (Pristina, 2006), 14. International 
Crisis Group, An Army for Kosovo? (Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 2006), 8, Europe Report No. 174. 
126 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2007/134, 3. 
127 International Crisis Group, Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition (Pristina/Belgrade/New 
York/Brussels, 2007), 9, ICG Europe Report No. 188. 
128 Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, 
7. 
129 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Parallel structures in Kosovo 2006-2007. 
 Institutional Support 
 209  
of the Government and the Assembly increased until June 2005. From June 2005, 
however, support for the work of the Government and Assembly decreased 
considerably to reach the low point of 28,1 percent and 36,7 percent of the 
respondents being satisfied with the Government (September 2007) and Assembly 
(December 2007) respectively.  
 
Table 6.3: Satisfaction of respondents with the performance of the Government and 
the Assembly “satisfied” or “very satisfied” respondents (weighted %)  
 Government Assembly 
July 2002 60,2 49,6 
November 2002  74.1 76.7 
March 2003  74.9 71.9 
July 2003  78.1 74.7 
November 2003  68.5 65.3 
March 2004  73.9 64.3 
July 2004  71.9 59.1 
November 2004  72.2 64.5 
March 2005 81,1 73,6 
June 2005 67,7 63,1 
September 2005 48,7 59,0 
December 2005 51,0 56,2 
June 2006 43,3 45,4 
September 2006 27,7 43,0 
December 2006 26,0 27,0 
March 2007 34,2 34,6 
June 2007 35,9 31,9 
October 2007 28,1 36,2 
December 2007 Not available130 36.7 
May 2008 47,0 52,0 
Source: Riinvest Opinion polls (for the UNDP) - July 2002 to May 2008.131 
 
When examining the first condition of institutionalisation that support for 
political institutions should exist for some period of time, it can be argued that until 
June 2005 it was more or less met for the Government. In seven out of nine times 
support for the institution exceeded 70 percent. In July 2002 and November 2003, 
the satisfaction rate was lower, but still more than three fifths of the respondents 
                                                 
130 Due to the change of government, no data is available for satisfaction with the performance of the 
government in December 2007. 
131 See UNDP’s Kosovo Early Warning Reports No. 1 to No. 19. Obtainable from: 
www.kosovo.undp.org (last visited on 20 January 2009). 
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were satisfied with the institutional performance of the government. If it had not 
been for a result of 68,5 percent in November 2003, then support would have been 
above the 70 percent for two and a half years in a row. However, the table shows a 
negative trend beginning in June 2005. Support decreased spectacularly from 81.1 
percent in March 2005 to 28,1 percent in September 2007. A similar negative trend 
is shown in the data regarding support for the Assembly. Support for the Assembly 
dropped from 73,6 percent in March 2005 to 36,2 percent in September 2007. From 
the outset, support for the Assembly was lower than support for the Government: 
the level of 70 percent has only four times been reached. However, from 
September 2005 support for the Assembly regularly exceeded support for the 
Government.  
The spectacular drop in support for both institutions can be explained by a 
wave of political pessimism that swept over Kosovo in 2005 and was stopped only 
after the declaration of independence (as evidenced by the sudden increase in 
support in May 2008). In 2005, pessimism was caused by accusations of the abuse 
of financial resources by the Assembly, by the serious illness of President Rugova, 
by the delay in the implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, and by the 
political problems in setting up two new ministries.132 The continued dissatisfaction 
in 2006 can be explained by the misuse of political positions, corruption and low 
standards of public administration.133 Furthermore, the status negotiations that took 
place in 2006 and 2007 increased political tensions within the Kosovo Albanian 
community as well as between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. These 
tensions coincided with the highest level of political pessimism that was reported 
by the UNDP since July 2002; political pessimism reached 57 percent in October 
2007.134 Political pessimism decreased significantly when the prospect of 
independence became more real: in December 2007 it had decreased to 41 percent. 
The decrease continued after the declaration of independence and in June 2008 
political pessimism was only 31 percent.135 As shown in Table 6.3, the 2008 
decrease in political pessimism was matched by an increase in institutional support.  
The data in Table 6.3 reflects Kosovo’s society as a whole, which means 
that the opinion of the Kosovo Serb minority is not visible. Table 6.4 shows that 
for the year 2003 Kosovo Serb mass level support for the Government and the 
Assembly is very low compared to the general levels of support for that year 
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Table 6.4: Opinion on the performance of some institutions in Kosovo - “satisfied” 
or “very satisfied” respondents (weighted %) 
Kosovo Albanians
Institution/Date Jan. – April 2003 May – August 2003 Sept. – Dec. 2003 
Assembly 76,8 76,9 68,9 
Government 79,1 80,5 72,7 
Kosovo Serbs 
Institution/Date  Jan. – April 2003 May-August 2003 Sept. – Dec. 2003 
Assembly 2,6 1,2 1,1 
Government 2,6 1,2 0 
Others: 
Institution/Date Jan. – April 2003 May-August 2003 Sept. – Dec. 2003 
Parliament 60,7 69,5 77,2 
Government 63,3 66,4 75,7 
Source: UNDP Opinion polls - January 2003 to December 2003.137 
  
Since data on the difference in support for the Government and Assembly 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs has only been collected for the year 
2003, a proxy indicator has to be used for the other years. A good indicator in that 
respect is the extent of support for an independent Kosovo. That shows that from 
2002 to 2008 only a very small percentage of the Kosovo Serbs – shifting between 
0 percent (lowest score) and 2,9 percent (highest score) – were in favor of an 
independent Kosovo. Instead, most Kosovo Serbs were in favor of Kosovo being 
an autonomous province within Serbia.138 Just as with the Kosovo Serb political 
elite, at the level of the mass population the Kosovo Serbs considered the PISG as 
institutions representing a would-be independent Kosovo. Taking that into account, 
the lack of support for an independent Kosovo suggests a very low level of support 
among the Kosovo Serbs for the Assembly and Government.   
The rejection of the PISG by the Kosovo Serbs has made compliance with 
the second condition of institutionalization (those rejecting the institutions should 
not be politically relevant) problematic. Since the support of the Kosovo Serbs for 
the Government and Assembly is crucial for their institutionalization, neither 
institution can be regarded as having sufficient institutional support. That 
conclusion is further supported by an opinion poll organized in June 2006, which 
showed that most Kosovo Serbs had very little trust in individual Kosovo Albanian 
politicians. The best score was achieved by the head of the Assembly, Kole 
Berisha, with a score of 1.87 on a scale of 1 to 5. Moreover, Kosovo Serbs tended 
to support mostly those Kosovo Serb politicians that opposed the PISG, whereas 
                                                 
137 See UNDP Early Warning Reports No. 3 to No. 5. Obtainable from: www.kosovo.undp.org (last 
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Kosovo Serb politicians who cooperated with Kosovo’s institutions scored very 
low.139  
Next to opinion polls, voter turnout during elections is a valid indicator of 
support for political institutions. The data from the public opinion polls is 
supported by the voter turnouts during the three Assembly elections which have 
been organized between 2001 and 2007. Overall, as shown by Table 6.5, voter 
turnout declined considerably.  
 
Table 6.5: Voter turnout in Kosovo’s Assembly elections from 2001 to 2007  
(weighted %) 
Date Type of Elections Voter turnout140 
17 November 2001 Kosovo Assembly 64 % 
23 October 2004 Kosovo Assembly 54 % 




The overall turnout (including Kosovo Serbs) during the first Assembly 
elections was 64 percent.141 The participation of Kosovo Serbs had been ensured by 
UNMIK, which had negotiated a Common Document with the Serbian 
Government in which Belgrade agreed not to obstruct Kosovo Serb participation.142 
This led to the relatively high turnout among Kosovo Serbs of 46 percent.143 The 
second Assembly elections led to an overall turnout of 54 percent.144 Although UN 
Special Representative Jessen-Petersen called the turnout ‘satisfying’ it was 10 
percent lower than in 2001.145 The voter turnout among Kosovo Serbs declined 
even more drastically. Whereas Kosovo Serb turnout during the first Assembly 
elections reached 46 percent, Kosovo Serbs massively abstained in 2004. Only 0,3 
                                                 
139 The poll was executed by KUMT Consulting and the Gani Bobi Institute. Kosovo Perspectives 
Bulletin 7, ‘In Focus’, (16 June 2006). International Crisis Group, An Army for Kosovo? 4. 
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2006), 6.  
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percent of the registered Serbs (around 2000 persons) decided to cast their vote.146 
This was mainly due to the conflicting messages from the Serbian government 
whether the Kosovo Serbs should participate or not. While Prime Minister 
Koštunica urged Kosovo Serbs not to vote, President Tadi stated that he would 
support Kosovo Serb participation under certain conditions.147  
Finally, the third round of elections, which combined Assembly elections 
with elections at the municipal level, resulted in a turnout of 42,8 percent. Again 
Kosovo Serb participation was rather low, all be it a little larger when compared to 
2004; around 2300 Kosovo Serbs (around 0,3 percent) cast their vote. Almost all of 
these came from the south of Kosovo where most Kosovo Serbs recognized the 
need for practical ties with the PISG. From the three northern municipalities 
(Leposavi/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok and Zvean), no Kosovo Serb votes were cast. 
The Serbian government had called for a full boycott of the elections and most 
Kosovo Serbs decided to fulfill this request.148  
  
6.2.3 Conflict management and institutional support in Kosovo 
 
In the analysis presented above it was argued that the PISG were supported by the 
Kosovo Albanian political elite. Since they pursued the independence of Kosovo, 
every domestic political institution was welcomed as another step towards that 
goal. It was shown that the Kosovo Serb politicians, in contrast, clearly rejected the 
PISG. This has been manifested in their frequent boycotts of the political 
institutions and their establishment of parallel institutional structures. The 
uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo has motivated Kosovo Serb politicians 
to be as antagonistic as possible toward the PISG. From their point of view, every 
new or strengthened institution meant a step towards independence. In addition 
Kosovo Serb parallel institutions were created which undermined the authority of 
the PISG. At the mass level, both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were 
dissatisfied with the Government and the Assembly. The absence of support among 
the Kosovo Albanian community was strongly related to the weak economic 
development, corruption, nepotism and the lack of political will or inability of 
                                                 
146 This is the turnout as measured by UN. According to the Kosovar Institute for Policy and 
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politicians to solve these problems.149 This caused a remarkable difference between 
the high level of support among the Kosovo Albanian elite and the low level of 
support at the mass level among the Kosovo Albanian people.  
How can the absence of institutional support be related to the conflict 
management strategy chosen in Kosovo? The persistence of the incompatibility of 
the Kosovo conflict, i.e. the status issue, can explain the lack of support among the 
Kosovo Serbs on both levels of society. Given the uncertainty over the final status 
on the one hand, and the Kosovo Albanian commitment for creating an 
independent state on the other hand, the Kosovo Serbs were unable to commit 
themselves to the PISG. The most important reason not to support the PISG was 
the possibility that Kosovo could become independent. This enabled the 
perpetuation of the conflict and enabled the Serbian government in Belgrade and 







                                                 
149 UNDP, Early Warning Report Kosovo 14: July - September 2006, 14. 
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7  Muddling Through by the EU? 
 
In the three preceding chapters, it was shown that the political institutions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo have not become embedded in their domestic societies. 
Therefore, although the first phase of institutionalization (the creation of political 
institutions) was successful, the international administrations have not been 
successful in fulfilling the second phase of institutionalization. It has also been 
argued that the absence of autonomy, congruency and support can possibly be 
explained by the absence of conflict resolution. Instead of resolving the conflict, 
the Dayton Peace Agreement embedded the incompatibility into Bosnia’s post war 
political system. In Kosovo there was not even a peace agreement as a result of 
which the incompatibility persisted during the international administration. The 
negative effects of the non-resolution of both conflicts have been slowly realized 
by the international community. In the course of both international administrations, 
strategies were developed to resolve the incompatibilities of both conflicts. 
Different routes were taken in Bosnia and Kosovo, but the outcome is very similar. 
In this chapter the efforts to overcome the conflicting incompatibilities are 
discussed. It starts with the attempt to reform Bosnia’s Constitution which 
commenced in 2005 and almost led to an agreement in the spring of 2006. 
Secondly, the attempt at resolving the incompatibility in Kosovo is elaborated 
upon. The resolution attempt failed as Belgrade and Pristine could not agree on the 
future status of Kosovo and because there was no consensus on the issue in the UN 
Security Council. The chapter ends by exploring how the process of European 
enlargement - at least according to the EU - may lead to a possible resolution of 
both conflicts. The EU has intensified its presence in Bosnia and Kosovo in the last 
few years; on the one hand through its European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), on the other hand through its enlargement process. It will be argued that 
although European enlargement is widely considered as a logical and necessary 
next step in the effort to resolve the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, it cannot be 
regarded as a quick route towards embedded political institutions. On the contrary, 
the most the EU can do is muddle through.  
 
7.1 Reforming the Dayton Constitution 
 
7.1.1 Discussing constitutional reform  
 
From the beginning of the OHR’s mission there has been a debate on the value of 
the Bosnian Constitution. The constitution became increasingly regarded as a 
document suited to end a war, but flawed for providing a sound basis for a healthy 
and functioning state. As High Representative Ashdown recalled in his inaugural 
speech in 2002: ‘The peace agreement (…) was designed to end a war, not to build 
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a country.’1 In 2004, the Council of Europe stated that the Constitution “was the 
outcome of a political compromise reached in order to end the war, [but] it cannot 
secure the effective functioning of the state in the long term and should be 
reformed once national reconciliation is irreversible and confidence is fully 
restored”.2 Clearly, the Constitution drafted during the Dayton negotiations was a 
starting point. The objective of the PIC had been that the Dayton Agreement would 
provide a framework for progress. It had been expected that Bosnia’s political 
institutions would develop to a stage where Dayton could be transcended.3 This did 
not happen. Under the Dayton regime, the state level institutions were designed to 
be weak and dependent (in financial and political terms) on the two entities.4 
Consequently, the state level institutions have remained weak in terms of 
institutional autonomy, institutional congruency and institutional support, as has 
been explained in the preceding chapters.  
A political revision of the Dayton Constitution has been suggested from 
time to time, but proved to be a highly contentious topic. First, the mandate of the 
OHR did not allow for an amendment of the Constitution.5 Secondly, the 
international community feared a renewed war if the Constitution would be 
changed.6 Therefore, the OHR carried out reforms that strengthened the state level 
in practice, but did not formally amend the constitutional order. This changed in 
the spring of 2003 when the idea that the Constitution should be revised seemed to 
gain some ground. During a meeting hosted by the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly on 19 May 2003, several Bosnian and foreign participants 
argued that the Dayton Constitution was a major obstacle for Bosnia’s integration 
into the EU. On 6 May 2003, after a meeting with EU officials, Bosniak member of 
the Presidency Sulejman Tihi gave an explanation for the lack of reform in 
Bosnia. In addition to the legacy of the wartime destruction, the negative 
interference of neighboring countries into Bosnia’s political affairs, and the lack of 
a coherent strategy by the international community, Tihi named as one of the 
reasons the defective Constitution imposed at Dayton. Since then Tihi has 
campaigned for a new international conference in order to rewrite the Constitution. 
                                                 
1 Office of the High Representative, ‘Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown, the new High 
Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina’, (Sarajevo: 27 May 2002). 
2 As quoted in: Christophe Solioz, Turning Points in Post-War Bosnia. Ownership Process and 
European Integration (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 107. 
3 Kurt W. Bassuener, ‘Lost Opportunities and Unlearned Lessons. The Continuing Legacy of Bosnia’, 
After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies. From Intervention to 
Sustainable Local Ownership, Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. (Vienna: DCAF et al., 
2005) 101-137, 126. 
4 Ibid., 129. 
5 International Crisis Group, Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU (Sarajevo/Brussels, 
2005), 6, ICG Europe Report No.164. 
6 International Crisis Group, Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy 
(Sarajevo/Brussels, 2007), 10, Europe Report No.180. 





He was supported by his colleague Dragan ovi, the Bosnian Croat member of 
the Presidency. The Bosnian Serb member, Borislav Parava, opposed the effort 
and called the proposal dangerous.7 Nonetheless, the issue remained on the agenda. 
In November 2003, the European Commission reported that the complexity of the 
Dayton Constitution could hinder the progress of Bosnia’s closer association with 
the EU.8  
The debate on constitutional reform accelerated in 2004. In January 2004, 
the think-tank European Stability Initiative published a proposal for reforming the 
Dayton Constitution.9 The reactions of the SDA and SDS were negative, but the 
HDZ believed that the proposal should not be immediately rejected.10 
Consequently, the HDZ expressed support for the abolition of the Federation and 
the transfer of its powers to the cantonal level.11 A similar radical proposal was 
made by the SDP in September 2004. The political party proposed radical changes 
in the Constitution by abolishing the entities and replacing it with a decentralized 
and secular republic with strong regional and local self-government. All citizens 
would be constituent throughout the territory.12 Another proposal, made by a group 
of legal experts funded by the Open Society Institute, was also made public in 
September. These and other proposals were welcomed by High Representative 
Ashdown who reiterated that the political structure of Bosnia was dysfunctional.13 
He expressed the need for revising the Constitution in order to enable the creation 
of a more effective state.14  
The dysfunctional elements of the Dayton Constitution were elaborated 
upon by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission) of the Council of Europe. In March 2005, it identified several 
constitutional elements that hindered the functioning of the state level institutions. 
First, it concluded that the responsibilities of the state level institutions should be 
strengthened. The Venice Commission argued that these were too weak in 
comparison with other European federal states such as Switzerland or Belgium. 
                                                 
7 International Crisis Group, Thessaloniki and After II (Sarajevo/Brussels, 2003), 5, Balkans briefing. 
8 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council on the 
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Whereas in these countries the state enjoys strong legislative and executive powers 
and has control over most financial resources, this is not the case Bosnia.15  
The second shortcoming identified was the vital interest veto. The vital 
interest veto is the most important mechanism for ensuring that no decisions are 
taken against the vital interests of any constituent people. The procedure consists of 
a vote in the House of Peoples on a proposed decision of the House of 
Representatives. In order to be adopted, the decision has to be supported by the 
majority Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat delegates. If no such majority 
can be achieved, a conciliation procedure and ultimately a decision by the 
Constitutional Court are foreseen as possible solutions to the deadlock. However, 
the Venice Commission argued that the problem of the mechanism is not the use of 
the veto as such, but its preventive effect. Political issues that are expected to be 
blocked by a veto were often not being put to the vote. Moreover, due to the 
existence of the veto, a delegation that refuses to compromise is in a strong 
position.16 
A third problem identified was the bicameral parliamentary system. 
Whereas the usual purpose of a bicameral system in a federation is to ensure a 
representation of smaller entities, in Bosnia both houses of parliament are 
dominated by representatives of the Federation. Thus, the Venice Commission 
concluded that the House of Peoples is mainly a mechanism favoring the interests 
of the constituent peoples instead of a reflection of the federal character of the 
state. The negative consequence of this arrangement is that the compromise based 
decisions made in the House of Representatives always risk being blocked in the 
House of Peoples, because its delegates regard the defense of the vital interests of 
their communities to be their exclusive task.17 
Fourthly, the collective Presidency was regarded to be dysfunctional and 
inefficient. The Venice Commission considered the arrangement to be very 
unusual. The existence of the collective Presidency seemed only motivated by the 
concern to ensure the participation in all important decisions of the representatives 
of all constituent peoples. However, the Venice Commission argued that 
representational functions of a Head of State are better carried out by one person. 
In addition, since at the top of the executive there is already a tripartite Council of 
Ministers, the addition of a second collective body was considered to be 
dysfunctional.18 
A fifth constitutional problem identified by the Venice Commission, and 
related to the problem of the collective Presidency, was the weak position of the 
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Council of Ministers. Under the Dayton Constitution, there was a large risk of 
overlap between the Presidency and the Council of Ministers, because both 
institutions were collegiate bodies. Having two collegiate bodies risked not only 
the duplication of decision-making processes, but it threatened also the 
effectiveness of decision-making. Therefore, the Venice Commission argued that 
the Council of Ministers should be strengthened by concentrating the executive 
power in the Council of Ministers rather than to let it share its competencies with a 
collective Presidency.19  
 Finally, the Constitution’s emphasis on ethnic group rights was also 
considered to be problematic in certain respects. The Venice Commission 
concluded that the state institutions were structured to represent the constituent 
peoples rather than to represent citizens directly.20 Consequently, Bosnian Serbs 
living in the Federation and Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks living in the Serb 
Republic were unable to vote a representative of their own community in the 
Presidency. Instead, they have had to rely on representatives of their community 
from the other entity.21 The Venice Commission concluded that the rules on the 
composition and election of the Presidency and House of Peoples were 
incompatible with Protocol No. 12 and Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.22  
 
7.1.2 Negotiations on constitutional reform 
 
The discussion on constitutional reforms led to concrete negotiations in 2005 and 
in 2006. The reform effort was heavily driven by the USA, with Donald Hays, 
former Principal Deputy High Representative, as one of the key architects of the 
plan.23 Despite being the main architect of the Dayton Constitution, the USA had 
from the beginning of the conflict been in favor of a much more centralized 
Bosnian state.24 With the support of the EU and the PIC, Hays started to prepare 
plans for revising the Constitution and brought together the eight leading Bosnian 
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parties from the House of Representatives.25 The Bosniak political parties proved 
to be the most supportive, the Bosnian Serb parties the most rejectionist and the 
Bosnian Croat parties were somewhere in between. Senad Sepi, member of the 
SDA presidency, was quoted saying in 2005: ‘After the war ended, it started 
getting in the way of development and better life in Bosnia. Ten years later, it is 
high time to replace the Dayton Agreement with a constitution which will be 
adopted in a normal procedure.’26 The most resistant to constitutional change were 
the Bosnian Serb representatives. On 11 October 2004, for example, the Bosnian 
Serb delegation had walked out of the House of Representatives’ Constitutional 
and Legal Affairs Commission when concrete constitutional changes were 
discussed.27 Half a year later, in reaction to a call for constitutional change by the 
European Parliament, the Serb Republic’s President Dragan avi voiced strong 
objections and implicitly called the Dayton Constitution a success.28 
Despite the lack of enthusiasm among the Bosnian Serbs, the eight parties 
reached a rough consensus about a reform package in the autumn of 2005. 
Subsequently, the Bosnian politicians were invited to Brussels and Washington to 
endorse the reform plans. On 21 November 2005, at the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, the eight political parties signed an 
agreement with the US State Department to push the reforms through Parliament 
by March 2006. The deadline was established in order to ensure that the reforms 
would be adopted before the general elections of October 2006.29 On 14 December 
2005, the PIC held an extraordinary session in Paris to discuss the course of the 
reform process and declared the reforms to be a priority. It was expected that they 
would ‘increase the functionality and efficiency of BiH’s [Bosnia’s, NvW] 
institutions and of BiH itself so as to create a state that puts citizens first.’30  
Between November 2005 and March 2006 several rounds of negotiations 
on concrete amendments took place. On 18 March 2006 this resulted in an 
agreement among six of the eight parties on a set of draft constitutional 
amendments. It was aimed at letting the amendments come into effect on 1 May 
2006.31 The agreement included the following changes: 32 
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- replacement of the directly elected (by popular vote) collective 
Presidency rotating every 8 months with an indirectly elected (by 
Parliament) single President and two Vice-Presidents (all three rotating 
every 16 months). The Presidency would be elected for four years and 
each member would represent one of the three constituent peoples; 
- the House of Representatives would be expanded from 42 members to 
87 members; 
- the House of Peoples would be expanded from 15 to 21 members, but 
its powers would be curtailed; 
- the creation of two new ministries (expanding the number from nine to 
eleven); 
- expansion of the powers of the Prime Minister, including the power to 
hire and fire ministers; 
- a more clear-cut division of responsibilities between the state and the 
entities. 
 
These changes were to be adopted by both houses of parliament before the October 
2006 elections. In the meantime, the incumbent chair of the Presidency, Tihi, 
asked the Venice Commission to give a preliminary opinion on the March 
Agreement.33 The Venice Commission responded with their opinion on 7 April 
2006. It concluded that the Agreement addressed the issues that were identified as 
priorities for reform by the Venice Commission, such as granting additional powers 
to the state level institutions and increasing their efficiency. On the whole, the 
Venice Commission was positive on the March Agreement, but it also emphasized 
that a follow up would be needed and that some amendments proposed should be 
redrafted.34 
On 31 March, the legal grounds for the amendments were affirmed by the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Commission of the House of Representatives and 
a public debate on the amendments took place on 12 April. Although the 
amendments survived the committee stage of the legislative process, the reform 
package failed to be adopted in the plenary meeting of the House of 
Representatives on 26 April.35 By two votes, the required majority of two thirds of 
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the House of Representatives was not reached.36 Resistance to the constitutional 
amendments did not come from the Bosnian Serbs, but from dissenters of the HDZ 
and from Haris Silajdži’ SBiH. The HDZ dissenters, who split off from the party 
and formed the ‘HDZ 1990’, argued that the reforms did not improve the position 
of the Bosnian Croats. They even argued that the amendments would lead to their 
marginalization. The SBiH opposed the package, because in its perspective it did 
not go far enough. The amendments were judged to be superficial and to legitimize 
the existence of a de facto sovereign Serb Republic.37 Although Tihi (SDA) 
attempted to save the package by proposing several compromises, the parties 
remained committed to their resistance.38 
Despite their disappointment, the USA, the PIC and the EU recognized that 
the Bosnians should make the ultimate decision on constitutional change 
themselves. Therefore, after the March Agreement had failed to get adopted in the 
House of Representatives, neither the USA nor the other international actors were 
prepared to impose the settlement. Instead, continued efforts were made to 
convince the political parties that constitutional reform was necessary. The PIC 
repeatedly called for the adoption of the reform package: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has a constitution that was shaped by the necessity to end the war, not by the need 
for functionality, fiscal sustainability and economic and social development. 
Constitutional reform will be needed to accelerate progress towards the European 
Union and Euro-Atlantic institutions.’39 No further progress on the issue could be 
achieved in the first few months after its rejection. First, the October 2007 elections 
dominated the political agenda, then the formation of the new central and entity 
governments, and finally the contentious issue of police reform.40 
It was only in March 2007 that High Representative Schwarz-Schilling 
announced the restart of the constitutional reform process with the objective of 
having it operational in the second half of 2007.41 An entire new process was 
deemed necessary as it was unlikely that the March 2006 reform package would be 
adopted. In 2007 and the first months of 2008, Bosnian political parties worked on 
their internal positions regarding the issue, but no concrete reform proposal could 
be achieved. Among the Bosnian Croats there was much internal division. The 
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Bosnian Croat political parties agreed in their Kresevo Declaration of September 
2007 on common principles for constitutional reform, but the concrete proposals of 
the HDZ, the HDZ 1990 and the smaller parties differed substantially. The Bosnian 
Serb political parties were more united. All parties made clear that they would only 
support constitutional changes when they would not diminish the current strong 
position of the Serb Republic. The SNSD even concluded that future federal or 
confederal units would need to have the right to self-determination, including the 
right of secession. They would also need to have more state-like powers in 
comparison to the Dayton-based entities. Bosniak politicians, finally, were 
reluctant to discuss reform models in detail and used the police reform process as a 
surrogate for constitutional reform. They also considered constitutional discussions 
to be pointless until Kosovo’s final status was settled.42 
 In May 2008 no progress on the issue had been achieved. On 2 February 
2008, the party leaders of the ruling Government coalition had decided that in the 
view of the deep divisions regarding the issues, it would be better to concentrate on 
police reform. Any discussions on the process or scope of constitutional reform 
would be postponed until after signing a Stability and Association Agreement with 
the EU.43 In his report to the PIC High Representative, Miroslav Laják concluded: 
‘Although constitutional reform remains essential if BiH is to be a functional and 
sustainable state with real hopes of joining the EU any time soon, reaching any 
domestic consensus on the matter will prove extremely difficult so long as the 
domestic parties’ conceptions remain both antithetical and non-negotiable.’44 The 
lack of domestic consensus on constitutional reform meant that the incompatibility 
embedded in the Dayton Agreement had not been replaced yet by a new 
constitutional order. In fact, the constitutional reform process had led to serious 
challenges to the Dayton Constitution, without resulting in an alternative one. The 
failure of the constitutional reform process meant that the EU would have to deal 
with constitutional reforms during the accession process of Bosnia. This is 
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7.2 Resolving Kosovo’s status 
 
7.2.1 Preparing for the status talks 
 
Several opinion polls conducted during the eight years of UNMIK’s administration 
show that the differences of opinion about Kosovo’s future between Kosovo 
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs persisted. A survey held by the US Department of 
State in May 2001 showed that if by that time a referendum on the status of the 
territory would have been held, 97,9 percent of Kosovo Albanians would have 
voted in favor for independence and 100 percent of Kosovo Serbs would have 
voted for remaining in Serbia.45 These preferences are supported by statistical 
evidence from the UNDP: in November 2003, 86,1 percent of the Kosovo 
Albanians were in favor of independence, while 81,9 percent of the Kosovo Serbs 
wanted the territory to remain a province within Serbia. In March 2004, the 
percentages had increased to 90,4 percent and 83,2 percent respectively.46 In 
December 2005, 93,4 percent of the Kosovo Albanian community supported 
independence and 89,6 percent of the Kosovo Serbs wanted Kosovo to remain in 
Serbia.47 Finally, in October 2007, 89,3 percent of the Kosovo Albanians were in 
favor of independence and 89,8 percent of the Kosovo Serbs wanted Kosovo to 
remain a Serbian province.48 
Since February 1999 several proposals had been made for solving the 
incompatibility of the Kosovo conflict. The Rambouillet Agreement, to begin with, 
called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy within the borders of Serbia. 
NATO and other international organizations would help implementing the 
Agreement. As was described in Chapter three, Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet 
settlement and after operation Allied Force had ended Kosovo was put under 
international administration. UNMIK had to implement UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 and was not allowed to decide on the status of Kosovo. 
In 2002 the International Commission on the Balkans presented a report in 
which it argued for Kosovo’s ‘conditional independence’. During the press 
briefing, two commission members, Carl Tham and Jacques Rupnik stated: ‘It is a 
huge disillusion if someone thinks of buying time through the status quo.’ And 
further: ‘You cannot expect Kosovar leaders to build democracy if they’re not 
allowed to hold responsibilities.’ 49 The same International Commission on the 
Balkans proposed a concrete road map in May 2005. The Commission was very 
clear in its position that in order to solve the status issue, the EU would necessarily 
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have to play a large role. The Commission connected the status issue to the process 
of European enlargement and identified four stages. The first stage would 
acknowledge a de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia, which according to the 
Commission was already implicit in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The 
second stage would create a situation of ‘independence without full sovereignty’. 
At this stage Kosovo would be recognized as an independent entity, but without 
full sovereignty. Instead, the EU (rather than the UN) would have reserved powers 
in the fields of human rights and the protection of minorities. The third stage would 
be the stage of ‘guided sovereignty’ in which Kosovo would be recognized as a 
candidate for EU membership and in which accession negotiations would be 
started with Brussels. The EU would no longer have its reserved powers and would 
only exercise influence through the accession process. In the fourth and final stage, 
Kosovo would receive ‘full and shared sovereignty’. On the one hand, Kosovo 
would be fully independent; on the other hand, it would be a member of the EU in 
which all states to a certain degree share their sovereignty.50  
The road map of the ICB emerged at a time when the UN was reviewing 
its international administration. The preparations for this review had started in 
November 2003 when the US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc 
Grossman declared that progress of the Standards would be assessed in mid-2005.51 
Subsequently, the March 2004 violence prompted a review of the policies and 
practices of all actors in Kosovo, including recommendations for the way forward. 
The review was requested by the UN Secretary-General in July 2004 and executed 
by Kai Eide during the summer. In August 2004 in his report, Eide observed: 
‘Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) is characterized by growing dissatisfaction and 
frustration.’52 He identified three challenges: meeting the immediate and urgent 
requirements following the March 2004 violence; selecting priorities among the 
(too ambitious) Standards and transferring greater competencies to the PISG; and 
preparing for future status negotiations. With respect to the latter Eide stated: 
‘They cannot be postponed much longer. There will not be any ideal moment for 
starting such preparations – not even a good moment.’53 
One year later, Eide was asked by the UN Secretary-General to conduct a 
new review with the purpose to assess whether the conditions were met to start a 
political process designed to determine the status of Kosovo. In October 2005, Eide 
published his second report: A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo. 
Eide concluded that although Standards implementation had been uneven, the time 
had come to go beyond the Standards before Status policy. In fact, Eide repeated 
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his earlier position and stated that: ‘There will (…) not be any good moment for 
addressing the future status of Kosovo. Determining Kosovo’s future status 
remains - and will continue to be - a highly sensitive political issue with serious 
regional and wider international implications. Nevertheless, an overall assessment 
leads to the conclusion that the time has come to commence this process.’54 The 
lowering of expectations regarding the necessary level of Standards 
implementation was part of an international policy shift that occurred in spring 
2005. During the UN Security Council’s debate on Kosovo on 27 May 2005, it was 
acknowledged that much progress had been made with regard to Standards 
implementation and in many capitals, especially in Washington, it was thought that 
the process of Standards and Status should be started.55 
After the first Eide report, the Contact Group got more involved with 
Kosovo. On 13 April 2005, the Contact Group formulated three guiding principles 
for resolving the status issue. The first principle ruled out a return to the situation 
that existed before NATO’s intervention in 1999. Secondly, the partition of 
Kosovo along ethnic lines was excluded as a solution. And the third principle 
excluded a union of Kosovo with any country in the region. These three principles 
became part of a larger set of ten guidelines which the Contact Group transmitted 
to the members of the Security Council in November 2005, who accepted them 
without delay.56 The guiding principles of the Contact Group were also adopted by 
the EU. In a joint declaration in June 2005, High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli 
Rehn declared the EU guiding principles to be the following:57 
 
- Kosovo must not return to the situation before March 1999 and 
Belgrade and Pristina must move towards Euro-Atlantic integration; 
- Kosovo’s Status must be based on multi-ethnicity; the protection of 
minorities; the protection of cultural and religious heritage; and 
effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism; 
- The solution of Kosovo’s Status must strengthen regional security and 
stability; 
- Accordingly, there must be no change in the current territory of 
Kosovo (i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any 
country or part of any country after the resolution of Kosovo's status); 
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- Any solution must be fully compatible with European values and 
standards and contribute to realising the European Perspective of 
Kosovo and of the region; 
- Kosovo will continue to need international civilian and military 
presences. 
 
The Contact Group, the UN and the EU would become the principal actors in the 
process towards determining the final status of the territory. The negotiations were 
led by a Special Envoy appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN. On 14 
November 2005, Kofi Annan appointed former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari to 
fulfill that function. Ahtisaari and his deputy, Albert Rohan, established the UN 
Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) in Vienna as their support 
office. 
 
7.2.2 Negotiations on the final status 
 
UNOSEK started operations in late 2005. It decided to focus on technical issues, 
including decentralization of governance, community rights, protection of (Kosovo 
Serb) cultural heritage and property claims.58 During a press conference on 23 
November 2005, Ahtisaari stressed that the policy of the international community 
had become one of Standards with Status.59 Ahtisaari claimed that he followed a 
bottom-up approach in which mainly practical and status-neutral issues would be 
dealt with.60 In that respect, there was little difference with the technical dialogue 
which had been part of the Standards before Status policy, apart from the fact that 
the UNOSEK negotiations had a more robust political profile. The idea behind the 
approach of Ahtisaari and his team was that it would be unlikely to reach a 
negotiated settlement on Kosovo’s status as such. The plan was to negotiate a 
solution on the technical issues and then refer the matter back to the UN Security 
Council. Based on the Ahtisaari document, the Security Council would take the 
final decision on the status of the territory. 
Ahtisaari negotiated with delegations from Pristina and Belgrade. The 
Albanian negotiation team (Team of Unity) was constructed and led by President 
Rugova. The Team of Unity was endorsed by the Assembly on 28 September 2005 
and was a joint enterprise of Government coalition parties and opposition parties. 
Next to Rugova, the team included Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi, the President 
of the Assembly Nexhat Daci and the two leaders of the main opposition parties in 
the Assembly in 2005: PDK’s President Hashim Thaci and ORA’s President 
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Vetton Surroi. The ‘Unity Team’ was the product of lengthy and difficult 
negotiations between the government and the opposition and met for the first time 
in October 2005.61 The team consisted of several technical working groups (such as 
on constitutional affairs) which operated below the senior party leaders. Their main 
task was to depoliticize sensitive issues and produce workable negotiation papers.62 
Especially the Political and Strategic Group proved to be creative in producing 
workable negotiation papers and positions. The working group contributed 
considerably to the cohesion of the negotiation team.63  
The composition of the negotiation team changed in the first months of 
2006 after three leaders were replaced. First, Rugova died on 21 January 2006 and 
was replaced by President Fatmir Sejdiju. Secondly, Kosumi and Daci were ousted 
by the Assembly and replaced with Agim Ceku (AAK) and Kole Berisha (LDK) 
respectively in March 2006. That move had been coordinated within the 
Government coalition, which increasingly considered Kosumi to be ineffective and 
Daci to be ‘overbearing and abrasive.’64 
The Serbian negotiation team was led by Serbian President Boris Tadi 
and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica. Some Kosovo Serbs were included, but 
they were under-represented.65 The first internal meeting of the Serbian negotiation 
team was in December 2005. In preparation for the first round of negotiations, 
initially scheduled on 25 January 2006 in Vienna, the Serbian negotiators prepared 
a document which called for the establishment of Serb municipalities and 
constitutional and legal protections for Kosovo Serbs.66 A few days after the 
presentation of the Serbian document on 9 January 2005, Special Representative 
Jessen-Petersen and speaker of the Assembly Daci repeated the principle that 
partition was ruled out.67 This event started what would become a trend during the 
negotiations. Whereas the Kosovo Albanian delegation proved to be able to come 
up with comprehensive proposals and demonstrated flexibility, the Serbian 
delegation often was ‘disorganized, poorly briefed and ill prepared’, but 
nonetheless able to shape the direction of the talks.68 Thus, most attention during 
the talks went to the issues of decentralization and the protection of Serbian 
cultural heritage, rather than on a broader framework of minority rights, debt and 
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state property.69 Part of Serbian negotiation tactics was to offer few concessions 
and to send low-level delegations.70 
In total fifteen meetings took place in ten rounds between the Serbian and 
Kosovar delegation. An overview of all meetings and the topics discussed are 
presented in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina in 2006 (adapted from 
UNOSEK)71   
- One meeting of the Serbian and Kosovar leadership in Vienna (24 July). 
- Eight meetings related to decentralization: (20-21 February, 17 March, 3 
April, 5 May, 19 July, 7 August, 7 September and 15 September). 
- Three meetings related to the protection of cultural and religious heritage in 
Kosovo: (23 May, 18 July and 8 September). 
- Two meetings related to community rights: (8 August and 8 September). 
- One meeting related to economic issues: (31 May). 
 
The first meeting focused on local government reform.72 The Kosovo Albanian 
team was presided over by Lufti Haziri who was Kosovo’s Minister for Local 
Governance and the Serbian team was led by Leon Kojen who was adviser to 
President Tadi. The talks were regarded as constructive by UNOSEK, despite the 
absence of big results. The Serbian team declared that although they welcomed the 
talks on decentralization, they preferred to address the status issue. With respect to 
decentralization, the Serbs wanted substantial autonomy for Kosovo Serb minority 
communities, the possibility of close ties between the communities, and a special 
relationship between the communities and Belgrade. The Kosovo Albanians 
wanted to reform local government only after the status had been decided upon and 
the only outcome of the status could be full independence.73 
The next three rounds of direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade (17 
March, 3 April, and 5 May 2006) also focused on the issue of decentralization. 
Topics like local finance, inter-municipal cooperation, cross-boundary cooperation 
and the creation of new municipalities were addressed. At the same time, parallel 
discussions on cultural and religious heritage, minority rights and the economy 
were held. The fifth round of talks (23 May) was dedicated to the protection of 
cultural and religious sites. A special sixth round (31 May) on economic issues was 
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organized.74 During the round, the issues of the external debt of the former 
Yugoslavia and state property were discussed. On neither issue was an agreement 
reached.75 A similar lack of progress dominated the seventh round (18 July) on 
decentralization and cultural heritage.76 The eighth, ninth and tenth rounds 
discussed community rights (8 August and 8 September) and decentralization (7 
and 15 September).77  
Apart from these rather technical consultations, direct high level 
negotiations on the status of the territory took place on 24 July 2006. The Serbian 
delegation had made clear during the first technical meeting that they would prefer 
such direct talks and in May 2006 they had returned with such an explicit request 
to the Contact Group. This resulted in the July meeting between Serbia’s and 
Kosovo’s Presidents, Prime Ministers and other senior political leaders.78 During 
the meeting, it became clear that the opinions on the future of Kosovo were still 
very divergent. Ahtisaari claimed that ‘Belgrade was willing to give everything 
except independence, while Pristina does not want anything else but 
independence.’79 Given the deadlock on the final status, Ahtisaari emphasized that 
negotiations on practical issues, such as decentralization, the protection of religious 
and cultural heritage and the economy, would be much more important.80 As a 
result, direct negotiations on the status of Kosovo were not repeated. 
After the last technical negotiations had been held on 15 September, 
Ahtisaari and his team set out to draft a report that would first be offered to Pristina 
and Belgrade for feedback and that then would be submitted to the UN Security 
Council. On 15 September 2006, Rohan had declared that the negotiation team had 
met a dead-end.81 Ahtisaari expressed similar pessimism in a statement to the UN 
Security Council on 22 September 2006. He accused Belgrade of being too 
obstructive and inflexible. On the one hand, Belgrade still insisted on dividing 
Kosovo into an (autonomous) Kosovo Albanian entity and a Kosovo Serb entity; 
the latter with close ties to Serbia. Pristina, on the other hand, still held the position 
of a unitary state with unified power for the central level of government. The 
situation got even more complicated after the passage of Serbia’s new Constitution, 
which explicitly mentioned Kosovo as being an integral part of Serbia.82 
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As a result of Ahtisaari’s and Rohan’s statements, Russia and China 
expressed support for continued negotiations. Instead, Ahtisaari succeeded in 
creating greater political space for settling the issue through the arbitration of the 
UN Security Council. On 9 October 2006, during a seminar in Finland, he 
declared: “I can’t see [that] there will be a negotiated settlement (…) I don’t see the 
parties moving on the status issue. The parties remain diametrically opposed.’83 
Given the deadlock, Ahtisaari decided to postpone the presentation of his report 
until after 21 January 2007 when Serbian parliamentary elections would have been 
held. Consequently, Ahtisaari presented his Draft Comprehenisive Proposal to 
Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February 2008. Following the presentation, additional 
meetings between both delegations took place in Vienna in order to discuss the 
draft report. On 10 March, Ahtisaari declared that the discussions were exhausted 
and that both sides would not come closer together with additional efforts. 
Therefore, Ahtisaari completed his Final Comprehensive Proposal and submitted it 
together with his mission report to the UN Secretary-General who in turn sent it to 
the UN Security Council on 26 March 2007.  
In his report to the UN Security Council, Ahtisaari stated that reintegration 
of Kosovo into Serbia would not be a viable option, that a continued international 
administration would not be sustainable, and that independence with international 
supervision would be the preferable option. Based on these three general 
conclusions, the essential provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal were:84 
 
- Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and 
with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
- Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the 
Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key 
elements that must form part of that constitution; 
- Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements, including the right to seek membership in international 
organizations; 
-  With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the 
Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, 
language, education and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two 
official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages shall have 
the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of 
communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation 
mechanisms for key institutions. 
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- The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good 
governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public 
service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and 
concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree 
of control over its own affairs. 
- The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice 
system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. 
- The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and 
undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Kosovo. 
- All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the 
right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based 
upon a voluntary and informed decision. 
- The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and 
safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. 
- The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic 
Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its 
development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary 
for ultimate success in this sensitive area. 
- In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the 
Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement 
defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military 
presences. 
 
The Comprehensive Proposal arranged for international supervision in order to 
ensure the implementation of the proposal. The presence of NATO (KFOR) and 
the OSCE would continue, whereas the EU would start an ESDP mission. UNMIK 
would be replaced by an International Civilian Representative with comparable 
functions and powers as the High Representative in Bosnia. The relevant provision 
states: ‘The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as 
the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an 
International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over 
implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall 
have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective 
powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her 
powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and 
sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be 
inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian 
Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that 
Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.’85 
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  Extensive discussions about the proposal for supervised independence took 
place in the UN Security Council from April to July 2007. While the Kosovo 
Albanians, the USA, the EU Presidency (Germany), the EU’s General Affairs and 
External Relations Council, the European Parliament, NATO and the UN 
Secretary-General had expressed their support for the Ahtisaari plan, it was 
strongly opposed by Serbia and Russia. Moreover, some Security Council members 
requested an additional fact-finding mission. In an effort to build consensus, the 
UN Security Council sent such a mission to Kosovo and Serbia, but it failed to 
reach that objective. In the summer of 2007, five resolutions on the Comprehensive 
Proposal were drafted, but none reached the approval of all UN Security Council 
member states.86 On 20 July, the USA, the UK and France called off their attempts 
to achieve a resolution. However, they continued to express support for the 
Ahtisaari proposal which they regarded as fair and balanced and the best solution 
for Kosovo and the region. Deploring that it had been impossible to secure a 
resolution in the UN Security Council, they decided to renew the discussion within 
the Contact Group and with the parties to the conflict. This resulted in a troika 
existing of the German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger representing the EU, the 
American Frank Wisner and the Russian Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko. The troika 
was a last chance for the conflicting parties to arrive at a negotiated solution. 87 
 Like Ahtisaari had done, the troika avoided discussing the status issue 
directly and focused on technical issues instead. The troika focused in particular on 
possible cooperation mechanisms and on the planned oversight missions of the EU. 
A fourteen point document outlined the possible overlaps in the parties’ positions. 
In the document, emphasis was put on a regime of special relations in which both 
parties would cooperate through common bodies.88 During the negotiations, all 
kinds of specific arrangements were considered, including full independence, 
supervised independence, territorial partition, substantial autonomy, confederal 
arrangements and a status silent agreement to disagree.89 None of these 
arrangements proved acceptable for the parties. Belgrade continued to insist on 
substantial autonomy and Pristina considered (supervised) independence to be non-
negotiable. As a result, neither party accepted the troika proposals fully. Especially 
after November 2007, room for compromise between the conflicting parties 
decreased. In December the troika had to conclude that the last attempt at 
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resolution had failed, because ‘neither side was willing to yield on the basic 
question of sovereignty.’90  
After the failed attempt of the troika to arrive at a compromise, the 
Kosovar Assembly unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 2008. 
Before the declaration of independence, Kosovo had ensured the approval of the 
USA and most member states of the EU. As a result, supportive declarations were 
issued by these countries in reaction to the declared independence. Given the lack 
of consensus, the UN Security Council made no declaration and Serbia declared 
that the declaration of independence represented ‘a forceful and unilateral 
secession of a part of its territory.’91  
In the first paragraph of the declaration, Kosovo committed itself to the 
implementation of Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Status Proposal. The declaration 
stated: ‘We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare 
Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will 
of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement.’92 The Comprehensive Proposal included an international 
administration of the control type, the International Civilian Office (ICO) under the 
direction of the International Civilian Representative. The ICO would be led by the 
International Steering Group a PIC-like ad hoc institution. However, given the 
increased EU involvement in Kosovo, the International Civilian Representative 
would be double hatted as the EU Special Representative in Kosovo. Already 
during the troika negotiations the EU had informally taken the lead. Ischinger even 
claimed during the troika process that ‘for the first time in the history of the 
Kosovo conflict, the EU has become an actor in its own right and even the one with 
the most responsibility.’93 After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the EU 
together with the ICO practically took over the international administration from 
the UN, but under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. On 13 June 
2008, the UN Secretary-General announced that the restructuring of UNMIK’s 
presence was based on strict status neutrality. He declared that until the UN 
Security Council decided otherwise, Resolution 1244 would remain the legal 
framework for the UN’s presence. He also declared that although the EU would 
perform an enhanced operational role, its activities would fall under the framework 
of Resolution 1244. At the same time, the UN presence would limit itself to 
monitoring and reporting on the situation, facilitating arrangements for Kosovo’s 
engagement in international agreements, facilitating dialogue between Pristina and 
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Belgrade on practical issues and carrying out functions related to that dialogue.94 
As will be pointed out in the next section, like in the case of Bosnia, European 
enlargement became the new focus of international conflict management in 
Kosovo. 
 
7.3 European enlargement: two conflicts, one resolution? 
 
7.3.1 The unfolding European perspective for Bosnia and Kosovo 
 
International officials have consistently referred to the regional link between 
Bosnia and Kosovo. Right before NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, High 
Representative Westendorp stated that Miloševi’s choice for war would have 
negative consequences for Bosnia: ‘Miloševi has awoken the monsters of 
nationalism in Bosnia. Now he is fighting against the same problems in Kosovo. 
(…) If Miloševi chooses war, the whole region would feel the severe 
consequences of such a decision. (…) The war would also have a negative impact 
on Bosnia.’95 In May 2007, High Representative Schwarz-Schilling said: ‘As noted 
above and predicted in my previous report, the uncertain regional situation and, in 
particular, mounting tension occasioned by both the approach to and deferment of a 
Kosovo status decision impacted unhelpfully on BiH [Bosnian, NvW] politics and 
political discourse over the period.’96 At the same time, international officials have 
gone at great lengths insisting that political developments in Bosnia would not 
affect the situation in Kosovo and vice versa. For example in 1998, Deputy High 
Representative Hans Schumacher stated: ‘At this stage, I see no direct connection 
between the Kosovo crisis and the implementation of the DA [Dayton Agreement, 
NvW]. There is no doubt that the IC [International Community, NvW] has learnt its 
lesson here in Bosnia and that it will be applied in resolving the Kosovo crisis, 
too.’97 In an address to the Venice Commission on 9 October 2004, High 
Representative Ashdown stated that the future status of Kosovo would have no 
bearing on Bosnia.98 Finally, Schwarz-Schilling reacted to Milorad Dodik’s appeal 
for an independent Serb Republic during the Bosnian elections in 2006 as follows: 
‘From a legal, international point of view, the situation in Kosovo has no link with 
BiH [Bosnia, NvW]. I am really sorry that Mr. Dodik is giving such statements 
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about the RS [Serb Republic, NvW], making a direct connection between the RS 
and the final decision on the status of Kosovo. This is simply wrong and leads 
peoples to wrong conclusions and in the wrong direction.’99 
These latter statements were primarily made in an attempt to ease tensions, 
to prevent spill over effects and they confirm how closely related developments are 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. The international community’s recognition of the linkage 
between Bosnia and Kosovo is expressed by the idea of a common European future 
for South Eastern Europe (or the Western Balkans) and in particular for Bosnia and 
Kosovo. A European perspective for Bosnia and Kosovo has evolved since 1999. 
During operation Allied Force, Germany proposed, supported by the USA, that the 
Western Balkans should have a place in Europe. At an international summit in 
Sarajevo in June 1999, a few weeks after Allied Force had ended, the EU 
acknowledged for the first time that the region would have a future in Europe, 
although a concrete reference towards EU-membership was not made.100 After the 
Sarajevo summit, the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans 
became more concrete.  
First, during the European Council meeting in Feira in June 2000, it was 
stated that the EU would aim at ‘the fullest possible integration of the countries of 
the Western Balkans region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe 
through the Stabilisation and Association process, political dialogue, liberalisation 
of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned 
are potential candidates for EU membership.’101 Secondly, during the European 
Council meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003, a concrete agenda for the 
integration of the Western Balkans into Europe was adopted. 102 All the countries in 
the Western Balkans were given the prospect of EU membership once they fulfilled 
the accession conditions.  
The principal instrument for European enlargement in the Western Balkans 
has been the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The final stage of the 
SAP is the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
between a country and the EU. Before an SAA can be concluded, the European 
Commission assesses the stability of the country in question. If it decides that 
stability is sufficiently ensured, the European Commission recommends to the EU 
Council of Ministers whether and under what circumstances negotiations for an 
SAA can begin. The SAA, in turn, creates a contractual relationship between an 
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individual country and the EU and prepares the country for future membership by 
introducing EU regulations in various fields well in advance of actual accession. Its 
aim is to demonstrate that the country is able to sustain more advanced relations 
with the EU. When the SAA is properly implemented the potential candidate 
country reaches the next stage and becomes an official candidate country. Having 
achieved this status and having a sufficient degree of compliance with the EU’s 
Copenhagen criteria, accession negotiations with the country can be opened. 103 
 The SAP in Bosnia was started in March 2000 when EU External Affairs 
Commissioner Chris Patten handed a road map of reform to Bosnia’s Foreign 
Minister. In 2003, after the road map had been implemented, the EU initiated a 
feasibility study in order to assess whether negotiations on a SAA could be started. 
Although in the conclusions of the feasibility study it was recognized that Bosnia 
had progressed in several areas, it was also acknowledged that the country was not 
ready yet to start SAA negotiations. The document identified sixteen priorities of 
reform; including among others cooperation with the ICTY, more effective 
governance and more effective public administration. Given the pace of reform, the 
intention was expressed to start SAA negotiations in 2004.104 In order to facilitate 
that process, a Directorate for European Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was created within the Council of Ministers in 2003.  
Instead of starting actual SAA negotiations, a European Partnership was 
adopted in June 2004. The document identified again the priority reform areas.105 
On their part the Bosnian authorities drafted an action plan in which they set out 
their idea on how they would implement the European Partnership. Progress was 
slow, but on 25 November 2005 Bosnia was allowed to start SAA negotiations 
with the EU. It was described as a ‘highway to the Euro-Atlantic integration’ by 
Principal Deputy High Representative Lawrence Butler.106 On 25 January 2006, the 
first round of SAA negotiations took place and several other rounds followed. 
Progress was mainly achieved with respect to technical issues, such as trade 
concessions, the movement of goods, approximation of laws, law enforcement and 
competition rules. However, in 2006 and in the first months of 2007 no 
breakthrough was achieved on the EU’s political preconditions, which included 
police reform, public broadcasting reform and cooperation with the ICTY.107 It 
took until December 2007 before the EU was prepared to initiate a SAA. Despite 
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the political turbulence in the last months of 2007, the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats 
and Bosnian Serbs agreed on 28 October in Mostar on police reform. Police reform 
had been the major issue preventing the coming about of a SAA and after a 
concrete action plan for the implementation of the Mostar Agreement was adopted, 
the European Commission initialed the SAA on 4 December 2007. Actual 
signature of the SAA would take place after the passage of the requisite legislation 
for police reform.108 This took place in June 2008 after which the SAA between 
Bosnia and the EU was signed.109  
 For Kosovo it was technically impossible to start a Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) because Kosovo was not a sovereign state. Therefore, 
falling under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was included in the 
SAP through the so-called Stability and Association Process Tracking Mechanism. 
The Tracking Mechanism was launched in November 2002 in order to make it 
possible for Kosovo’s PISG to benefit from core elements of the SAP; i.e. 
receiving EU assistance, policy advice, monitoring of EU standards and trade 
concessions.110 In June 2004, the EU developed a European Partnership for 
Kosovo. It was in fact a Partnership with ‘Serbia and Montenegro including 
Kosovo’ in which Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and Kosovo on the other 
hand got separate attention. 111 In the chapter on Kosovo actions were formulated to 
achieve the implementation of UNMIK’s Standards before Status policy. In order 
to facilitate the Tracking Mechanism, an Office of European Integration Processes 
was established within the Office of the Prime Minister in July 2004. The Office of 
European Integration Processes became responsible for ‘the coordination of 
Government action in aligning practices and legislative activities with relevant 
European Union (EU) norms and standards in the context of the EU Stabilization 
and Association Process (SAP).’112  
A revised European Partnership was decided upon on 24 January 2006 
with Kosovo still being considered as a part of Serbia under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244.113 After the declaration of independence in February 2008 
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Kosovo could become a full recipient of the SAP. EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Olli Rehn declared that the EU would immediately start working on a closer 
association with Kosovo.114 A new European Partnership was agreed upon by the 
EU Council of Ministers on 18 February 2008. Remarkably, the document is still 
addressed to ‘Serbia including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244.’115 Since the UN 
Security Council had not replaced Resolution 1244 with a new resolution on the 
status of Kosovo, this was necessary from a legal point of view. At the same time, 
it shows that the integration of Kosovo into the EU would be different from 
previous enlargement processes.  
 
7.3.2 Enlargement as an instrument of conflict resolution? 
 
In general, the EU considers the political perspective of integration for South 
Eastern Europe crucial for keeping political and economic reforms on track and for 
transforming a region of weak states and divided societies.116 The primary 
objective of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is to increase the stability and 
development of the region. EU enlargement also provided an exit strategy for the 
OHR and UNMIK. By starting a process of European integration for Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the EU enabled the OHR and UNMIK to phase out their international 
administrations. The EU’s role is considered to be important, because in the long 
run Brussels expects that Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s integration into the EU will 
facilitate the resolution of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
Theoretically, European integration could indeed lead to the resolution of 
the incompatibilities in Bosnia and Kosovo. European integration goes beyond 
mere conflict management in the sense that it aims at restructuring the conflict 
environment ‘into a regional framework, common incentive structure, and 
standards of acceptable behavior.’117 For Bosnia and Kosovo that means that the 
incompatibilities could be overcome by integrating the territories into the European 
Security Community. This community not only includes the EU, but also other 
relevant Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO. Being part of a Security 
Community would imply that Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia are integrated to such an 
extent that they have a sense of community which creates the assurance that they 
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can settle disputes without violence.118 Integration in the EU as a specific 
institution within the European Security Community goes even further. It is 
thought that ethnic identity and national borders will become less relevant when 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia are embedded in a multi-ethnic supra-national 
organization like the EU, which in turn will lead to stability. Support for this thesis 
can be found in the academic literature. First, there is a general agreement that 
European integration has been crucial for maintaining peace in (Western) Europe 
after the Second World War.119 Secondly, the eastward expansion of the EU in 
2004 has been legitimated mainly by the concern of overcoming conflicts and 
maintaining peace and stability.120 And thirdly, it has been argued that international 
organizations in general can be used to overcome the security dilemma between 
states, to sustain international cooperation and to forestall the recourse to unilateral 
self-help strategies.121  
Although integration into the EU and the European Security Community 
might have the potential of resolving conflict, the incompatibilities will not 
automatically disappear. European integration might change the conflict 
environment and motivate conflicting parties to resolve their differences, but the 
actual outcome is still dependent on the concrete political will of the parties 
involved. Moreover, apart from the question of whether European enlargement will 
lead to conflict resolution at all, it matters how Bosnia and Kosovo are being 
integrated. The question is whether EU enlargement still has benevolent effects 
when it is primarily done through international administration. 
Arguably, by the spring of 2008 the EU had become the principal conflict 
manager in Bosnia and Kosovo. First, in Bosnia the EU ran a police mission 
(EUPM) and a military mission (EUFOR). In Kosovo after the declaration of 
independence the EU had launched a rule of law mission (EULEX). Moreover, by 
having a double hatted EU Special Representative in both countries, the EU had 
become involved in two international administrations of the control type: the OHR 
and the ICO. In Bosnia, the EU Special Representative exercised political power 
through the mandate of the OHR. As from February 2008, a similar situation 
existed in Kosovo where the EU Special Representative exercised political power 
through the mandate of the International Civilian Representative.  
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The EU missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have primarily been established in 
order to facilitate the European integration of Bosnia and Kosovo. This is clearly 
expressed in the mandate of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia: ‘The 
mandate of the EUSR [EU Special Representative, NvW] shall be based on the 
policy objectives of the EU in BiH [Bosnia, NvW]. These centre around continued 
progress in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
(GFAP) in BiH, in accordance with the Office of the High Representative’s 
Mission Implementation Plan, and in the Stabilisation and Association Process, 
with the aim of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH, cooperating 
peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards EU 
membership.’122 In the light of these objectives, the ESDP missions have been 
embedded in the enlargement policy. Next to securing peace, EUFOR’s tasks 
explicitly include the obligation to support the civil implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement. This includes among others the obligation to assist the unified state 
level defense structures and to assist in the process of parliamentary oversight of 
the armed forces.123 The assistance in the civil implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement is also a clear reference to making Bosnia ready for the EU. At the 
establishment of EUFOR, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Javier Solana stated: ‘EUFOR will mesh with the EU’s 
substantial engagement in so many areas: a formidable economic commitment, a 
police mission deployed, a solid political relationship. All this is part of the journey 
to the only possible direction: the EU institutions.’124 As mentioned in this 
quotation, the EUPM is also meant to help facilitate Bosnia’s entry into the EU. It 
aims ‘to establish in BiH [Bosnia, NvW] a sustainable, professional and multi-
ethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international 
standards.’125  
Secondly, for Kosovo, when the Council of the EU appointed the EU 
Special Representative in its Joint Action, it was reiterated that the ‘Stabilisation 
and Association Process is the strategic framework for the EU’s policy towards the 
Western Balkans region, and its instruments apply to Kosovo.’126 The Council’s 
Joint Action also indicates that within the framework of the SAP the EULEX 
mission ‘shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability 
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and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice 
system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions 
are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized 
standards and European best practices.’127 
As with the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, enlargement is 
largely considered to be the best tool for stabilization in Bosnia and Kosovo.128 The 
question is whether the authority at the disposal of both EU Special 
Representatives (i.e. international administration of the control type through the 
mandates of the OHR and ICO) is compatible with European enlargement. The 
idea of the EU taking over from the OHR and UNMIK was to replace the ‘push’ of 
international administration with the ‘pull’ of Brussels.129 Bosnia and Kosovo 
would be pulled in like the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, as well as 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Pulling candidate countries into Europe has mainly 
been done through conditionality; the accession countries of 2004 and 2007 had to 
adjusted their state structures and policies according to accession conditions set by 
Brussels. What the EU is allowed to do in Bosnia and Kosovo goes beyond 
conditionality, because the EU Special Representatives are allowed to exercise 
political power. While conditionality (at least in theory) respects and stimulates 
local ownership, this is not the case with direct political control. Through the 
mandates of the OHR and ICO, the EU Special representatives could - if judged 
necessary - impose constitutional reform in Bosnia and impose the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Proposal in Kosovo. By exercising its full authority, the EU 
would risk becoming part of the domestic political process as has happened with 
the OHR and UNMIK. 
The outcome of this study suggests that a new international administration 
led by the EU would likely result in further progress regarding the first phase of 
institutionalization (establishing new institutions), but it probably would not lead to 
domestically embedded political institutions. After all, why would the EU perform 
better than the OHR and UNMIK? Instead of imposing constitutional reforms in 
Bosnia and imposing the implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal in 
Kosovo, the EU could better use the prospect of membership combined with strict 
conditionality. That means that if Bosnia and Kosovo do not comply with the 
conditions put forward by the EU, further progress towards accession should 
(temporarily) be stopped instead of being imposed through international 
administration. 
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The purpose of this study was to understand how the OHR and UNMIK have 
attempted to create sustainable political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Or more 
specifically, to investigate whether the OHR and UNMIK were able to create 
autonomous institutions with congruent value systems that enjoy popular support. 
In that case, the international administration would have to had succeeded not only 
in creating the institutions, but also in embedding them in the Bosnian and Kosovar 
societies. In this concluding part of the study, the research findings are summarized 
and a general answer to the main research question is formulated.  
 Beginning with a discussion of the findings presented in Chapter two, it 
was shown that our contemporary international administrations have had quite a 
few historical predecessors. It was pointed out that the main elements that define an 
international administration are: (1) that the institution is created by an 
international rather than a foreign authority; (2) that its purpose is to respond to 
sovereignty and governance problems; (3) that the response often comes down to 
state-building; and (4) that it has sovereign powers at its disposal. It was further 
argued that the term international administration should be reserved for the 
international control and international governorship types of international 
administration. Only when international administrations are regarded as activities 
which include governance or territorial administration, can it be distinguished from 
less intrusive activities like monitoring elections or providing humanitarian 
assistance. Accordingly, international administration was defined as: a political 
authority which is established by an international organization and which aims to 
develop political, social and economic institutions on a specific territory by 
assuming some or all sovereign powers of the state on a temporary basis. As 
became clear in Chapter three, the international administrations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo both fall within the scope of this definition. 
The second chapter also elaborated on conflict management and on 
institutionalization. Utilizing Johan Galtung’s conflict triangle, it was explained 
that conflict resolution involves a solution to the incompatibility of the conflict as 
well as non-hostile attitudes and non-violent behavior. It was stated that when the 
focus of the conflict intervention is on the attitudes and behavior of the conflicting 
parties without resolving the incompatibility, one should speak of conflict 
management instead of conflict resolution. It was argued that conflict management 
often leads to a negative peace. Negative peace was defined as the absence of 
direct violence (relating to the behavioral dimension of conflict), while positive 
peace was defined as the absence of direct violence, cultural violence (related to 
the attitudinal dimension of conflict) and structural violence (related to the 
incompatibility). Since the incompatibilities of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo 
have not been resolved during the international administrations the state of affairs 
in 2008 can only be described as a negative peace.  
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Political institutions play an important role in establishing and maintaining 
positive peace. Well functioning and sustainable political institutions could 
possibly resolve the incompatibilities and mitigate violent behavior and hostile 
attitudes in Bosnia and Kosovo. Chapter two defined institutionalization as ‘the 
creation and the persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior 
that enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political 
claimants and/or demands within a given organization whether it be a party, a 
legislature, or a state.’1 In the definition it is recognized that institutions are 
regarded as instruments of conflict resolution and that institutionalization consists 
of two phases: first the creation of the institutions and secondly the persistence of 
institutions. Within the context of international administration, the first phase is 
internationally driven, whereas the second phase is locally driven. In order to 
persist, institutions must be embedded in their domestic societies. In more concrete 
terms, this means that the political institutions established by an international 
administration must be able to function independently from the international 
administration, must have congruent value systems, and must be supported by the 
political elites and the population as a whole. In this study, an answer was provided 
to the question of whether the established international administrations have 
succeeded in creating political institutions (Chapter three) and in embedding them 
in the Bosnian and Kosovar societies (Chapters four to six).  
 Chapter three elaborated on the creation of political institutions and thus 
the first phase of institutionalization. The establishment of the OHR and UNMIK 
was first described. The establishment of the international administrations was 
presented in the broader historical context of the break-up of Yugoslavia. It was 
shown that in the case of Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement was imposed on the 
conflicting parties and could not be considered as an agreement that resolved the 
conflict between Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Instead, the basic 
incompatibility (Bosnia as one single state or being split up in different political 
entities) was incorporated in the Dayton Agreement, which made the establishment 
of an international administration necessary in order to ensure the implementation 
of the contested settlement. In the case of Kosovo, the absence of conflict 
resolution was even more evident. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 was silent 
on the final status of the territory. The UN established an international 
administration, which would prepare Kosovo for self-government without knowing 
whether that would be self-government as an independent state or as an 
autonomous region of Serbia.  
Despite the absence of conflict resolution, it was shown that the OHR and 
UNMIK achieved much in terms of setting up political institutions. By 2008, 
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Bosnia and Kosovo had all the institutions needed by a modern state and thus the 
first phase of the institutionalization process had been a success. However, the 
mere creation of institutions is not sufficient. Internationally created institutions 
need to be embedded in the domestic societies. In Chapters four, five and six it was 
argued that with respect to this second phase of institutionalization in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the international administrations have not been successful.  
In Chapter four, it was shown that the OHR and UNMIK have not 
succeeded in developing autonomous domestic institutions. First, the contested 
nature of the Dayton Agreement made it necessary for the OHR to implement the 
agreement by imposition. As a result, all principal state level political institutions 
in Bosnia have been created and sustained by the OHR and its international 
partners. These institutions were still not able to act autonomously in 2008. The 
OHR has continued to operate as the final authority regarding the implementation 
of the Dayton Agreement. With the declining number of decisions and the transfer 
of authority from the international level to the domestic level, the institutional 
independence in Bosnia increased a little between 1995 and 2008. However, the 
continued existence of the OHR with its extensive political authority meant that the 
international administration kept dominating Bosnian politics. Further, next to 
institutional independence, the state level institutions also lacked institutional 
capacity. For a large part they were dependent on help from the OHR and other 
international actors to function well.  
Secondly, in the case of Kosovo, the international administration also did 
not succeeded in creating autonomous institutions. They had little institutional 
independence. Until Kosovo’s Constitution entered into force on 15 June 2008, 
UNMIK was the sovereign authority rather than the domestic institutions. 
Although UNMIK had regularly transferred authorities to the PISG, there could at 
most be a provisional transfer of authority. Lacking sovereignty, Kosovo’s political 
institutions were even more dependent on UNMIK than Bosnia’s institutions had 
been on the OHR. Further, the institutional capacity of the PISG, including their 
administrative and policy-making capacities, remained rather limited. As in Bosnia, 
Kosovo’s political institutions depended on assistance from the international 
administration in order to function well.  
In Chapter five it was shown that the OHR and UNMIK have not 
succeeded in creating institutional congruency in Bosnia and Kosovo. In both 
territories the institutions were weakened by the persistence of two competing and 
mutually exclusive value systems: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. In 
Bosnia the three large ethnic nationalist political parties increasingly got 
competition from more moderate ethnic nationalist political parties. They were also 
weakened by internal differences which led to several split offs. Nonetheless, in 
2008 all significant domestic institutions were still dominated by political parties 
who appealed to specific ethnic communities rather than to a civic nation. At the 
same time, the international administration continued to pursue a civic nationalist 
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agenda. As a result in 2008 there were two value systems still competing to 
dominate Bosnia’s political culture and thus its political institutions.  
In Kosovo, UNMIK was also not successful in creating institutional 
congruency. On the one hand, the PISG were still dominated by an ethnic 
nationalist political culture. All political parties appealed to specific ethnic 
communities (whether Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb or any other community) 
instead of to a civic nation. On the other hand, UNMIK stimulated a civic 
nationalist political culture. In 2008, the ICO/EUSR as the incoming control type 
of international administration continued this policy. Thus, given the two 
competing and mutually exclusive value systems, it is not possible to speak of 
institutional congruency in the case of Kosovo.  
 Chapter six on institutional support has shown that neither Bosnia’s 
institutions, nor Kosovo’s institutions have become sufficiently supported by the 
population. In Bosnia there has been an increasing support of Bosnian Croat 
politicians for the state level institutions, but this did not occur among the majority 
of Bosnian Croats. Bosnian Serb politicians have criticized the Dayton 
Constitution, especially the state level institutions, from the very first day. The 
majority of Bosnian Serbs were also not enthusiastic supporters for the Presidency, 
the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. Although institutional support among 
Bosniak politicians (considered to be the most enthusiastic supporters of the 
Dayton Constitution) remained high, in 2007 support among the Bosniak 
community at large decreased considerably. In general, there has been an increased 
dissatisfaction with the Dayton Agreement among all three communities in 2007 
and 2008. The Bosniaks wanted to reform the Constitution and get rid of Dayton in 
favor of more powerful state level institutions. The Bosnian Croats also wanted 
constitutional reform, but demanded more autonomy for the Bosnian Croat 
Cantons. Finally, the Bosnian Serbs showed dislike of the state level institutions, 
but nonetheless defended the Dayton Constitution, because it ensured the strong 
position of the Serb Republic. 
In Kosovo the Kosovo Albanian politicians wanted an independent Kosovo 
and therefore welcomed any political institution as a step in that direction. At the 
majority level, the Kosovo Albanian population has been less supportive mainly 
due to the weak performance of the PISG. The Kosovo Serb politicians rejected the 
PISG for the same reasons why their Kosovo Albanian counterparts supported it: 
the development of a possibly independent Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb population 
became in the course of time even less supportive towards the PISG and for the 
same reason as their politicians: lending support to the institutions would indirectly 
legitimize them and stimulate the creation of an independent state.  
Finally, in Chapter seven, it has been shown that the international 
community tried to go beyond conflict management when it attempted to resolve 
the incompatibilities in Bosnia and Kosovo. In both cases, the attempts failed. The 




House of Representatives in Bosnia. This created a political crisis which stalled 
reforms on all levels and necessitated the continued presence and intervention by 
the OHR. In Kosovo, the unilateral declaration of independence ended the attempt 
to arrive at a negotiated solution with Belgrade. UNMIK was restructured and 
together with the ICO the EU adopted the responsibility of the international 
administration from the UN. The failure to resolve the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Kosovo seems to indicate that the conflict resolution capacity of international 
administrations is rather limited. Neither of the three communities in Bosnia, nor 
the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs had grown closer together during the 
years of international administration. The question is whether the EU can do better 
and provide the right context within which the parties can resolve their basic 
incompatibilities. It was argued that European enlargement could lead to a 
resolution of the incompatibilities, but this depends both on how the enlargement is 
managed and on the political will of the conflicting parties. 
Apart from determining whether the international administrations have 
been successful in regard to the second phase of institutionalization, a tentative 
explanation was provided for the absence of domestically embedded institutions. 
At the end of Chapters four, five and six it has been suggested that the absence of 
conflict resolution might have impeded the development of autonomy, congruency 
and support. Both conflicts were managed rather than resolved, but each was 
managed in a very different way. While the international administration in Bosnia 
was based on an internationally imposed peace agreement, the international 
administration in Kosovo was based on the absence of a peace agreement. This led 
to two different kinds of international administrations, but with a similar outcome. 
Neither the control type nor the governorship type of international administration 
has succeeded in creating sustainable political institutions. The absence of conflict 
resolution may be the common factor that explains the absence of domestically 
embedded institutions. Since it is likely that there are other factors that play a role 
in explaining the outcome, conflict resolution should then be regarded as a 
necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the second phase of 
institutionalization. However, since this study was about assessing whether the 
international administration have been successful in establishing sustainable 
political institutions and not about explaining the presence or absence of 
sustainable institutions, additional research would be necessary to support this 
claim.  
The conclusion of this study is that the OHR and UNMIK have been 
successful in creating political institutions, but not in making them sustainable. In 
2008, Bosnia and Kosovo were weak states with weak institutions being dependent 
on support from international organizations and foreign states. Moreover, instead 
of a positive peace, defined as the absence of violence of all kinds, both 
international administrations had created a negative peace, in which there is 
(merely) an absence of direct violence. That being said, establishing negative peace 
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in a conflict ridden environment is already a major achievement. Especially if one 
considers that often many territories which experience war revert to violent conflict 
within a few years after a peace accord or armistice has been signed. Arguably, due 
to the international administrations this did not happen in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Therefore, establishing international administrations should not be abandoned as a 
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Zijn de internationale besturen in Bosnië-Herzegovina (Bosnië) en Kosovo er in 
geslaagd om in beide gebieden duurzame politieke instituties op te zetten die los 
van verdere buitenlandse bemoeienis zelf voort kunnen? Deze vraag staat centraal 
in dit proefschrift. Internationaal bestuur wordt gedefinieerd als een door een 
internationale organisatie opgerichte politieke autoriteit die tot doel heeft om door 
middel van tijdelijke soevereine bevoegdheden in een bepaald gebied politieke, 
sociale en economische instituties te ontwikkelen. Internationaal bestuur is een 
specifieke institutie in de internationale politiek. De eerste internationale besturen 
werden opgezet na de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1914 – 1918). Tussen 1920 en 1945 
zijn er internationale besturen gevestigd in de steden Memel (Litouwen), en Danzig 
(Polen), in het Saar-gebied (Duitsland) en in de regio Leticia (Colombia). Na de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog zijn er verscheidene internationale besturen opgezet door de 
Verenigde Naties (VN), zoals de VN-missies in Congo (1960-1964), Namibië 
(1989-1990) en Oost-Timor (1999-2002). Daarnaast zijn er voorbeelden te vinden 
van instituties die lijken op internationaal bestuur, maar dit niet zijn. Deze 
instituties missen één of meer van de vier kenmerken van een internationaal 
bestuur: oprichting door een internationale organisatie (in plaats van bijvoorbeeld 
door één staat), gericht op het oplossen van problemen die te maken hebben met 
het bestuur van een gebied of met soevereiniteit, het uitvoeren van taken die 
worden geassocieerd met state-building, en het beschikken over vergaande 
bevoegdheden op het gebied van de wetgevende, uitvoerende en/of controlerende 
macht. Voorbeelden van instituties die één of meerdere van deze kenmerken 
missen zijn protectoraten, koloniën, en militaire bezettingen (waaronder de 
geallieerde bezettingen van Duitsland en Japan na 1945 en de Amerikaanse 
bezetting van Irak in 2003). 
 Er zijn verschillende soorten internationaal bestuur te onderscheiden. In 
Bosnië werd een internationaal bestuur gevormd dat getypeerd kan worden als 
‘internationale controle’, waarbij het internationale bestuur gezag uitoefent via de 
lokale instituties en er formeel sprake is van een soevereine staat. In Bosnië moest 
het Bureau van de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger (Office of the High Representative, 
OHR), aangestuurd door een internationale raad (Peace Implementation Council, 
PIC), de naleving van het Vredesakkoord van Dayton garanderen. Het Akkoord 
van Dayton maakte in 1995 een einde aan de oorlog tussen de verschillende 
etnische groeperingen in voormalig Joegoslavië. In Bosnië hadden Bosnische 
Serven, Bosnische Kroaten en Bosnische Moslims elkaar fel bevochten, maar zij 
moesten onder de bepalingen van het Dayton Akkoord verder met elkaar in één 
Bosnische staat. Die staat bestond uit een Servische entiteit (de Servische 
Republiek), en een Moslim-Kroatische entiteit (de Federatie). De Hoge 
Vertegenwoordiger kreeg vergaande bevoegdheden om de bepalingen van het 
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Dayton Akkoord te effectueren. Hierdoor werd Bosnië, ondanks zijn soevereine 
status, onder internationaal bestuur geplaatst.  
Het in 1999 gevestigde internationale bestuur in Kosovo kan getypeerd 
worden als ‘internationaal gouverneursschap’. Anders dan Bosnië was Kosovo 
geen soevereine staat en had het internationale bestuur (tijdelijk) de volledige 
zeggenschap over het gebied. Het internationale bestuur was niet gebaseerd op een 
vredesverdrag zoals het Dayton Akkoord, maar op een VN- 
Veiligheidsraadresolutie. Daarin werd geen uitspraak gedaan over de politieke 
status van Kosovo. De sterk verdeelde VN-Veiligheidsraad kon geen besluit nemen 
over de toekomst van het gebied. De voornamelijk door Kosovo Albanezen 
bewoonde Servische provincie, die zich met geweld had proberen los te maken van 
het door Slobodan Miloševi geleidde Servië, werd direct onder het gezag van een 
door de VN aangestuurd internationaal bestuur (de United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK) geplaatst. De politieke status van het 
gebied zou pas (door de VN-Veiligheidsraad) bepaald worden als er een 
democratisch Kosovaars zelfbestuur was opgebouwd waaraan zowel de Kosovo 
Albanese meerderheid als de Kosovo Servische minderheid zou deelnemen. 
In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat hoewel beide internationale besturen 
er in zijn geslaagd te voorkomen dat er weer oorlog uitbrak, geen duurzame 
politieke instituties hebben weten te creëren. In 2008 waren Bosnië en Kosovo nog 
steeds afhankelijk van de politieke en financiële steun van de internationale 
gemeenschap. In die zin kon in 2008 nog niet worden gesproken van duurzame 
instituties. Politieke instituties, zoals het parlement, de regering en het 
presidentschap, zijn binnen de context van een internationaal bestuur duurzaam op 
het moment dat ze zijn ingebed in de samenleving. Bij een internationaal bestuur 
zijn er twee fases van institutionalisering te onderscheiden: het opzetten van de 
institutie en het inbedden van de instituties in de samenleving. Waar in de eerste 
fase het internationale bestuur het initiatief neemt, zijn in de tweede fase de lokale 
actoren aan zet. Hoofdstuk drie geeft een overzicht van de eerste fase van 
institutionalisering, maar de nadruk ligt in deze studie op de tweede fase. Er zijn 
drie indicatoren geselecteerd aan de hand waarvan het institutionaliseringproces in 
beide gebieden wordt onderzocht.  
Ten eerste wordt onderzocht of de politieke instituties in Bosnië en Kosovo 
in de loop van de tijd autonoom zijn geworden in hun functioneren (institutionele 
autonomie). Dit gebeurt door te onderzoeken hoe onafhankelijk de instituties zijn 
van het internationale bestuur (institutionele onafhankelijkheid) en door te 
onderzoeken of de instituties in staat zijn hun taken goed uit te voeren 
(institutionele capaciteit). Ten tweede wordt onderzocht of de waardesystemen die 
het gedrag binnen de politieke instituties bepalen met elkaar overeenstemmen 
(institutionele congruentie). In het geval van Bosnië en Kosovo is er 
concurrentiestrijd geweest tussen enerzijds een lokaal gedragen etnisch-
nationalistische politieke cultuur en anderzijds een door het internationale bestuur 
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gestimuleerde burgerlijk-nationalistische politieke cultuur. Een analyse van de 
institutionele congruentie wordt gemaakt door te onderzoeken of de internationale 
besturen er in zijn geslaagd de etnisch-nationalistische politieke cultuur te 
vervangen door een door de Bosniërs en Kosovaren gedragen politieke cultuur van 
burgerlijk nationalisme. Wanneer dit niet het geval is, is er sprake van 
onverenigbare (incongruente) waardesystemen die instituties verzwakken. Ten 
slotte wordt onderzoek gedaan naar de steun van de bevolking en de steun van de 
politieke elite aan de instituties (institutionele steun). Door opiniepeilingen en de 
opkomst bij verkiezingen te onderzoeken wordt nagegaan of de instituties door de 
Bosniërs en de Kosovaren worden geaccepteerd.   
Uit alle drie indicatoren blijkt dat de in dit proefschrift onderzochte 
politieke instituties (parlement, regering en presidentschap) in Bosnië en Kosovo in 
2008 niet waren ingebed in de samenleving. De eerste fase van institutionalisering 
(het opzetten van de instituties) was succesvol; de tweede fase (de inbedding) is 
minder succesvol verlopen. 
In het geval van Bosnië heeft de OHR zich ontwikkeld tot een centrale 
factor in de Bosnische binnenlandse politiek en het openbare bestuur. Het 
ontbreken van overeenstemming over de richting die Bosnië als staat zou moeten 
inslaan, leidde er toe dat het presidentschap, de regering en het parlement met grote 
regelmaat werden verlamd door de fundamenteel verschillende posities van de drie 
grote etnische groepen. De OHR fungeerde telkens als breekijzer op belangrijke 
hervormingsdossiers en nam besluiten op het moment dat de Bosnische politiek 
zelf verlamd was. De laatste jaren is het aantal interventies van de OHR in de 
Bosnische politiek geleidelijk afgenomen. Ook werden steeds meer bevoegdheden 
van het internationale bestuur formeel overgedragen aan de Bosnische autoriteiten 
en werden er meer Bosniërs betrokken bij belangrijke hervormingsprocessen. Toch 
was de OHR in 2008 nog een politieke factor van grote betekenis in Bosnië. En 
hoewel de capaciteit van de politieke instituties door de jaren heen is gegroeid, was 
Bosnië in 2008 nog niet in staat om deze instellingen zonder internationale steun 
goed te laten functioneren. In die zin, waren de politieke instituties niet autonoom.  
In Kosovo heeft de institutionele autonomie zich niet veel beter 
ontwikkeld. Sterker nog, de Kosovaarse instituties waren afhankelijker van 
UNMIK dan de Bosnische instituties van de OHR. In tegenstelling tot Bosnië was 
Kosovo namelijk niet soeverein toen het internationale bestuur in 1999 werd 
gevestigd. UNMIK bestuurde Kosovo als soevereine autoriteit en de president, de 
regering en het parlement namen een specifieke door UNMIK bepaalde plaats in 
binnen het constitutionele raamwerk (waarin de voorlopige politieke instituties 
waren opgericht). Terwijl de toekomst van Bosnië was vastgelegd in het Akkoord 
van Dayton, was de toekomst van Kosovo onduidelijk; UNMIK mocht zich niet 
uitspreken over de politieke status van Kosovo. Het gevolg was dat alle instituties 
die werden opgericht per definitie het predicaat ‘voorlopig’ meekregen. De 
onafhankelijkheid van de Kosovaarse instituties nam geleidelijk toe tussen 1999 en 
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2008. Dit gebeurde door formele overdracht van bevoegdheden en toenemende 
betrokkenheid van Kosovaren bij hervormingsprocessen. Ook nam in dezelfde 
periode de institutionele capaciteit toe. Toch moet worden geconcludeerd dat op 
het moment dat Kosovo onafhankelijk werd op 17 februari 2008, de nieuwe staat 
niet kon functioneren zonder vergaande internationale steun.  
Wat betreft de institutionele congruentie heeft de OHR weinig succes 
geboekt in Bosnië. Terwijl het internationale bestuur heeft geprobeerd het 
presidentschap, de regering en het parlement te laten dragen door een politieke 
cultuur van burgerlijk nationalisme, zijn het vooral etnisch-nationalistische 
politieke partijen geweest die de naoorlogse Bosnische politiek hebben 
gedomineerd. Tussen 1995 en 2008 hebben Bosnische politici vooral de belangen 
van hun eigen etnische groep behartigd. De OHR heeft veel werk verzet om een 
burgerlijk-nationalistische politieke cultuur te creëren, maar is daar onvoldoende in 
geslaagd. Er is ook thans sprake van twee onverenigbare en concurrerende 
waardesystemen binnen de Bosnische politieke instituties. 
In Kosovo heeft UNMIK hetzelfde geprobeerd als de OHR in Bosnië. Wat 
de politieke status van Kosovo ook zou worden, uiteindelijk moest er een op 
burgerlijk nationalisme gebaseerde samenleving komen waarin zowel Kosovo 
Albanezen als Kosovo Serven een plaats konden vinden. Het verschil met Bosnië 
was dat het internationale bestuur zich voornamelijk richtte op de deelname van 
Kosovo Serven aan de politieke instituties in plaats van bijvoorbeeld op het 
stimuleren van multi-etnische politieke partijen. Aangezien zowel de Kosovo 
Albanezen als de Kosovo Serven zich op de eigen gemeenschap bleven richten, 
werd Kosovo in 2008 nog steeds gedomineerd door een politieke cultuur van 
etnisch nationalisme. Ook in Kosovo was sprake van twee onverenigbare 
waardesystemen.  
Onderzoek naar de institutionele steun, ten slotte, levert een gelijksoortig 
beeld op. In Bosnië accepteerden de conflicterende partijen de gezamenlijke 
instituties slechts schoorvoetend. Terwijl de OHR zich constant heeft ingezet voor 
centralisering van het bestuur, hebben vooral de Bosnische Serven en de Bosnische 
Kroaten zich daar op het niveau van de politieke elite sterk tegen verzet. De 
Bosnische Serven zagen niet graag hun bevoegdheden binnen de eigen entiteit, de 
Servische Republiek, verdwijnen ten gunste van een sterkere centrale staat. In 
tegendeel, de Bosnische Servische etnisch-nationalistische partijen zagen liever 
een, al dan niet bij Servië aangesloten, eigen Servische Republiek ontstaan. Ook de 
Bosnische Kroatische etnisch-nationalistische partijen riepen regelmatig op tot 
meer autonomie in de vorm van een derde (Bosnische Kroatische) entiteit. De 
numeriek dominante Bosnische Moslims waren op het niveau van de politieke elite 
de meest enthousiaste aanhangers van de Bosnische staat. De steun onder 
Bosnische Moslims op massaniveau was ook hoog, maar nam in de loop der jaren 
af. Eenzelfde dalende trend is te zien bij de Bosnische Servische en Bosnische 
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Kroatische bevolking, zodat de institutionele steun in 2008 over het geheel 
genomen laag was.  
In Kosovo was er onder de Kosovo Albanese politieke elite veel steun voor 
de politieke instituties. Zij was uit op de onafhankelijkheid van Kosovo en steunde 
daarom iedere stap in die richting. De Kosovo Albanese bevolking was minder 
enthousiast. Zowel de waardering voor de politieke instituties als de opkomst bij 
verkiezingen laten een dalende trend zien. Dit had vooral te maken met onvrede 
over het gebrekkige functioneren van de politieke instituties op het gebied van de 
economie en de corruptiebestrijding. De Kosovo Servische politieke elite steunde 
de politieke instituties niet. De weerzin was groot. Dit uitte zich in boycots van de 
politieke instituties en in het opzetten van parallelle politieke structuren, 
voornamelijk in door Kosovo Serven numeriek gedomineerde gebieden. Deze 
situatie werd door Kosovo’s onafhankelijkheid in 2008 eerder versterkt dan 
afgezwakt. Ook de steun onder de Kosovo Servische bevolking is te verwaarlozen. 
Zowel de waardering voor de politieke instituties als de opkomst bij verkiezingen 
was extreem laag.  
Het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift was te onderzoeken of de 
internationale besturen in Bosnië en Kosovo er in zijn geslaagd duurzame 
instituties op te zetten. Daarnaast werd ook een mogelijke verklaring gegeven voor 
de mislukking van deze internationale projecten. De stelling werd opgeworpen dat 
de tweede fase van institutionalisering in Bosnië en Kosovo niet is gelukt, omdat 
aan het begin van beide internationale besturen geen proces in gang kon worden 
gezet dat tot een oplossing van het conflict zou leiden (conflict resolution). 
Idealiter is een conflict opgelost wanneer de conflictpartijen overeenstemming 
hebben bereikt over een oplossing van de fundamentele tegenstelling (in beide 
gevallen de politieke organisatie van het gebied) en wanneer er geen sprake meer is 
van wederzijdse vijandelijke attitudes en vijandelijk gedrag. Los van de vraag of 
een dergelijke eindsituatie ooit bereikt kan worden, richt een proces van 
conflictoplossing zich op al deze drie definiërende elementen van conflict 
(tegenstelling, attitudes en gedrag). In Bosnië en Kosovo bleken de standpunten 
van de verschillende partijen te ver uiteen te liggen om het conflict inhoudelijk op 
te lossen. Het hoogst haalbare was een strategie van conflictbeheersing (conflict 
management), waarin een internationaal bestuur probeerde uiteindelijk ook tot een 
inhoudelijke oplossing te komen door de attitudes en het gedrag te veranderen. In 
geen van beide gevallen is dat gelukt.  
In Bosnië werd met het Akkoord van Dayton in 1995 formeel vrede 
gesloten. Deze vrede kon tot stand komen door een combinatie van militair-
strategische verhoudingen tussen de strijdende partijen en internationale dwang. De 
fundamentele tegenstelling (de kwestie of de drie grote etnische gemeenschappen 
één staat zouden vormen of zich zouden opsplitsen) werd niet opgelost. In plaats 
daarvan werd deze tegenstelling via het Dayton Akkoord ingebed in de naoorlogse 
politieke ordening van Bosnië. Het is aannemelijk dat de constante discussie over 
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de aard en vorm van de Bosnische staat een hindernis vormde voor de inbedding 
van de politieke instituties. Ten eerste zag de OHR zich genoodzaakt veelvuldig te 
interveniëren in de Bosnische politiek, omdat het Dayton Akkoord constant ter 
discussie werd gesteld. Deze bemoeienis leidde weliswaar tot naleving van het 
Dayton Akkoord, maar beïnvloedde de ontwikkeling van autonomie in negatieve 
zin. Ten tweede leidde de sterke nadruk op etniciteit binnen het Dayton Akkoord 
tot een voortzetting van etnisch-nationalistische politiek. Dit hinderde de poging 
van de OHR om een burgerlijk-nationalistische politieke cultuur te creëren. Ten 
slotte leidde de voortdurende strijd over de aard van de Bosnische staat tot weinig 
vertrouwen in de politieke instituties bij politieke elite en bevolking. Dat leidde 
vervolgens tot een lage institutionele steun.  
In Kosovo kon ook geen proces van conflictoplossing in gang worden 
gezet. Anders dan in Bosnië was er niet eens een vredesverdrag. Door sterke 
verdeeldheid van de VN-Veiligheidsraad was het niet mogelijk een besluit te 
nemen over de politieke status van Kosovo. UNMIK bereidde Kosovo dus voor op 
zelfbestuur, zonder dat vooraf duidelijk was of dit zou leiden tot een status als 
autonome provincie van Servië of tot een onafhankelijke staat. Dat betekende een 
voortzetting van het conflict tussen de Kosovo Albanezen aan de ene kant, en de 
Kosovo Serven en de Servische regering aan de andere kant. Net als in Bosnië is 
het denkbaar dat de afwezigheid van een inhoudelijke oplossing van het conflict de 
inbedding van de instituties heeft gehinderd. Ten eerste had UNMIK volledige 
zeggenschap over het gebied. Het gevolg was een grote afhankelijkheid van de 
Kosovaars instituties en een beperkte ontwikkeling van de institutionele autonomie. 
Ten tweede leidde de onzekerheid over de toekomstige status van Kosovo tot 
voortzetting van de etnisch-nationalistische politieke cultuur. Het gebrek aan 
perspectief op oplossing van het conflict motiveerde beide conflictpartijen om zich 
op de eigen gemeenschap te blijven richten en hinderde de door UNMIK 
gestimuleerde ontwikkeling van burgerlijk nationalisme. Ten slotte leidde de 
onzekerheid over de politieke status er toe dat feitelijk alleen de Kosovo Albanezen 
de politieke instituties steunden. De Kosovo Serven konden zich niet identificeren 
met de instituties zoals die onder het internationale bestuur waren opgezet.  
Dat twee verschillende typen internationale besturen (internationale 
controle in Bosnië en internationaal gouverneursschap in Kosovo) hetzelfde 
resultaat boeken (geen duurzame instituties) maakt bovenstaande verklaring 
aannemelijk. In ieder geval sluit dit onderzoek uit dat het type internationaal 
bestuur een verschil maakt bij het opzetten van duurzame instituties. Toch is er 
meer onderzoek nodig om aan te tonen dat de afwezigheid van duurzame instituties 
verklaard kan worden door de afwezigheid van een oplossing van het conflict, 
omdat er waarschijnlijk ook andere factoren een rol spelen. Het is denkbaar dat een 
oplossing van een conflict een noodzakelijke, maar geen voldoende voorwaarde is 
voor het inbedden van instituties.  
The results of international administration in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo 
 
 274
Zowel in Bosnië als in Kosovo is geprobeerd om de fundamentele 
tegenstellingen alsnog op te lossen. In 2006 werd in Bosnië onder leiding van de 
VS een poging ondernomen een nieuwe grondwet te creëren. Deze poging strandde 
op politieke verdeeldheid in het parlement. In Kosovo werden in 2006 en 2007 
onderhandelingen gevoerd tussen de Kosovo Albanezen en de Servische regering 
in Belgrado. Dit leidde tot niets en in februari 2008 riep Kosovo unilateraal de 
onafhankelijkheid uit. Het mislukken van deze pogingen betekende dat de EU het 
roer van de OHR en UNMIK moest overnemen. Een complicerende factor is dat de 
EU niet alleen van plan is beide gebieden te stabiliseren en duurzame instituties op 
te bouwen, maar ook om Bosnië en Kosovo uiteindelijk op te nemen als lidstaten. 
Het toetredingsproces zal anders verlopen dan dat van eerdere toetreders, omdat de 
EU zich via de OHR en de Internationale Civiele Vertegenwoordiger in Kosovo (in 
2008 opgericht) bezighoudt met internationaal bestuur. Hoewel in het verleden is 
gebleken dat Europese uitbreiding een positief effect kan hebben op de 
ontwikkeling van politieke instituties, is dat niet per definitie het geval. In het 
laatste deel van hoofdstuk zeven wordt betoogd dat, wanneer het toetredingsproces 
de vorm krijgt van een internationaal bestuur door de EU, het in het licht van de 
resultaten van de OHR en UNMIK onwaarschijnlijk is dat dit zal leiden tot 
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